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Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace is the latest report
from the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), which is a collaboration of the Citizen Lab at the
Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center
for Internet and Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group (Canada). The
country profiles and regional overviews provided in this volume have been sub-
stantially updated and revised to reflect recent events since our last publication, Access
Denied. In addition, Access Controlled includes six newly authored thematic chapters
that analyze the themes of our investigations and grapple with the theoretical and
public policy implications.
With Access Controlled, we take on new themes emerging from our research and con-
centrate on the countries that make up the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), as it is there, primarily, where some of the most important tech-
niques of next-generation Internet controls are emerging and a normative terrain is
being set. While the Access Controlled volume focuses on the OSCE region as an impor-
tant locus of norms and emerging techniques, the ONI conducted tests in more than
65 countries over the last year and a half. We have included a selection of these
regional overviews and country profiles in this volume on the basis of two criteria: first,
we included countries that either border on or have strategic significance to the OSCE
region; second, we included countries that are significant stories in and of themselves
and on which we wanted to report. China and Iran are included in both categories,
for example, but we also included Egypt, Tunisia, and South Korea (which are OSCE
‘‘partner in cooperation’’ states), as well as Australia and New Zealand, and all our
regional overviews. As with Access Denied, all our country profiles and regional over-
views are accessible in full on our Web site: http://opennet.net/, as well as the thematic
chapters of this book.
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
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Foreword
Imagine if an unknown person entered your home on a regular basis and removed
books from your bookshelves. You would never be told which books were being taken
away, and you would never be given a reason except that someone, somewhere, some-
how, deemed them ‘‘extremist,’’ ‘‘indecent,’’ or simply ‘‘insulting,’’ or felt that they
might ‘‘incite’’ some form of hatred. Imagine if the books removed included historical
research on disputed facts, secular depictions of religious images, and irreverent
accounts of the conduct or policies of political leaders.
Couldn’t happen in a democracy? Guess again.
Under the guise of protecting citizens from ‘‘smut’’ and ‘‘offensiveness,’’ Internet fil-
tering programs routinely block access to thousands of World Wide Web search results,
home pages, chat rooms, newsgroups, and other Internet options—in democratic
countries as well as in authoritarian states. In most cases the criteria are based on an
arbitrary and politicized understanding of what is ‘‘smut’’ or ‘‘offensive.’’
Online surveillance and censorship are growing in scale, scope, and sophistication
around the world. This growth is not surprising given the importance of the medium.
But there is increasing cause for concern about the implications of these trends for
media freedom, for unhampered discussion of matters of public interest, and even for
political activism.
In charting these developments, surveys carried out by the OpenNet Initiative (ONI)
are indispensable tools in my own daily job of reminding governments of the Organi-
zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of their commitments concern-
ing the free flow of information.
Published in 2007, ONI’s first global survey of Internet filtering, Access Denied: The
Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering, revealed that ‘‘state-mandated net filter-
ing’’ was carried out in a only ‘‘a couple’’ of countries in 2002—but by 2007, it was
under way in 25 out of the 41 countries scrutinized.
In its new publication, Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in
Cyberspace, ONI goes further.
It shines a spotlight on filtering to help make the practice more transparent, or at
least to divulge it as an acknowledged fact. And it also predicts a rise in more ‘‘subtle’’
forms of Internet censorship, such as blocking certain political Web sites during elec-
tion periods or waging cyberwarfare campaigns such as those recently witnessed in
the Russian-Georgian conflict.
One of the most regrettable aspects of net filtering is the fact that it is often invisible—
and almost always happens out of public control. As a citizen, there is no place you can
turn to get answers from your state authorities about how and why they are filtering,
and about what is being blocked.
In the early days of the Web, a decade or so ago, it was taken for granted that free-
dom of expression online would inexorably evolve and progress. It was assumed that
governments that did not uphold the fundamental human right to speak and write
freely would be powerless against the spread of those values over the Internet.
By now, though, those early dreams have been dashed. The reality today is that
Internet censorship is a growing practice both east and west of Vienna, with the filter-
ing of Internet content carried out by both established Western democracies and tran-
sitional ones. Indeed, the countries where Internet matters the most as the sole carrier
of real news media are the same countries whose governments, posing as ‘‘defenders’’
of the public, filter and block the most online content.
No one can rely on the Internet anymore as a self-healing mechanism that can
defeat censorship or blocking on its own. It is for that reason that the Freedom of the
Media office will continue to actively promote guarantees for freedom of the media on
the Internet.
Let us be clear. The benefits of the Internet far outweigh the dangers of misuse. In
some countries, the Internet is the only source of pluralistic and independent informa-
tion, even if Internet penetration may still be low. Let us make sure that this unique
source of unguided information does not dry out.
In light of these issues, I dedicate this foreword to Magomed Yevloyev, the publisher
of the independent news Web site Ingushetiya.ru, who was shot dead on August 31,
2008, while in police custody. The Ingushetiya.ru Web site has been a torchbearer of
what a free Internet stands for: access to a plurality of information and opinion.
I am grateful for the partnership with the ONI, as well as for the timely publication
of this book, which would not have been possible without the generous contribution
of the government of Ireland, for which I also express my gratitude.
Miklos Haraszti
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
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Part I Access Controlled: Theory and Analysis

1 Beyond Denial
Introducing Next-Generation Information Access Controls
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
Introduction
It is hard to imagine the world before the Internet. A generation of digital natives has
grown up with ubiquitous connectivity, where neither borders nor language seems a
barrier to communication.1 And yet, less than 20 years ago the global information en-
vironment was a much more controlled and regulated space, organized around sover-
eign states. Throughout much of modern history, governments have wrestled with the
tensions of the relentless drive to build new technologies and the unpredictable and
often counterproductive consequences that flow from them for their power and au-
thority.2 No less of a historical figure than Stalin captured this tension between the
quest for modernity and the compulsion to control. When presented with a proposal
to build a modern telephone system for the new Soviet state, he reportedly replied, ‘‘I
can imagine no greater instrument of counterrevolution in our time.’’
The rise of the Internet coincided with a major set of political upheavals that culmi-
nated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist bloc. In the euphoria that
ensued, the idea of technological redemption, inevitable democratization, and for
some, the end of history, coalesced into a popular ideology that equated technology
with empowerment. This idea was far from new. Indeed, the telegraph, electrical light-
ing, and telephony all emerged at similarly transformational historical junctures, lead-
ing to a long pedigree of speculation regarding the democratizing role of technology in
social and political change.3
There is no doubt that the Internet has unleashed a wide-ranging and globally signif-
icant shift in communications—a shift that has led to the empowerment of individuals
and nonstate actors on an unprecedented scale. At times, the Internet seems uncon-
trollable, a constantly evolving and dynamic virtual realm, reshaped continuously by
a growing number of users at edge points of the network. But Newtonian physics is as
relevant in politics and cyberspace as it is in the physical realm. Just as with previous
technological developments, as the Internet has grown in political significance, an
architecture of control—through technology, regulation, norms, and political calculus
—has emerged to shape a new geopolitical information landscape.
In 2008, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) published its first global study—Access Denied:
The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering4—which documented how states are
seeking to establish borders in cyberspace. Our snapshot of 41 countries discovered
that states were busy constructing defensive perimeters to deny access to unwanted
content. For the most part, these methods consisted of building firewalls at key Inter-
net choke points. The People’s Republic of China was among the first to adopt national
filtering systems at the backbone of the country’s Internet—popularly known as the
‘‘Great Firewall of China’’—and it has become a paradigm of Internet censorship ever
since. ‘‘Chinese-style’’ filtering—as we call it here—represents the first generation of
Internet control techniques.
In Chinese-style filtering, lists of Internet protocol (IP) addresses, keywords, and/or
domains are programmed into routers or software packages that are situated at key
Internet choke points, typically at international gateways or among major Internet ser-
vice providers (ISPs).5 Requests that are made for any information contained in the
block lists are denied for citizens living within those jurisdictions. The latter can hap-
pen in a variety of ways, with greater and lesser degrees of transparency, but it is almost
always static, fixed in time, and relatively easy to discern using the methods developed
over time by the OpenNet Initiative’s researchers (see box on ONI’s methodology).
Moreover, determined Internet users can circumvent them with relative ease.
Not all countries have been as forthright with their rationale for filtering Internet
content as China. Our research for Access Denied also found coyness on the part of
many states to admit seeking to control Internet content. In many cases, denial of ac-
cess occurred extralegally, or under the guise of opaque national security laws. Often,
ISPs were simply asked or told to block access to specific content without any reference
to existing law. Other times, blockages were difficult to distinguish from network errors
or other technical problems, like denial of service attacks, but seemed suspiciously con-
nected to political events. Many of the countries listed in our first report denied that
they were in fact blocking access to Internet content or had any connection to attacks
on services. We saw these events as anomalies insofar as they did not fit the paradigm
of Chinese style filtering and largely eluded the methodologies that we had developed
to test for Internet censorship.6
We have subsequently come to learn that these anomalies were, in fact, emerging
norms. Since our research for Access Denied was conducted, a sea change has occurred
in the policies and practices of Internet controls. States no longer fear pariah status by
openly declaring their intent to regulate and control cyberspace. The convenient rubric
of terrorism, child pornography, and cyber security has contributed to a growing ex-
pectation that states should enforce order in cyberspace, including policing unwanted
content. Paradoxically, advanced democratic states within the Organization for Secu-
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rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—including members of the European Union
(EU)—are (perhaps unintentionally) leading the way toward the establishment of a
global norm around filtering of political content with the introduction of proposals to
censor hate speech and militant Islamic content on the Internet. This follows already
existing measures in the UK, Canada, and elsewhere aimed at eliminating access to
child pornography. Recently and amid great controversy, Australia announced plans
to create a nationwide filtering system for Internet connectivity in that country. Al-
though the proposal has ultimately languished, it shows the extent of this growing
norm. No longer is consideration of state-sanctioned Internet censorship confined to
authoritarian regimes or hidden from public view. Internet censorship is becoming a
global norm.
At the same time, states have also become more cognizant of the strategic im-
portance of cyberspace (of which the Internet is an important constituent compo-
nent). Cyberspace has become militarized. A clever use of the Internet by insurgents
and militants in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, the significance of the Internet
Box 1.1
The ONI employs a unique ‘‘fusion’’ methodology that combines field investigations, tech-
nical reconnaissance, and data mining, fusion, analysis, and visualization. Our aim is to un-
cover evidence of Internet content filtering in countries under investigation. The ONI’s
tests consist of running special software programs within countries under investigation
that connect back to databases that contain lists of thousands of URLs, IPs, and keywords.
The lists are broken down into two categories: global lists include URLs, IPs, and keywords
that are tested in every country, and which help us make general comparisons of accessibility
across countries. Global lists also provide a ‘‘snapshot’’ of accessibility to content typically
blocked by filtering software programs, and can help us understand whether particular soft-
ware programs are being used in a specific context. Local lists are unique for each country
and are usually made up of content in local languages. These are high-impact URLs, IPs,
and keywords, meaning they are content that is likely to, or has been reported to have
been, targeted for filtering. Our aim is to run tests on each of the main ISPs in a country
over an extended period of time—typically at least two weeks on at least two occasions.
Our accessibility depends very much on our in-country testers, and for security and other
reasons we are not always able to perform comprehensive tests, meaning in some cases we
have only partial results on which to make inferences. Our specially designed software
checks access both within the country and from one or more control locations simultane-
ously. Anomalies are analyzed and determinations are made as to whether a site is accessi-
ble or not, and if the latter, how the inaccessibility occurs. In some instances, block-pages—
Web sites that explicitly confirm blocking—are yielded for requests for banned content. In
other instances, connections are simply broken. In some cases, special filtering software is
employed, while in others routers are manually configured to block.
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in conflicts such as the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, and revelations concerning large-
scale cyber-espionage networks,7 has emphasized the impact of cyberspace on the
sweat and muscle aspects of war fighting, and geopolitical competition among states
and nonstate actors. Reflecting on these recent incidents, many states’ armed forces
and policymakers have engaged in a fundamental rethinking of assumptions about
the importance of the informational domain to conflict and competition. As a conse-
quence, states are now openly pursuing a cyber arms race with leading powers such as
the United States, Russia, and China unashamedly making their intentions clear in
doctrines for military engagement in cyberspace. The quest for information control is
now beyond denial.
The present volume aims to document, analyze, and explore these emerging next-
generation techniques, what they mean for relationships between citizens and states,
and how they will shape cyberspace as a domain for civic interaction into the future.
The title of our volume—Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in
Cyberspace—suggests how the center of gravity of practices aimed at managing cyber-
space has shifted subtly from policies and practices aimed at denying access to content
to methods that seek to normalize control and the exercise of power in cyberspace
through a variety of means.
This volume differs from its predecessors in two ways. First, our focus is primarily on
the 56 countries that make up the OSCE. This is a deliberate choice, as many of the
legal mechanisms that legitimate control over cyberspace, and its militarization, are
led by the advanced democratic countries of Europe and North America. Likewise,
many of the more innovative means by which laws and techniques used to silence
voices in cyberspace are emerging from the postcommunist countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS). In this respect, the industrialized North is estab-
lishing norms that are only too readily propagated and adopted by repressive and
authoritarian regimes elsewhere.
Second, Access Controlled focuses on the new generations of Internet controls that go
beyond mere denial of information. Whereas Chinese-style national filtering schemes
represent the first generation of Internet filtering, second- and third-generation techni-
ques are more subtle, flexible, and even offensive in character. These next-generation
techniques employ the use of legal regulations to supplement or legitimize technical
filtering measures, extralegal or covert practices, including offensive methods, and the
outsourcing or privatizing of controls to ‘‘third parties,’’ to restrict what type of infor-
mation can be posted, hosted, accessed, or communicated online. Examples of next-
generation techniques include the infiltration and exploitation of computer systems
by targeted viruses and the employment of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks,
surveillance at key choke points of the Internet’s infrastructure, legal takedown
notices, stifling terms-of-usage policies, and national information-shaping strategies,
all of which are highlighted in one way or another in the chapters that follow. Al-
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though these measures may have the same aim as Chinese-style filtering, they reflect a
maturation of methods resulting from a growing colonization of cyberspace by states
and other actors. They emerge from a desire to shape and influence as much as tightly
control national and global populations that are increasingly reliant on cyberspace as
their main source of information. These next-generation controls raise important and
sometimes troubling public policy issues—particularly for the relationship between
citizens and states.
Chapter Overview
Second- and third-generation controls are carefully defined in our subsequent chapter
in this volume, Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace. Second-generation con-
trols create a legal and normative environment and technical capabilities that enable
actors to deny access to information resources as and when needed, while reducing
the possibility of blowback or discovery. These controls have an overt and covert track.
The overt track aims to legalize content controls by specifying the conditions under
which they can be denied. Instruments here include the doctrine of information secu-
rity as well as the application of existent laws, such as slander and defamation, to the
online environment. The covert track establishes procedures and technical capabilities
that allow content controls to be applied ‘‘just in time,’’ when the information being
targeted has the highest value (e.g., during elections or public demonstrations), and to
be applied in ways that assure plausible deniability.
Third-generation controls take a highly sophisticated, multidimensional approach to
enhancing state control over national cyberspace and building capabilities for compet-
ing in informational space with potential adversaries and competitors. The key charac-
teristic of third-generation controls is that the focus is less on denying access than
successfully competing with potential threats through effective counterinformation
campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize opponents. Third-generation con-
trols also focus on the active use of surveillance and data mining as means to confuse
and entrap opponents.
We argue that while the countries of the CIS are often seen as lagging behind Eu-
rope, North America, and the technological tigers of Asia, they may be leaders in the
development of next-generation controls. Some of the first, and most elaborate, forms
of just-in-time blocking, terms-of-usage policies, surveillance, and legal takedown no-
tices occurred among the countries of the CIS over the last several years. Examining that
region in detail may give us insight into the future of information controls elsewhere.
Computer network attacks and exploitation—what we called ‘‘just-in-time’’ blocking
in Access Denied—are perhaps the starkest of examples of next-generation techniques.
Computer network attacks describe the range of controls that target and ‘‘take down’’
strategically important sources of information or services at key moments in time
Beyond Denial 7
through computer-based information attacks. Although there are several tactics that
can be employed within this rubric—deliberate tampering with domain name servers,
virus and Trojan horse insertion, and even brute physical attacks—the most common
is the use of DDoS attacks. These attacks flood a server with illegitimate requests for in-
formation from multiple sources—usually from so-called ‘‘zombie’’ computers that are
infected and employed as part of a ‘‘botnet.’’ The ONI has monitored an increasing
number of just-in-time blocking incidences using DDoS attacks, going back to our first
acquaintance during the Kyrgyzstan parliamentary elections of 2005. In that episode,
the Web sites of opposition newspapers came under a debilitating attack that left
them unable to communicate during the critical period leading up to and during the
Kyrgyz election.8 Since the Kyrgyz case, DDoS attacks have featured prominently in
the dispute between Russia and Estonia in May 2007, during the Russia-Georgia con-
flict of 2008, and in numerous cases involving the Web sites of human rights and po-
litical opposition groups.
These tactics are particularly difficult to monitor using traditional ONI methods
because of their temporary and fleeting duration, and because their perpetrators can
disguise their involvement through distribution and anonymity. Today, organized
criminal networks operate commercial botnets with significant powers of disruption.
Perpetrators can simply contract out a DDoS attack and benefit by the convenience of
an electronic assault that from the outside may look as though it is a random attack or
a series of unfortunate network errors. Attributing such attacks to their source is diffi-
cult because the vectors are distributed and the transactions are done through criminal
activity and illicit shadow markets. Although much of what the ONI has observed in
terms of computer network attacks and just-in-time blocking has occurred in the devel-
oping world, it is noteworthy the military use of botnets is being debated in NATO
countries and elsewhere.9 The prospect of an arms race in cyberspace looms large.
Among many countries in the industrialized world, a major impetus to filter is the
desire to control access to information relating to the sexual exploitation of children,
otherwise known as child pornography. In almost all countries, possession and distri-
bution of child pornography is illegal. In some countries, laws have been enacted to
restrict distribution of child pornography online. In some countries, private ISPs have
entered into voluntary arrangements to filter access to lists of child pornographic ma-
terial, while in others entire nationwide filtering schemes have been proposed. In all
cases, the proposals have been the subject of considerable public debate and contro-
versy. Although only a few very extreme minority groups, such as libertarians, ques-
tion the right to access child pornography, many have raised questions about the
transparency of the processes being followed or the mechanisms put in place for over-
sight and review. For the ONI, for example, the mere test for access to this material is
prohibited because a simple connection to such a site would constitute a crime in most
jurisdictions. This situation leaves many researchers in a quandary as to how to verify
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that lists are accurate and do not contain collateral filtering problems or categorization
mistakes common to filtering software. Nart Villeneuve’s chapter provides a historical
overview of online child pornography controls and examines the range of policy
responses that have been employed. As Villeneuve explains, many governments have
adopted national filtering policies rather than developing international information-
sharing arrangements that would involve police cooperation and the removal of infor-
mation at its source.
Another example of next-generation information controls prominent among the
countries of the OSCE is the extensive use and application of surveillance. As Hal Rob-
erts and John Palfrey outline in their chapter, surveillance can happen at numerous
points throughout the infrastructure of cyberspace and can be collected by a variety
of public and private actors who have access to those choke points. States’ intelligence
and law enforcement agencies are increasingly extracting precious information flows
through the installation of permanent eavesdropping equipment at key Internet choke
points, such as Internet exchanges, ISPs, or major international peering facilities, and
combining such information with new tools of reconnaissance drawn from data
sources such as CCTVs, satellite imagery, and powerful systems of geo-locational map-
ping. To be sure, electronic surveillance is nothing new, having a long history
shrouded with secrecy. Throughout the cold war, both superpowers assembled globe-
spanning electronic surveillance systems that operated in the most highly classified
realms. However, today’s surveillance systems are much more extensive and penetrat-
ing, and are legitimized by permissive antiterror legislation that removes many previ-
ous operational constraints. They are also increasingly operated and controlled not by
the state but by private actors. As with just-in-time blocking, surveillance eludes the
ONI’s methods and is generally quite difficult to monitor using technical means. It is,
however, a very powerful force of information control and can create a stifling climate
of self-censorship.
Another control beyond denial that is profiled in Access Controlled relates to the
growing and widespread prevalence of cyberspace as a communications environment,
and the ways in which third-party intermediaries, including private companies and
public institutions, host, service, and ultimately control that environment. At one
point in time, it might have been fair to characterize cyberspace as largely a separate
and distinct realm—something people ‘‘enter into’’ when they turn on their com-
puters or play video games. Today, however, with always-on portable devices that are
fully connected to the Internet, and much of society’s transactions mediated through
information and communication technologies—including business, work, government,
and play—cyberspace is not so much a distinct realm as it is the very environment we
inhabit. Our lives have been digitally disassembled, disaggregated, and dispersed into
multiple digital domains. Our ‘‘private’’ information now traverses through cables and
spectrum owned and operated by numerous private and public institutions located in
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numerous legal jurisdictions. The same is true of government and business informa-
tion. It is hosted on servers each of which may have unique terms-of-service, data-
retention, and use policies. Depending on the territorial jurisdiction in which they are
located, they may be subject to the pressures of law enforcement and intelligence to
turn over that information, either overtly or covertly. And they are subject to a be-
wildering variety of local, national, and international laws, some of which may
conflict.
Issues of censorship that involve terms-of-use policies, takedown notices, and other
commercial compliance and service issues are taken up in both the Ethan Zuckerman
and Colin Maclay chapters. Zuckerman outlines some of the ways in which competi-
tive market forces can create unintended consequences leading to censorship by ISPs
and online service providers (OSPs). Unwilling or afraid to bear the burden of legal
and other costs of hosting controversial information, ISPs and OSPs may simply err on
the side of caution, leading to a situation where the spaces for hosting content deemed
objectionable anywhere are progressively winnowed. As much of what happens online
today, from e-mail to documentation to chats, flows through or otherwise depends on
these large ‘‘cloud’’ services managed by private companies, such a chilling effect could
have profound consequences on freedom of speech and access to information.
Maclay’s chapter focuses on issues of accountability and transparency around OSPs
and ISPs that operate or provide services in jurisdictions where Internet censorship
takes place. In many countries, Internet companies are either pressured or legally com-
pelled to censor their services or turn over user data, with search engines being among
the most common of them. In China, for example, major search engine companies all
filter their search results, and at least one has turned over personal data to Chinese
authorities, resulting in arrests. These practices have garnered significant controversy,
particularly in the United States where the largest of them—Microsoft, Yahoo!, Goo-
gle—are based. In an effort to forestall legislation that would restrict their investment
practices abroad, these companies have entered into a self-regulation pact, called the
Global Network Initiative, which Maclay analyzes and discusses. Given that much of
cyberspace is operated by the private sector, such self-regulation pacts may become a
more common feature of cyberspace governance, as will undoubtedly the policing of
Internet content controls.
Conclusion
The trends and findings analyzed in Access Controlled reveal a rapidly emerging norma-
tive terrain that should be of concern to policymakers, advocacy and rights networks,
and academics. Given the strategic importance of the OSCE, in terms of relative mili-
tary capabilities, wealth, and diplomatic influence, the norms emerging from this re-
gion are bound to have unintended consequences all over the world. Understanding
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those impacts will be of paramount importance for Internet governance at all levels in
years to come.
Probably the most important norm is the ‘‘security first’’ orientation toward Internet
governance, driven in part by the fear of terrorism and in part by concerns of protect-
ing vulnerable populations (particularly children) from exploitation. Across the OSCE,
communities of practice in law enforcement, intelligence, and the private sector are
working, often in uncoordinated, discrete, but like-minded ways, leading to a normal-
ization of Internet surveillance and censorship across all sectors of cyberspace. It is per-
haps ironic that these norms so antithetical to basic rights and freedoms are being
propagated from many countries that just over a decade ago were responsible for the
expansion of liberal democratic principles and market capitalism across the globe.
And yet upon closer consideration such trends conform to what have been called ‘‘gov-
ernmentality practices’’ in general that characterize these societies, as techniques of
control become progressively more refined, technologically rigorous, and bureaucrati-
cally complex. Although not ‘‘socially sinister,’’ as David Lyons puts it, what he calls
‘‘everyday surveillance’’ has routinized itself into ordinary life in so many myriad
ways that it has become the taken-for-granted context within which modern industri-
alized society operates.10 The security-first norm around Internet governance can be
seen, therefore, as but another manifestation of these wider developments. Internet
censorship and surveillance—once largely confined to authoritarian regimes—is now
fast becoming the global norm.
But there is a second characteristic of this newly emerging normative terrain that is
unique to cyberspace and the speed with which such changes are being wrought, in
particular to the long-standing pillars of modern citizen-state relations. The ‘‘social
contract’’ that has set the basic framework for citizen-state relations in the modern
industrialized period has been shaped by decades of technological and social change
and institutional innovations. One must be careful, therefore, to ascribe to contempo-
rary events unique and epochal challenges. However, the way in which citizen-state
relations are being upset in a very compressed time frame is worth noting, and may
be comparable only to that which happened at the height of the industrial revolution
itself. In such a context of rapid technological and social change, the margin for error
and unintended consequence around laws and regulations is enormous as path
dependencies open up around fast-moving developments that only in hindsight can
be identified as such.
The salience of such impacts can be seen in the practices surrounding the distributed
ownership infrastructure of cyberspace. Today, peoples’ everyday lives are mediated not
only through the state per se, but dispersed through clouds of digital-electronic tele-
communications owned and operated by private entities. Each of these clouds—often
spanning multiple national jurisdictions—represents potential, and often actual, loci
of private authority. As shown throughout each of the chapters in this volume, the
Beyond Denial 11
decisions they make on when to retain, filter, monitor, and share the information they
control (and with whom) are increasingly having important political ramifications for
citizens the world over. The normative terrain outlined in Access Controlled thus offers a
compelling example of the privatization of authority.
Perhaps the most important unintended consequences may come from new conflicts
and offensive operations documented in this volume. The growing acceptance of
the militarization of cyberspace, by states and by third-party actors, risks significant
blowbacks as these techniques—once hidden from view or confined to marginalized
contexts—become an entrenched characteristic of global relations. Societies around
the world—none more so than those of the OSCE—are heavily dependent on globally
networked technologies. They have been locked in and interpenetrated by a digital
web of their own spinning.11 And so from a rational perspective, an arms race in cyber-
space is to no one’s advantage; a collapse of one information infrastructure would
undoubtedly affect others—perhaps even the perpetrator. But as so often is the case in
the competitive dynamics of world politics, the logic of security dilemmas can easily
overwhelm and entrap rational decision-making processes. Today, governments are
responding to the threats of cyberwar not by pursuing norms of mutual restraint
but by endorsing new techniques of offensive operations, including outsourcing to
third-party actors and criminal organizations.
Last, this newly emerging normative terrain of next-generation Internet controls
presents major challenges to monitoring organizations, including the ONI itself. The
technical investigations that informed our country studies and that are reported on
here represent a methodology borne out of the need to monitor first-generation tech-
nical filtering techniques. If the trends identified in Access Controlled are accurate, then
these first-generation filtering techniques may be gradually superseded by a variety of
next-generation controls that are more subtle and fluid and deeply integrated into
social relations rather than fixed at specific choke points. This possibility suggests that
the ONI itself must now respond with a new suite of methodologies if it hopes to re-
main relevant to the challenges of cyberspace governance that lay ahead.
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2 Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
Introduction
It has become a truism to link censorship in cyberspace to the practices of authoritar-
ian regimes. Around the world, the most repressive governments—China, Burma,
North Korea, Cuba, Saudi Arabia—are the ones that erect digital firewalls that restrict
citizens’ access to information, filter political content, and stymie freedom of speech
online. When we turn to the countries of the former Soviet Union—Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—we should expect no different. The Eco-
nomist index of democracy paints a bleak picture of political freedoms in the CIS (see
Table 2.1; numbers represent the country’s rank in the world).1 Only two countries,
Ukraine and Moldova, rank as flawed democracies, with the remaining 10 countries of
the region described as either hybrid regimes or authoritarian.
Throughout the CIS, this creeping authoritarianism is evident in just about every
facet of social and political life. Independent media are stifled, journalists intimidated,
and opposition parties and civil society groups harassed and subject to a variety of suf-
focating regulations. And yet, in spite of this increasingly constrained environment,
the Internet remains accessible and relatively free from filtering. The ONI has tested
extensively through the CIS region, far deeper and more regularly in fact than in any
other region in the world. To date we have documented traditional ‘‘Chinese-style’’
Internet filtering—the deliberate and static blocking of Internet content and services
by state sanction—only in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For the rest of the region,
while connectivity may be poor and unreliable, and suffer from the usual rent-seeking
distortions found in other developing country environments, the same basic content is
available there as in the most open country contexts.
In our chapter, we explore this seeming disjuncture between authoritarianism in the
CIS and the relative freedom enjoyed in Russian cyberspace, commonly known as
RUNET. We argue that attempts to regulate and impose controls over cyberspace in
the CIS are not necessarily absent (as ONI testing results may suggest) but are different
than in other regions of the world. We hypothesize that CIS control strategies have
evolved several generations ahead of those used in other regions of the world (includ-
ing China and the Middle East). In RUNET, control strategies tend to be more subtle
and sophisticated and designed to shape and affect when and how information is
received by users, rather than denying access outright.
One reason for this difference may be the prior experiences of governments and op-
position groups in the region. State authorities are aware of the Internet’s potential for
mobilizing opposition and protest that goes far beyond the nature of content that can
be downloaded from Web sites, chat rooms, and blogs. These technologies have the
potential to enable regime change, as demonstrated by the eponymous color revolutions
in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. By the same token, state actors have also come to
recognize that these technologies make opposition movements vulnerable, and that
disruption, intimidation, and disinformation can also cause these movements to frag-
ment and fail. The failure of opposition movements in Belarus and Azerbaijan to ignite
a wider social mobilization, along with the role that targeted information con-
trols played in fragmenting and limiting the effectiveness of these movements, also
points to the possible trajectory in which controls aimed at Russian cyberspace may
be moving.
Our chapter unfolds in several steps. We begin by describing some of the unique
characteristics of the ‘‘hidden’’ information revolution that has taken place in Russian
cyberspace since the end of the cold war. Contrary to widespread perceptions outside of
Table 2.1
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008,’’
2008, http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf.
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the region, Russian cyberspace is a thriving and dynamic space, vital to economics,
society, and politics. Second, we outline three generations of cyberspace controls that
emerge from the research conducted by the ONI in this region. First-generation
controls—so-called Chinese-style filtering—are unpopular and infrequently applied.
While instances of filtering have been identified in just about all CIS countries, wide-
scale national filtering is only pursued as a matter of state policy in two of the CIS
states. Rather, information control seems to be exercised by way of more subtle,
hidden, and temporally specific forms of denial. These controls can involve legal
and normative pressures and regulations designed to inculcate an environment of
self-censorship. Others, like denial-of-service attacks, result in Web sites and services
becoming unavailable, often during times of heightened political activity. Still others,
like mass blogging by political activists on opposition Web sites, cannot be character-
ized as an attack per se, although the outcome of silencing these Web sites is as effec-
tive as traditional filtering (if not more so).
These second- and third-generation controls are increasingly widespread, and they are
elusive to traditional ONI testing methods. They are difficult to measure and often re-
quire in-depth fieldwork to verify. Consequently, many of the examples in this chapter
are based on field investigations carried out by our ONI regional partners where techni-
cal testing was used to establish the characteristics of controls, rather than measure the
extent of them. We hypothesize that, although these next-generation controls
emerged in the CIS, they may in fact be increasingly practiced elsewhere. In the next
section of the chapter we turn our lens beyond the CIS to find examples of second- and
third-generation controls.
We conclude by arguing that, contrary to initial expectations, first-generation filter-
ing techniques may become increasingly rare outside of a few select content categories,
raising serious public policy issues around accountability and transparency of informa-
tion controls in cyberspace. The future of cyberspace controls, we argue, can be found
in RUNET.
RUNET
On July 6, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin fielded questions from the Internet
at an event organized by the leading Russian Web portal Yandex.2 It was the first time
a Russian leader directly engaged and interacted with an Internet audience. The event
itself made few headlines in the international media, but in Russia it marked an impor-
tant milestone. The Internet had graduated to the mainstream of Russian politics and
was being treated by the highest levels of state authority as equal in importance to tele-
vision, radio, and newspapers. The question put to President Putin by the Internet au-
dience also revealed a sense of the informal, irreverent culture of Russian cyberspace.
Over 5,640 netizens wrote in to ask when the President first had sex. More surprising,
perhaps, was that Putin replied.3
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The rise of the Internet to the center of Russian culture and politics remains poorly
understood and insufficiently studied. With the end of the cold war and the demise of
the USSR, Russia and the CIS entered into a long period of decline. Economies stag-
nated, political systems languished, and the pillars of superpower status—military
capacities and advanced scientific and technological potential—rapidly ebbed away.
Overnight, the CIS become less relevant and dynamic. The precipitously declining
population rates in the Slavic heartland, a wholesale free-for-all of mafiya-led priva-
tization, growing impoverishment, and failing public infrastructure, all made the dis-
tant promise of a knowledge revolution led by information technologies seem highly
improbable.
Moreover, the prospects for Russia and the CIS keeping up with the Internet and
telecom boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s seemed, for many, a distant reality.
By the time the USSR finally collapsed in 1991, it had the lowest teledensity of any
industrialized country. Its capacity for scientific development, particularly in the field
of PCs (which the USSR had failed to develop) and computer networking (which was
based on reverse-engineered systems pirated from European countries) was weak
to nonexistent. Moreover, Russian seemed to be a declining culture and language
as newly independent CIS countries adopted national languages and scripts, and
preferred to send their youth to study at Western institutions. In almost every major
indicator of economic progress, political reform, scientific research, and telecommuni-
cations capacity, the countries of the CIS seemed headed for the dustheap of history.
Not surprisingly, scholarly and policy interest in the effects and impact of the informa-
tion revolution in the CIS waned, as attention focused on the rising behemoths in Asia
(particularly China and India), and the need and potential of bridging the digital divide
in Africa and the Middle East. And yet, during the last decade the CIS has undergone a
largely unnoticed information revolution. Between 2000 and 2008 the Russian portion
of cyberspace, or RUNET, which encompasses the countries of the CIS, grew at an aver-
age rate of 7,208 percent, or over five times the rate of the next faster region (Middle
East) and 15 times faster than Asia (see Table 2.2).
More than 55 million people are online in the CIS, and Russia is now the ninth-
largest Internet country in terms of its percentage of world users, just ahead of South
Korea.4 By latest official estimates, 38 million Russians, or a third of the population of
the Russian Federation, are connected, with over 60 percent of those surfing the Inter-
net from home on broadband connections. And these figures may be low. Russian
cyberspace also embraces the global Russian diaspora that, through successive waves
of emigration, is estimated at above 27 million worldwide. Many Russian émigrés re-
side in developed countries, but tend to live online in the RUNET. Statistics to back
this claim are methodologically problematic, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this
is the case. The popular free mail service mail.ru, for example, boasts over 50 million
user accounts, suggesting that the number of inhabitants in Russia cyberspace may
be significantly above the 57 million users resident in the CIS. And these figures are
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set to rise—dramatically. By official predictions, Russia’s Internet population is set to
double to over 80 million users by 2012.5
Paradoxically, the very Russianness of the RUNET may have contributed to hiding
this ‘‘cyber revolution.’’ Unlike much of the Internet, which remains dominated by
English and dependent on popular applications and services that are provided by U.S.-
based companies (such as Google, Yahoo, and Hotmail), RUNET is a self-contained lin-
guistic and cultural environment with well developed and highly popular search
engines, Web portals, social network sites, and free e-mail services. These sites and ser-
vices are modeled on services available in the United States and the English-speaking
world but are completely separate, independent, and only available in Russian.6 In a
recent ranking of Internet search engines, the Russian Web portal Yandex was one of
only three non-English portals to make the top ten, and was only beaten out by a Baidu
(China) and NHK (Korea), both of which have much larger absolute user base.7 Within
RUNET, Russian search engines dominate with Yandex (often called the Google of
Russia), beating out Google with 70 percent of the market (Google has between 18
and 20 percent).8
The RUNET is also increasingly central to politics. Elections across the CIS are now
fought online, as the Internet has eclipsed all the mass media in terms of its reach,
readership, and especially in the degree of free speech and opportunity to mobilize
that it provides. By 2008, Yandex could claim a readership larger than that of the
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Armenia 2,968,586 172,800 5.8% 476%
Azerbaijan 8,177,717 1,500,000 18.3% 12,400%
Belarus 9,685,768 2,809,800 29% 1,461%
Georgia 4,630,841 360,000 7.8% 1,700%
Kazakhstan 15,340,533 1,900,600 12.4% 2,615.1%
Kyrgyzstan 5,356,869 750,000 14% 1,353.5%
Moldova 4,324,450 700,000 16.2% 2,700%
Tajikistan 7,211,884 484,200 6.7% 24,110%
Turkmenistan 4,829,332 70,000 1.4% 3,400%
Russia 140,702,094 38,000,000 27% 1,125.8%
Ukraine 45,994,287 6,700,000 14.6% 3,250%
Uzbekistan 27,345,026 2,400,000 8.8% 31,900%
Totals 267,567,387 55,847,400 20% (average 13.5%) 7,208%
Source: Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘‘Internet World Statistics, 2009,’’ http://www.internetworldstats
.com.
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popular mainstream newspapers Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Moskovsky Komso-
molets combined.9 The Russian-language blogosphere—which currently makes up 3 per-
cent of the world’s 3.1 million blogs—grows by more than 7,000 new blogs per day.10
There are currently more Russian-language blogs than there are French, German, or
Portuguese, and only marginally fewer than Spanish,11 which is spoken by a larger per-
centage of the world population.12
This shift has been fueled as much by the growing state control over the traditional
mass media as it has been by the draw of what the new online environment has to
offer. Well-known journalists, commentators, and political figures have all turned
to the RUNET as the off-line environment suffers through more severe restrictions and
sanctions. Across the CIS, especially in the increasingly authoritarian countries of
Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the RUNET has become the last and only refuge
of public debate. Given its rapid ascent to the popular mainstream, it is paradoxical—
and certainly a puzzle—that RUNET has elided filtering controls of the kind imposed
by China on its Internet in all but a few countries. In the next section, we explore
why that is the case.
Next-Generation Information Controls in the CIS
Although RUNET is a wild hive of buzzing online activity, it is not completely unregu-
lated. Since its emergence in the early 1990s, RUNET has been subject to a variety of
controls. Some controls have been commercial in motivation and represent crude
attempts to use formal authority to create what amounts to a monopoly over secure
communications and as means to seek rents.13 This form of control has not been
unique to RUNET and has extended to every other facet of post-Soviet life, from car
registration through to the supply of gasoline, as an aspect of the great scramble to
prihvatizatsia public assets that occurred during the early to mid 1990s.14 Other con-
trols have emerged from a legal system inherited from the Soviet era, which criminal-
ized activities without necessarily seeking prosecution, except selectively. These forms
of control effectively form the rules of the game for all informal networks. Their emer-
gence in the virtual online world of the RUNET is transparent and natural.
But during the late 1990s, and especially following the color revolutions that swept
through the CIS region, states began to think seriously about the security implications
of RUNET, and in particular its potential to enable mobilization of mass social unrest.
The first attempts at formally controlling cyberspace were legal, beginning with legis-
lation enabling surveillance (SORM-II),15 and later in 2001 with the publication of
Russia’s Doctrine of Information Security. While the doctrine addressed mass media and
did not focus on RUNET specifically, it declared the information sphere to be a vital
national asset that required state protection and policing. The doctrine used strong lan-
guage to describe the state’s right to guide the development of this space, as well as its
responsibility to ensure that information space respects ‘‘the stability of the constitu-
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tional order, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Russian political, economic
and social stability, the unconditional ensuring of legality, law and order, and the de-
velopment of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation.’’16
The intent of the doctrine was as much international as it was domestic, establishing
demarcated borders in cyberspace, at least in principle. The international intent of the
doctrine appears to have been driven by a growing concern that Russia was falling be-
hind its major adversaries in developing a military capability in cyberspace; efforts by
countries such as the United States, China, India, and others to develop covert com-
puter network attack capabilities risked creating a strategic imbalance.17 Domestically,
the doctrine was aimed at the use of the Internet by militant groups to conduct infor-
mation operations, specifically the Chechen insurgency. Within a few years, most
other CIS countries had followed suit, adopting variations of the Russian doctrine.
ONI Tests for Internet Controls in RUNET
The controls outlined previously are qualitatively different from the usual types of con-
trols for which the ONI tests. Establishing empirical evidence of the effects of policies
like SORM and the Doctrine of Information Security is challenging, since their applica-
tion is largely contextual, their impact at times almost metaphysical. Such controls do
not yield a technological ‘‘fingerprint’’ in the way that a filtering system blocking ac-
cess to Internet content does. However, they may be just as effective, if not more so,
in achieving the same outcomes. In its 2007 study of the policy and practice of Inter-
net filtering, the ONI found that substantial and pervasive attempts to technically filter
content on RUNET did not begin until 2004, and even then were isolated to Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan, with lesser attempts at filtering found in most other CIS countries
(see Table 2.3)18
These reports have remained consistent in more recent rounds of ONI tests. And yet
persistent anecdotal reports, as well as special monitoring efforts mounted by the ONI,
reveal in the majority of CIS countries that information denial and access shaping is
occurring, and on a significant scale, especially around critical events such as elections.
The ONI carried out a number of special investigations, including mounting monitor-
ing efforts during the 2005 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan19 and the March
2006 Belarus presidential elections.20 These efforts yielded the first technically verified
results that the RUNET was being deliberately tampered with to achieve a political
effect.
The results obtained by ONI in the CIS are unique, and they differ significantly
from the results obtained in ONI’s global survey. They demonstrate that informa-
tion controls in the CIS have developed in different ways and using different tech-
niques than those found in other areas of the world. They suggest a much more
sophisticated approach to managing networks through denial that is highly selective
and event based, and that shapes access to the sources of information and means of
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communication in a manner that could plausibly be explained by errant technical fail-
ures or other random network effects. In the following sections, we define the three differ-
ent generations of cyberspace controls and provide examples for each from our research
in the CIS region. The three generations of controls are also summarized in Table 2.4.
First-Generation Controls
First-generation controls focus on denying access to specific Internet resources by
directly blocking access to servers, domains, keywords, and IP addresses. This type of
filtering is typically achieved by the use of specialized software or by implementing
instructions manually into routers at key Internet choke points. First-generation filter-
ing is found throughout the world, in particular among authoritarian countries, and is
the phenomenon targeted for monitoring by the ONI’s methodology. In some coun-
tries, compliance with first-generation filtering is checked manually by security forces,
who physically police cybercafés and ISPs.
In the CIS, first-generation controls are practiced on a wide scale only in Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan. In Uzbekistan, a special department of the SNB (KGB) monitors the
Internet and develops block lists that are then conveyed to individual ISPs who in turn
implement blocking against the specific resources or domain names. The filtering is
universal across all ISPs, and the SNB spot-checks ISPs for compliance. In Turkmenis-
tan, filtering is centralized on the country’s sole ISP (operated by Turkmentelekom),
and access is heavily filtered. Up until late 2007, Internet access in Turkmenistan was
severely restricted and expensive, limiting its access and impact.
Table 2.3
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR ONI TESTING FOR INTERNET FILTERING, 2007–2008
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A second practice associated with first-generation blocking is policing and surveil-
lance of Internet cafés. In Uzbekistan, SNB officers monitor Internet cafés, often enlist-
ing café owners to notify them of individual users who try to access ‘‘banned’’ sites.
Many Uzbek Internet cafés now openly post notices that viewing illegal sites is subject
to fine and arrest. On several occasions, ONI researchers have manually verified the
surveillance.
Second-Generation Controls
Second-generation controls aim to create a legal and normative environment and
technical capabilities that enable state actors to deny access to information resources
as and when needed, while reducing the possibility of blowback or discovery. Second-
generation controls have an overt and a covert track. The overt track aims to legalize
content controls by specifying the conditions under which access can be denied.
Instruments here include the doctrine of information security as well as the applica-
tion of existent laws, such as slander and defamation, to the online environment. The
covert track establishes procedures and technical capabilities that allow content con-
trols to be applied ‘‘just in time,’’ when the information being targeted has the highest
value (e.g., during elections or public demonstrations), and to be applied in ways that
assure plausible deniability.
The legal mechanisms used by the overt track vary from country to country, but
most share the characteristic of establishing double jeopardy for RUNET users, making
requirements such that compliance sets the grounds for prosecution, and noncompli-
ance establishes a legal basis for sanction.
The following are among the more common legal mechanisms being applied:
Compelling Internet sites to register with authorities and to use noncompliance as
grounds for taking down or filtering ‘‘illegal’’ content, and possibly revoking service
providers’ licenses. This tack is effectively used in Kazakhstan and Belarus, and it is
currently being considered in Russia. The mechanism is particularly effective because
it creates multiple disincentives for potential Web site owners who must go through
the hassle of registering with authorities, which leaves them open to legal sanction
should their site be deemed to be carrying illegal content. It also creates double jeop-
ardy for international content providers (such as the BBC, CNN, and others) and opens
the question whether they should register their services locally. In practice, the regis-
tration requirement applies to them so long as their audience is local, and a failure to
comply leaves open the option to filter their content for ‘‘noncompliance’’ with local
registration requirements. On the other hand, registering would make the content they
carry subject to local laws, which may deem their content ‘‘unacceptable’’ or ‘‘slander-
ous’’ and could lead to legally sanctioned filtering.
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Strict criteria pertaining to what is ‘‘acceptable’’ within the national media space, lead-
ing to the de-registration of sites that do not comply. In Kazakhstan, opposition
Web sites or Web sites carrying material critical of the government are regularly de-
registered from the national domain. This includes a large number of opposition sites
and, notably, the Borat Web site, ostensibly because the owners of the site were not res-
ident in Kazakhstan as required by the Kazakh domain authority. In Belarus, the popu-
lar portal tut.by refused to put up banners advertising opposition Web sites, possibly
for fear of reprisals (although those fears were not made explicit).21
Expanded use of defamation, slander, and ‘‘veracity’’ laws, to deter bloggers and inde-
pendent media from posting material critical of the government or specific govern-
ment officials, however benignly (including humor). In Belarus, slander laws were
used to prosecute an owner of a Web site posting cartoons of the president. In both
Belarus and Uzbekistan, the law on mass media requires that reporting passes the ‘‘ob-
jectivity test.’’ Journalists and editors are held responsible for the ‘‘veracity’’ of publica-
tions and postings, leading to a high degree of self-censorship. In Kazakhstan, there are
several cases of oppositional and independent media Web sites being suspended for
providing links to publications about corruption among senior state offices and the
president.
Evoking national security concerns, especially at times of civic unrest, as the justification
for blocking specific Internet content and services. Most recently, this justifica-
tion was evoked in Armenia when the opposition demonstrations that followed the
February 2008 presidential elections turned to violence leading to the death and injury
of several dozen protesters. A 20-day state of emergency was declared by President
Kocharian, which also led to the de-registration of popular Armenian political and
news sites, including a site carrying the Armenian-language BBC service and the filter-
ing of YouTube (ostensibly because of allegations that footage of the rioting had been
posted to the popular video sharing site).22 Similar filtering occurred during the Russian-
Georgian crisis of 2008 when Georgia ordered ISPs to block access to Russian media.
The blocks had the unintended consequence of creating panic in Tbilisi, as some Geor-
gians perceived the blocks as a signal of impending Russian invasion of the capital.
The technical capabilities typical of second-generation controls are calibrated to
effect ‘‘just-in-time’’ or event-based denial of selected content or services.23 These tech-
niques can be difficult to verify, as they can be made to look like technical errors. One
of the more common techniques involves formal and informal requests to ISPs. Pro-
viders in the CIS are under constant pressure to comply with government requests or
face any number of possible sanctions if they do not, from visits from the taxation po-
lice to revocations of their licenses. Such pressures make them vulnerable to requests
from authorities, especially those that are conveyed informally. In Russia, top-level
ISPs are in the hands of large telecommunication companies, such as Trans-
TeleKom and Rostelecom, with strong ties to the government. These providers appear
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responsive to informal requests to make certain content inaccessible, particularly when
information could prove embarrassing to the government or its officials. In one such
case, the popular Russian site—Kompromat.ru—known for publishing documents
and photographs of corrupt or illegal practices (roughly analogous to the Web
site wikileaks.com) was de-registered or filtered by several top-level ISPs (including
TransTeleKom and Rostelekom). Service was later restored, and the blocking of the
site was deemed ‘‘accidental.’’ Nonetheless, the Web site was inaccessible throughout
the February 2008 Russian presidential poll.24 Similar incidents have been documented
in Azerbaijan, where Web sites critical of President Ilham Aliyev were filtered by ISPs,
apparently at the request of the security department of the office of the president. 25 A
similar dynamic is found in Kazakhstan, where a number of Web sites are inaccessible
on a regular basis, with no official reason ever being given.26
Other, less subtle but nonetheless effective technical means include shutting down
Internet access, as well as selected telecommunications services such as cell phone serv-
ices and especially short message services (SMS). Temporary outages of the Internet and
SMS services were employed by Belarus authorities during the February 2006 presiden-
tial elections as a means to limit the ability of the opposition to launch street demon-
strations of the type that precipitated the color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia,
and Kyrgyzstan. At first, authorities denied that any interruptions had taken place,
and later they attributed the failures to technical reasons.27 Similar instances
were reported (although not verified) to have occurred during the 2007 elections in
Azerbaijan.
Second-generation techniques also make extensive use of computer network attacks,
especially the use of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which can overwhelm
ISPs and selected sites, and which make tracking down perpetrators difficult, since the
attacks themselves are sold and engineered by ‘‘black hat hackers’’ and can be ordered
by anyone. Such attacks were used extensively during the 2005 Kyrgyz presidential
elections that precipitated the Tulip revolution.28 They were also used during the
2006 Belarus elections against opposition political and news sites. In 2008, presidential
and parliamentary elections in many parts of the region saw the significant use of
DDoS attacks against the Web sites of major opposition leaders as well as prominent
human rights groups. Recently, computer network attacks have been conducted by
state-sanctioned ‘‘patriotic hackers’’ who act as vigilantes in cyberspace. A Russian
hacker who admitted that officers from the FSB encouraged him brought down the
pro-Chechen Web site ‘‘Kavkaz center’’ repeatedly.29 There is strong suspicion that
the May 2007 DDoS attacks that brought down most of Estonia’s networks were the
work of state-sanctioned ‘‘patriotic hackers’’ responding to unofficial calls from the FSB
to ‘‘punish’’ Estonia over the removal of a monument to Soviet soldiers in Tallinn.
Such attacks were also a prominent feature of the Russian-Georgian crisis of 2008.
Several prominent investigations have been undertaken to determine attribution
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in this case—including an ongoing one by the ONI’s sister project, the Information
Warfare Monitor—and to date no definitive evidence has been found linking the attacks
to the Russian security forces.
Third-Generation Controls
Unlike the first two generations of content controls, third-generation controls take a
highly sophisticated, multidimensional approach to enhancing state control over na-
tional cyberspace and building capabilities for competing in informational space with po-
tential adversaries and competitors. The key characteristic of third-generation controls
is that the focus is less on denying access than successfully competing with potential
threats through effective counterinformation campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or
demoralize opponents. Third-generation controls also focus on the active use of sur-
veillance and data mining as means to confuse and entrap opponents.
Third-generation controls include enhancing jurisdiction over national cyberspace
and expanding the powers of state surveillance. These include warrantless monitoring
of Internet users and usage. In 2008, Russia expanded the powers previously estab-
lished by SORM-II, which obliged ISPs to purchase and install equipment that would
also permit local FSB offices to monitor the Internet activity of specific users. The new
legislation makes it possible to monitor all Internet traffic and personal usage without
specific warrants. The legislation effectively brings into the open covert powers that
were previously assigned to FAPSI, with the twist of transferring to the ISPs the entire
costs associated with installing the necessary equipment. The SORM-II law was widely
used as a model for similar legislation in other CIS counties, and it is expected that the
new law will likewise become a standard in the CIS. Although it is difficult to verify the
use of surveillance in specific incidences, inferences can be drawn from specific exam-
ples. In July 2008, a Moldovan court ordered the seizure of the personal computers of
12 individuals for allegedly posting critical comments against the governing party. The
people were accused of illegally inciting people ‘‘to overthrow the constitutional order’’
and ‘‘threaten the stability and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.’’ It is
unknown how the authorities obtained the names of the people, but some suggest
that an ISP provided them with the IP addresses of the users.30
Several CIS countries are also pursuing the creation of national cyberzones. Countries
such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Russia are investing heavily into expanding Inter-
net access to schools. These institutions are being tied to special Internet connections,
which limit access only to resources found in the national Internet domain. These ‘‘na-
tional zones’’ are popular among some Tajik and Kazakh ISPs because they allow the
ISPs to provide low-cost connectivity, as traffic is essentially limited to the national
segment. In 2007, Russian authorities floated the idea of creating a separate Cyrillic
cyberzone, with its own domain space and addressing scheme. National cyberzones
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are appealing because they strengthen the degree of national control over Internet
content. They also appeal to consumers, since access to them is less costly and the
resources that can be found there are almost exclusively in the local language.
Other aspects of third-generation controls, such as state-sponsored information cam-
paigns in cyberspace, are difficult to document, as they use surveillance, interaction,
and direct physical action to achieve a disruption of target groups or networks. The in-
tent of these campaigns is to effect cognitive change rather than to deny access to on-
line information or services. The ultimate source of these campaigns is also difficult to
attribute and can only be established through careful research or insider knowledge,
since they are designed to render opaque the role of state actors. These techniques in-
clude employing ‘‘Internet Brigades’’ to engage, confuse, or discredit individuals or
sources. Such action can include the posting of prepackaged propaganda, kompromat,
and disinformation through mass blogging and participation in Internet polls, or ha-
rassment of individual users, including the posting of personal information.31 This
technique, along with the use of surveillance of Internet traffic to affect direct action,
saw a marked increase in the run-up to parliamentary and presidential polls in Russia.
Numerous accounts allege that progovernment forces monitored opposition Web sites
and disrupted planned rallies and marches. In some cases, members of the opposition
were warned by cell phone not to participate in rallies or risk being beaten. In other
cases, false information was disseminated by progovernment forces, leading to confu-
sion among opposition supporters and, in one documented case, leading them into an
ambush by progovernment supporters where several were severely beaten.
Assessing the Evolution of Next-Generation Controls in the CIS
The three generations of controls are not mutually exclusive, and several can exist con-
currently. Taken together, they form a pattern of control that is both unique to each
country and generalizable to the region as a whole. However, the degree to which a
country is more or less authoritarian does seem to influence the choice of ‘‘genera-
tional mix’’ applied. Countries with stronger authoritarian tendencies tend to apply
more comprehensive information controls in cyberspace, often using all three genera-
tions of controls. Conversely, countries that are ‘‘more democratic’’ tend to favor
second- and third-generation strategies. None of the six countries scoring as ‘‘hybrid
regimes’’ or ‘‘flawed democracies’’ applied first-generation controls (see Figure 2.1).
Several factors can explain this pattern. The most obvious explanation of the general
tendency is that authoritarian states will seek to dominate the public sphere. These
states tend to be the most vulnerable to mass unrest, prompting additional efforts by
security forces to ensure that all channels of potential mobilization are controlled. A
second factor worth noting is that these six counties are also experiencing the fastest
rates of Internet growth and, with the exception of Belarus, have among the lowest
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levels of Internet penetration in the region. This latter explanation, which suggests
that the RUNET in these counties has not become the locus for informal networks
that it has in some of the less authoritarian countries, may make it more vulnerable
and a target for filtering controls than what would be the case elsewhere in the CIS
where the RUNET is more central to the political mainstream. In this respect, the ma-
turity of the network itself seems to influence the degree to which filtering controls
will be applied. This observation begs the obvious question—will the RUNET remain
open even as countries in the CIS slide toward a new authoritarianism?
While the possibility of greater direct content controls being applied in the RUNET
certainly exists, there is a far greater potential that information controls will continue
to evolve along the evolutionary trajectory, toward strategies that seek to compete, en-
gage, and dominate opponents in the informational battle space through persistent
messaging, disinformation, intimidation, and other tactics designed to divide, confuse,
and disable. In this respect, the patterns of information control in the CIS may in fact
represent a model that will evolve elsewhere as governments are faced with the choice
of imposing harsh controls and being labeled pariahs or doing nothing and risking
that the technologies could become enablers of hyperdemocracy and undesired regime
change.
Figure 2.1
Spectrum of cyberspace content controls in the CIS (clustered by generation and EIU Index of
Democracy)
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy
2008,’’ 2008, http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf.
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Conclusion: Next-Generation Controls Beyond the CIS?
There are several obvious and not so obvious reasons to believe that second- and third-
generation controls will become more common outside of the CIS and in fact may
presage the future of cyberspace controls as a whole. First, the experience from other
regions suggests that first-generation filtering is easy to circumvent. The ‘‘Great Fire-
wall of China’’ is easily breached, as evidenced by the growing number of circumven-
tion technology solutions, from Tor to Psiphon and others. As such techniques become
more common, enabled and supported by large-scale and distributed efforts in the
United States and Europe, the incentives to rely on less technologically static and tem-
porally fixed methods characteristic of next-generation controls will likely grow.
It is also questionable whether first-generation controls in countries like Burma,
North Korea, and China are really sustainable in the long run. In China’s case, the
floodgates may open sooner rather than later as the Chinese Internet itself becomes
much more central to popular culture. First-generation filtering practices can produce
economic and other social costs through collateral filtering and disincentives for for-
eign direct investment and tourism. As countries become more dependent on cyber-
space for research, business, and other international communications, the friction
introduced by filtering becomes increasingly unpopular, costly, and impractical.
More important than these factors, however, is the growing legitimization and fre-
quent practice of policing the Internet through indirect and distributed means, and in
particular through third parties, including the entities that actually support the cyber-
space infrastructure, from connectivity to hosting to social networking platforms. Since
much of cyberspace is operated by the private sector, there are practical and legal limits
to the direct reach of government controls. Controls have thus evolved downward
and in a distributed fashion, in a significant privatization of authority, in conformity
with second- and third-generation controls outlined previously. Naturally, the scope
for second- and third-generation controls differs among authoritarian and democratic
countries, but examples of each can be found in both contexts.
In China, for example, while much of the attention focuses on the technologies of
the Great Firewall of China filtering access to the Internet, at least as much, if not
more, of the information controls exercised in that country happen in a more distrib-
uted fashion and by private actors. Web hosting and social networking services are
now routinely obliged to sign self-discipline pacts and follow rigid hosting protocols
that limit what can be communicated online; search engines—including those owned
by American companies like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!—routinely filter their
search results, often more aggressively than the government does itself; and in the
most extreme example, volunteer citizen groups—sometimes known in China as
50 cent brigades for the amount they are purportedly paid for each post—swarm the
Internet’s chat rooms, blogs, and other public forums making statements favorable to
the government.32 The latter was dramatically demonstrated, in a clear example of
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third-generation controls, during the time of the Olympics, when thousands of
Chinese bloggers posted aggressively to counter what they perceived as anti-Chinese
propaganda.33 Whether the volunteer posts were managed or encouraged by the state,
or simply benefited the state coincidentally, or some combination, is a vexing question
nearly impossible to untangle. Such attribution problems are, in fact, one of the key
characteristics of second- and third-generation controls and one of their greatest chal-
lenges for research projects like the ONI.
Outside of authoritarian contexts and among democratic countries, it is now com-
mon to hear of legal and market pressures being invoked to remove content from
Web hosting and social networking platforms, and there is also a very noticeable trend
to offload policing activities to ISPs, particularly in the areas of content controls around
pornography, hate speech, and copyright violations. In fact, most industrialized demo-
cratic countries have passed far-reaching surveillance measures that enable widespread
eavesdropping on e-mail, cellular phone, and other communications activities by
requiring ISPs to retain and, when required, turn over such information to legal
authorities.
Perhaps the strongest impetus toward second- and third-generation controls has
emerged from a growing emphasis on cyber security and the recognition of cyberspace
as a domain of military action. Military actors have come to understand cyberspace as a
domain equal in importance to land, air, sea, and space, requiring a full spectrum of
capabilities. This has meant developing weapons and tactics designed to disrupt, de-
stroy, and confuse potential adversaries. For the most part, these capabilities have
been kept quiet and under classification, but they are similar in intent and execution
to the network attacks characteristic of second-generation information controls. Russia,
China, and the United States have all developed doctrines and capabilities for opera-
tions in cyberspace that include computer network attacks, as well as psychological
operations designed to shape the domain through selective filtering, denial of access
to information, and information engagement. The intent and effect of these emerging
doctrines is the same as those we have documented in second- and third-generation
controls in the CIS—to silence information that is strategically threatening and sow
confusion and doubt among opponents dependent on cyberspace for information
and organization.
Overall, the lexicon of cyber security is shifting norms around acceptable behavior
for intervention into cyberspace and generating new incentives for technological de-
velopment. Pervasive surveillance, including deep packet inspection, is now an accept-
able part of compliance with good security practices, despite the impacts on privacy
protections. Similarly, the political rush to secure cyberspace is generating economic
opportunities not seen since the Internet boom of the 1990s. However, unlike the
1990s when the rush was led by companies seeking to open up cyberspace, the current
momentum is in the other direction. The fact that defense contractors are now lin-
ing up to compete in this domain only raises the troubling concerns that some of the
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valuable freedoms gained over the last 15 years in cyberspace will be sacrificed at the
altar of security.
These are troubling tendencies, and ones with implications far outside of the demo-
cratic countries of the OSCE. The confluence of second- and third-generation controls,
the militarization of cyberspace, and the legitimization of surveillance are contributing
to a dangerous brew. The cyberspace enjoyed by the next generation of users may be
a very different, more regulated, and less empowering domain than that which was
taken for granted in the past.
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3 The EU Data Retention Directive in an Era of Internet Surveillance
Hal Roberts and John Palfrey
Introduction
The European Union (EU) enacted a directive on data retention in 2007 that requires
all member countries to mandate the retention by telecom companies of the sender,
recipient, and time of every Internet or other telecom communication. The directive
requires the collection of the Internet Protocol (IP) address, user ID, phone number,
name, and address of every sender and recipient, but explicitly excludes (but does not
forbid) the monitoring of content itself. All the monitored data must be retained for a
period ranging between six months and two years, contingent upon the local law of
each member state. Telecom companies must promptly give these data to law enforce-
ment authorities upon request to assist with serious crimes, overseen by a national
public authority monitoring the data retention practices.1 As of its effective date of
April 2009, all Internet service providers (ISPs) in EU countries must comply with the
relevant national implementations of the directive.
The monitoring required by the EU data retention directive amounts to a form of
surveillance. The directive does not take the form of surveillance that most quickly
leaps to mind: the two men in a van with headphones listening to phone conversa-
tions of an unwitting crook in a seedy apartment. But it has functional similarities.
The directive requires that the participating states collect personal data about their citi-
zens without the citizens’ consent. It enables states to use these data to control some of
the subjects of monitoring (including by arresting them). What matters most about the
directive and its relationship to surveillance is its impact on citizen activity and its
place in the growing constellation of surveillance activities online.
The Internet is a ‘‘surveillance-ready’’ technology. There is a wide range of choices
for any state that wishes to know more about its citizens. This digital information
comes in the form of bits of data that flow through rivers and into oceans of data.
These rivers are full of information that passes by a given point, or series of points, in
a network and can be intercepted; these oceans are stocked with information that can
be searched after the fact; and the rivers arise from springs that can be watched at the
source. The data involved are held in private hands as well as public.
This chapter paints a simplified picture of the technical landscape of Internet surveil-
lance, as well as the place of the EU data retention directive within that landscape, by
taking up a series of short cases about surveillance. We examine how these cases in-
form (and are informed by) the technical questions of what data are being actually
and potentially monitored on the Internet and whom we are trusting to access that data.
We break Internet surveillance into three broad categories: network, server, and cli-
ent. The Internet is composed of clients and servers, in essence a series of devices that
talk to one another through the network. Every bit of data on the Internet is traveling
or residing at one or more of these locations at any given time. As such, any given
Internet activity must happen at one (or more) of these locations. We treat any surveil-
lance happening on the end user device as client-side surveillance, including both soft-
ware tools like workplace keylogging systems and hardware tools like keyboard tapping
devices. We treat any surveillance happening on a machine that predominantly
accepts requests, processes them, and returns responses as server-side surveillance.
And for simplicity, we treat everything between the client and the server as the net-
work, including the wires over which the data travel and the routers that direct the
traffic.
We argue in this chapter that the EU data retention directive introduces new risks re-
lated to the networks of trust created by each category of surveillance. In the section on
network surveillance we argue that trust can only be rerouted around the network,
rather than removed from it, and that the EU data retention directive may cause users
to reroute trust in the network in ways that both reduce the amount of useful data
available to law enforcement and encourage users to expose more of their network
data to non-EU states. In the section on server surveillance we argue that users struggle
to evaluate how the data they submit to servers are used and combined and that the
EU data retention directive is likely to increase this problem by requiring ISPs to store
more server data (which will be used and combined in ways opaque to most users). In
the section on client surveillance we argue that the client has become an intensely
complicated battleground of trust played out by sophisticated actors with their own
agendas, resulting in widespread leaks of data from the client. This section argues that
the EU data retention directive will place a large new set of private data onto this
battleground—to the detriment of people from around the world.
Network Surveillance
The most obvious kind of Internet surveillance takes place on the network between
the clients and servers. Government agencies collect data from within network ISPs,
including not only wiretap-like data about specific subjects with warrants but also en-
tire streams of data for mining without judicial oversight. But the network is a diverse
place. There are a wide variety of different actors with different access to data. As a re-
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sult, there are a wide variety of other cases of network surveillance: about users who try
to get around surveillance but end up exposing themselves to different sorts of surveil-
lance in unexpected ways, about the collection of extensive user data without mean-
ingful consent for targeted advertising, and about how criminal organizations exploit
the trust model of the network to facilitate illegal surveillance.
The U.S. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires
that telecommunications companies have the ability to respond quickly and fully to
wiretap requests even when using the newly digital telephone switches. The current
interpretation of this law includes not only traditional telephone service but also Inter-
net telephone services like Skype and, pending a ruling by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, maybe even sender and recipient data for all Internet traffic. Such
a ruling would render CALEA in a sense analogous to the EU data retention directive.
The FCC has ruled that ISPs can forward their entire data stream to independent
‘‘trusted third parties’’ to handle the wiretapping implementation, exposing data
streams of entire ISPs to these third parties.2
More intrusively, the National Security Agency (NSA) is apparently mining the full
stream of data passing through major ISP backbones in the United States.3 There are
limits to our understanding, as laypersons, of this process, for obvious national security
reasons. We know that the equipment used for this surveillance is capable of executing
highly sophisticated queries on the data passing through the backbone. We know that
the NSA is engaged in some level of warrantless surveillance of the international com-
munications of U.S. citizens, but we do not know precisely what is being done with the
data.4 We are left with indeterminate, circumstantial evidence about the existence and
function of the surveillance that leaves unanswerable questions about what data the
NSA is making available to whom.
Relakks is one of many proxy tools available on the Internet that encrypts and
reroutes traffic to avoid monitoring or filtering by anyone, such as the NSA, monitoring
the user’s local ISP. When someone in China uses Relakks to request a page from the
BBC, the connection goes from the user’s ISP in China to Relakks in Sweden (where
Relakks is hosted) and then from Relakks in Sweden to the BBC in Britain (and back
along the same route). The Chinese ISP can only see a connection to Relakks in Swe-
den, hiding the ultimate destination of the request (and bypassing any filtering as
well). But in 2008, Swedish lawmakers authorized the the Försvarets Radioanstalt
(FRA), or National Defense Radio Establishment, a government agency responsible for
signals intelligence, to monitor the content of all international Internet and phone
traffic (including that of Relakks) without a warrant, requiring all Swedish ISPs to
install FRA monitoring equipment.5 Now, Relakks users (at least, those who do not fol-
low Swedish politics) are unwittingly handing their complete Internet data streams
over to the Swedish government as they seek to avoid monitoring on their own local
networks.
The EU Data Retention Directive in an Era of Internet Surveillance 37
Users have reason to be concerned about forms of surveillance on their local net-
works beyond government monitoring. In June and July of 2007, several British Tele-
com (BT) Internet customers noticed strange problems with their Internet connections
that they tracked down to a spyware company, 121media.6 BT insisted that it had
nothing to do with the suspicious behavior, and 121media refused to comment on
the grounds of customer (BT’s) privacy.7 But in 2008, 121media, renamed Phorm, pub-
licly announced a deal with BT to target advertising at the ISP’s customers.8 Phorm
soon afterward admitted, in response to media reports of the 2007 activity related to
121media and BT, that it had already tried its targeted advertising on tens of thousands
of users on the BT network with BT’s help but without the knowledge of the users.9
Phorm claims that it does not store any personally identifying information or browsing
histories in the process of targeting ads; Phorm says it only stores information about
the kinds of sites each user visits (expensive cars, rugby sites, and so on) connected to
the user only by a randomly generated unique ID.10 Privacy advocates have reacted
strongly against Phorm’s announcement and justifications, but BT continues to push
for a full rollout of the system.11
As with the Relakks case, user efforts to circumvent network monitoring can have
unpredictable results on the network of trusted relationships that tie together Internet
activity. In February 2008, a Pakistani ISP responded to a government request to ban a
video on YouTube.com by (probably accidentally) blocking a majority of the entire
Internet from accessing the whole site for a few hours.12 During the few days Pakistan
was blocking YouTube.com locally, many Pakistanis bypassed the block using a tool
called Hotspot Shield.13 AnchorFree describes Hotspot Shield as a privacy tool: ‘‘You re-
main anonymous and protect your privacy.’’14 But AnchorFree makes money by inject-
ing ads into Web pages, and users of the tool give AnchorFree complete access to all
data exchanged while Web browsing with the tool. AnchorFree implies (but never
explicitly says) that it does not monitor its users’ traffic, but it nonetheless has both
the ability to snoop on the data at any time and a business model based on processing
user data for advertisers. Thus, Pakistan is monitoring its citizens’ Internet traffic to
block content it does not like, and citizens are accessing the blocked content by using
a tool that circumvents Pakistan’s filters. But the circumvention tool is at least poten-
tially just a monitoring tool for the different purpose of advertising.
To make sense of these cases, we need to understand what data are available on the
network and to whom they are accessible. Three sorts of data are vulnerable to surveil-
lance on the network: routing information, the actual content of the data stream, and
contextual signatures. All Internet data packets must include the IP address of the ulti-
mate recipient, and most data packets (including all Web and e-mail traffic) also in-
clude the IP address of the sender. Users can hide routing information on the network
by using proxies, like Relakks or HotSpot Shield, which forward communication be-
tween a client and a server. In addition to the routing data, the packets contain both
protocol-specific data (data about the URL requested, the referring URL, the user agent,
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and so on for Web requests; data about the originating e-mail server, the ‘‘from:’’
e-mail address, the date, and so on for e-mails) and the content proper of the commu-
nication. This content includes, but is not limited to, any data submitted to Web sites,
any Web pages retrieved, and any e-mails sent or received.
Users can encrypt the content of their network communications to hide their activ-
ities from network monitoring. Encryption is most effective when it is applied end-to-
end, as by using Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). In this case, the entire
stream of data from the client to the server is encrypted, allowing no one on the net-
work between the sender and the receiver to read the content. But end-to-end encryp-
tion has to be supported by both the client and the server, and many servers do not
support encrypted communication at all or for all pages. In these cases, a user can con-
nect through a proxy like Relakks or HotSpot Shield to encrypt the data from the client
to the proxy. But such encrypting proxies still use unencrypted channels to talk to
servers that do not support encryption. As a result, the proxied content remains read-
able to any intervening routers on the network. For instance, even though content be-
tween Relakks and the user is encrypted, the requests and responses between Relakks
and Google.com are not encrypted.
These apparently secure connections between Internet users leak other, contextual
forms of information as well. The information about those requests and responses—
think of it as ‘‘metadata’’ to the ‘‘data’’ of the communication itself—can be observed
by anyone on the network in between. Communications that are both encrypted and
proxied can hide both the routing information for, and the content of, a communica-
tion from the network between the client and the proxy. But even proxied and
encrypted data leaks some of its metadata: information about the timing, number,
and size of the packets as well as the fact that the communication is proxied and
encrypted, may be observed. Different sorts of traffic generate different signatures of
packet size and timing that can allow easy identification of the nature of the commu-
nication. These signature-based monitoring methods have reportedly been used, for
example, to block proxied file-sharing traffic.
The Internet consists of billions of links between clients, servers, and routers, making
comprehensive surveillance of the entire network very difficult. But in practice, all
Internet traffic flows through a much smaller number of links between routers, and
those routers are controlled by a much smaller yet number of autonomous systems
(ASs). These ASs are the independent entities (mostly ISPs) that have the ability to
route traffic on the Internet. There are fewer than 100,000 of these ASs in the world.
In practice, the vast majority of Internet traffic flows through an even much smaller
number of those ASs. For instance, virtually all 300 million Internet users in China
connect to the Internet through only five big ISP ASs.15 For a combination of techni-
cal, business, and policy reasons, a disproportionate amount of global Internet traffic
flows through a few very large ASs in the United States, including most traffic between
Europe and Asia.16 Traffic between ASs within a given country (or sometimes even a
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given city) often flows through an Internet exchange point (IXP), a physical network
node that connects geographically close ASs. There are fewer than 200 major IXPs in
the world, which together carry much of the Internet’s local traffic.17 IXPs keep local
traffic local, so unlike the ASs responsible for routing intracountry and intracontinental
traffic, most IXPs are located in (and therefore potentially under the jurisdictional con-
trol of) the country whose traffic they carry.
This topology of the Internet has several implications for the actors trusted with ac-
cess to Internet data. The first is that a large majority of users need to access the Inter-
net through an AS (usually an ISP). The situation should be familiar by now: data from
these users is therefore vulnerable to surveillance by someone controlling that AS. The
second is that there are a relatively small number of these ASs within any given coun-
try and an even smaller number of IXPs, so monitoring all the network traffic in a
given country is a manageable task of making the small number of ASs and IXPs mon-
itor their networks (though some of these ASs can be big complex organizations in
themselves). This rule applies doubly for international Internet traffic, which is con-
trolled by an even smaller number of ASs disproportionately located in the United
States.18 And the United States is capable of monitoring a large portion of international
Internet traffic through a few ASs based in the United States, including even traffic
flowing between non-U.S. countries.
A user can move her trust around from provider to provider. In the end, though, she
must ultimately trust someone on the network (barring the unlikely event of wide-
spread adoption of end-to-end encryption of networked digital communications). In
practice, almost every user of digital networked technologies ends up trusting more
actors over time. A user who tries to get around surveillance of her local ISP connec-
tion, for instance by Phorm, has only a few choices of ISPs in the United Kingdom,
most of whom have been reported to be considering adding Phorm monitoring to their
networks. A user may choose to stay on the possibly monitored local network but use a
service like Relakks to proxy and encrypt her data as it travels through the local, Phorm
monitoring, ISP. The user will avoid Phorm monitoring in the process, but at the cost
of trusting not only Relakks but also the Swedish ISP through which Relakks talks to
the Internet and the Swedish government that monitors the data flowing through all
Swedish ISPs. And her local ISP will still be able to tell that she is proxying and encrypt-
ing all her data through a third party, which fact itself might prove suspicious to a law
enforcement agency. Finally, the user’s data are vulnerable to network monitoring at
any point along which they travel, from her local ISP to the server’s ISP to any ISPs
between. A portion of her data is likely to travel outside of Europe through one of a
few ISPs in the United States that process a disproportionate share of international
Internet traffic.
Against the backdrop of these forms of network surveillance, we can see that the EU
data retention directive has the potential to distort the network of trust through which
Internet data flows. The precise effects of these distortions are difficult to predict. Some
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number of EU users may react to the increased monitoring by using encrypted proxies
in non-EU countries to avoid local ISP surveillance, maybe to hide illegal activity but
maybe to hide legal but sensitive personal activity. The directive may encourage these
proxy users to route their connections through non-EU countries to avoid the data re-
tention mandate altogether.
The net effect of this process may very well be that law enforcement has less access to
useful data. Likewise, smart users may proxy their data through autocratic countries
like China that are least likely to share data with EU countries to avoid monitoring
by another EU country compliant with the data retention directive. If enough users
resist monitoring through the use of proxies, ISPs will be pressured to try to block
such proxied traffic. If ISPs were to take this step, they would likely start an arms race
between proxy tools and proxy blocking tools analogous to the current arms race be-
tween malware and antivirus software (as has happened in China with its attempts to
block filtering circumvention tools). This arms race could further strain the network
through the same sort of knock-on effects of the malware arms race: users wanting to
avoid monitoring would become increasingly dependent on increasingly sophisticated
anonymizing tools and therefore become increasingly vulnerable to the developers of
such tools (some with good, some with bad intentions as with the current developers
of antivirus tools). We have already seen this process with music downloading tools,
which have become a vector for malware infections as the music industry has driven
them underground.19
The popularity of tools that circumvent various sorts of filtering of music download-
ing tools points to the possibility that large numbers of users will attempt to route
around the monitoring, particularly if authorities brand illegal music downloading a
‘‘serious crime.’’ But users also have a tendency to accept gradual erosions of privacy
without resorting to resistance.20 Even relatively small-scale usage of proxy tools could
have the strong effect of making those few users very susceptible to false suspicion by
law enforcement authorities. Given the widespread availability of proxying tools and
widespread publication of the EU data retention directive, it seems safe to assume that
many of the most serious criminals will use such tools, reducing the effectiveness of
the monitoring of such users. Internet service providers can use contextual informa-
tion about connections to detect the use of proxies and will be tempted to track which
users are resisting monitoring. This possibility raises the risk that merely resisting moni-
toring will label a user as suspicious.
Server Surveillance
As with the network, the collection of data on Internet servers is highly concentrated
among a few big actors. Even though there are hundreds of millions of servers on the
Internet, a few large entities like Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and Wikipedia capture a
large proportion of Internet traffic. Virtually all these big sites collect data about their
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users. For example, Google and Yahoo collect search queries (among many other sorts
of data), Facebook collects the social maps of its users, Wikipedia collects the editing
histories of its users, and so forth. The collection of these sorts of data does not look
like the typical Internet surveillance performed by the NSA and other government
actors, but it represents a second type of surveillance on the network, equivalent in
scope to the collection of data flowing across the network.
Google in particular (but not alone) has collected a tremendously large and intrusive
amount of personal data about its users through the operation of its various services.
Google argues that users should not be overly concerned about Google’s data collec-
tion: ‘‘we remember some basic information about searches. Without this information,
our search engine wouldn’t work as well as it does or be as secure. [What this informa-
tion] doesn’t tell Google is personal stuff about you like where you live and what your
phone number is. . . . Logs don’t contain any truly personal information about you.’’21
User search data surely help in the way Google says they do (‘‘improve our search
results,’’ ‘‘maintain security,’’ and ‘‘prevent fraud’’). And their explanations of the pri-
vacy implications of the data usage of Google’s engineers are accurate in a narrowly
technical sense. But the importance of data is determined by the larger world in which
it exists—by the other data that it connects to. Google’s statement that a cookie does
not tell them ‘‘personal stuff about you like where you live’’ is only true in the narrow
sense that your driver’s license number does not tell the police where you live. Even
though the cookie itself is just a random string of gibberish letters, it can indeed be
used to look up personal information ‘‘like where you live.’’ For example, the cookie
connects to all searches performed by a single person. Many people search for their
own names at some point and for their own addresses at some point (if for no other
reason than to see their houses in Google Maps). The cookie connects those two
searches to the same (otherwise anonymous) person, thus potentially identifying
the name and address of the person behind the random gibberish of a particular
cookie. Researchers have consistently shown the ability to crack the identity of indivi-
dual users in these kinds of data collections with anonymous but individually unique
identifiers.22
It is likely that Google’s collection of search terms, IP addresses, and cookies repre-
sents one of the largest and most intrusive single collections of personal data online
or off-line. Google may or may not choose to do the relatively easy work necessary to
translate its collection of search data into a database of personally identifiable data, but
it does have the data and the ability to query personal data out of the collection at will.
Even assuming perfect security to prevent data leaks, Google is still subject to many
sorts of government requests for its data. Witness, for instance, the success of Viacom
in subpoenaing the complete log of every video ever viewed on YouTube.com (which
is owned by Google) in the context of copyright litigation.23
In addition to its search engine, Google’s AdWords displays ads on about 35 percent
of all advertising Web pages.24 Google logs instances of consumers clicking on ads
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through its AdWords system and watches the advertisers through AdWords auctions
that determine the value of advertising topics. Content providers track the value of
those advertising topics to determine which sorts of content to publish. The advertisers
use the AdWords system as a stateless form of market research to target consumers
without knowing anything about them. Content providers watch consumers to deter-
mine which sorts of content generate the most interest. All this monitoring happens in
real time. Google adjusts the placement of ads in real time according to the current
results of an ad auction; content providers watch the profitability of their content
in real time and make adjustments to attract more ad-clicking customers; advertisers
adjust their bids and update their ads in real time to attract more users. The effect of
the system is continuous but stateless market research that is constantly adjusting to
the current interests of users rather than the historical interests over time tracked by
user profiling organizations like comScore, Phorm, and NebuAd.
Google and other service providers only have access to data that is sent directly to
them over the network: the client address, the request itself, and any content explicitly
submitted by the user. All these server-collected data, other than the client address,
may be encrypted while traveling over the network, giving the end server access to
some data that are not available on the network. For Web servers, the protocol data
may include cookies, which are often used to assign a pseudonymous identity that per-
sists between separate requests. Users voluntarily (and knowingly, at least in theory)
submit vast amounts of such data to Internet servers. Users are aware that they are sub-
mitting names, addresses, and credit card numbers to Amazon when buying merchan-
dise, personal e-mail to Microsoft through Hotmail, and movie preferences to Netflix
when renting videos.
What determines the risk of privacy intrusions—and what ties this case to the narra-
tive of online surveillance—is not just the collection of data but rather what the actors
controlling the servers do with the data, with whom they share the data, and how the
data are combined with other data. The act of collecting a credit card number to exe-
cute a purchase for a user is presumably acceptable and necessary in the modern global
economy. But using the credit card number to request data about a user’s purchase his-
tory from the credit card company in order to target advertising at him may not be so
acceptable. Likewise, it is fine for Microsoft to collect personal e-mails through Hot-
mail, but it would become a concern if Microsoft were to sell its users’ e-mail content
to a consumer research company. And Netflix seems innocuous when using video pref-
erence information for its own recommendation engine, but many users would be un-
comfortable if they found out Netflix was combining its users’ video rental history
with (even public) information from users’ social networking pages to make video
recommendations.
The issue of combining data is particularly relevant (but not unique) to server-based
surveillance because, in comparison to network and client surveillance, the domain of
the data collected is generally much more limited. However, these domains of data can
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almost always be combined either with themselves or with other domains to create a
much more personal, intrusive set of combined data—for instance, by combining the
Google search data with the Google search cookies to identify users by cookie, or by
combining the Google search IP addresses with ISP logs (as required by the EU data re-
tention directive) to identify users by IP address.
All these different possible uses and combinations of data represent networks of
trust. A rational user ought to evaluate these decisions about trust carefully, though in
practice few have the time to do so with any level of sophistication. The example of
Google demonstrates the complexity of these issues of trust—about how data are col-
lected, who has access to it, and what is done with it. Google is collecting vast amounts
of information from users in ways that are not clear to most users, yet most users
eagerly accept the arrangement that Google offers them. Most users presumably under-
stand that they are giving Google access to their search terms, but some may not
understand that Google is storing these data. Yet other users are likely not to under-
stand that Google generates its revenue through its advertising brokerage business. It
is not at all clear that clicking on any Google AdWords ad takes you to a Google server
first and only then redirects you to the clicked ad. Nor is it clear that by clicking on a
Google AdWords ad, you are sharing with the advertiser the fact that you searched for
or browsed content about a given subject. The potential of Google’s vast store of user
data creates a serious risk of disclosure throughout this network of trust regardless of
whether Google’s intentions are in fact good for its customers.
The exchange of data between user and server establishes a relationship of trust. A
survey by the Internet security company WebSense found that 60 of the 100 most pop-
ular sites on the Internet had hosted malicious code at some point in the past year.25
The examples that WebSense cites are attacks on the Web pages displayed to users
rather than the back-end servers, so they do not give direct access to user data stored
on the servers. But they do hijack the identity of the server on behalf of the attacker,
allowing the attacker to present a portion of the Web page as if it is coming from the
trusted server. The result is a variety of attacks that collect data on behalf of an attacker
posing as the trusted server. These widely prevalent Web site attacks allow attackers to
insert themselves into users’ networks of trusted actors by way of the infected sites.
Google tried to use the EU data retention directive as part of the rationale behind its
eighteen-month data retention period for certain user data, though some observers
contend that the directive does not apply to Google as a ‘‘content provider,’’ as
opposed to a ‘‘communication service.’’26 EU commissioners beat back that particular
argument and have aggressively lobbied for Google to reduce the amount of data
it keeps and how long it keeps the data under its privacy directive.27 This exchange
demonstrates precisely the problem at the intersection of the EU data retention direc-
tive and the way that surveillance works in the networked public sphere today. The
same EU authority that is responsible for guarding against the retention of personal
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data by service providers like Google is at the same time requiring ISPs to increase the
amount of data they are storing and the length of time over which they are storing
it. ISPs are companies just like Google, and requiring that they store the data re-
quired by the data retention directive imposes the same sorts of risks of unwarranted
surveillance.
Client Surveillance
In addition to surveillance on the network and on servers, there is a range of different
actors directly watching users’ machines in various ways. The number of different
actors trying to control access to the client has turned the end user’s computers into a
constant battleground of surveillance. Malware creators try to infect machines to steal
valuable personal information. Anti-virus developers watch computers to find these
malware and other sorts of snooping software, including sophisticated family and work-
place surveillance systems. Even personal computing equipment—say, a laptop—
can itself be turned into a surveillance system, through the use of keyboard logging
devices that are installed inside the box of the computer, making them virtually impos-
sible for the casual user to detect.
SpectorSoft was selected as PC Magazine’s editor’s choice for ‘‘monitoring’’ software
and is the largest provider of such software for home, small business, and corporate
use. It captures virtually every kind of activity on the client computer and can send all
of the monitored data to a remote computer for viewing.28 Since becoming the market
leader in 2004, SpectorSoft has stopped advertising to spouses, citing legal ambiguity
and spousal abuse, but it continues to market itself for use monitoring minors and
employees, neither of whom are legally protected from such monitoring in the U.S.29
SpectorSoft reported in 2007 that its software was installed on over 400,000 desktops,
60 percent of which were home users.30 All major anti-virus products classify Spector-
Soft as spyware and attempt to remove it, but SpectorSoft actively avoids detection by
either the monitored subject or anti-virus or other anti-spyware software.31
In addition to these monitoring products like SpectorSoft, which take the form of
software, a variety of companies make hardware keyboard logging devices. These devi-
ces are generally small plugs that sit between the USB plug of the logged keyboard and
the USB plug of the logged computer but can also be cards that sit inside the computer
case. The devices record every key pressed on the keyboard and can be used to capture
passwords, emails, typed documents, and any such information entered on the key-
board. Relative to software keyloggers, these devices are much easier to install given
physical access and are impossible to detect via anti-virus software. The only way to de-
tect some of these devices is physically to open the computer case.32
The most intrusive and prevalent example of client-side surveillance software is
the collection of various bots, viruses, worms, trojans, and other malware that infect a
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significant chunk all Internet connected computers. As a whole, the set of malware-
infected computers have the ability to collect all of the client data of hundreds of mil-
lions of computers, though in practice data collected is usually limited to obviously
profitable data like credit card numbers.33 Most of these infected computers are organ-
ized into large botnets—networks of infected computers remotely controlled by a sin-
gle entity. The Conficker botnet, one of the biggest currently, now controls several
million infected computers.34 Botnets like Conficker perform a variety of illicit activ-
ities including sending spam, committing click fraud, subjecting servers to denial of
service attacks, and stealing financial information. One recent study of spam distribu-
tion determined that the Storm botnet was responsible for twenty percent of all spam
sent in the first quarter of 2008, and Storm was just the biggest of many botnets at the
time.35
The direct impact of most of these activities on any given infected user is usually rel-
atively small: outgoing spam only costs the user bandwidth, credit card theft is gener-
ally insured by the credit card company, and click fraud costs a user nothing directly.
But the potential for greater abuse of personal data, both individually and collectively,
is difficult to overstate given the vast number of malware-infected computers, the com-
plete access of the malware to the infected computers’ data, and the increasing sophis-
tication of the criminal organizations that run them.36 A recent report by two of this
volume’s co-editors, Ron Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, and their respective teams, on
the use of a small botnet to surveil a wide variety of embassies and other highly sen-
sitive sites in southeast Asia, demonstrates the potential for harm represented by the
botnet surveillance. The Information Warfare Monitor found clear evidence that
the botnet, which they call GhostNet, had wide ranging abilities on the client: from
copying locally stored files to watching the physical spaces through the webcams.37
The study presented only circumstantial evidence pointing to Chinese involvement—
the servers commanding the botnet were mostly located in China, and the infected
sites were all of high, regional value to China. But the documentation of this particular
botnet demonstrates that it would be straightforward for China or another state (or pri-
vate) actor to perform wide-scale client-side surveillance through a botnet.
To protect oneself from viruses, bots, worms, and other such malware, most experts
recommend installing anti-virus systems on all client computers. But this anti-virus
software is itself highly intrusive, operating at the most fundamental levels of the oper-
ating system, incurring significant performance penalties, and attempting to avoid the
notice of malware (which is itself trying to detect the anti-virus systems to disable
them). Anti-virus tools have the capability to do the same sorts of harm that a piece
of malware can do, including both stealing data from and disabling the host computer.
Trust in Symantec and the other anti-virus vendors not to snoop or harm the computer
is mostly well founded, but fake anti-virus systems have now become one of the most
common types of malware precisely because of the need to trust anti-virus systems and
the difficulty of determining which anti-virus systems to trust.
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Various other sorts of actors surveil users through their clients as well. ComScore is
one of the biggest of several companies that collect data about Internet users for mar-
ket research. It collects the entire Web browsing stream, including encrypted requests,
from the 2 million members of its worldwide ‘‘consumer panel.’’ ComScore connects
its online data with a variety of sources of off-line data, including supermarket pur-
chases and automobile registrations. ComScore has admitted to using its collected
data to log in to its members’ online banking accounts to verify reported incomes.38
ComScore recruits these panel members from a wide variety of countries, including
many from Europe and Asia, through a combination of sweepstakes, network per-
formance improvement tools, claims of antimalware protection, and (according to
ComScore) a sincere desire by panel members to improve the efficiency of the
Internet. ComScore discloses to the panel members that the software is monitoring
their Web browsing activities, but it also keeps a strong separation between the
company itself and the operations that collect the data—currently OpinionSquare
and PermissionResearch—by not directly naming the tools or the organizations that
operate them anywhere on ComScore.com or even in its SEC annual report filing. And
it has had to recreate those operations at least once to evade detection by antispyware
tools.39 ComScore sells access to these data, estimated by ComScore at 28 terabytes col-
lected per month in 2007, as market research to many of the largest companies in the
world. The U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits the U.S. federal law enforcement and
other government agencies from importing data from ComScore (or LexisNexis or oth-
er private database) en masse, but the law does allow the agencies to perform queries
through ComScore or other private data sources about specific people.40
Governments have various levels of access to data collected through anti-virus soft-
ware market research, and malware. Some governments allegedly also use their own cli-
ent software to collect data directly. Direct evidence of government client surveillance
is rare, but examples occasionally pop up. For instance, the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) has been documented as installing a keylogger on a suspect’s machine
to capture the encryption keys necessary to read the suspect’s PGP-encrypted email.41
And we know major anti-virus companies have complied with court orders to ignore
such U.S. government spyware.42 There is strong evidence that the German police are
aggressively pursuing the use of client-side software to tap calls on Skype.43 In Den-
mark, parliament approved a law that explicitly gives law enforcement agencies the
authority to install keylogging software on a suspect’s computer.44 And, thanks to
researchers at the Citizen Lab, the world knows that a Chinese version of Skype was
logging sensitive messages to servers as mandated by the Chinese government.45 The
software used by government agencies for surveillance in all these examples is func-
tionally indistinguishable from client malware—the whole point of the software is to
collect data from the subject without knowledge or consent.
Client-side surveillance provides the most complete access to user data in compari-
son to network or server surveillance. Every bit of data sent, received, viewed, played,
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or typed on a computer is vulnerable to client-side surveillance, though most client
surveillance tools collect all possible data. Malware mostly targets various sorts of di-
rectly profitable data, including e-mail addresses and bank account information. The
most sophisticated anti-virus tools monitor all data stored on and transmitted to the
computer, checking the data for malware signatures, but not keyboard or screen activ-
ity. Market research tools like ComScore typically monitor all network traffic, whether
encrypted or not, but not stored data or keyboard or screen activity. Workplace and
family monitoring tools usually monitor keystrokes and periodic screenshots of the
activity on the computer screen but not stored or network data. The GhostNet report
demonstrated that active malware is even capable of activating and recording the web-
cams and microphones of infected computers.
Indeed, the biggest problem for client surveillance tools is often dealing with the
sheer amount of data. For example, even one screenshot a minute on a single com-
puter can generate a daunting amount of data. This problem is magnified when ap-
plied over a large set of monitored clients. Botnets (networks of malware-infected
computers controlled from a single point) only search for a limited set of data, like
credit card numbers, which they can easily sell, presumably because of the difficulty
(and therefore unprofitability) of sifting through the vast trove of other sorts of data
on infected computers. Likewise, a primary challenge of corporate anti-virus systems
that must manage entire networks of clients is to manage the resulting flood of data
about infections and vulnerabilities in a network of clients.
Nonetheless, any client-side program has at least the potential to access every sort
of data that resides on or passes through the computer. So, a keylogger may only mon-
itor keystrokes, but that restriction is mostly the choice of the tool (and its developers)
once it has been installed. Even non-surveillance-oriented programs (screen savers,
games, chat programs, and so on) potentially have complete access to data once they
have been installed. Most computers try to make it difficult for an arbitrary program to
take over a computer, but a constant stream of vulnerabilities gives client programs ac-
cess to the entire computer. And this same level of access applies to most hardware
devices installed on the computer as well. Even devices that do not directly have the
ability to access a shared bus or run a driver may have the ability to infect clients with
malware, as shown by cases like virus-carrying digital photo frames.46
Unlike server and network surveillance, client surveillance is always theoretically
detectable. Any change in the client behavior (whether processing data, storing it, or
sending it over a network) requires some detectable change to the client. In practice,
there is a long history of surveillance tools using increasingly sophisticated methods
to hide themselves, including through rootkits that embed themselves into the deepest
layers of the client operating system. But even with these sophisticated methods, there
are always small changes in behavior that at least theoretically make the tools detect-
able. But detecting these small changes in the large number of malware, spyware, and
other surveillance tools is beyond the capabilities of even the most sophisticated user.
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Detection of the most advanced client surveillance tools requires the use of some other
monitoring tool, such as an anti-virus system, designed specifically for this purpose.
The latest versions of malware and other surveillance tools change themselves con-
stantly to avoid detection even by sophisticated anti-virus systems. This cycle of in-
creasingly sophisticated detection and evasion requires constant monitoring of every
networked client, by anti-virus tools, by mal- or spyware, or often by both.
In a strict sense, the EU data retention directive applies directly only to network and
server monitoring. But the routers that will be used in the implementation of the direc-
tive to collect network data are client devices themselves. As such, they are vulnerable
to a stack of hardware, operating system, and applications just like any other client.
Any actor within that network may potentially have access to the data, so adding the
monitoring box to the ISP network potentially adds all those actors to the network
trusted with the client data. Most of those actors (including hardware manufacturers,
operating system developers, application developers) have access to all the data poten-
tially collected through network surveillance and not just the legally monitored data,
so we have to consider the flow of both the actual and potential data mandated by
the directive through this network of trust around the monitoring tools. The sophisti-
cation of client surveillance tools at both collecting data and hiding themselves from
detection demonstrates the possibility of an attacker installing such code undetected
on a data retention tool. The number of well-publicized, active exploits against a range
of routers (not to mention counterfeit routers) means that the risk of this occurring is
high.
Conclusion
This chapter provides a typology of the different sorts of Internet surveillance through
cases about Internet surveillance tools. For each set of cases, it is important to focus on
the actual and potential data monitored and networks of trust through which the data
necessarily flow. This typology is intended to serve as a starting point for analysis
of the steady stream of cases about Internet surveillance; for the analysis of those
cases not only from a technical frame but also from social, political, legal, and other
frames; and for the application of the resulting road map to specific questions about
surveillance that arise over time. As new stories about surveillance emerge, this road
map can provide a context for determining whether and in what ways those
stories tell us anything new about Internet surveillance. For example, one might ask
whether recently reported iPhone viruses represent a new sort of surveillance or
how the monitoring required for Comcast’s BitTorrent throttling (described in the
U.S.-Canada Overview presented later in this book) compares to existing examples of
surveillance.
This typology also provides a frame for considering the impact of the EU data reten-
tion directive, which is likely to have important effects beyond its explicit scope. These
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effects apply both to the data potentially accessible to monitoring and to the way users
will relate to the networks of trusted actors who have access to these data. As the cases
about client tools show, surveillance is both widespread and very difficult to detect on
a range of client devices, including the routers and other computers necessary to imple-
ment the EU directive. As a result, an unintended outcome of the directive will be that
both the mandated data (senders, recipients, and time stamps) and the potentially col-
lected data (the content of the whole data stream) will be exposed to potential access
by a whole network of new actors. The cases about server tools and surveillance show
that the directive’s requirements, when applied to server-side companies like Google,
will have the effect of increasing the data stored by those companies and thereby fur-
ther pushing the already strained trust relationship between users and servers. Similar
mandates related to data retention should be viewed in a similar context of growing
Internet surveillance practices in the OSCE member states and elsewhere around the
world.
Finally, the cases about network surveillance show that many users, including many
of the serious criminals that the directive is meant to track, have an incentive to
choose to use available rerouting methods to avoid monitoring. The increased use of
rerouting proxies will both pose a privacy risk to those users and potentially route a sig-
nificant portion of EU Internet traffic through countries unfriendly (at least in terms of
data sharing) to the EU. As a result, the intended purpose of the EU data retention
directive may be thwarted in dangerous ways. The unintended consequences of the
EU data retention directive are likely to prove costly.
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4 Barriers to Cooperation




While providing an innovative platform for global communications and economic
transactions, the Internet brings some of society’s worst ailments, such as the prolifer-
ation of images of child abuse, into the public sphere. Every day, children are sexually
abused, and graphic images of this exploitation are transferred over the Internet to a
global audience.1 Despite a near worldwide consensus on the illegality of the trafficking
of images of child abuse (often referred to as child pornography) on the Internet, effec-
tive international cooperation on this issue remains elusive.2 Instead, an increasing
number of countries are simply hiding online child sexual abuse through the cosmetic
practice of Internet filtering—the technical blocking of Internet content within a
country’s territorial boundaries—rather than cooperating internationally to remove
such content at its (foreign) source and subsequently prosecuting those who produce
and traffic in images of the sexual abuse of children.
However, there was an early recognition among diverse international actors that
tackling the problems posed by new information communication technologies (ICT)
would require potentially new forms of cooperation. These forms of cooperation em-
phasize sustained communication and interaction among a community of diverse
actors spanning supranational institutions such as the European Union, national gov-
ernments, law enforcement, private industry including Internet service providers
(ISPs), and nongovernmental organizations. This concept of ‘‘dynamic cooperation’’
constitutes not just the outcome of an agreement reached through bargaining, but
the ongoing practice of cooperation in which actors must rely on each others’ capabil-
ities for continual implementation in situations where compliance cannot be achieved
solely through unilateral means.
While the prospect of dynamic cooperation was consistently raised in international
deliberations concerning the challenges of combating child pornography and ICTs, it
is not reflected in official outcomes such as declarations and conventions. Moreover,
preliminary evidence indicates that the introduction of Internet filtering, to prevent
accidental access to child pornography, correlates with decreasing efforts to have images
of child abuse removed at the source. As a result, child pornography identified and fil-
tered by one country remains available on the Internet and is accessible in other coun-
tries. This situation occurs among countries that participate in institutions designed to
facilitate cooperation targeting the source of the child pornography. Thus, countries
that participate in the institutions dedicated to removing child pornography—such as
international law enforcement task forces, including the Virtual Global Task Force and
the Innocent Images International Task Force, as well as the INHOPE association of
‘‘hot line’’ providers—filter Internet content located within each other’s territorial
boundaries.
This evidence suggests that traditional cooperative mechanisms may have un-
intended consequences that conflict with rather than complement dynamic coopera-
tion. This potential conflict raises the concern that contemporary cooperative
institutions do not have the capacity to meet the global challenges posed by the prolif-
eration of ICTs. This chapter argues that the dominant conception of cooperation, the
domestic implementation of the results of bargaining, obscures potentially new forms
of dynamic cooperation at the international level. A conceptual shift in the under-
standing of what constitutes cooperation is required to capture this emergent practice.
In this chapter, I present an analysis of the widespread adoption of filtering as the
primary solution to combating the proliferation of child pornography on the Internet.
While international agreements concerning the protection of children played a role in
spurring state action, the emphasis on domestic implementation over dynamic cooper-
ation facilitated the preference for filtering as the solution to the problem of Internet
child pornography. Internet filtering is a solution that states can implement domesti-
cally irrespective of international agreements, and it does not require sustained cooper-
ation. The goal of filtering is to block domestic access to Internet content located in
another country. Dynamic cooperation—in contrast to blocking domestic access
to foreign-hosted child pornography—refers to the continual cooperation necessary to
have foreign-hosted content removed at its source.
Within this context, I trace how filtering has been constituted as a solution to the
problem of Internet child pornography and how its implementation was made possible
by delinking the issue from three key factors: the interpretation of filtering mandated
by the state as a form of censorship, the effect of filtering on freedom of expression as
a result of technical deficiencies, and the overall effectiveness of filtering technology
itself in combating Internet child pornography. I present a preliminary analysis of the
ways in which the continued emphasis on domestic implementation may be affecting
attempts to move toward dynamic cooperation on this issue. Finally, I suggest areas for
further research that result from treating cooperation as a dynamic practice rather than
an instance of bargaining and domestic implementation.
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Following the methodology outlined by Richard Price, this chapter does not focus on
causal explanations, but emphasizes historical contingencies that reflect ideational
contests and defining moments in international agreements, conferences, and events
concerned with the issue of child pornography.3 The chapter will employ a genealogi-
cal method as a means of understanding how the conception of cooperation as domes-
tic implementation emerged in the international arena concerning the issue area of the
protection of children. It will trace how the discourse of domestic implementation
overshadowed that of dynamic cooperation and thus enabled the practice of filtering.
It examines the role of discourses and power in redefining filtering from an ineffective
tool of state censorship to one of effective cooperation. The following is not a compre-
hensive history of international efforts to protect children or of Internet filtering but,
following Price, an analysis of events that ‘‘provide discursive moments’’ and reflect
‘‘crucial dimensions.’’4 Such an analysis detects the unsuccessful attempts to constitute
cooperation as more than an outcome of bargaining but as a dynamic practice based
on sustained communication and interaction.
Competing Perceptions of Cooperation
An analysis of the texts of key international agreements and conferences focused on
the rights of children highlights a tension between perspectives that view cooperation
as the implementation of domestic laws and procedures by states and those that see it
as constituting the continual practice of interaction and information sharing between
a diverse set of actors. This becomes particularly evident with the rise of new commu-
nications technologies and the complex set of problems, including the proliferation of
child pornography, that result. It also reflects a dynamic between state and nonstate
actors that emerged as a result of the prominent role that nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) played in international conferences and agreements concerning the
rights of children.
While given an arguably low priority in international political affairs, children have
constituted an important issue at the international level.5 Primarily framed in terms of
human rights, children have been singled out for protection in international agree-
ments as far back as the Declaration of Geneva, which was adopted by the League
of Nations in 1924.6 A more specific emphasis on children followed with the United
Nations’ (UN) Declaration on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1959. This declaration
put forward ten principles that emphasized diverse issues such as the child’s right
to nutrition, education, and nationality. The protection of children from forms of ex-
ploitation was also explicitly raised, as was a prohibition on any forms of trafficking in
children.7 Although these Declarations firmly entrenched the issue of children on the
international agenda they were not legally binding on states and did not ‘‘lay down
precise obligations for states.’’8
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The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) was adopted in 1989 after
11 years of negotiation among the UN and its related bodies such as UNICEF, as well as
the International Committee for the Red Cross and many NGOs.9 In fact, NGOs were
instrumental in the development and adoption of both the 1924 and 1959 declara-
tions as well as the 1989 convention. Nongovernmental organizations played a critical
role in ensuring that a legally binding agreement was reached. Moreover, particular
elements including ‘‘articles which give the child protection against sexual and other
exploitation, traffic, torture, and armed conflicts’’ would have not been included were
it not for the determined efforts of NGOs.10 However, while the role of international
cooperation was acknowledged, the convention relied heavily on domestic mecha-
nisms and little on the ‘‘international machinery’’ required to enforce these rights.11
The United Nations created the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child
prostitution, and child pornography in 1990, but its emphasis was also domestic imple-
mentation. However, by 1994 an increasing awareness emerged concerning the lack of
international cooperation, including a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the
‘‘need to adopt efficient international measures’’ in addition to domestic solutions.12
The Special Rapporteur began to highlight the international character of the problem
of child sexual exploitation by framing the issue in terms of states that fall on the de-
mand or supply side of the problem.13 By 1995, the Special Rapporteur began to note
the impact of new communications technology on legislation and jurisdiction, noting
that ‘‘new technology gave birth to concepts and applications like cyberporn or audio-
pornography, not envisaged by most legislation’’ and that when ‘‘materials cross na-
tional boundaries the determination of the forum having jurisdiction over the offence
will also pose a problem.’’14 The Special Rapporteur represented an early attempt to
sustain cooperation after the UNCRC was adopted in 1989; however, it was confined
to an advisory role. Although the ability to make recommendations helped in terms
of agenda setting and raising the profile of the issue, it fell well short of facilitating sus-
tained cooperation.
The 1996 World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children
(CSEC) was the result of the considerable efforts of End Child Prostitution in Asian
Tourism (ECPAT), a child advocacy NGO, and UNICEF. The congress centered on the
UNCRC and culminated in the Stockholm Declaration and Agenda for Action. Despite
the growing awareness of the challenges posed by the rapid expansion of Internet tech-
nology, the Stockholm Declaration and Agenda for Action contains no mention of the
Internet. Instead, they focus on the promotion of national laws and policies that
would allow states to meet their obligations under the UNCRC. The Stockholm Decla-
ration encourages states to develop national plans of action to combat child exploi-
tation. Despite some recommendations focused on increasing communication and
cooperation among states, civil society, and international organizations, the primary
emphasis of the document is on domestic state action. In fact the document explicitly
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states that the ‘‘primary task of combating the commercial sexual exploitation of chil-
dren rests with the State and families.’’15
However, the extensive background paper on child pornography presented at the
conference as well as the congress’s child pornography panel all highlighted the role
of new technologies, particularly the Internet, and the global character of the problem.
It was argued that, whereas domestic legislation and increased enforcement led to a re-
duction in the production of child pornography in the 1980s, video and Internet tech-
nologies were dramatically changing the production and distribution of images of
child sexual abuse. The background report concluded that domestic efforts, such as
updating legislation to cover criminal activities made possible by new technologies,
must be ‘‘supported by global cooperation of an enormous magnitude.’’16 Although
increased enforcement of domestic legislation led to a decrease in child pornography
in the 1980s, such methods would not be sufficient to deal with the problems posed
by new technologies:
Regulation of child pornography in the computer age presents special challenges that require con-
siderable technical expertise. . . . The establishment of an international resource organisation
which would employ a team of specialists in the areas of investigation, law enforcement, behav-
ioural science, prosecution, law and computer technology could be an invaluable resource for the
global community.17
Although it does not explicitly suggest reconceptualizing cooperation as a sustained
practice, it does strongly indicate that the problems posed by new technologies require
more than domestic implementation by states. It does clearly articulate that past prac-
tices, such as domestic legislation, would be insufficient. These debates are not reflected
in the formal outcome of the congress.
The International Conference on Combating Child Pornography on the Internet in
1999 focused almost exclusively on child pornography and new communications tech-
nologies. This conference also marked the introduction of filtering as an option to deal
with the problem. However, the discussion of filtering was limited to applications at
the individual level in order to ‘‘empower Internet users.’’ Efforts at the national and
international level focused on increasing international cooperation, since Internet
child pornography ‘‘does not know or respect borders.’’18
The fight against this abuse cannot be done alone but only through strong international coopera-
tion, among governments, particularly law enforcement agencies, but equally important between
States and the Internet industry, hotlines and non-governmental organizations.19
The result of the conference, the Vienna Commitment, called for ‘‘common measures
to speed up and enable the transborder use of coercive powers such as transborder
computer search and seizure’’ in conjunction with government, law enforcement, and
the Internet industry.20 It explored the relationship between law enforcement organi-
zations, Internet service providers, and ‘‘hotlines’’ to which illegal content could be
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reported. These ‘‘hotlines’’ had recently formed an association known as INHOPE in
order to increase sustained cooperation based on the development of ‘‘common good
practices’’ to facilitate the ‘‘exchange of reports internationally.’’21 The heavy focus on
technology and the inclusion of diverse actors signaled the emergence of a conception
of cooperation as a sustained practice.
While the Vienna Commitment was explicitly recognized by the UN’s Optional Pro-
tocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child pros-
titution, and child pornography, which was introduced in 2000, its emphasis on
sustained cooperation as a response to the challenges of new technologies was not.
While noting challenges posed by the Internet in the preamble, the actual text of the
document does not explicitly mention new technologies, nor does it provide for mech-
anisms of sustained cooperation. Instead, the Optional Protocol focuses primarily on
domestic implementation by highlighting issues of legislating criminal offenses into
national law. The Optional Protocol, which has been the basis of action against child
pornography since 2000, constitutes cooperation as a form of domestic implementa-
tion and does not reflect the diversity of discourse on the issue of child pornography.22
Recognizing the challenges posed by new communications technologies, nonstate
actors devoted considerable efforts toward broadening the conception of cooperation
to include practices that leveraged the continual and coordinated efforts of multiple
actors. However, these efforts are not reflected in official declarations and conven-
tions. The official discourse thus heavily favors solutions that can be domestically
implemented.
The Emergence of Filtering
Filtering technology emerged in 1995, and by 1999 authoritarian states had already
implemented such technology to block access to political content at the national
level.23 Inspired by these developments, studies concerning the role of the state in reg-
ulating access to Internet content at the national level through technical means began
to emerge in democratic states. However, these studies concluded that filtering tech-
nologies deployed at the national level would be ineffective and would have the un-
intended consequence of harming freedom of expression online.24
At the international level, deliberation on the role that technology could play in
combating Internet child pornography was also taking place. The Second World Con-
gress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children held in 2001 resulted in the
Yokohama Global Commitment, which encouraged states to ‘‘take adequate measures
to address negative aspects of new technologies, in particular child pornography on
the Internet.’’25 However, the specific measures to be taken are not specified. While
articles emphasizing cooperation reflect the need to include diverse actors, their role is
confined to one of supporting state actors in increasing the effectiveness of domestic
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measures taken to protect children. However, documents presented during the confer-
ence reflect a broader debate.
The Theme Paper on Child Pornography presented at the conference does focus on
the challenges of sustained interaction. It highlights the successes and challenges of
coordinated efforts of law enforcement agencies from multiple states to arrest and pros-
ecute those involved with the production and exchange of child pornography. It noted
that ‘‘closer working relationships’’ were required between law enforcement agencies
worldwide to further ‘‘greater co-operation within the international law enforcement
community.’’26 In conjunction with the need to cooperate, the paper also makes clear
that technology can play a role. The technological focus of the paper was devoted
to technologies that can identify and remove, as opposed to filter, child pornography
online.
Software developers have a particular responsibility to develop technologies which can locate
child pornographic images on the Internet more swiftly, and allow for their rapid identification
and removal.27
The report noted the increased use of filtering technology at the individual level but
warned that ‘‘none of this software is perfect and it would be wrong if parents thought
of it as being a substitute for sound advice and appropriate supervision.’’28 Moreover,
the report noted that increasing public demand to do something about the problem of
child pornography online was leading to the preference of restrictive technologies,
such as filtering at the national level, and warned of possible negative unintended
consequences:
Unless the Internet industry, Governments and the civil society can find a convincing way of
assuaging these strong concerns which are beginning to surface, public opinion will sooner or
later force politicians to consider forms of intervention which could rob us of much that it is truly
marvellous, dynamic and revolutionary about the Internet.29
With the exception of a growing number of authoritarian countries using filtering to
impose political censorship, democratic states had not implemented filtering at the na-
tional level.30 In 2004 the role of filtering technology was thrust into the international
spotlight. In the United States, the Pennsylvania state legislature passed a law in 2002
that required ISPs to block access to Web sites suspected of hosting child pornography.
When the Pennsylvania attorney general’s office identified Web sites containing child
pornography, they issued an informal notice to ISPs requiring that access to these Web
sites be blocked. The ISPs subsequently blocked access to these Web sites. Because of
the nature of ISP networks, these ISPs blocked access nationally, since they were tech-
nically unable to differentiate users located in Pennsylvania.31
However, civil liberties organizations challenged the law in court, arguing that these
informal notices constituted ‘‘secret blocking orders’’ issued by the state and thus vio-
lated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, they argued that the
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technical filtering process implemented by ISPs resulted in large-scale overblocking
that further violated free speech rights. Ultimately, the Federal District Court in Phila-
delphia ruled that the law violated the First Amendment. This ruling details the pro-
cess, both legal and technical, that led to the blocking of 1.5 million legitimate Web
sites while trying to block access to approximately 400 Web sites suspected of contain-
ing child abuse images. The decision by Judge Jan E. duBois stated:
There is little evidence that the Act has reduced the production of child pornography or the child
sexual abuse associated with its creation. On the other hand, there is an abundance of evidence
that implementation of the Act has resulted in massive suppression of speech protected by the
First Amendment.32
The decision explicitly confirmed what had been implicitly noted by NGOs through-
out their involvement in international agreements and conferences on child pornogra-
phy: state-mandated national filtering was technically ineffective and posed a threat to
the right of freedom of expression. While the case of the United States may be excep-
tional given the strong preference for the First Amendment guaranteeing the right to
freedom of speech, the events in Pennsylvania did not go unnoticed. A report pub-
lished in 2004 by UNESCO after the World Summit on the Information Society in
2003 noted that some countries were beginning to follow the legislative approach of
the United States by introducing their own legislative efforts to ‘‘require the implemen-
tation of filtering at ISPs and gateways.’’33 However, these attempts were plagued by
the same issues faced in the United States, and widespread adoption did not occur until
filtering was reconstituted as a legitimate practice.
The Legitimization of Filtering
The legitimization of filtering centers on three interlocking developments: a model of
implementation in which the role of the state is reduced, the delinking of filtering and
free speech concerns through technological developments, and a reframing of the ef-
fectiveness of filtering.
In 2004, British Telecom (BT), the largest ISP in the United Kingdom, and the Inter-
net Watch Foundation (IWF), a ‘‘tip line’’ for reporting illegal online content, developed
a partnership in consultation with the government.34 British Telecom agreed to block
access to a list of Web sites compiled by the IWF. This model of private partnership
removes the need for government to implement legislation requiring ISPs to filter—it
is a voluntary private initiative. This development changed the perception of filtering
from one of state imposition to one of private initiative. While technically a private ar-
rangement, the state’s involvement in the process leading to the implementation of fil-
tering allowed it to retain some influence.35 British Telecom’s filtering system, known
as Cleanfeed, was designed to be extremely precise and cost effective.36 Cleanfeed ele-
gantly avoids the pitfall of overblocking, the key objection that was consistently raised
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with respect to filtering. This innovative system created a flood of interest from ISPs
worldwide and received an endorsement from the leading child advocacy group
ECPAT.37
The Cleanfeed filtering system was promoted as a method to block inadvertent ac-
cess to child pornography. The reduction of the scope of the mandate to simply in-
advertent access protected Cleanfeed from the charges of ineffectiveness that plagued
earlier filtering technologies. While those determined to access such content could eas-
ily circumvent the filtering system, Cleanfeed is in fact effective at blocking inadver-
tent access.38 The advocacy group ECPAT, whose background documents submitted to
the World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children had been crit-
ical of filtering, now added filtering to its model National Action Plan. The National
Action Plan, which has its roots in the first World Congress against Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of Children held in 1996, now recommends ‘‘cooperation arrangements
between ISPs and police in place to block illegal content.’’39 Following the UK’s lead,
numerous countries began implementing national filtering systems, including Norway
(September 2004), Germany40 (February 2005), Sweden (May 2005), Denmark (Octo-
ber 2005), Canada (November 2006), Switzerland ( January 2007), Italy41 ( January
2007), the Netherlands42 (September 2007), and Finland ( January 2008).43
The rapid spread of filtering across numerous democratic countries was enabled by
conceptual and technological changes that legitimized filtering.44 Countries that had
previously shunned the practice now embraced it. From a traditional perspective the
introduction of filtering technologies can be seen as the successful domestic implemen-
tation of agreements such as the UNCRC. However, such a ‘‘thin’’ conception of coop-
eration obscures the calls for sustained interaction that emerged within the competing
discourses in and around international conferences and agreements. Dominant dis-
courses and key events sidelined conceptions of dynamic cooperation that key non-
state participants advocated as a response to the challenges posed by new ICTs.
Prospects for Dynamic Cooperation
International cooperation often produces unintended consequences. These ‘‘side
effects’’ may be positive or negative.45 Empirical evidence is beginning to emerge that
suggests that domestic filtering efforts may be acting as a disincentive to cooperate.
Consistent with a conception of cooperation as domestic implementation, filtering is
perceived as cooperation, thus conceptually negating the need to engage in dynamic
cooperation.
INHOPE is an international organization founded in 1999 comprising state-
delegated NGOs that operate ‘‘hotlines’’ that deal with the issue of child exploitation.
While distinct from the state, these organizations were empowered with authority
and legitimacy by their strong connections to the state. These domestic organizations
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accept tips from the public and act to remove images of child abuse if located within
their territorial jurisdiction. They may also act within the INHOPE organization to
have the content removed at the source by their international counterpart within
INHOPE. One of INHOPE’s major objectives is ‘‘to ensure rapid and effective response
to illegal content reports around the world by developing consistent, effective and se-
cure mechanisms for exchanging reports between hotlines internationally and ensur-
ing a coordinated approach is taken.’’46 It has been argued that ‘‘cooperation between
members of INHOPE has facilitated the removal of illegal content from the Internet
and avoided the ‘difficulties in the complex diplomatic procedures necessary for cross
border cooperation of law enforcement authorities.’’’47
Save the Children is an NGO and a key member of INHOPE. In a 2003 position paper,
Save the Children outlined a vision of dynamic cooperation that centered on INHOPE.
INHOPE is the nexus that links intergovernmental organizations, such as the European
Union, primarily through national law enforcement organizations, the Internet indus-
try, and child advocacy NGOs. The report provides examples of interaction across these
actors but particularly emphasizes the relationship between INHOPE and law enforce-
ment leading to ‘‘high profile police-operations [that] have led to the infiltration [of]
and legal action against international child pornography/abuse networks.’’48 The vi-
sion of INHOPE before the proliferation of filtering technologies in 2004 was clearly
on the dynamic cooperation necessary to remove Internet child pornography at its
source and arrest and convict those found responsible for trafficking in such content.
Many countries with representation in INHOPE have subsequently implemented na-
tional filtering technology to block access to foreign-host Internet child pornography.
Some, but not all, members of INHOPE are now filtering such content, including con-
tent hosted within the territorial boundaries of other INHOPE members.49 INHOPE
reports that between September 2004 and December 2006 reports sent through the
network between ‘‘hotlines’’ has decreased by 11 percent per year.50 This decrease cor-
relates with the increase in the number of INHOPE countries that implemented filter-
ing, although for a variety of reasons it does not indicate causation.51 Further research
is required to determine precisely why this decrease in cooperation is occurring within
the organization.
However, even when there is cooperation to have content removed at its source
(rather than filtered), there are still significant delays and limited effectiveness. In
2006, the IWF, an INHOPE member, conducted a six-week test in which they found
that 20 percent of the sites in their database remained active after having been
reported to the relevant authorities in other countries.52 Moore and Clayton obtained
2,585 suspect domains from the IWF and noted that nearly all of them had been pre-
viously reported and had removed images of child sexual abuse. They found that
‘‘child sexual abuse image websites fare worse than other types of offending content,’’
such as phishing and copyright violations, when it comes to removal, with most last-
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ing 719 hours after being reported.53 While the IWF has been successful within the
United Kingdom, their own jurisdiction, they acknowledge that there are Web sites
that have been reported to relevant national authorities outside the United Kingdom
that continue to remain active.
One site, for example, has been reported to us 224 times since 2002; another has been reported to
us 54 times since 2000 and in that time has been found on seven different servers in different
countries; yet another has been reported by us to the relevant authorities 32 times since 2005.
Some of the most prolific of these commercial child abuse websites have remained ‘‘live’’ for
long periods of time, despite our concerted efforts to the contrary. 94 of these websites reported
by us to relevant authorities in 2006 are known to have been actively selling child abuse images
in 2005. Indeed, 33 were ‘‘live’’ in 2004 and 32 were ‘‘live’’ prior to that.
We regularly pass details of the websites and other intelligence to Interpol via our own police
agency links, to international hotlines and the apparent host countries’ own police services to en-
able them to launch a united assault on the organised criminals selling images of child abuse.
However, the ever-changing jurisdictions, the differing laws, priorities and police responses as
well as the varying cooperation of internet service providers around the world, mean that some
countries face challenges to remove content.54
The factors that the IWF highlights as barriers to removing images of child sexual ex-
ploitation online illustrate the conception of cooperation as domestic implementation.
Once the report has been handed off to the relevant domestic authorities, no further
action is taken. After analyzing takedown regimes in a variety of different circum-
stances, including defamation, copyright violation, phishing, and child pornography,
Moore and Clayton argue that incentives rather than differences in law, penalties, and
other factors influence the rate at which takedown successfully occurs. In cases of
phishing, banks have a high level of incentive to have the offending content removed
and work with a variety of actors to achieve the takedown of such sites almost always
without the use of courts or official channels. In contrast, the responsibility for the re-
moval of child abuse images is delegated to the relevant national authorities and is sub-
ject to delay and neglect despite strong legal regimes.55 Moore and Clayton argue:
The Internet is multi-national. Almost everyone who wants content removed issues requests to
ISPs or website owners throughout the world, believing—not always correctly—that the material
must be just as illegal ‘‘there’’ as ‘‘here.’’ Unexpectedly, in the one case where the material is
undoubtedly illegal everywhere, the removal of child sexual abuse image websites is dealt with in
a rather different manner. The responsibility for removing material has been divided up on a na-
tional basis, and this appears to lead directly to very long website lifetimes.56
Not only do the domestic organizations charged with compiling lists of offending child
pornography Web sites lack the willingness (or ability) to reach out to relevant non-
state actors across national boundaries, but they also have a reduced incentive to do
so because their own population is ‘‘protected’’ from the offending foreign content
through the use of filtering.
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Conclusion
This chapter presented competing conceptions of cooperation that emerged from a
genealogical analysis of the developments that led to the implementation of filtering
to combat the proliferation of child exploitation on the Internet. In contrast to domi-
nant perspectives that view cooperation as the state’s domestic implementation of in-
ternational agreements, this chapter presented the concept of dynamic cooperation.
Dynamic cooperation constitutes a sustained practice in which actors, both state and
nonstate, must continually interact to achieve implementation. While not reflected in
official declarations, the behind-the-scenes debates surrounding international efforts to
protect children online reflected a concern that the problems posed by ICTs required
potentially new forms of cooperation. These approaches emphasized continual interac-
tion among a diverse set of participants in order to take down images of child abuse at
their source. However, this conception of cooperation was unable to unseat the domi-
nant discourse, and Internet filtering was ultimately legitimized and implemented.
The result is a situation in which domestic organizations that have been delegated
authority to combat the proliferation of child abuse images online lack the willingness
or institutional capacity for dynamic cooperation. The introduction of filtering tech-
nology reduces the incentive for organizations with an already narrow conception
of cooperation to further engage with relevant counterparts across international boun-
daries. Those engaging in the proliferation of images of child abuse online remain
largely unaffected by filtering technology, as well as takedown and removal efforts.
They are able to exploit the lack of cooperation among international actors. Unlike
the forms of cooperation emerging in other areas of content removal, such as those
targeting phishing Web sites, efforts to combat child pornography are framed and
narrowly understood as the domain of states. There remain considerable barriers to
dynamic forms of cooperation as a result.
Problematizing cooperation contributes to a better understanding of the complex
challenges facing the international community in the 21st century. It suggests that
our existing institutions may be unable to cope with the demands of problems exacer-
bated by the proliferation of ICTs. It suggests that new norms and mechanisms
designed to promote a deeper form of dynamic cooperation may be necessary.
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When academics, journalists, or Internet users discuss ‘‘Internet censorship,’’ they are
usually referring to the inability of users in a given country to access a specific piece of
online content. For instance, when Internet policymakers from around the world came
to Tunisia for the 2005 World Summit on the Information Society, they discovered
that the Tunisian government was blocking access to several sites, including Yezzi.org,
an online freedom of speech campaign.1
This model of Internet filtering, where Internet service providers (ISPs) implement
directives issued by government authorities and block connections to selected
Web addresses, has been extensively documented by the OpenNet Initiative using in-
country testing. Identifying potential cases of filtering by ISPs is likely to be easier in
the future with the advent of tools like Herdict (www.herdict.org), which invite end
users to be involved with in-country testing on a continuing basis.
Given aggressive national filtering policies implemented in countries like Saudi
Arabia, China, and Vietnam, state-sponsored ISP-level Web filtering has been an appro-
priate locus for academic study. However, ISPs are only one possible choke point in a
global Internet. As the Internet increases in popularity around the world, we are begin-
ning to see evidence of Internet filtering at other points in the network. Of particular
interest are online service providers (OSPs) that host social networking services, blogs,
and Web sites. Because so many Internet users are dependent on OSPs to publish con-
tent, censorship by these entities has the potential to be a powerful control on online
speech.
In this chapter, I look at recent developments in intermediary censorship in China,
where unclear government directives mandate censorship by blogging hosts, but pro-
vide little guidance for what content must be filtered. Confusion over U.S. trade restric-
tions is having a chilling effect on speech in the United States, where some OSPs are
removing the accounts of users from sanctioned nations, including sensitive human
rights Web sites. I examine the incentives and costs OSPs face surrounding removal of
online content and argue that protection of online speech rights by these intermedia-
ries will require an affirmation of their role as free speech providers and clarification of
applicable laws and regulations.
Points of Control
While filtering by ISPs was well documented as early as 2002, and commercial tools to
filter Internet access in schools, libraries, and businesses have been available since the
late 1990s, filtering at other points in the network is a more recent phenomenon.
Skype’s Chinese-language client, built in cooperation with TOM Online, demonstrated
that Internet filtering could be implemented at the client software level. In April 2006,
Skype admitted that the co-branded Chinese version of the Skype text chat product fil-
tered users’ messages based on a list of banned keywords.2 In 2008, Internet researcher
Nart Villeneuve discovered that the TOM Skype software was not merely blocking key-
words, but surveilling users, storing conversations where specific keywords had been
mentioned.3
Examples like this indicate that scholars of Internet filtering and censorship need to
develop methods to monitor and study filtering at other points in the network: an end
user’s operating system, application software and hardware; intermediate nodes in net-
works, beyond ISPs and boundary routers; Web hosting providers; and providers of
social media services.
Companies that provide Web hosting services or social media platforms are becom-
ing increasingly important as possible choke points as Web users publish content on
Web servers they do not control. In the early days of the World Wide Web, most Web
sites were managed by organizations that controlled the content posted on the sites,
the server software that delivered Web pages, and the server hardware that ran the
code. While some Web sites are still vertically integrated and managed, the vast major-
ity of Web site developers rent server space from Web hosting companies or use free
Web hosting services like Tripod.com or Wordpress.com.
These OSPs provide services to millions of users, most of whom would lack the
means and technical skill to maintain their own Web servers. Sites that allow publish-
ing in the context of more complex community interactions, like Facebook or Live-
Journal, would be extremely difficult for even a sophisticated user to reproduce. The
unique dynamics of those communities require thousands or millions of users to share
a single platform managed by a community host. While the ease of use of these plat-
forms has been a great boon for online free speech, it has put a great deal of power in
the hands of companies that provide Web site or community hosting services.
Under pressure from local legal authorities, these companies can reveal sensitive in-
formation about users. Yahoo!’s Hong Kong office complied with Chinese government
requests for the identity of a user who forwarded a memo documenting government
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pressure on Chinese journalists to an overseas Web site. Armed with information from
Yahoo!, Chinese authorities arrested journalist Shi Tao and eventually sentenced him
to ten years on charges of leaking state secrets.4 These companies can also act as cen-
sors, removing material that governments deem unacceptable in local jurisdictions.
More unsettlingly, they may also remove material based on misunderstandings of local
laws or based on calculations of fiscal and legal risk.
Host-Based Censorship in China
Studies of ISP-based Internet filtering have characterized Chinese Internet filtering that
was pervasive as early as 2002.5 Bloggers and journalists refer to China’s complex set of
filtering practices as the Great Firewall. It should not be a surprise, then, that China has
pioneered censorship at the Web and community hosting level, as well as filtering con-
tent by means of ISPs.
In March 2004, Chinese authorities closed down three blog hosts—blogcn.com,
blogbus.com, and blogdriver.com—because of concerns that sensitive content was be-
ing published on these sites.6 After these sites reopened, the OpenNet Initiative found
evidence that Chinese-based blogging providers were using lists of sensitive keywords
to prevent controversial content from being posted to their Web servers.7 In June 2005,
Rebecca MacKinnon demonstrated that Microsoft was using similar techniques to
block content on their Chinese-language version of MSN Spaces—her attempts to start
a blog titled ‘‘I love freedom of speech, human rights and democracy’’ (in Chinese)
yielded an error message that she translates as ‘‘You must enter a title for your space.
The title must not contain prohibited language, such as profanity. Please type a differ-
ent title.’’8
A report by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and China Human Rights Defenders,
released in October 2007, was compiled with the help of an anonymous technician
(Mr. Tao) working for a Chinese Internet company, presumably a company involved
with hosting user-generated content. The report, ‘‘A Journey to the Heart of Internet
Censorship,’’9 details training efforts to ensure that employees of content hosting com-
panies censor sensitive content, and describes a weekly meeting at the Internet Infor-
mation Administrative Bureau of the employees of Beijing’s 19 leading Web sites. The
meetings outline sensitive topics likely to be discussed in the coming week and provide
instructions on which topics are to be censored.
While RSF’s report details efforts aimed at coordinating content censorship in China,
subsequent research by MacKinnon reveals that such censorship is extremely unpre-
dictable and subjective. In ‘‘China’s Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Blog-
gers,’’10 MacKinnon and students tested censorship systems on 15 Chinese blogging
providers, using a variety of potentially sensitive texts taken from Chinese-language
blogs and news sites. Her team posted the text to author accounts on the 15 platforms,
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and checked to see whether (1) they were able to successfully post the material, (2)
whether it remained posted 24–48 hours later, and (3) whether they could view the
posted content from a Chinese ISP without using circumvention software.
Results varied widely. One of the blogging service providers tested blocked 60 of 108
tested texts. Another blocked only one. MacKinnon was unable to find a single text
blocked by all blogging providers, though she concluded that current news topics,
which she terms ‘‘sudden incidents’’ were far more likely to be blocked than other sen-
sitive topics. She observes, ‘‘The wide variation in levels of censorship confirms that
censorship of Chinese user-generated content is highly decentralized, and that imple-
mentation is left to the Web companies themselves.’’
While many countries block access to social media sites,11 the vast majority of these
blocked sites are managed and hosted in the United States. China’s unusual approach
of filtering access to sensitive sites and requiring social media providers to censor their
users reflects the large number of social media companies based in China, catering to a
huge domestic market. The history of filtering and censorship in China may have led
to an especially effective model. Since many popular online publishing platforms are
filtered by Chinese ISPs, Chinese netizens have gravitated to hosts located in China.
Because these sites provide interfaces in Chinese, they are easier to use than U.S.-based
sites. And while these sites engage in censorship to avoid government sanctions, most
users will not notice the censorship until they try to post about sensitive topics.
It is somewhat surprising that we have not seen other countries that filter the Inter-
net by means of ISPs implement China’s model of platform-based censorship. How-
ever, Chinese companies have taken leadership in the social media world, while
leading platforms for social media in many other countries that filter the Internet are
located outside national control, generally within the United States.
OSP-Based Censorship in the United States
There is no evidence that the U.S. government is demanding censorship of OSPs in
the same way that the Chinese government has attempted to control social
media. However, unclear U.S. laws may have led to situations in which U.S.-based
OSPs have removed user accounts, effectively silencing those users, based on legal
misinterpretations.
Brenda Burrell is used to worrying about censorship. As one of the cofounders
of Kubatana, a civil-society organization based in Harare, Zimbabwe, she works with
human rights organizations whose members are routinely harassed and imprisoned
for speaking in public or online. In a blog post, she notes that she is used to fielding
questions about what might happen if the Mugabe regime shut down her Internet
operations. But on February 6, 2009, she was surprised to hear from BlueHost, an
American Web-hosting company, that Kubatana’s Web site, along with the Web sites
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of Women of Zimbabwe Arise and Island Hospice and Bereavement Service, would be
disabled so that BlueHost would remain in compliance with U.S. Treasury Department
restrictions.12
BlueHost, which had hosted Kubatana’s Web site, told Burrell that her site was in
contravention of section 13 of their terms of service, which read in part:
Sanctioned Countries presently include, among others, Balkans, Belarus, Burma, Cote d’Ivoire
(Ivory Coast), Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Iraq, former Liberian Regime of
Charles Taylor, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe. ‘Sanctioned Countries’ shall be deemed
automatically to be added to or otherwise modified from time to time consistent with the determi-
nation(s) of the government of the United States, and shall include all other countries with re-
spect to which commercial activities are prohibited, embargoed, sanctioned, banned and/or
otherwise excluded by determination(s) of the government of the United States from time to time.
1. Each Sanctioned Country, all governmental, commercial, or other entities located therein,
and all individuals located in any Sanctioned Country are hereby prohibited from registering or
signing up with, subscribing to, or using any service of BlueHost.Com.13
These are not the terms of service Burrell agreed to when opening an account with
BlueHost. Archived copies of the BlueHost terms of service, retrieved via Archive.org,
do not contain section 13—the section was evidently added sometime after February
8, 2008 (the last date BlueHost’s terms of service is available via Archive.org).14 Burrell
was unaware of the change in terms of service until BlueHost alerted her that she
would need to remove her Web site or face its removal.
Burrell challenged BlueHost’s decision, not by arguing that she was in compliance
with their terms of service—she clearly was not—but by arguing that these terms
of service misrepresented the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions. The sanctions
Zimbabwe faces are targeted to the Mugabe regime, not toward all Zimbabweans. The
U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is quite specific
about who the sanctions target:
Executive Order 13391 prohibits U.S. persons, wherever located, or anyone in the United States
from engaging in any transactions with any person, entity or organization found to: 1.) be under-
mining democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe; 2.) have materially assisted, spon-
sored, or provided financial, material, or technological support to these entities; 3.) be or have
been an immediate family member of a sanctions target; or 4.) be owned, controlled or acting on
behalf of a sanctions target. Persons, entities and organizations referenced in Annex A of the Exec-
utive Order are all incorporated into OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs).15
It would be difficult for a company like BlueHost to evaluate whether Burrell and
Kubatana were engaged in undermining democratic institutions. Fortunately, OFAC
maintains a list of Specially Designated Nationals that U.S. companies are banned
from doing business with—checking against this list is significantly simpler.
Burrell forwarded the relevant OFAC sanctions documents to BlueHost’s abuse
department, sought assistance from the U.S. Embassy in Zimbabwe, and mounted an
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online campaign to pressure BlueHost to change its policies.16 Neither the explanatory
e-mails nor public campaign swayed BlueHost or their CEO Matt Heaton. Burrell
reports that Heaton communicated with her directly on the matter of the campaign,
telling her that her supporters were ‘‘spamming’’ him and that he was unwilling to
help her resolve the situation given this external pressure.17
Pressure from the Treasury Department, however, was ultimately successful. Burrell
received an e-mail from BlueHost on February 18 stating:
Per request from the Treasury Dept, we have reactivated your account with Bluehost. With the re-
lease from the Treasury Department received today from Rachel Nagle of the Treasury Department
via telephone and email confirming on February, 18, 2009 that you do not appear on OFAC’s list
of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons we will continue hosting your website.
We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused you.
Burrell and Kubatana decided that the ‘‘inconvenience’’ was significant enough that
they moved their Web sites to a hosting company based in New Zealand and exempt
from U.S. Treasury Department sanctions—the managing director of that company
was alerted to Kubatana’s status as a Zimbabwean nonprofit and affirmed his willing-
ness to host their Web sites.
Zimbabwean human rights organizations were not the only ones affected by Blue-
Host’s interpretation of U.S. Treasury regulations. Yaraslau Kryvoi, a Belarusian activist
based in Washington, DC, saw his blog, promoting the Belarusian American Associa-
tion, taken down by BlueHost.18 1 Fathi, a prominent Persian blogger, reported that
his blog, as well as several other Persian blogs, were being removed by BlueHost as
they contravened Section 13 of the company’s terms of service.19
Evgeny Morozov, reporting on the situation in Newsweek, suggests that BlueHost’s
decision was based on expediency: ‘‘Although BlueHost is one of the world’s biggest
hosting companies, it probably does not have the time or resources to match the
OFAC list with its own customer ranks. Banning everyone from Belarus takes much
less time and effort.’’ He notes that BlueHost’s terms of service are surprisingly
sloppy—there’s no nation called ‘‘the Balkans,’’ and Morozov wonders whether Blue-
Host plans on removing Romanian and Slovenian sites as well.20 It is worth noting
that, despite Burrell’s successful protest and Morozov’s article, BlueHost’s terms of ser-
vice still include a blanket block on usage from 11 nations, one region, and one long-
deposed regime.
The removal of Iranian, Belarusian, and Zimbabwean content is deeply ironic, given
that the sites that were removed were critical of the governments being sanctioned by
the United States. The actions taken by BlueHost, either at the encouragement of the
Treasury Department or because of their misinterpretation of Treasury regulations,
had an effect opposite to what was intended by those sanctions—by silencing criti-
cism, the removal of these sites benefits the sanctioned governments.
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An Emerging Trend?
It is possible that BlueHost may be on the leading edge of a new trend. Social network-
ing site LinkedIn.com began blocking Syrian users from connecting to their site in
April 2009. Anas Marrawi reported that LinkedIn began blocking Syrian users based
on their IP in late March, but that Syrian users continued to use the site through filter-
ing-circumvention software. On April 19, Marrawi reported that the site delivered a
message to any users who had listed their home country as Syria when they logged
on: ‘‘Access to this account has been suspended. Please contact Customer Service to re-
solve this problem.’’ He contacted customer service and was told that LinkedIn could
no longer provide services to Syrian users.21
Like Kubatana targeting BlueHost, Syrian LinkedIn users and their supporters began
an online campaign to convince LinkedIn to reevaluate their policies. Jillian York,22 a
U.S.-based blogger with strong ties to the Syrian online community, helped coordinate
the effort, writing about the block on the Huffington Post23 and promoting the cause
on Twitter. Through Twitter, she got in touch with LinkedIn’s senior director of corpo-
rate communications, who quickly issued a mea culpa and promised a swift reversal of
the decision.24 Shortly after, LinkedIn issued the following statement: ‘‘Some changes
made to our site recently resulted in Syrian users being unable to access LinkedIn. In
looking into this matter, it has come to our attention that human error led to over
compliance with respect to export controls. This issue is being addressed tonight and
service to our Syrian users should be restored shortly.’’25
It is unclear what has motivated U.S. Web hosting and social media companies to
ensure they are in compliance with Treasury restrictions and export controls. Like Blue-
Host, LinkedIn has recently changed their terms of service. The current terms of service
references export controls in its opening section: ‘‘Your use of LinkedIn services,
including its software, is subject to export and reexport control laws and regulations,
including the the Export Administration Regulations (‘EAR’) maintained by the United
States Department of Commerce and sanctions programs maintained by the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.’’26 An archived version of their terms
of service,27 from January 3, 2008, makes no reference to export controls or sanctioned
countries. Users of hosting and social media tools who live in nations subject to U.S.
export controls or sanctions face an extremely confusing situation. LinkedIn, MySpace,
and Blogger make reference to U.S. export laws, while YouTube, Facebook, Wikipedia,
Rapidshare, and Wordpress do not.28
Web hosting companies are similarly divided—of the 22 top hosting sites, as tracked
by Webhosting.info,29 BlueHost, sister company Hostmonster, and hosting company
One and One require users to certify that they are not from a list of specified countries.
Network Solutions and BCentral offer a general caution that users must comply with
U.S. export laws, and the other hosts do not mention export controls or sanctions in
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their terms of service. (Based on an examination of current terms of service of the 22
top sites as listed by Webhosting.info. One of the top sites does not offer a formal
terms of service—it controls hundreds of thousands of domains itself, but has no cus-
tomer relationships. Two sites serving China did not have terms of service available on
their Web sites. Evaluation covers the remaining 19 sites.)
In contrast to BlueHost’s decision to deny service to over 300 million potential cus-
tomers, sanctioned or not, other companies are taking a de minimis approach to com-
pliance with U.S. government restrictions. Andrew McLaughlin, senior policy counsel
for Google, notes, ‘‘We do the minimum to comply with the export restrictions and
sanctions regimes. Primarily, this means (1) we don’t allow downloads of software
(Google Earth, e.g.,) containing cryptography from IPs believed to be in restricted
countries (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Sudan)—this includes the Google download
server and code.google.com; and (2) we don’t engage in any sort of money transactions
into or out of restricted countries. We do not, though, block access to publicly available
sites where there are no downloads.’’30 Perhaps in reaction to the criticism the com-
pany took for filtering search results in the Chinese market, Google has demonstrated
a willingness to challenge government-mandated filtering measures. When South Korea
passed a law requiring online postings to be accompanied by the author’s real name
and ID card number, Google’s YouTube division disabled commenting and video
uploads from South Korea, but allows Korean users to state that they are posting from
another country and post anonymously.31
The Economics of Intermediary Censorship
Google may have decided to disable comments in South Korea to make a statement
about how requiring identification systems limits online speech. Or they may have
been making a smart business decision—it would have required a major engineering
effort for Google to build an identity authentication system for YouTube in Korea.
The decisions BlueHost, LinkedIn, and others have made make more sense in a context
of business risk and reward, rather than in a free speech and human rights context.
BlueHost advertises entry-level Web hosting for an annual cost of USD 83.40. Web
hosting is a highly competitive business, and profit margins tend to be quite tight.
With professional legal counsel experienced in U.S. export and sanctions law charging
hundreds of dollars an hour for advice, it is an easy decision for BlueHost to sacrifice a
handful of customer relationships in exchange for avoiding legal review. It is possible
that LinkedIn made a similar evaluation and reversed course when public pressure
indicated that LinkedIn’s cost in terms of public relations damage might be substantial
for removing Syrian users.
Wendy Seltzer identifies the problem of ‘‘unbalanced incentives’’ as a major concern
in the United States’ administration of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
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Section 512(c) of the DMCA provides ‘‘safe harbor’’ from liability due to copyright in-
fringement if online service providers follow a prescribed procedure to remove copy-
righted content when alerted by the copyright’s owner.32 On receiving a properly
completed notice, an OSP should promptly remove the content in question and alert
the individual who posted it, giving her an opportunity to respond with a counterno-
tice to the party claiming infringement—on receipt of this counternotice, the OSP
should restore the material to the Internet within 14 business days.
Seltzer argues that OSPs have a great incentive to take down potentially infringing
material (the threat of litigation from movie studios or record companies), but signifi-
cantly less incentive to protect the First Amendment rights of users. Providers do not
generally alert their users that they might have a fair use argument to defend their use
of a piece of content or direct users to sites like Chilling Effects (www.chillingeffects
.org), a clearinghouse of information on takedown notices developed by Seltzer and
others. The incentives for removing content are large, and they are small—and perhaps
negative—for OSPs to encourage their users to fight takedown notices. If an OSP devel-
ops a reputation for aggressively defending user rights, it is likely to attract more users
who generate infringement claims. Each one of these claims requires time and legal
resources from an OSP to respond to—as a result, OSPs have an incentive to rapidly re-
move potentially infringing users and, perhaps, to discourage them from returning.
Sjoera Nas and the Dutch nonprofit Bits of Freedom wondered whether Netherlands
ISPs would defend user rights against complaints of copyright infringement, so they
mounted an experiment. In 2004, they opened accounts with ten Dutch OSPs and
posted the same public domain text written by Eduard Douwes Dekker, better known
by the pen name Multatuli. Then, they sent complaints in the name of a fictitious Mr.
Johan Droogleever, legal advisor to the E. D. Dekker Society, which claimed to hold
copyright to the works and demanded their removal. Seven of ten OSPs complied
swiftly, without challenging the claim or demanding further information, despite the
fact that the e-mail came from a Hotmail address. However, ISPs generally alerted the
fictitious customer to the takedown request. Nas concludes, ‘‘It only takes a Hotmail
account to bring a website down, and freedom of speech stands no chance in front of
the cowboy-style private ISP justice.’’33
Whether Seltzer or Nas is correct in being concerned that copyright infringe-
ment complaints favor IP owners rights over user rights, the mechanisms for removing
content suggest key weaknesses that censors could exploit. During the 2008 presiden-
tial election, both the Obama and McCain camps found that campaign videos were
frequently removed from YouTube. The videos in question generally featured small
excerpts from broadcast television newscasts, and takedown notices were issued
by those broadcasters. The campaigns challenged the takedowns, arguing that their
use of excerpts represented fair use.34 Given the rapid-fire nature of political cam-
paigns, the 14 business days it can take to restore a video to YouTube may effectively
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constitute censorship. It seems likely that we will see political rivals attempt to disable
each other’s online speech using spurious copyright claims, even though these claims
run the risk of exposing a complainant to penalties for acting in bad faith.
We are already beginning to see attacks on online speech that attempt to trigger an
‘‘immune system response’’ from hosting companies. Irrawaddy, a leading Web site for
Burmese dissidents, suffered a series of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in
September 2008. Other pro-dissident sites, including the Oslo-based Democratic Voice
of Burma and the New Era Journal, based in Bangkok, were rendered inaccessible by
DDoS attacks, prompting speculation that the attacks were the work of hackers hired
by the Burmese government.35 As Irrawaddy struggled to fend off the DDoS attacks,
its hosting provider became increasingly agitated, since the DDoS attack affected their
other customers. For a period of time, the attack was so severe that Thailand’s primary
Internet connection was overloaded with DDoS traffic. The attack had the immediate
effect of making the site unreachable, as well as the longer-term effect of forcing Irra-
waddy to find a new ISP.36
As with copyright takedown notices, OSPs have a strong incentive to remove ‘‘trou-
blesome’’ users—DDoS attacks can require hours of expensive system administration
time to fend off. For hosting accounts that generate little revenue, the cost of fending
off even a small DDoS is likely to exceed profit margins, and OSPs have an incentive to
remove customers who have come under attack. Providers that develop a reputation
for protecting their users from DDoS attacks are likely to attract customers who come
under DDoS attacks, increasing their costs. As such, some OSPs are comfortable remov-
ing customers because they have come under attack. A libel lawsuit between Coloca-
tion America and Archie Garga-Richardson, whose Web site came under DDoS attack
while hosted by Colocation America, makes it clear that OSPs are sometimes willing
to remove customers generating thousands of dollars of revenue.37
Implications for Researchers
While the underlying threats to speech are deeply different between the case of
Chinese blogging hosts studied by MacKinnon and U.S.-based OSPs outlined here, a
common theme emerges: threats to online speech come not just from government
action, but from the needs of OSPs to interpret and follow government regulations
and to turn an operating profit. If this trend persists and grows, it has implications for
scholars and activists focused on this issue.
Scholars need to develop tools and methods to study corporate filtering of Internet
content. These methods might incorporate the techniques pioneered by MacKinnon
in testing Chinese Web sites for automated censorship, perhaps with development of
more robust tools to help automate testing. They could also include a site like Chilling
Effects focused on collecting reports of corporate censorship of content, or an expan-
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sion of the work of the Citizen Media Law Project to thoroughly document filtering
and censorship by online service providers beyond the United States. Global Voices
Advocacy, which now maps the accessibility of social media Web sites in different
countries, may need to start mapping Web sites that ban users from certain countries.
To the extent that confusion over U.S. Treasury and export restrictions is leading to-
ward the removal of Web sites and the understandable uncertainty of users in sanc-
tioned countries, it may be worth pursuing clarifications from the U.S. government.
Clinical students at the Berkman Center at Harvard are pursuing a formal request to
the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control to clarify the restrictions that social
media and Web hosting companies face in providing services to users in sanctioned
countries. If the Berkman Center receives useful clarifications, it will need to develop a
strategy to communicate these guidelines to the affected companies.
Intermediary censorship by U.S. companies appears to be experiencing a steep and
sudden rise. In May 2009, Vineetha Menon reported that Microsoft had turned off its
Windows Live Messenger service in Iran, Syria, Sudan, Cuba, and North Korea, citing
OFAC sanctions.38 It is likely that Microsoft, BlueHost, and LinkedIn are not acting en-
tirely independently—they may all be coming under pressure from the U.S. Treasury
Department or another government authority. It would be useful for journalists or
researchers to determine whether there is an organized campaign to remove users
from these five sanctioned countries from U.S.-based tools. Given the use of these tools
by human rights activists and ordinary citizens, a policy of removing all users in sanc-
tioned nations from these tools merits careful public debate. It is possible that the
most interested opponent of U.S. Treasury policy might be the U.S. State Department,
anxious to hear opposition voices in repressive nations.
Imbalanced Incentives and Free Speech
So long as it continues to be possible for for-profit OSPs to terminate difficult clients for
arbitrary reasons, it is likely that we will see providers ‘‘optimizing’’ their client base,
providing services to customers who do not attract DDoS attacks or copyright or trade
complaints. In a recent New York Times article, Brad Stone and Miguel Helft introduce
the troubling idea that social media sites may start restricting memberships for users in
developing nations because they are finding it difficult to target ads to these users.39
If these trends increase, organizations dedicated to free and open speech, especially
in developing nations, may find themselves needing to create OSPs specifically ori-
ented toward the needs of users who are less fiscally appealing to social media and
Web hosting companies. We can imagine supporters of human rights creating OSPs
explicitly to provide services for human rights organizations.
This is probably a poor idea. The cost structures of these organizations will be signifi-
cantly higher than for traditional hosting providers, as they are likely to attract users
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who come under attack by DDoS or who introduce complex legal questions. Further-
more, when human rights activists congregate on a small subset of servers, traditional
ISP-level filtering becomes a more effective tool for censoring sensitive speech. If all
sites critical of Burmese government policy are located on a single group of servers,
that server is certain to be blocked at a national level, and is likely to come under sus-
tained DDoS attack. By utilizing OSPs used by nonactivists, activists raise the social cost
of traditional censorship—a country that chooses to block the Blogger.com domain to
prevent access to a subset of blogs removes access from millions of uncontroversial
Web sites, alienating citizens. Individuals who were not interested in the censored
content become aware of the censorship when they can no longer access other
Blogger.com sites.
Rather than creating a subset of Web sites that protect speech, it would be vastly
better to see OSPs affirm their roles as providers of free speech tools to users throughout
the world. As discussed earlier, this is a difficult decision for an organization, particu-
larly a for-profit company, to make in isolation. At the moment, companies seem to
be choosing a legally cautious path, disabling access for users in sanctioned countries
before experiencing pressure from activists.
The experience of the successful protest against LinkedIn’s block of Syrian users sug-
gests that one powerful tool activists have is public protest. While companies may
make a calculated financial decision to discontinue services to certain users, public
pressure can add another factor into the equation—the potential lost business from
bad publicity. While the LinkedIn protest shows the power of this strategy, BlueHost’s
decision not to reconsider their terms of service shows that the influence of public
pressure may be limited.
Given the importance of OSPs as a space for open, public speech, it is necessary to
consider their responsibilities as common carriers. For OSPs to limit their liabilities as
common carriers, they should be required to provide services to anyone legally using
these services, even if their usage is likely to attract DDoS attacks. To do otherwise is
to allow attackers a ‘‘heckler’s veto,’’ an ability to silence speech by creating a damag-
ing and expensive response to that speech. If OSPs are required to provide services to
any law-abiding users, an appropriate response to this form of intermediary censorship
is legal action to address discrimination, not public protest. An affirmation of OSPs’
role as common carriers would not resolve the situation Iranian and Syrian users are
facing, but it might invite legal action that would force clarification of U.S. Treasury
sanctions.
Conclusion
In countries like China, where online speech is carefully monitored and controlled, we
are likely to see intermediary censorship emerge as an increasingly important compo-
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nent of a censorship apparatus. Filtering at the OSP level blocks content from reaching
both local and international audiences, allowing more thorough control of online con-
tent. The phenomenon is most developed in China, in part because existing Internet
filtering strategies drive local users to publish on locally hosted sites, and in part be-
cause linguistic constraints drive Chinese-speaking users to a particular set of tools. If
filtering and language constraints drive users in the Middle East toward locally hosted
tools, we might expect to see similar systems of OSP-based filtering emerge.
As users around the world look to online services hosted in less controlled countries
to find unfiltered venues to publish their content, other forms of content filtering are
emerging. Online service providers have compelling financial incentives not to host
content likely to provoke DDoS attacks or raise complex legal issues. While clarification
of relevant regulations may help reduce uncertainty about what content can and can-
not be hosted, there is a danger that OSPs will stop providing services to some users.
This tendency needs to be counterbalanced by the sorts of public protest that called
attention to BlueHost’s and LinkedIn’s actions, but user’s rights will only be guaran-
teed by an affirmation of common carrier status that explicitly protects rights to pub-
lish on these platforms.
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6 Protecting Privacy and Expression Online
Can the Global Network Initiative Embrace the Character of the Net?
Colin M. Maclay
Introduction
When Yahoo! became interested in building upon the surprise success of its services in
Vietnam, it was not simply a matter of finding an established partner or setting up
local servers, but began with a human rights impact assessment. This process sought
to anticipate the potential risks to freedom of expression and privacy in Vietnam that
might result from expanded operations, and to develop strategies to mitigate them.
What could happen if the Vietnamese authorities determined a blog post to be illegal
and demanded its removal, also requesting the author’s name? Ultimately, Yahoo! de-
cided to make its data harder to reach by hosting servers offshore (in Singapore), to re-
duce vulnerability to external pressure by minimizing the number and responsibilities
of staff (hiring only a local sales team, rather than people with operational control),
and to implement a series of other policies intended to limit avenues used by govern-
ment to abridge human rights.1
Although the decisions implied slower service and less robust operations, Yahoo!
placed those costs in perspective of previous very difficult and public lessons, most
notably, the ugly aftermath of having provided Chinese authorities with infor-
mation used in the 2005 imprisonment of Chinese journalist Shi Tao.2 This trade of
near-term profits for principles (and hopefully, long-term gain) was informed—and
required—by a nascent multistakeholder effort called the Global Network Initiative
(GNI),3 of which Yahoo! is a founding member. Participants evaluate human rights
risks and seek opportunities to mitigate them when considering whether and how to
enter a new market. Yahoo!’s motivations were likely diverse, but the actions were
aligned with their mission, corporate health and profitability,4 and the preferences of
at least some shareholders.5
GNI’s collaborative approach to compensating for the lack of effective legal and
policy measures to protect and advance online privacy and expression extends far be-
yond these assessments, recognizing that genuine progress requires a context of con-
scious corporate commitment to meaningfully integrate the protection of freedom of
expression and privacy into both business practice and corporate culture. For its part,
in 2008, Yahoo! created the Business and Human Rights Program, supported by corpo-
rate leadership, guided by principles and internal process, staffed by cross-functional
teams, tracking an inventory of rights issues, informed by stakeholder engagement,
and subject to outside monitoring and accountability.6 These internal developments
are complemented, informed, and reinforced by Yahoo!’s participation in the GNI.
From recent postelection violence in Kenya and Moldova facilitated by mobile
devices to vibrant online expression in Vietnam, ongoing battles over culturally sensi-
tive (and legally prohibited) imagery online in Turkey and Thailand, and the record
proportion of online journalists detained worldwide in 2008, digital tools are associ-
ated with voice and power, and governments realize it. Whether as part of the normal
sociopolitical milieu or in a moment of crisis, they are increasingly aware not only of
the power of new media, but also of the role of private companies in providing—and
potentially limiting—that power.
Governments also seem to be more cognizant of the unique characteristics of the Net
as compared to traditional media, not only in terms of how these traits might allow it
to threaten the status quo, but also where associated weaknesses can lie. However mis-
takenly, many people have come to understand this vulnerability of information and
communication technologies (ICT) companies to government interference as the China
Problem, owing in large measure to publicized instances in which Microsoft, Yahoo!,
and Google have failed to adequately protect their users’ rights to freedom of expres-
sion and privacy. Unfortunately, similar challenges are emerging around the world,
oftentimes at the hands of democratic governments, and not only in the Global South,
but also in the West.7
In response to these tensions and understanding the complexity of resolving them, a
group of companies, civil society organizations, investors, and academics spent over
two years creating a collaborative approach to protect and advance freedom of expres-
sion and privacy in the ICT sector, and formed an initiative to take this work forward.
Proposed by my colleagues John Palfrey and Jonathan Zittrain in the book Access
Denied and elsewhere,8 the GNI released foundational documents in October 2008
and publicly launched in December 2008 on the 60th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The group includes Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!,
along with numerous noncompany participants, such as Human Rights Watch, Hu-
man Rights in China, Committee to Project Journalists, Human Rights First, Calvert
Investments, Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), and the Berkman Center
for Internet and Society, where I work.
The process has been rewarding and challenging, seeking to move beyond mistrust,
hostility, and competition, drawing upon human rights experiences in sectors as far
afield as labor and security, and balancing the perspectives and needs of the diverse
participants. It began as three separate processes, driven respectively by companies,
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scholars, and non-governmental organizations. In early 2006, a group of companies
first met to draft an industry code of conduct under the joint facilitation of Business
for Social Responsibility (BSR) and the Berkman Center. That spring, Orville Schell
and Xiao Qiang of the University of California-Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journal-
ism initiated the creation of a code of conduct by academics, in collaboration with the
Berkman Center. Meanwhile, CDT convened a third set of actors to deepen under-
standing, raise issue awareness, and seek solutions. Participants from the three pro-
cesses met in Oxford in July 2006 and soon agreed to work together.
This chapter examines the context in which GNI has emerged, describes its structure
and intentions, explores some concerns, and highlights some of the challenges GNI
must address to fulfill its intended purpose. Issues that will impact success include the
tensions among structure and flexibility, aspiration and practicality, and refining
known approaches and creating new ones. While these considerations play into many
elements of the initiative, they are particularly salient with respect to accountability
and governance. I offer these thoughts as objectively as possible, recognizing my per-
sonal participation throughout the process, to support collective understanding of
both this process and emerging institutional approaches to governance in the knowl-
edge society.
Government and Business Collide: Expression and Privacy at Risk
All over the world, companies in the ICT sector face increasing government pressure to
comply with domestic laws and practices in ways that conflict with both core elements
of their business and their users’ fundamental rights to privately impart and access in-
formation and communication. Whether law enforcement officials request a user’s per-
sonal information for unknown reasons or a takedown of content that is acceptable in
other jurisdictions, companies find themselves in an untenable position in which they
must balance their obligation to respect local law with their responsibility to protect
the rights of their users. Companies know that resisting a government is costly, per-
haps placing their operating license and local employees at risk, but that acceding
blindly can have terrible implications for them and their users, and that this tension
is ever more part of their business. A (more) sustainable solution is essential.9
Described most comprehensively by Palfrey and Zittrain in Access Denied and in-
formed by the OpenNet Initiative’s research, the problem has been framed in many
ways, whether as an ethical issue, a reckless drive for appealing markets, an interna-
tional legal question, a matter of Internet governance, a trade barrier,10 or an organiza-
tional deficit. It is clear that ICT companies (broadly interpreted) face very real
challenges with respect to freedom of expression and privacy. Left unchecked, govern-
ments seem likely to chip away at these fundamental freedoms, potentially leading
companies into a proverbial race to the bottom, with a possibly daunting impact
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upon these liberties and the other rights they help to protect. Responsible interna-
tional companies might also choose to withdraw from such markets in order to protect
themselves against complicity, thereby further limiting the options of local users and
sacrificing the opportunity to engage troublesome governments constructively.
Under the guidance of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations on business and human rights, John Ruggie, the United Nations has
developed the Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework: ‘‘Each principle is an essential
component of the framework: the state duty to protect because it lies at the very core
of the international human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to respect be-
cause it is the basic expectation society has of business; and access to remedy, because
even the most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse, while access to judicial re-
dress is often problematic, and non-judicial means are limited in number, scope, and
effectiveness. The three principles form a complementary whole in that each supports
the others in achieving sustainable progress.’’11
Ruggie’s work recognizes the tremendous power of business but points out that mar-
kets work best when they exist in the context of rules and institutions. While he iden-
tifies governance gaps created by globalization as a root cause of the often uneasy and
sometimes negative relationship between business and human rights, he also notes
that most businesses do not actually have systems to know when they are causing
harm.
Government Steps In: Policy and Regulatory Responses
While business has focused its requests on the executive branch, requesting bilateral
assistance in individual cases and on trade issues, civil society has been more likely to
call for proscriptive legal solutions, spurring significant legislative interest.12 Such
approaches face many challenges, including law’s tendency to trail technology because
of its rapid pace of change, evolving business models, unanticipated user behavior, and
unpredictable government action, to say nothing of the cultural differences and juris-
dictional issues associated with globalization and the Internet. These factors, combined
with the desire to support continued innovation and creativity in the ICT space, sug-
gest that specific legal interventions or policy prescriptions may be premature, or may
even risk taking a step backward.
A varied group of supporters within the U.S. Congress has harnessed members who
are rights supporters and China-watchers, liberals and conservatives, to raise issue
awareness. Holding frequent hearings and considering the Global Online Freedom Act
(GOFA)13 annually for the past three years, their actions may occur at the intersection
of policy and politics, but they have created invaluable urgency for companies to take
action. Amid many other legitimate concerns, CDT has criticized GOFA for creating an
adversarial relationship with companies, rather than a collaborative one.14 For its part,
the U.S. Department of State created the Global Internet Freedom Task Force to track
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the issue and engage with foreign governments, but along with the Department of
Justice, the State Department also expressed concern over GOFA.15 The shortest ver-
sion of our analysis at the Berkman Center is that GOFA is simply too blunt, impracti-
cal, and inflexible: although the GNI may provide the basis for law over time, we
simply do not yet have a clear enough sense of the answers to mandate any particular
approach, let alone the proposed one.16
European policymakers have likewise been active on issues related to online expres-
sion and privacy on both the substantive and the political fronts. The Council of
Europe has offered actionable insights, including fostering understanding and develop-
ing useful guidance for the interactions between ICT service providers and law enforce-
ment17 and providing clear and detailed guidance on human rights issues for ICT
providers.18 The European Parliament weighed in on security and freedom online, call-
ing for sustained engagement and expressing interest in developing a multistakeholder
initiative.19 It has also recommended the creation of a code of conduct for freedom of
expression.20 Parliamentarians from across Europe also introduced a version of
GOFA,21 leading Viviane Reding, European Commission Lead Member on the Informa-
tion Society, to express concern over the ‘‘heavy’’ nature of the instruments (including
the prospect of forcing companies to withdraw and leave markets to less scrupulous
competitors) and to place promise in the GNI.22
Sadly, even as some governments seek to address this problem globally, numerous
competing government efforts are under way that will abridge the human rights others
are seeking to preserve.23 While problems in developing and transitioning countries
first caught the public eye, it is the disconcerting legislation among early Internet
adopters that has received attention recently. From proposals for national filtering in
Australia to the South Korean government’s requirement for real name registration,
efforts to rein in perceived Internet dangers represent troubling examples for countries
that are just beginning their policymaking efforts related to the Internet.
Stakeholders Unite: Global Network Initiative
Recognizing profound challenges associated with the broad spectrum of laws and
practices related to freedom of expression and privacy in states around the world,
as well as the laws and standards of home countries, employees, shareholders, and
the international community, some ICT companies decided not to continue down
this path in isolation. The initial framing was inspired substantially by the Sullivan
Principles,24 introduced in 1977 as a code of conduct for U.S. companies doing
business in apartheid South Africa. An industry-code approach offered the potential to
set a higher standard than if companies were left to fend for themselves, allowed them
to benefit from the strength of their numbers, and it recognized the need for even
dread competitors to unite around certain values—all while retaining control of the
expectations.
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But given the complexity of the current situation—that it is not simply about com-
panies following the law (or divesting), but also about companies understanding when
and how to challenge the law and avoiding conflicts and mitigating risk in the first
place—increased expectations alone would have limited impact. Gaining a deeper and
wider understanding of the pressures, developing supportive internal process and
structure, advancing global transparency, and engaging other stakeholders were judged
equally important—and best accomplished collectively. The perspective was not based
simply on altruism, but established by recognizing the broader business case, including
the fundamental social obligations of which companies have been clearly reminded by
human rights organizations, academics, investors, shareholders, and U.S. and Euro-
pean policymakers through protest, legislation, shareholder resolutions, and public
criticism. Ultimately, the companies recognized that they faced a serious business
problem with profound implications for all human rights.
Conversations about developing a response began in early 2006, with a consensus
emerging that underscored the importance of collaboration across sectors, each recog-
nizing that it required the other for understanding, implementation, legitimacy, expe-
rience, access, and so on. There was consensus that law and regulation were not
currently attending to the challenges that individual companies confronted in seeking
to respond responsibly to government requests. An unlikely family was born, including
former colleagues, current competitors, and long-time critics, and in which each group
needed the other to accomplish its goals and across which there was (perhaps) surpris-
ing overlap. There was also a great diversity of views, in particular, on how best to
achieve those goals, what to take as givens, and so on.
Beginnings
As the group moved from research and brainstorming to drafting, clear questions
emerged. What was the proper balance between aspiration (as manifest in documents
and language) and realistic, operational, and evaluable results? How high should the
bar be set? How would the noncompany partners (and the world) know whether the
company partners were implementing (and maintaining) their commitments? What
was the scope of the effort, in terms of company types, technologies, and business
models? Should focus go beyond freedom of expression and privacy, extending to
other rights, or to rule of law? What were the primary activities in which the group
could begin to see results in the near term and create value over time?
The group was able to exploit its institutional and individual differences, using them
to flesh out alternatives and implications, and to identify the intersections of ambi-
tious, realistic, meaningful, and sustainable solutions, based on interests and compro-
mise, rather than positions and claiming. Many of these key tensions are discernible
within the structure and letter of the GNI, some largely resolved, others to be informed
by future learning—an expectation built into the GNI. While the participants brought
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a wealth of knowledge and experience to the process, our collectively limited under-
standing was also acknowledged and is reflected in GNI’s adaptive stance.
Beyond identifying common cause, reaching rough consensus for an operating
approach was essential for the development of supportive strategies and tactics. These
positions are apparent in the documents, both by their presence and their absence.
As with the rest of the group decisions, they do not necessarily represent agreement,
except in the collaborative context of the GNI. The consensus included support for cor-
porate engagement, the development of tools that accounted for the complexity of the
situation, and the notion that we would actively develop understanding and responses
over time.
The group, for instance, took the perspective that on balance it was better to have
companies operating responsibly even in potentially repressive markets, both in terms
of services rendered and the leverage of positive engagement (around transparency and
rule of law, in particular). Platforms that many consider self-indulgent or worse, includ-
ing Twitter (and its 140-character ‘‘what are you doing?’’), Facebook, and YouTube,
have proven to be powerful platforms for activists. (Indeed, in the lead-up to the 20th
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests, these and others were blocked in
China.25) The tools they provide to potentially advance social, economic, and political
democracy are especially important in information- and communications-poor set-
tings, as artfully argued by my colleague Ethan Zuckerman.26
Just as we note the power of new technologies to support human rights, it is equally
essential to recognize the potential influence of company relationships and process on
government behavior. After Microsoft removed Michael Anti’s blog based on a less-
than-formal request from Chinese law enforcement, for instance, the company im-
plemented new policies with respect to content takedowns. In addition to limiting
removal to the local jurisdiction, Microsoft began requiring ‘‘legally binding notice
from the government indicating that the material violates local laws,’’ as well as requir-
ing assurance ‘‘that users know why that content was blocked, by notifying them that
access has been limited due to a government restriction.’’27 Google’s launch of
Google.cn, criticized by many for its willingness to censor results, also initiated the
practice of appending a warning to filtered search results that notes the removal of cer-
tain results according to local law, subsequently instituted by Microsoft and Yahoo!,
and later followed by Chinese services including market-leader Baidu.28 Moving for-
ward, strong corporate process may indeed be a great resource for supporting rule of
law and fostering increased transparency on free expression and privacy.
Participants
Global Network Initiative participants include ICT companies, nongovernmental
organizations, investors, and academics. The founding group of companies comprises
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!. Academic participants in the GNI are Annenberg School
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for Communication (University of Southern California); Deirdre Mulligan, Berkeley
School of Information (University of California); Berkman Center for Internet and Soci-
ety (Harvard University); Rebecca MacKinnon, Journalism and Media Studies Centre
(University of Hong Kong); and Research Center for Information Law (University of
St. Gallen). Investors participating in the GNI are Boston Common Asset Management,
Calvert Group, Domini Social Investments LLC, F&C Asset Management, KLD Re-
search & Analytics, Inc., and Trillium Asset Management. Nongovernmental organiza-
tions participating in the GNI are Center for Democracy and Technology, Committee
to Protect Journalists, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Human Rights First, Human
Rights in China, Human Rights Watch, International Business Leaders Forum, Inter-
news, and World Press Freedom Committee. The United Nations Special Representa-
tive to the Secretary General on business and human rights enjoys observer status. The
drafting group also included Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, France
Telecom, Teliasonera, and Vodafone, none of whom continued to participate in the
GNI after launch.
Foundational Elements
The structure and overall approach that emerged from the multiyear process are largely
defined by three documents: the Principles,29 the Implementation Guidelines,30 and
the Governance, Accountability, and Learning Framework,31 which were released in
October 2008 and will be supplemented by the Governance Charter, slated for final ap-
proval in September 2009. At the most fundamental, aspirational, and stable level lie
the Principles, which express overarching support for international standards centered
on expression and privacy, and a commitment to act upon them. The associated
Implementation Guidelines provide concrete guidance to companies regarding the re-
alization of the Principles in practice and are intended to reflect developing institu-
tional knowledge and respond to the challenges companies and users face. The
Framework describes the initial expectations regarding a supporting organization and
the general design of the accountability and learning regime, which both ensures that
companies are complying with the Principles and fosters learning within and across
GNI participants.
Principles
While implementation will surely prove to be the greatest challenge, the audacious
first task of the 20-odd participating organizations—and the essential first step toward
orienting the Initiative’s values and goals—was to articulate a common understanding
of global principles for freedom of expression and privacy online. In doing so, the GNI
drew heavily upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which together constitute the
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International Bill of Human Rights.32 Within this broad frame, the document high-
lights the undergirding role of government in respecting, protecting, and promoting
human rights, along with the complementary responsibility—and opportunity—of
ICT companies to do likewise.
The Principles include a preamble and sections on freedom of expression; privacy;
responsible company decision making; multistakeholder collaboration; and gover-
nance, accountability, and transparency. The structure and tone balance lofty state-
ments with more actionable commitments within each of these areas, acknowledging
the elements of aspiration and implementation in the GNI.
While the GNI limits its explicit focus to online expression and privacy, the Princi-
ples recognize the interdependence of all human rights. They call out the particularly
important role of expression and privacy in realizing other rights and as guarantors of
human dignity. On the more active side, GNI participants commit to protect expres-
sion and privacy rights both generally and in the face of laws and government
demands that seek to undermine them.
They also acknowledge ‘‘narrow’’ but potentially substantial exceptions to the rights
outlined in the ICCPR, including ‘‘actions necessary to preserve national security and
public order, protect public health or morals, or safeguard the rights or reputations of
others,’’33 related interpretations issued by international human rights bodies, and the
Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression, and Access to
Information.
The sections that describe the key elements of the GNI’s approach—including re-
sponsible company decision making; multistakeholder collaboration; and governance,
accountability, and transparency—include reference to both higher-level vision and
operational commitments. Companies agree to integrate the Principles within their
mission, decisions, and culture, and to that end, commit to senior-level involvement,
to anticipate risks and opportunities centered on expression and privacy, and to
make best efforts to encourage partners and related businesses to also implement
the Principles. In recognition of the novel challenges associated with ICT, the Princi-
ples point to the value of collaborative strategies that reach across sectors, and agree
to engage jointly to advance expression and privacy. The final, and perhaps most
notable, element is the commitment to public transparency and accountability in im-
plementation of the Principles—including independent assessment and evaluation of
compliance.
Implementation Guidelines
While accounting for the limitations of the GNI’s current incipient understanding of
effective strategies and tactics, the Guidelines promise actionable steps for ICT compa-
nies that constitute compliance with the Principles and provide an initial framework
for collaboration among participants. Drawing upon collective experience to date,
Protecting Privacy and Expression Online 95
they are designed as a starting point, prepared to incorporate lessons as the GNI and its
participants discern them.
The expectations cover roughly the same terrain as the Principles, but place ‘‘respon-
sible company decision making’’ first, suggesting the overall frame within which the
activities occur. Companies are expected to form internal cross-functional teams to
lead implementation, to train employees (and the board) on approaches and proce-
dures, to provide whistle-blowing mechanisms for employees, and to encourage busi-
ness partners and others to adopt the Principles.
With a priority placed on preventing incidents, participants will undertake human
rights impact assessments to identify circumstances when expression and privacy
rights may be jeopardized or advanced (e.g., entering new markets; designing and
introducing new technologies, products, or services; selecting partners; responding
to policy change) and develop steps to mitigate risks and to leverage opportunities.
Companies will elaborate procedures and policies that govern these occurrences and
the possible issues that arise within them.
The Guidelines state that authorities seeking to limit expression or privacy will be
expected to do so in writing along with the legal basis for the restriction and the
name of the requesting official, and that when required by governments to limit access
to information and ideas, companies will interpret laws and requests narrowly and
communicate actions to users when legally permissible. When they are confronted
with a practice that appears inconsistent with domestic law and procedures or interna-
tional human rights laws and standards on expression or privacy, companies will chal-
lenge it. Companies will document these requests and demands to permit tracking and
review.
Governance, Learning, and Accountability Framework
Much of the value of the collective is created by means of the activities described in the
Framework, which include the GNI’s organizational structure and responsibilities,
along with those of the participating companies and the independent assessors. The
Framework covers basic institution-building responsibilities including recruiting of
new participants and outreach, fostering learning and collaboration on policy issues,
offering a communications channel for external parties and users, publishing an an-
nual report, and creating an accountability mechanism.
Independent monitoring, which begins with an orientation toward process and
becomes increasingly comprehensive over the GNI’s first five years (ultimately includ-
ing incident review), supports corporate accountability, remediation where necessary,
development of good practice among participants, and continued evolution and re-
finement of the GNI. The accountability process moves from capacity building (2009–
2010), to independent process review (2011), and independent process and case review
(2012 and beyond). The phasing process was designed to accommodate the lack of
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existing capacity to conduct monitoring and assessment in the ICT space, with the rec-
ognition that assessment would have to parallel a gradual learning process, evolving
alongside the GNI and company implementation. During the first phase, the board
develops independence and competence criteria for monitor selection as well as opera-
tional guidance for assessors, while the companies initiate implementation of the Prin-
ciples, and the organization focuses on learning and outreach.
The second phase expects the companies to have fully implemented the Principles
and provided a detailed report of its internal processes to the organization. Based on
this report, an assessor (or team, more likely) who meets the GNI’s criteria and is
selected by a company will review that company’s processes in operation. In preparing
their report, assessors draw upon other relevant materials from the company, except in
cases of reasonable legal limits to disclosure, preservation of attorney-client privilege,
or protection of trade secrets.
In addition to facilitating the assessment process, the organization will review the ac-
countability process with an eye to necessary improvements, while also informing the
board of the results of individual assessments. In conjunction with GNI participants,
the organization develops ‘‘clear, achievable guidelines’’ for compliance with the next
phase of assessment based on experience to date.
In the third phase, the board accredits a pool of eligible assessors, identifying any con-
cerns related to independence for particular companies, and companies draw from this
pool, with the board resolving any resulting concerns. With GNI’s guidance, the asses-
sor goes beyond process, examining actual incidents and company responses to gov-
ernment requests, providing recommendations for improvement and a detailed report
to the GNI on the company’s implementation of the Principles. Based on this and ac-
counting for any changes the company has made in response to the findings, the
board will determine whether the company meets GNI expectations and share that
finding publicly.
As in the previous phase, companies may choose to withhold certain information
based on legal limitation (as in the case of a national security letter), for the preserva-
tion of attorney-client privilege, or to protect trade secrets, but will be expected to pro-
vide as much information as possible as to any specific limitations on their responses.
Withholding and the reasoning behind it will be reported and factored into the find-
ings and may render the assessor unable to certify compliance.
Criticisms and Challenges
Lackluster Participation
As varied as the group is in many respects, the Global Network Initiative clearly lacks
culturally and geographically diverse participation, and is likewise limited in terms of
the range of participating organizations within sectors, and companies in particular,
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which is surprising given the expectation of diverse corporate approaches to business
and technology and the avoidance of techno-deterministic solutions. For instance,
with the tremendous influence of telecommunications companies and recent issues to
date (e.g., warrantless wiretaps or TOM-Skype surveillance),34 their absence represents
an important and missing piece of the puzzle. Their participation throughout the draft-
ing process suggests that the model should be fairly well suited to their interests, and
yet they chose not to continue. Likewise, given the potential for explosive growth and
expansion within the ICT space, the lack of small companies is notable—and trou-
bling. From a strategic perspective, their inclusion is important to ensure diversity of
perspective and practicability of approach, to say nothing of orienting them to human
rights issues at the stages when integration with corporate functioning may be easier.
These deficits do not necessarily reflect a lack of GNI commitment to identifying
additional partners and are likely a result of some combination of its early stage of
organizational development, a market reaction, and limited outreach capacity. In each
case, however, GNI must ask what it needs to do to attract these groups, and also
whether their absence has some larger significance. Legislators, shareholders, and other
stakeholders should also consider whether they offer a sufficiently ample reward—and
urgency—for companies to make the investments necessary to participate in GNI.
Given that neither non-Western nor start-up companies took part in the drafting pro-
cess (a path passively taken and reluctantly accepted by the group for expediency), it
seems possible that some adaptation of the GNI may be necessary to facilitate their par-
ticipation, especially those in markets less welcoming to the GNI.
Accommodations could conceivably take many forms, whether some manner of on-
boarding or associate membership for those unable to implement the principles imme-
diately, or a private form of participation, either to avoid government scrutiny or to
simply focus on collective activities rather than make a public statement. While these
types of arrangements might extend participation, they might also diminish the GNI
brand and its value to current participants, and will require careful consideration.
Accountability
While Internet companies are new to accountability (perhaps reflecting their libertar-
ian outlook, propensity for confidentiality, and relative corporate immaturity), a rea-
sonable, meaningful, and ambitious approach to accountability was widely viewed
within GNI as essential to its success and was a necessity for retaining the diverse coali-
tion that comprises the GNI. Participants were deeply aware of Ruggie’s observation,
‘‘The Achilles heel of self-regulatory arrangements is to date their underdeveloped ac-
countability mechanisms. Company initiatives increasingly include rudimentary forms
of internal and external reporting. . . . But no universally—or even widely—accepted
standards yet exist for these practices. . . . Beyond certain multi-stakeholder systems,
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like the Fair Labor Association, or third-party verification processes, such as Social Ac-
countability 8000, social audits currently enjoy only limited credibility among external
stakeholders.’’35 With the credibility of the GNI, and the importance of accountability
for learning and behavior change, the GNI spent a great deal of energy examining di-
verse voluntary initiatives and industry practices, and developing its own regime.
Taking inspiration from researchers36 and practitioners37 who have identified the
limits to accountability and proposed a more integrated model, the GNI has sought
not to be an organization that is primarily based on accountability, but one that
integrates a strong regime alongside and in conjunction with other activities. Only
as reports and information are generated, however, will we learn what this means in
practice.
Beyond the more common challenges of nonexistent metrics (although relevant
ones are perhaps now on offer),38 various needs for confidentiality, and resistant corpo-
rate culture, the process is made more complex by GNI’s particular characteristics and
the unique attributes of the risks it seeks to mitigate—these include the tension be-
tween evaluating aspiration and implementation, the scale and scope of the Internet,
and the expectation that responsible companies will sometimes need to resist the law,
rather than comply with it. (Companies will choose to comply on some occasions,
based on the context, implications, and likelihood of success.) Moving forward, these
issues will remain in discussion, because the solutions—whether best or only good
practices—do not yet exist. Thus, the accountability process cannot only compare be-
havior with the model, but must go deeper to separate company implementation of
the Principles from the outcome, because the former may have limited efficacy.
As the structure that undergirds the GNI by informing learning and earning public
trust, the accountability regime has rightly received a good deal of attention. Indeed,
it is complex and important enough that discussions are ongoing within the GNI and
will likely be a significant internal focus for years to come. There are specific critiques:
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Amnesty International, and Reporters With-
out Borders have publicly questioned whether a company will have undue influence
on its assessment teams and whether the companies will withhold potentially damag-
ing information from assessors. The companies are uncomfortable, concerned with the
prospect of allowing outsiders to access and share intimate secrets, and eager to find
trustworthy and competent assessors. There is broad consensus that it will not be a
‘‘gotcha’’ process, wherein the assessors are trying to ‘‘catch’’ the company, but one in
which they work together to identify and address issues over time to keep the company
in compliance. The current approach seeks to achieve balance by having the board set
independence criteria for the assessors and the GNI assist in resolving concerns, likely
along with an elaborate contracting and compensation scheme, but only in implemen-
tation will fears be deemed justified or overblown. Indeed, at present, nobody has ever
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done such assessments, and it is not at all clear who might be both able and interested
in doing them.
Ultimately, each of these concerns (and others like them) must be addressed by the
accountability regime, as independent monitors report initially on company process
and then on actual incidents, in evaluating a company’s implementation of the Princi-
ples. This process will be complex, with the assessor needing to determine not only the
more straightforward elements of compliance such as whether a training program is in
place, but also the difference between lackluster recruitment efforts and GNI flaws. The
matters only get weightier, in the case of bad outcomes, discerning between irrespon-
sible company actions and good faith decisions, for instance, if the actions following
a human rights impact assessment were sufficient or ill considered, in light of the
impact.
The constraint on the accountability platform is that not only must it earn the
public trust, but it must do so in a relatively lightweight, scalable, and affordable fash-
ion that reinforces learning across the GNI. As participants, online activity, and gov-
ernment interventions all increase, the regime will need to evolve with the Internet. If
it is unable or if it cannot be effective without being overly onerous, ICT companies
will not embrace the GNI.
Public Communication and Remedy
As suggested by empirical experience and proposed in Ruggie’s Protect, Respect, and
Remedy Framework, offering transparent channels of communication and the poten-
tial for remedy is essential to addressing business and human rights concerns, and the
GNI views them as essential for the purposes of information gathering and for its own
credibility. A means for individual users and other parties to reliably access and com-
municate with the nascent GNI is still in the design phase and likely to be pilot tested
in 2009–2010. While all GNI participants recognize the need for channels for commu-
nication, query, and complaint, the sheer number of Internet users is intimidating, and
is orders of magnitude different from the equivalent community in the labor or extrac-
tive industries, for instance. The participatory expectations common to Internet cul-
ture further increase the likelihood of public interaction with the GNI (noting the
grass-roots creation of a GNI Facebook group upon launch), suggesting the incorpora-
tion of a Web 2.0 approach that not only accepts complaints, but develops and shares
information, perhaps even in real-time.
The GNI must be able to consider, review, utilize, or redirect large numbers of exter-
nal submissions and do its best to keep contributors informed of the progress of their
concerns. The GNI recognizes that it faces potential user submissions on any number
of general topics, from critiques to requests for participation in GNI. Relevant distinc-
tions must be made between those communications and submissions that concern
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noncompliance with the Principles. Problems may arise when, for example, poor
service, terms-of-service violations (often interpreted as censorship), or the desire for
an avenue of appeal is perceived as noncompliance.
According to the Governance Framework, the GNI complaints process should not be
triggered until company channels are exhausted, and is for extraordinary circum-
stances. Complainants may also choose to seek redress through noncompany partici-
pants, which may or may not have systems in place to address such inquiries,
potentially overloading them or yielding referrals to GNI without sufficient investiga-
tion. Given what are likely to be modest resources on the part of GNI, a robust system
will be imperative to maintain public trust and access to the system. The pilot program
will develop a mechanism that is credible, practical, and effective, while anticipating
the challenges posed by the potential scale of complaints and the diversity of end users
and issues.
Learning and Understanding
Limited knowledge of current practice among ICT companies and empirical under-
standing of the problems they face related to online free expression and privacy, in
conjunction with the ceaseless changes in business, user behavior, and government
responses, mean that learning is perhaps the greatest contribution that GNI can make
for participants and other stakeholders. The GNI should leverage the tremendous col-
lective resources and expertise of its participants, but will face the task of finding realis-
tic ways to access and combine them—a task made difficult by legal concerns, secrecy,
intellectual property, and other competing agendas. From the development of human
rights impact assessments (a process long under way in the GNI) to the generation of
useful data to identify emerging issues and trends, to the creation of relevant metrics to
help track the state of expression and privacy online worldwide, the Initiative has the
capacity to create novel outputs that can inform company and user behavior, as well as
government intervention. While more attention has been paid to other areas of GNI,
this zone holds the greatest potential to attract new participants and to change behav-
ior in the long term.
Scope and Specificity
While the GNI has been cautiously welcomed, the participants in the process and
others outside it have expressed a range of concerns. In many cases, it is simply too
early to tell whether these apprehensions will be borne out by experience, but they
serve as valuable markers for GNI guidance and evaluation. While all are of con-
sequence, some relate to the core functioning of the initiative, while others relate to
significant, but not necessarily essential, details. The EFF, for instance, has noted that
the Principles lack a commitment by companies to develop technologies that support
Protecting Privacy and Expression Online 101
privacy and circumvent censorship, a practice that seems to be a reasonable extension
of the GNI commitments.39 A host of other such issues were left out for a variety
of reasons, including data retention, user-notification on data storage locations and
risks, statistics on government requests, and circumvention methods, which have
technological, legal, practical, and business implications, and were deemed to be
either outside GNI’s scope or too involved to address within its initial phase.
As the GNI’s capacity grows with the hiring of a dedicated staff, the inclusion of ad-
ditional participants, and the development of robust systems, participants will need to
revisit these ideas in greater depth. For those that remain outside its purview, the hope
is that the GNI will be able to foster cross-fertilization among a variety of different
forums, including governments, advocacy groups, and international organizations.
Can EFF’s ideas on technology tools, for instance, be taken up in a joint technology
development group?
Of more cross-cutting concern, Amnesty International and Reporters Without
Borders40 point to language that they consider too open to interpretation, including
companies’ commitment to using ‘‘best efforts’’ to foster GNI adoption among joint
ventures, subsidiaries, and the like, as well as the discretion afforded to companies to
determine when and how to resist government requests. Responsible company behav-
ior in each is of the utmost importance, and while the language was intended to be re-
alistic and to provide companies with a degree of flexibility (e.g., not all suppliers are
relevant, oral requests may be acceptable in cases of imminent harm, fighting every
single government request is impractical), it most certainly also provides them with
an escape clause, which underscores the role of the accountability process.
Criteria for Success
In order to accomplish the goals of the GNI, there are broad traits present in the
design phase that should be retained over time. As the structure, process, and organiza-
tion develop and respond to existing and emerging concerns, it will be essential to
periodically revisit the values that inform the overall approach, especially with respect
to its efficacy, adaptability, scalability, transparency, legitimacy, neutrality, and
sustainability.
Efficacy Does the operationalization of the Principles recognize that expecting com-
panies to resist government requires balance with respect for the legitimate aspects of
government power over expression and privacy, including a spectrum of national stan-
dards? Will the accountability regime provide the correct incentives, encouraging com-
pany attention to specifics as well as larger and more aspirational activities?
Adaptability With the entire landscape shifting continually, presenting new chal-
lenges, opportunities, modes, and pressures, can the GNI create sufficient process to
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meet current needs while maintaining its flexibility to adapt and improve alongside, or
ahead of, the path ahead? Will the organization be caught responding to the
new terrain with the methods for traversing that of the past decade, whether in ac-
countability, learning, or public remedy? Can the GNI adjust its vision and mode as
the participants—and their needs and perspectives—change?
Scalability Does the approach scale alongside increasing users and uses of ICT, as well
as the apparently concomitant increase in government affronts on expression and pri-
vacy? How will the GNI attract greater participation? How will the GNI’s internal sys-
tems represent the interests of the current 1.6 billion Internet users41 and 4 billion
mobile subscribers,42 and what will happen as those numbers grow?
Transparency With an accurate understanding of the issues essential for effective in-
tervention on the part of the policymakers, advocacy organizations, business, and ulti-
mately users (who decide what, if anything, they do online), will the GNI be capable of
widely and faithfully conveying what is actually happening? Will statements be sup-
ported by data and directly informed by company experience, rather than by anecdote,
to promote understanding of systemic issues and trends, contributing to a chain of ac-
countability and building understanding of new/potential pressure points as they
emerge over time?
Legitimacy Will the organization earn and keep the public’s trust? Are the account-
ability processes perceived as both robust and reasonable, are there open channels for
communications with the public, is the information shared with the public adequate?
How does the GNI distinguish between the progress of the participants and its own
advances? How will these developments be evaluated?
Neutrality Can the GNI become a truly global standard, and not be viewed as being
unduly influenced or dominated by the interests of any nation, culture, or organiza-
tion? Will its interventions or recommendations take into account cultural nuance
and local knowledge while continuing to uphold high international standards for hu-
man rights?
Sustainability Will the GNI and its participants be able to generate the collective and
internal resources necessary for implementation and ongoing effectiveness? Will the
organization be able to sustain the level of activity to which it has committed, or
come up with creative ways that involve others in this work?
Conclusion
The story has not yet ended for the GNI or for Yahoo!. In December 2008, the Viet-
namese government passed a law limiting online political speech and requiring online
service providers to report violators, publicly stating its expectations that Google and
Yahoo! would contribute to a ‘‘healthy’’ Internet.43 How the situation develops—
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whether government rests on rhetoric or actually seeks to enforce the new law, and
how Yahoo! (and Google and non-GNI companies) responds—will inform company
and government strategy in Vietnam44 and suggest the capacity of a self-governing ini-
tiative to require its participants to not comply with the law when it conflicts with
international human rights standards.
As the GNI moves ahead, observers will rightly ask what to expect—how we will
know we have begun to impact company behavior, government approaches, and user
conduct online. Perhaps most importantly, they will ask what success will look like.
These are hard questions. The GNI was designed by a relatively small group with lim-
ited resources, and the fact that it has come this far in a relatively short period of time
is objectively impressive, but only when it is tested in the marketplace will the appro-
priateness of its design begin to become apparent. Initially, beyond reporting on basic
commitment, output measures will help, such as growth in participants, creation of
data and other learning resources, and policy engagement. Individual examples may
also be helpful, for instance, if GNI helps a company address a tough decision or antic-
ipate an emerging issue.
Over time, we must expect positive outcomes, but with so many factors affecting the
protection and advancement of free expression and privacy—and the GNI—the causes
of success and failure will not always be clear. Measuring impact is difficult in part be-
cause the GNI will be successful precisely when it avoids problems and goes unnoticed.
Some useful proxies may be increased public awareness of the issues, enlightened gov-
ernment action, and ideally metrics for takedowns and information requests that sug-
gest a combination of waning government abuse and avoidance of increased corporate
restrictions.
We are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place, particularly as society
undergoes the complicated process of integrating, adapting, and shaping the role of
new media. As it becomes integrated into our lives and livelihoods, the potential for
both good and harm continues to grow, along with the responsibility of the businesses
providing these services. Thus far, this adoption of the Internet and related technolo-
gies has brought not only new challenges, but new tools for addressing them. Rather
than resisting change, we need to consider how to guide it using a combination of
past experience and innovative approaches.
While there are other broad changes and trends with much deeper social, economic,
and political importance, the combination of reach, speed, and accessibility of new
media render it a poignant—and challenging—frontier for an increasingly globalized
world. The particular contours may well be indicative of other pressing (or emerging)
challenges, suggesting that our approach to addressing these challenges may also hold
broader lessons for new kinds of institutions and new approaches to policymaking at
the nexus of sectors and nations, economics and politics, culture and identity.
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Part II Country Profiles and Regional Overviews

Introduction to the Country Profiles
The country profiles that follow offer a synopsis of the findings and conclusions of
OpenNet Initiative (ONI) research into the factors influencing specific countries’ deci-
sions to filter or abstain from filtering the Internet, as well as the impact, relevance,
and efficacy of technical filtering in a broader context of Internet censorship.
These profiles cover the countries where ONI conducted technical testing and analy-
sis from 2007 to 2008. Countries selected for in-depth analysis are those in which it is
believed that there is the most to learn about the extent and processes of Internet filter-
ing.
Each country profile includes the summary results of the empirical testing for filter-
ing. The technical filtering data alone, however, do not amount to a complete picture
of Internet censorship and content regulation. A wide range of policies relating to me-
dia, speech, and expression also act to restrict expression on the Internet and online
community formation. Legal and regulatory frameworks, including Internet law, the
state of Internet access and infrastructure, the level of economic development, and
the quality of governance institutions are central to determining which countries re-
sort to filtering and how they choose to implement Internet content controls. A brief
study of each of these factors is included in each of the country profiles. Together,
these sections are intended to offer a concise, accurate, and unbiased view of Internet
filtering and content regulation.
Each country is given a score on a five-point scale presented in the ‘‘Results at a
Glance’’ table. The scores reflect the observed level of filtering in each of four themes:
1. Political: This category is focused primarily on Web sites that express views in oppo-
sition to those of the current government. Content more broadly related to human
rights, freedom of expression, minority rights, and religious movements is also consid-
ered here.
2. Social: This group covers material related to sexuality, gambling, and illegal drugs
and alcohol, as well as other topics that may be socially sensitive or perceived as
offensive.
3. Conflict and security: Content related to armed conflicts, border disputes, separatist
movements, and militant groups is included in this category.
4. Internet tools: Web sites that provide e-mail, Internet hosting, search, translation,
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephone service, and circumvention methods
are grouped in this category.
The relative magnitude of filtering for each of the four themes is defined as follows:
1. Pervasive filtering is characterized by both its depth—a blocking regime that blocks a
large portion of the targeted content in a given category—and its breadth—a blocking
regime that includes filtering in several categories in a given theme.
2. Substantial filtering has either depth or breadth: either a number of categories are
subject to a medium level of filtering, or a low level of filtering is carried out across
many categories.
3. Selective filtering is narrowly targeted filtering that blocks a small number of specific
sites across a few categories or filtering that targets a single category or issue.
4. Suspected filtering is indicated when connectivity abnormalities are present that sug-
gest the presence of filtering, although diagnostic work was unable to confirm conclu-
sively that inaccessible Web sites are the result of deliberate tampering.
5. No evidence of filtering: ONI testing did not uncover any evidence of Web sites being
blocked.
The ‘‘Results at a Glance’’ table also includes a measure (low, medium, or high) of the
observed transparency and consistency of blocking patterns. The transparency score
given to each country is a qualitative measure based on the level at which the country
openly engages in filtering. In cases where filtering takes place without open acknowl-
edgment, or where the practice of filtering is actively disguised to appear as network
errors, the transparency score is low. In assigning the transparency score, we have also
considered the presence of provisions to appeal inappropriate blocking or report
instances of it. Consistency measures the variation in filtering within a country across
different ISPs—in some cases the availability of specific Web pages differs significantly
depending on the ISP one uses to connect to the Internet.
An aggregate view of the level of development for each country is represented by the
results of the first four indexes presented in the ‘‘Key Indicators’’ table: gross domestic
product per capita, life expectancy, literacy rates, and the human development index.
The first three measures are drawn from the World Bank development indicators
data set. The GDP measure, which captures the ability to purchase a standard basket
of consumer goods, is expressed in constant 2005 international dollars. Life expectancy
can be seen as a proxy for general health, and literacy an imperfect but reasonable in-
dication of the quality of education. The human development index is constructed by
the United Nations Development Program to reflect overall human well-being.
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Governance is widely recognized to be a key determinant of economic success and
human welfare. We therefore also include two measures of governance: rule of law
and voice and accountability. These indexes are defined and compiled by researchers
at the World Bank using an aggregation of the best available data. The authors of the
indexes define them in the following way:
Rule of law includes several indicators that measure the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the inci-
dence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforce-
ability of contracts.
Voice and accountability includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects
of the political process, civil liberties, and political and human rights, measuring
the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of
governments.
An aggregate view of the state of democracy is provided by the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit’s index of democracy. This index is based on five categories: electoral
process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political partici-
pation; and political culture. The 165 states included in this index are placed within
one of four regime type categories; full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid
regimes, and authoritarian regimes.
We also include two measures of Internet accessibility provided by the International
Telecommunication Union: the digital opportunity index (DOI) and Internet users as
a percentage of the population. The DOI is based on 11 core information and com-
munication technology (ICT) indicators that are agreed upon by the International
Telecommunication Union’s Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development. These
are grouped in three clusters by type: opportunity, infrastructure, and utilization. The
DOI therefore captures the overall potential for and context of Internet availability
rather than usage alone. The measure of Internet access, the Internet penetration
rate, is simply the percentage of the population identified as active Internet users.
Additional Internet penetration rate indicators are drawn from the Miniwatts Mar-
keting Group, which compiles the latest Internet usage statistics from a range of
reputable international and local sources including the ITU, Gfk Group, and Nielson
Online.
Internet regulation and filtering practices are often dynamic processes, subject to
frequent change, though we expect that the political climate and the aggregate view
of the issues reflected in these profiles will change more slowly than the specific in-
stances of filtering. As the context for content regulation and the practice of Internet
filtering evolve, updates will be made to the country profiles, and new countries may
be added. These updates will be available at http://www.opennet.net.
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Sources for Key Indicators
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars)
World Bank, ‘‘World Development Indicators Online,’’ 2009, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20398986~menuPK:64133163~pagePK:64133150
~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html.
Life expectancy at birth (years)
World Bank, ‘‘Key Development Data and Statistics,’’ 2009, http://www.worldbank.org/data/
countrydata/countrydata.html.
Literacy rate
World Bank, ‘‘Key Development Data and Statistics,’’ 2009, http://www.worldbank.org/data/
countrydata/countrydata.html.
Human development index (value and ranking)
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). ‘‘2008 Statistical Update’’, 2008, http://hdr.und-
p.org/en/.
Rule of law
World Bank. ‘‘Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996–2008’’, 2009, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.asp.
Voice and accountability
World Bank. ‘‘Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996–2008’’, 2009, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.asp.
Democracy index
Economist Intelligence Unit. ‘‘Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, 2008’’, 2008, http://
www.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=sovereign_ratings.
Digital opportunity index (value and ranking)
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ‘‘World Information Society Report, 2007: Be-
yond WSIS’’, 2007, http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/worldinformationsociety/2007/.
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Internet penetration
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ‘‘Internet Indicators: Subscribers, Users, and
Broadband Subscribers,’’ 2008, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx
?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechnologyPublic&RP_intYear=2008&RP_intLanguageID=1.
Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘‘Internet World Statistics,’’ 2009, http://www.internetworldstats
.com.
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Commonwealth of Independent States

CIS Overview
Over the past four years the scale and reach of the Internet in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) has continued to expand. As it has grown, a vibrant cyber cul-
ture has emerged, strengthened by a Soviet legacy, which has bequeathed the region
with Russian as a lingua franca and common cultural and historical reference that con-
tinues to bridge the national boundaries between the former Soviet states.
Commensurate with its growth, the Internet domain in the CIS has emerged as a dy-
namic and complex environment in which states, cyber criminals, nongovernmental
organizations, businesses, and individuals actively collude and compete. The region is
currently driving the evolution of next-generation information controls encompassing
legal regulation as well as innovative tactics such as the alleged use of third-party actors
to generate crowd sourced denial of service attacks and other offensive means. These
control tactics shape the information space through competition, rather than tradi-
tional filtering. There are also indications that these tactics and techniques are now be-
ing adopted in other regions.
Consequently, since the last OpenNet Initiative (ONI) volume, Access Denied, the CIS
region has provided a number of new developments in information controls. The region
witnessed two cyberwars. The first was a campaign by pro-Russian (and allegedly state-
sponsored) hackers, which paralyzed the Estonian Internet in May 2007. The second
was a similar campaign (also allegedly organized by nationalist pro-government Rus-
sian hackers) that occurred at the same time as major combat operations in Georgia
(August 2008). The latter campaign targeting Georgian online media and government
Web sites led Georgian authorities to filter access to Russian Internet sites (allegedly as
a means of self-defense against Russian cyber propaganda) and resulted in an informa-
tion vacuum in Tbilisi during the critical days where it was unclear whether Russian
troops would stop their advance into Georgia.
Next-generation Internet controls have also been utilized during elections. For exam-
ple, reports indicate that in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and (allegedly) Russia1 pro-government
forces selectively used denial-of-service (DoS) attacks during elections in order to silence
opposition and independent media. During periods of heightened political tensions,
countries such as Armenia and Belarus have employed legal and technical means to
seize control of domain space, or shut down access to the Internet.
In the last 20 years, rapid changes have been a constant phenomenon in the CIS, but
Western-sponsored democratic reforms have only been partially successful. In recent
years a new authoritarianism has emerged in the region, with many governments seek-
ing to reassert control over the national information sphere.
At the same time, many countries of the CIS have adopted national development
strategies that emphasize information technology (IT) as a means for economic
growth, with some even declaring their intent to become regional ‘‘IT powerhouses.’’
However, as a consequence of the color revolutions in the early to mid-2000s in
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, many CIS states—particularly those with au-
thoritarian tendencies—are aware of the consequences that this ‘‘technological
empowerment’’ may prompt. Many in the region now see the Internet and other
communications channels in national strategic terms, and these countries have in-
creasingly turned to security-based arguments—such as the need to secure ‘‘national
informational space’’—to justify regulation of the sector. Consequently, the region is
a leader in the development of next-generation information controls.
In 2007 and 2008, ONI tested for the presence of filtering in all CIS countries: Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The results of ONI testing yield significant patterns of first-generation filtering in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan pursued pervasive filtering of the kind
found in China and Iran. Turkmenistan’s Internet is even more tightly restricted, with
access available only through a single government provider. In other countries, strong
evidence of second- and third-generation controls is emerging, with filtering occurring
at strategic junctures, as well as in indirect and less detectable ways often supported by
restrictive legal regimes. In almost all countries, filtering also occurred on corporate
networks (such as educational and research networks), where accepted usage policies
(AUPs) dictated that inappropriate content was not permitted; or in ‘‘edge locations’’
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such as Internet cafés, where the reasons for filtering were more benign (conserving
bandwidth) or left to the discretion of the Internet café owners themselves.
The ONI methodology makes it difficult to detect second- or third-generation tech-
niques, which often involve DoS attacks, or other means of eliminating or silencing
Web sites that do not rely on filtering. In these cases, which include Kyrgyzstan,
Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, and the Russian-Georgian war, the ONI relied on a network
of researchers within these countries to run ad hoc and one-time tests, as well as to
investigate specific instances where DoS attacks, or other forms of technical manipula-
tion, were used to silence Web sites or other Internet-based communication tools.
The CIS Region: Ethnocultural Diversity and a Shared Historical Space
The CIS—a loose and largely ineffectual political organization—occupies most of the
territory that once constituted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Strad-
dling a swath of Eurasia from the Pacific to the doorsteps of Europe, the Arctic Circle,
and the deserts of Central Asia, this vast land mass encompasses 12 time zones, some
350 million people, and more than 100 distinct ethnic groups including all the world’s
major religions and at least three major linguistic communities (Slavic, Turkic, Farsi).
The CIS remains dominated by the Russian Federation, which maintains its influence
through economic, political, and defense ties, as well as popular culture that continues
to predominate within the region. Russia is currently a major energy supplier to many
CIS states, giving it considerable political muscle in the region.
The region’s shared political heritage, together with the fact that many present-day
leaders in the CIS governments and economies were also in positions of authority
during the Soviet era, means that much formal and informal coordination continues
to exist among and between member states, despite political differences that are at
times difficult. On some occasions, this coordination has led to the adoption of similar
approaches in legal and political development. Furthermore, the loose, informal coor-
dination among officials is helped along by the fact that most countries share the same
legal tradition, as well as similar organizational characteristics of the security forces and
the distribution of powers among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of
government.
Notwithstanding their shared past, over the past few years CIS governments have
not hesitated to challenge Russia’s hegemony by seeking other political and military
alliances with Western Europe and the United States. At an accelerating pace, gov-
ernments are looking beyond their traditional partners to discover new international
trade and economic routes. This approach even more distinctively defines the CIS as a
quickly changing region: although CIS countries share a common cultural heritage,
they are increasingly taking diverging paths in their political and economic develop-
ment, mainly because of foreign influence and an emerging rivalry among them.
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Access to the Internet in the CIS
Internet penetration rates in the CIS region have experienced significant growth over
the last couple of years, though the figures are still low in comparison to Europe and
other regions. Internet access is mainly clustered in urban areas and spread among
youth. In contrast to gender penetration rates in most Asian and Middle East and
North African (MENA) countries, the percentage of male and female users in the CIS
is almost the same, perhaps reflecting the ‘‘equality’’ between sexes prevailing in the
Soviet era.2 Income levels in the CIS are generally low, while the costs of computers
and connectivity are relatively high. Overall, Internet penetration in Russia lags behind
that of other industrialized nations (27 percent as of 2008)3 and is relatively high only
in large cities (particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg). Among the CIS countries,
Belarus has the highest Internet penetration rate, 29 percent for 2008. The popularity
of the Internet in this country might be a response, at least in part, to the fact that
Belarus is one of the countries with the toughest governmental control in the CIS. As
a result, the Internet remains one of the few media where citizens can exchange view-
points and obtain uncensored information from international sources.
Ukraine (with a 14.6 percent penetration rate) and Moldova (16.2 percent) have
almost doubled their Internet access rates over the last couple of years. The states of
Central Asia have also shown considerable growth in their Internet penetration rates:
Kyrgyzstan (13.8 percent) has become a leader in this subgroup partly as a result of
the state’s policies aiming at further market liberalization. Kazakhstan (12.3 percent)
follows closely. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have measured a swift increase in the
number of Internet users, with Uzbekistan at 8.8 percent and Tajikistan at 6.6 percent
in 2008. Turkmenistan measures very low Internet penetration (1.4 percent), since
until recently the Internet was a privilege only for elites. As of 2008 Azerbaijan had an
Internet penetration rate of 18.3 percent, while Armenia and Georgia had penetration
rates of 5.8 percent and 7.8 percent, respectively.4
Official figures, in most cases, are far from being accurate. Depending on the country,
local sources show either higher Internet penetration rates or considerably lower (in
Kyrgyzstan local sources show that only 7 percent of the population had access at
the end of 2008).5 Even among international organizations the estimates are strikingly
different: the United Nations (UN) e-Government Survey6 states that in Kyrgyzstan,
Internet penetration was no more than 5.6 percent for 2008, while the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) provides figures almost three times higher for 2008.
These discrepancies are partly due to difficulties in calculating the number of users in
countries where most people share Internet access through their places of work or
study (for example, workplaces account for over 51 percent of all users in Kyrgyzstan7
and Belarus), as well as via Internet cafés, whose use is very high in some countries
(around 30 percent for Uzbekistan). This shared use, and in some cases the creative
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use of networks such as Fidonet to route traffic to and from the Internet, may result
in considerable underestimation of the actual number of users.8 In addition, some
Internet service providers (ISPs) do not reveal the real number of customers in order
to conceal their proceeds.
The Role of New Technology in the CIS
The CIS region showcases examples of just how profoundly the Internet can affect
social and political life. The importance of the Internet to political and social life is af-
fected by the general openness of the media in the country. In Uzbekistan and Belarus,
for example, where the government controls the media and stifles political opposition,
the relevance of the Internet to political and social life is very high. In Tajikistan rele-
vance remains low, while in Turkmenistan the Internet is still reined in by the govern-
ment to such an extent that simple access remains a problem, leaving little room for
the Internet to significantly influence political and social life.
The Internet constitutes an effective political tool in the hands of the people. During
sensitive times, when governments attempt a tough crackdown on the media, the
Internet remains the only available source of information, a fact that determines its
high impact on shaping groups and affecting behavior. At times, when faced with a
‘‘state of emergency,’’ governments attempt to shut down online news sources in order
to limit the spread of oppositional materials. For example, in Armenia the president
imposed severe restrictions on the media and the Internet after the presidential elec-
tions in February 2008. This situation by itself triggered waves of discontented reactions
by bloggers and online media journalists, who were among the few who reported on
these events outside the country. Their condemnation of the imposed restrictions was
quickly taken on, spread on the Internet, and hence multiplied the effect of the gov-
ernment’s critics both inside and outside the country.
The CIS demonstrates that information and communication technology (ICT) is not
always deterred by low incomes, and its significance to political life grows quickly
when people want to voice their opinion. Such examples were the Ukrainian Orange
Revolution (November 2004),9 the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), and recently
the so-called Twitter Revolution in Moldova (April 2009). Even though Moldova is
one of the poorest countries in Europe, Moldovans demonstrated that they are pre-
pared to resort to the latest technologies when needed to unite and voice their discon-
tent. Communicating by means of Twitter through the General Packet Radio Service
(GPRS) on their mobile telephones, Moldovans revealed the growing role of social
media in Eastern Europe as a political tool. Surprisingly, poor countries show a growing
appetite for adopting new technology and catching up with the West. Turkmenistan
is another example of how quickly technology can reach people when it is offered
at competitive prices. For years operating only with one state ISP and limited access,
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the country has been showing the lowest Internet penetration rate in the region.
When a license for a private operator was granted, MTS began offering new services
(GPRS/EDGE for the country). More than 500,000 people joined for about half a year,10
which is 9–10 percent of the population. Citizens in CIS countries have expressed a
growing enthusiasm for the Internet and 3G mobile services and have manifested their
‘‘e-readiness’’ in politically sensitive times. This trend raises the concern that govern-
ments already accustomed to controlling media and communications may wish to
develop means to close down free speech outlets any time they feel threatened.
Government officials recognize the power of the Internet to affect political and social
life, and have actively moved to compete for influence in the space. In Moldova and
Azerbaijan, for example, ministers and heads of agencies are now required to main-
tain Web sites and blogs, and regularly give interviews to student organizations, broad-
casting them over YouTube or IPTV as an effective means to reach out to young people.
This is a relatively new development that demonstrates an awareness among the po-
litical elites that the Internet is an important channel for exerting influence over
domestic audiences.
Moreover, a key aspect of the Internet’s political significance remains understudied:
as a person-to-person back channel for communications and social networking essential
to daily life in Russia, where personal contacts and an ‘‘informal economy of favors’’ re-
main keys to ‘‘getting ahead.’’11 In this sense, it is interesting to note that in Uzbekistan
information obtained from the Internet is accepted as being more accurate than that
secured from other sources, reflecting the culture’s strong social networking aspect.
Legal and Regulatory Mechanisms to Control the Internet in the CIS
In recent years, the trend in all CIS states has been toward greater regulation of the
national information space, which includes the Internet. While the constitutions of
(nearly) all countries enshrine the principles of freedom of information and freedom
of expression, the authorities have taken various legal steps to regulate and shape par-
ticipation in this space. Such measures are described in the following subsections.
Restrictions on Access to or Dissemination of Certain Types of Content
Restriction of Internet Content under State General Laws Freedom of expression is
an important feature in almost all constitutions in the CIS. But increasingly, laws,
decrees, and administrative orders are used to limit the extent of these freedoms, and
in general the tendency is toward restrictions which contradict in spirit, if not in law,
the rights enshrined in constitutional documents. For example, freedom of information
can be restricted when necessary to protect moral values, public order, national secu-
rity, state secrets, and other privileged data (Belarus, Russia, and Tajikistan). Uzbekistan
goes even further to limit freedom of information to safeguard national, spiritual, cul-
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tural, and scientific potential. No specific laws explain satisfactorily the meaning be-
hind such notions as ‘‘public order.’’ By referring to broadly defined values, the text ap-
parently leaves leeway for authorities to prosecute users for any type of content that it
considers ‘‘illegal.’’
In some cases, government officials have demanded that the ISPs—formally or
informally—temporarily suspend sites detrimental to ‘‘public order’’ (Tajikistan).
Some of these sites remain suspended for an indefinite period of time (Kazakhstan).
Restrictions Envisioned in the Internet Service Agreements between the ISPs and their
Customers Meant to be an open medium encouraging freedom of speech and expres-
sion, the Internet has increasingly become a target for strict regulation. Governments
are frequently expanding the scope of content that is not to be allowed on the Inter-
net. At times, ISPs are setting strict rules for the users, which, if not complied with,
can lead to the termination of service agreements. Some providers set broad restric-
tive rules as preconditions in the contract with the user (e.g., TurkmenTelecom,
Kazakhstan); others may decide to limit access if they subsequently decide that the
accessed content is ‘‘inappropriate’’ (Uzbekistan). Such ‘‘inappropriate’’ content is not
strictly defined and open to broad interpretations and arbitrary decisions by the ISPs,
or state authorities.
In some cases, ISPs are part of the state administration and are directly instructed by
the government to introduce such restrictive legal provisions in the customer agree-
ment. One such example is TurkmenTelecom, which cautions its users that Internet is
not a ‘‘place for unconsidered behavior’’ and provides an extensive list of types of con-
tent that users are forbidden to access or disseminate online, such as violent behavior,
foul language, and defamatory remarks, among others.12 On other occasions, ISPs have
been directly instructed by the state to envision restrictions to accessing online con-
tent. In Kazakhstan, for example, ISPs prohibit their customers from disseminating
pornographic, extremist, or terrorist materials or ‘‘any other information not in accor-
dance with the country’s laws’’ over the Internet.13 Such vague categorization opens
the door for authorities to prosecute online journalists and bloggers on a broad range
of issues. Such uncertainty contributes to growing self-censorship.
In a third category of cases, ISPs may not have been instructed by authorities to
apply measures against certain online behavior or types of content posted on the Inter-
net, but based on the repressive climate encouraging self-censorship, these ISPs are
attempting to anticipate what the authorities may find objectionable and act accord-
ingly in order to avoid losing their license, as is the case in Russia.
Registration Requirements for Internet Web Sites
CIS states are increasingly requiring Web sites to register as mass media, making them
subject to national legislation governing content, defamation, and copyright, criminal
offense to the state and officials, and others. Officials increasingly speak in favor of
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registering all information outlets, including the Internet, as a means to exert control
over the quality and character of media content (e.g., Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan).
Requiring such registration for Web sites would have a chilling effect on anyone seek-
ing to publish on the Internet. They would become vulnerable to criminal or civil
liability and would be an easy target for government prosecution, especially as the
laws describing ‘‘undesired content’’ weigh in favor of the state. Moreover, failure to
register a Web site creates a valid legal pretext under which such content can be
deemed ‘‘illegal’’ by state authorities, thus providing a legal case for filtering the con-
tent or suspending the licenses of the ISPs. Posting ‘‘illegal’’ content also carries the
risk of prosecution for the site owner or the user who posted such material, contribu-
ting to a climate of self-censorship, and generally dissuading anyone from posting con-
tent on the Internet.
In Uzbekistan, the law on mass media that holds journalists and editors responsible
for the ‘‘veracity’’ of published materials has already brought about self-censorship
among journalists and bloggers. The ‘‘objectivity’’ test is applied also in Belarus, where
independent journalists, editors, and opposition leaders are frequently subject to arbi-
trary prosecution and arrest. In Russia, online forums have been added to the defini-
tion of mass media, setting a precedent for prosecution of social networking sites.
Defamatory Provisions
Defamation laws have been used successfully to prosecute civil and criminal cases
against Web site owners for allegedly hosting ‘‘defamatory’’ content. In Belarus, for ex-
ample, the definition of defamation and slander laws has been expanded to selectively
prosecute and deter bloggers, opposition leaders, and independent media from posting
material critical of the government or specific government officials. On numerous
occasions, Russian officials have spoken of the need to introduce specific legal measures
that would allow them to prosecute online participants for defamation of members
of the federal or regional state administration. In Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus, there are numerous cases of online journalists and bloggers being charged for
defamation and subsequently jailed.
National Security Concerns
The need to develop ICT is a national priority in many CIS countries. Almost all CIS
governments have adopted national ICT strategies that set ambitious targets for the
development of the Internet in government, education, and industry. At the same
time, most countries have also adopted national information security doctrines, which,
on one hand, underline their understanding of the need to encourage development of
the information sphere and, on the other, document their growing security concerns
with regard to the Internet. Russia remains a significant influence in leading these ten-
dencies within the region, and has been increasingly proactive in exporting its exper-
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tise to other CIS states. Since late 2000, Russia’s ‘‘Doctrine of Information Security’’ has
been adapted (in various forms and guises) as the basic precept defining the national
strategic value of the Internet and the ‘‘national informational space’’ in most CIS
countries.14
Governments see the Internet as a very direct and personal media that reaches into
people’s homes faster and deeper than traditional media. As it is subject to less
regulation and less control than the traditional media, its potential impact on national
security is seen as greater than that of mass media. Consequently, several governments
have actively moved to restrict foreign influences ostensibly to safeguard the citizens
from being exposed to any ‘‘damaging’’ and subversive content online. This is the
case in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and in 2009 the issue of designating the Inter-
net as a national strategic sector of the economy was included in Russian legislation for
a second time.15 Such a designation would limit the percentage of foreign investment
in Internet companies and would expose the sector to a number of usage restrictions.
Surveillance
Russia’s legal approach to Internet surveillance for law enforcement (that is, the System
for Operational-Investigative Activities or SORM-II, which allows security services
unfettered physical access to ISP networks) has influenced the way in which other CIS
countries have approached surveillance of the Internet.
At the regulatory and technical level, SORM-II, (which came into effect in Russia in
200016) requires ISPs to provide the Federal Security Service (FSB) with statistics about
all Internet traffic that goes through the ISP servers (including the time of an online
session, the IP address of the user, and the data that were transmitted).17 The ISPs
themselves are responsible for the cost and maintenance of the hardware and con-
nections. Providers’ objections to SORM-II, which raised concerns about individual
privacy, resulted in the ISPs being stripped of their licenses.18
In many respects, SORM-II is not unlike a combination of the United States’ Com-
munications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)19 and the recent ‘‘warrant-
less’’ provisions for wiretapping, including the PATRIOT Act20 passed after the attacks
of 9/11. Russian legislation formally protects individual privacy, prohibiting wire-
tapping of any kind without a court order.21 As a consequence, SORM-II requires gov-
ernment personnel to obtain a court order to intercept telephone conversations,
electronic communications, or postal correspondence. In reality, however, the FSB
does not bother to seek a warrant. Recently, a senior FSB official sought to apply similar
registration requirements for all mobile phones with Internet capabilities. However,
despite this formidable surveillance potential, there is doubt about the actual capacity
of the FSB to analyze the data collected.22
Most CIS countries have followed Russia’s lead in implementing Internet surveil-
lance. These include the following:
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1 Kazakhstan followed the Russian example, requiring ISPs to install SORM-II in order
to register and maintain electronic records of customers’ Internet activities.
1 Azerbaijan made an unsuccessful attempt to employ technologies similar to SORM-II.
As of 2009, surveillance does occur, but mainly by way of visits to ISPs and Internet
cafés by officials from the State Security Service.
1 In Uzbekistan, the principal intelligence agency, the National Security Service (SNB),
monitors the Uzbek segment of the Internet and works with the main regulatory body
to impose censorship. As all ISPs must rent channels from the state monopoly provider,
available evidence strongly suggests that Internet traffic is recorded and monitored by
means of a centralized system. SNB officers frequently visit ISPs and Internet cafés to
monitor compliance.
1 In Ukraine, the security services have developed a capacity to monitor Internet traffic,
and legislation has been proposed to limit access to ‘‘questionable’’ content for reasons
of national security. The security services are also empowered to initiate criminal inves-
tigations and use wiretapping devices.
1 In Belarus, special services conduct active and warrantless surveillance of Internet
activities under the pretext of national security using a system similar to SORM-II.
Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine have all established specialized units under
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Department ‘‘K’’) trained in combating cyber crime.
Specialized technical units have also been established in other security services and
ministries of defense in these countries.
Other Means to Control the Internet
The ONI has documented the use of a wide range of measures to control the Internet—
legal, administrative, and technological, as well as psychological: threats and physical
violence, which usually are designed to cultivate a culture of self-censorship among
Internet users. In some cases these measures are used only at times of heightened polit-
ical tensions and are limited in scope and duration, making them difficult to document
and report.
The following subsections list some of the second- and third-generation techniques
documented by the ONI during the last four years.
Event-Based Interventions The CIS is the first region in which ONI research docu-
mented the presence of ‘‘event-based’’ filtering. This form of filtering differs in techni-
cal execution from more conventional filtering forms (such as those that rely on block
lists) and is more difficult to track and definitively ascertain.
The Case of Kyrgyzstan (2005) During Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 parliamentary elections,
two ISPs were disrupted by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Following the
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attacks, a ‘‘hacker for hire’’ posted threats to the affected ISPs’ visitor logs, stating that
unless these sites stayed off-line the attacks would continue.23 The DDoS attacks effec-
tively disrupted the ISPs’ services because the hacker exploited the ISPs’ narrow band-
widths and dependence on a single satellite-based connection. It remains unclear who
hired the hackers responsible for the attack, although an investigation by ONI found
that they were based in Ukraine (and were also responsible for an attack on a U.S. site
using the same ‘‘bot’’ network). The opposition accused the government of ordering
the attacks as a means of undermining them. The government responded by order-
ing the affected ISPs to keep their resources online, but it was impossible to do so be-
cause the DDoS attack had degraded their ability to provide any services. In the end,
the attack was stopped as a result of U.S. legal action against the originating ‘‘botnet,’’
which had also been attacking a U.S. site. When the ‘‘botnet’’ was taken down, the
attacks against the Kyrgyz sites also stopped.
The Case of Belarus (2006) During the March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus,
several opposition Web sites became suddenly inaccessible, ostensibly because of inno-
cuous network faults and domain name system (DNS) failures. Likewise, at the peak of
protests against the election results, a major Minsk-based ISP ceased to provide dial-up
services owing to ‘‘technical problems.’’ These occurrences meant that important inde-
pendent media and opposition political Web sites were not accessible at periods when
the information they were conveying could have had political significance or acted as a
catalyst for further political action. Although nothing transpired that could be identi-
fied as extralegal filtering, de facto access was not available when and where needed,
with some evidence suggesting that tampering may have occured.24
This form of ‘‘event-based’’ information control, which temporally shapes Internet
access, can be said to represent the emerging next-generation Internet controls. Not
unlike the shorter supply-line chains that boosted manufacturing efficiencies under
‘‘just-in-time’’ production, event-based filtering can also be considered to be ‘‘just-in-
time,’’ as it offers greater efficiencies in denying access to information when and where
it is needed. At the same time, the fact that this form of targeted and time-limited fil-
tering is much harder to prove also removes the potential liabilities of being caught
undertaking more deliberative filtering.
Crowd-Sourced Attacks: Pro-Government or Patriotic Hacktivists
During the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war over the breakaway territory of Ossetia,
pro-government Russian hackers launched DDoS attacks against a wide range of Geor-
gian ISPs and Web sites. As a consequence, the majority of Georgian government
Web sites, as well as official media sites were inaccessible throughout the conflict. In
response, Georgian ISPs filtered Russian Internet sites to prevent the dissemination of
what they considered inaccurate and inflammatory reports by Russian media.25 The
effect of the Russian DDoS attacks and Georgian filtering was to create an information
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vacuum in Georgia during crucial moments of the conflict, particularly as Russian
troops crossed the Ossetian border and moved in the direction of the Georgian capital.
While the Russian government denied responsibility for the cyber campaign, it did
little to stop these activities, even though most of the attacks originated from crowd-
sourcing on Russian Web sites and chat rooms.26 In many respects, the cyber campaign
against Georgia resembled a scaled-up version of techniques previously used against
opposition Web sites and independent media during elections in the CIS, and the ear-
lier cyber attack against Estonia.
The emergence of cross-border hacktivist activities, however, is not a new phenome-
non within the CIS. Similar attacks—albeit on a much smaller scale—have taken place
between Armenia and Azerbaijan for more than a decade, where the moribund conflict
over the region of Nagorno Karabakh continues in cyberspace.
Administrative Mechanisms to Shut Down Access to the Internet
Legal Deregistration of Domain Names and Web Sites Authorities often resort to var-
ious quasi-legal or ‘‘administrative’’ mechanisms to suppress ‘‘inappropriate’’ infor-
mation or shut down oppositional domain names (e.g., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). In
Armenia, the president created an unprecedented media and Internet blackout after
announcing a state of emergency following public protests. Based on the president’s
instructions, the registrar of the top-level country domain suspended a number of in-
dependent media and opposition Web sites.
Pro-government and patriotic social activism has become a feature of politics in
several CIS countries. In Russia, the pro-government Nashi youth movement ran an
aggressive campaign in cyberspace in support of the government during the 2008 par-
liamentary and 2009 presidential elections.27 The volume of blogs, online newspapers,
and even posts to opposition and independent media sites overwhelmed and over-
matched critical posts or articles, and has proven a more successful mechanism for
silencing the opposition than resorting to Internet filtering or other more heavy
handed repressive measures.
Self-Censorship The constitutions of the CIS countries prohibit censorship. None-
theless, the net effect of the various sanctions (legal, administrative, technological) is
creating a general climate of self-censorship among ISPs in many CIS states, which are
fearful of jeopardizing their licenses, and among individuals for whom prosecution or
imprisonment is too high a price to pay for voicing criticism. Often, self-censorship is
aided by opaque state practices. Many CIS countries deny that they filter the Internet
or resort to extralegal methods. In Azerbaijan, for example, the author of Web sites crit-
ical of the government was detained on a number of occasions (on no legal grounds)
without any follow-up or prosecution. In other cases, such as the pervasive filtering
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policies of Internet cafés throughout the region, the decision to limit content is for-
mally controlled by the café owners, so it is difficult to argue whether their filtering
results from a fear of sanction for allowing politically sensitive material to be accessed
or from personal choice. Certainly, for most Internet café owners, the objective is to
make a living, not to defy state policy. In Russia, self-censorship is sometimes perceived
as a citizen’s responsibility. In Tajikistan, however, research suggests that filtering is
based on economic factors rather than fear of persecution from the security forces.
Emerging Second- and Third-Generation Controls in the CIS
Overt Internet filtering, such as that undertaken by China or Iran, is unlikely to occur
in the CIS for several reasons. First, only in a very few cases (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan)
is the government disposed to effect an informational blockade of the country that
could, in turn, jeopardize economic prospects and stifle the ‘‘scientific potential’’ of
these technologies. Second, as noted earlier, governments generally have more subtle
legal and quasi-legal methods for putting pressure on content and access providers to
remove or otherwise eliminate ‘‘undesirable’’ content, so there is little need to resort
to overt technical means such as filtering. Third, many CIS states are dependent on
development aid and trade, and have oriented themselves toward integration with the
global economy and are actively seeking to lower barriers on trade. Engaging in wide-
spread filtering of the kind conducted by China or Iran would present the risk of being
labeled as an ‘‘international human rights pariah,’’ an eventuality that most CIS coun-
tries would rather avoid. Fourth, and perhaps most important, CIS states that are
concerned about the Internet’s empowering potential—that is, its potential to make
possible further ‘‘color revolutions’’—have found more subtle technical means for
ensuring that these capacities are curtailed, if and when necessary.
Telecoms and ISP Market Players Until recently, almost all CIS governments pre-
served the monopoly right of the state telecommunication provider over international
traffic. Under the pressure of international organizations (such as the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organiza-
tion), some CIS countries are abolishing the exclusivity provision over international
traffic (Armenia). However, the need to demonopolize the service continues to be a sig-
nificant problem in the rest (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). Since the traffic
of all ISPs has to go through the state incumbent’s channels, filtering can be achieved
easily, without outside control, while using centralized resources. The ISPs may un-
knowingly receive filtered content because the main operator could install filters on
any information that it deems inappropriate.
Russia, for example, does not require that the ISPs buy international traffic
from a major state provider. Nonetheless, Russia has introduced other practices
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unprecedented for other industrialized countries. There are multiple players on the
Internet market, but few of these are the major ISPs that provide international traffic
to the groups of small regional providers. Interestingly, most of the big telecommu-
nication operators (if not all) are owned or controlled by the large state company
Svyazinvest. Control in Russia is not easily detectable but permeates the ownership
and control structure of the operators. The Russian Internet (including operators
and popular blog servers) remains a playground of interests for the state and pro-
government oligarchs.
Upstream Filtering
For its size, the CIS region has a relatively underdeveloped telecommunications sys-
tem, much of which remains centered on Russia. At the same time, the region itself is
contiguous with (or borders) Europe, Asia, and—via the circumpolar route—North
America. This centrality means that most countries in the region obtain connectivity
from several different sources beyond Russia. This situation has created some interest-
ing patterns in filtering behavior, such as similar content becoming inaccessible across
several different countries, but with different filtering patterns among content pro-
viders within any single country.
Some of the CIS countries are buying connectivity from European and Asian opera-
tors. An interesting phenomenon that ONI confirmed is that private operators some-
times effectively influence online behavior of foreign operators. For example, in 2008,
YouTube was not accessible in Georgia for a few days because the main ISP in the
country was buying international traffic from TurkTelecom. The Turkish operator,
however, often executes bans against the multimedia site in the implementation of
the controversial Internet law.28 Since the local ISP provides Internet service to more
than 85 percent of the users, this block rendered YouTube inaccessible to the majority
of Georgians.
Judging by common indicators appearing in almost all CIS countries, ONI research
suggests that providers reselling connectivity to CIS countries may be providing prefil-
tered access, passing on filtered content either as part of their service offering or as a
consequence of the policies they use to manage traffic on their own networks. This
form of blocking, which we have dubbed ‘‘upstream’’ filtering (indicating that the fil-
tering is happening in a jurisdiction other than that of the state in question), was first
observed during ONI testing in Uzbekistan in 2004. At that time, the traffic of one
Uzbek ISP was clearly filtered using a pattern similar to that employed by Chinese
ISPs. Further investigation revealed that the Uzbek ISP was buying connectivity from
China Telecom, which in this case may have sold access to its network as it would to
a regular Chinese client. Testing conducted by the ONI in 2006, 2007, and 2008 reveals
similar patterns of prepackaged filtering affecting Internet services within several other
CIS states where ISPs had purchased their connectivity from a Russian provider.
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Conclusion
The CIS region is experiencing a general trend toward greater regulation and control
of the national information space, which includes the Internet. Although most CIS
countries do not practice substantive or pervasive filtering—with the exception of
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—Internet content control through regulation or intimi-
dation is growing throughout the region. Countries deny allegations that filtering
based on ‘‘official’’ requests is taking place. Governments are becoming more creative
in designing new ways to influence the content posted online and to shape the infor-
mation environment. At times, filtering is justified by national interests or by other
broad notions like ‘‘public morals’’ that answer the needs of the ruling elite and submit
the rest to self-censorship.
Moreover, the laws are often unevenly applied, with ‘‘flexible’’ implementation
often paired with other more subtle (but effective) measures designed to promote self-
restraint (or self-censorship) of both ISPs and content producers. Information control
—in particular the protection of national informational space—is clearly an issue of
concern throughout the CIS, and it has encouraged more stringent attention to tele-
communications surveillance. In addition, measures to deny access to Internet content
at sensitive times, flagged as ‘‘event-based filtering,’’ to limit access to content geo-
graphically through ‘‘upstream filtering,’’ or to influence accessed information in a
neighboring country because of international control of the Internet traffic routes are
indicative of a new seriousness with which strategies for information control are being
developed. The CIS region is leading the world in the evolution of second- and third-
generation information controls. The trend toward new authoritarianism, combined
with shifts in regional power relations that include a relative decline in U.S. influence
and Chinese ascendancy, suggests a tendency toward greater control. These are un-
likely to manifest themselves in Internet filtering as overt censorship, but rather will
take the form of attempts to shape the information space creating a growing climate
of self-censorship. The success (or lack thereof) of this approach is likely to shape
policy choices well beyond the CIS region.
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Access to the Internet in Armenia is
largely unfettered, although evidence
of second- and third-generation filter-
ing is mounting. Armenia’s political
climate is volatile and largely unpre-
dictable. In times of political unrest,
the government has not hesitated to
put in place restrictions on the Inter-
net as a means to curtail public pro-
test and discontent.
Background
Located in the heart of the Caucasus region, and situated between Turkey, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Iran, Armenia relies on diplomacy in order to overcome political and
economic isolation. Because of its unique geographical situation—and unlike most for-
mer Soviet countries—Armenia has traditionally been ethnically and religiously homo-
geneous. Armenia is a semipresidential republic where the president (currently, Serzh
Sargsyan) holds a substantial amount of power, particularly in the areas of defense
and national security. Like the other CIS republics, Armenia has experienced the hard-
ships of switching from a centrally planned system to a market economy. The land-
locked status of this country coupled with poor transportation infrastructure has not
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eased Armenia’s economic transition. The Nagorno-Karabakh war with neighboring
Azerbaijan and uneasy political relations with Turkey have further complicated this
process. Russia remains Armenia’s main strategic partner in the region, and the two
countries are parties to a bilateral military agreement. Armenia is also seeking close
political, economic, and strategic ties with the United States and NATO. Although the
government has implemented far-reaching economic measures, including joining the
World Trade Organization in 2002, poverty in Armenia remains widespread, and its
economy is critically dependent on foreign support.
Internet in Armenia
The number of Internet users in Armenia increased from 161,000 in 2006 to 172,800 in
2008—the latter figure represents 5.8 percent of the population.1 Armenia has 90,000
Internet subscribers, representing 2.97 percent of Armenia’s population. Low-speed
dialup access still dominates among private users (about 80–85 percent) and most com-
panies use DSL and Wi-Fi broadband access. In addition, official sources suggest that
Internet penetration is less than 4 percent.2 In June 2007, the incumbent operator of
the telephone network (Armentel) introduced DSL services—they represent approxi-
mately 76 percent of the capital city of Yerevan’s population and 15 percent of the
population of rural areas.3 Local statistics show that fixed-line penetration amounted
to around 18 percent,4 while international sources point to 19.7 percent.5
Owing to the high level of urbanization in the country, the percentage of access to
basic telephony appears high. While it has been officially estimated that 95 percent
of households in the capital and 75 percent of households in other major cities have
access to public telephone networks,6 in reality only 40 percent of households have
individual telephone connections, and the quality of service is extremely poor.
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 5,377
Life expectancy at birth (years) 72
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 83
Rule of law (out of 211) 125
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 145
Democracy index (out of 167) 113 (Hybrid regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 117
Internet users (percent of population) 5.8
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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Most users access the Internet from home and work. Internet cafés, which grew rap-
idly in the 2000–2005 period, currently attract fewer users. During the last two years,
the number of Wi-Fi hot spots has significantly increased, covering Yerevan’s center
and some residential areas. There is little Internet penetration outside Yerevan, mainly
because of poor infrastructure, low income, and low levels of computer literacy. The
most popular languages among Internet users are Russian, English, and Armenian. In
2005, 40 percent of Web sites visited from within Armenia were located in Russia, 30
percent were in Europe and the United States, 25 percent were local resources, and 5
percent were hosted in other countries.7
The high cost of Internet access for some years slowed down the entry of foreign
providers into the market.8 Over the last couple of years, the number of ISPs providing
Wi-Fi and broadband connections has been increasing, resulting in price cuts. Despite
the increased affordability, Internet access is still expensive in comparison to most
European countries. Monthly unlimited dial-up access service costs AMD 7,500 (USD
24.50)9 in Yerevan and about USD 30 in rural areas. The cost of dial-up of Beeline,
however, is the same for rural and urban areas. If the user prefers megabyte services,
connection speeds are not dedicated and can vary from 64 Kbps to 1 Mbps, depending
on the area and time of day.10
Regulatory enforcement against dominant market players has been problematic.
However, in July 2008, Armenia’s antitrust regulator imposed a fine on Beeline for
anticompetitive behavior.11 In the wake of the regulator’s decision, the market has
enjoyed greater competitiveness, and Internet services have expanded.
Armenia was one of the first of the former Soviet countries to privatize its tele-
communications industry.12 In August 2007, the Russian VimpelCom13 acquired a
majority shareholding in ArmenTel, the incumbent telecommunications operator,
and subsequently bought out the rest. In February 2008, VimpelCom registered the
operator’s license, allowing ArmenTel to use the Beeline brand on the territory of
Armenia.14 Until 2007 the incumbent operator enjoyed a monopoly over international
connections and other services. Consequently, the liberalization of international Inter-
net access introduced only in 2007 radically altered the Internet access market. The
cost of international connections significantly decreased, but it is still higher than in
European and some CIS markets.15 The incumbent operator owns the main telecom-
munications infrastructure including the Trans-Armenian Optical System (the national
fiber-optic backbone), satellite antennas, the entire fixed telephone infrastructure
(PSTN), and most of the country’s cellular infrastructure, which covers about 85 per-
cent of Armenia.
The telecommunications regulation authority renewed ArmenTel’s license, stripping
it of its monopoly in some telecommunications services. However, ArmenTel has
maintained its de facto monopoly of the fixed-line market. This situation may change,
as two ISPs (Arminco and Cornet) announced they would start offering fixed-line
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communication services by the end of June 2009.16 Nonetheless, as the networks of all
operators are connected to ArmenTel’s infrastructure, the incumbent will continue to
dominate and benefit from interconnection fees.
Although ISPs are increasingly building their own fiber-optic networks, cable infra-
structure is still underdeveloped in Armenia. Over the last three years, more than three
ISPs have extended their network to cover the capital, while networks in rural areas
have been developing at a much slower rate.
Satellite services are relatively well developed in Armenia; however, the demand for
them is not significant because of their higher cost. Home users utilize satellite services
almost exclusively for television. Downlink satellite services are widely used by ISPs in
the capital city and rural areas because they provide the only means of supplying Inter-
net services without requiring physical networks. Nonetheless, the development of
two-way satellite services in Armenia has been affected not only by their high cost but
also by administrative barriers to importing and using radio equipment.
The majority of the main ISPs are owned by Armenian entities. The main ISPs in the
country are ArmenTel (operates under the Beeline brand),17 Arminco LLC,18 WEB
LLC,19 Xalt LLC,20 Netsys LLC,21 ADC CJSC,22 Cornet-AM CJSC,23 Fibernet Commu-
nication LLC,24 and Freenet Armenia.25 There are numerous small ISPs supplying Inter-
net services to large companies or to certain geographic areas. However, their number
is decreasing as a result of strong competition, and they recently introduced high li-
cense fees and state duties (regulated by the Law on State Duties), which have led to
increasing consolidation in the market. At least two foreign ISPs are expected to enter
the market in 2009.
Most ISPs gain access to the international backbone by way of ArmenTel’s fiber-optic
cable (Trans Armenia Optical System)26 with 155 Mbps capacity, which connects to the
Georgian Optical Highway and then to Russian and European channels. The second
national backbone, routing through Iranian territory, commenced operations in Sep-
tember 2008. ArmenTel bought this cable, which connects to Sovintel (VimpelCom’s
subsidiary).27 The third international route over the TRASEKA fiber-optic cable is
owned by the state and is operated by Fibernet LLC on the basis of a 25-year conces-
sion agreement.
As an alternative route, ArmenTel utilizes the Teleglobe satellite connection, limited
to 2 Mbps. Major ISPs such as Arminco and WEB LLC have built their own infrastruc-
ture, mainly fiber-optic networks and wireless networks, and also use satellite con-
nections (usually via PlanetSkye and SatGate).
There are three nonprofit fiber-optic networks constructed with the assistance of
foreign and international organizations that supply Internet services to scientific and
educational institutions: ARENA Foundation, National Foundation for Science and
Advanced Technologies, and Academic Scientific Research Computer Network of
Armenia (ASNET-AM).
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There is no Internet exchange point used by all Armenian ISPs. However, most ISPs
are interconnected, and local traffic is not charged yet. The Armenian top-level domain
‘‘.am’’ is administrated by the Armenian Internet Society.28
The provision of VoIP services has raised a number of conflicts between the incum-
bent operator, new market players, and regulatory authorities. At present, ISPs and
other private service providers are allowed to freely use the incumbent’s fixed network
for the provision of VoIP services. According to data provided by the Public Services
Regulatory Commission, from May 2007 to May 2008, 108 companies were granted
authorization to provide VoIP services.29
There are two mobile telephony operators in Armenia: Beeline and Vivacell-MTS,
both controlled by Russian companies. Vivacell-MTS entered the market in 2005 under
the name K-Telecom.30 Each mobile operator in Armenia serves approximately 1 mil-
lion users.31 The cost of mobile communication services varies from USD 0.10 to
0.16 per minute. A third mobile operator (Orange France Telecom) recently obtained a
license to operate in the country and is expected to enter the market by the end of
2009. Its entry might reduce mobile communication costs.
Legal and Regulatory Framework
In June 2001, the government issued a Concept Paper announcing that ICT is a prior-
ity for the country’s economic development. Pursuant to a presidential decree, the gov-
ernment created the ICT Development Supporting Council (ITDSC), an advisory body
chaired by the prime minister. The ITDSC was established as a communication plat-
form for stakeholders to propose and discuss issues in the area of telecommunications
policy and regulation. In 2003, the government launched the ‘‘E-Armenia’’ initiative.
However, progress toward implementing the proposal and the Concept Paper was
interrupted by the parliamentary election in 2003 and presidential election in 2004,
and little progress has been made on relaunching either initiative since.32
Finally, in July 2008 the government approved the Concept Paper on Development
of the ICT sector in Armenia. In contrast to the Concept Paper of 2001, the former lays
out short- and long-term action plans with fixed timetables for fostering an informa-
tion society and ensuring sector competitiveness.
The Law on Electronic Communications adopted in July 2005 regulates electronic
communications in Armenia. The Ministry of Transport and Communications is re-
sponsible for formulating sector policy and setting universal service objectives.
In 2006, the Public Services Regulation Commission (PSRC) took on the role of
the regulatory authority for telecommunications in line with the Law on Electronic
Communications.33 The Telecommunications Department of the PSRC develops and
enforces a package of important regulations, including criteria for license holders
and their reporting standards, standards for cost accounting and archiving, quality of
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service, and cost calculation standards for the incumbent operators and service pro-
viders. Even though the government does not have direct political influence on the
decisions of the regulator, the PSRC is not entirely independent, as it is financed by
the state and its members are appointed by the president upon nomination of the
prime minister. The regulator frequently does not consult with operators on all impor-
tant questions that affect them.
In the context of other CIS countries, Internet legislation in Armenia has demon-
strated liberal trends. For example, Armenia was one of the first countries that opened
the 2.4-GHz frequency band for free use by ISPs and end users. Data services have been
fully liberalized since December 2006 and voice services since October 2007. There are
four types of licenses for providing communication services: (1) a generic ‘‘network’’
license; (2) a license for the provision of electronic communications services (data
transmission and Internet access); (3) a license for providing VoIP services; and (4) a
license for utilization of radio frequencies.
Generally, the fees for obtaining a license are low. Electronic communications and
VoIP licenses are obtained after a relatively simple procedure. By contrast, network
licenses are granted through a rather complicated process.
The supply of leased-line services has always been an obligation of the incumbent
operator in Armenia. Although the license requires the incumbent to provide leased-
line services on a transparent and nondiscriminatory basis, communications providers
have complained of the selective provision of leased-line services and alleged frequent
refusals by the incumbent. The tariffs for leased-line services are subject to approval by
the national regulator. The legal regime for local loops unbundling and access to the
network still does not meet international standards, a fact which negatively affects
market competition.
With regard to media rights, the Armenian constitution guarantees freedom of ex-
pression, media, and other means of mass information (Article 27) and freedom of
entrepreneurship and ownership.34 Armenian media have become increasingly
restricted since 2003. Most newspapers act as a mouthpiece for official political agen-
das, and television stations are predominantly progovernment.35 In practice, censor-
ship is widespread among journalists.
In 2005, Armenia signed and ratified the Optional Protocol of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornog-
raphy. Armenia’s Criminal Code implemented these conventions, criminalizing, inter
alia, the possession and distribution of child pornography on computer networks.
Moreover, according to the Law on Mass Media (2003), the publication of any kind of
pornographic material in mass media (including the Internet) is prohibited. Indeed,
there have been at least two criminal convictions over the last three years related to
the dissemination of pornographic materials on the Internet.
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Surveillance
In Armenia, there are no express provisions to conduct monitoring of online content.
Furthermore, ISPs and companies providing Web hosting services are not obliged to
monitor the content of transmitted and stored content. In addition, under Armenian
law it is necessary to prove gross negligence or actual knowledge in order to impose
liability upon an Internet hosting company or ISP for hosting illegal content. However,
ISPs must block access to particular content on request from law enforcement agencies
for the purposes of crime prevention.
Following the February 2008 elections, widespread protests led the outgoing presi-
dent, Robert Kocharyan, to sign a state-of-emergency decree imposing severe restric-
tions upon mass media and Internet publications for a 20-day period.36 Consequently,
Armenia faced both media censorship and Internet blocking for the first time since
its independence. This blockage targeted Armenia-based sites, as well as YouTube after
a video showing clashes between protesters and police was uploaded. The blocked
Web sites included news portals, opposition Web sites, foreign media, and blogging
services. The blocking was not extended beyond the original 20-day term because of
international pressure. The media and Internet blackout created an unprecedented op-
portunity for bloggers to provide alternative viewpoints on the situation in Armenia, as
during this period they were one of the few information outlets available.
Internet censorship has been implemented in two ways. First, the Armenian Internet
Community simply froze several subdomains in the ‘‘.am’’ domain (such as aravot.am,
hzh.am, echannel.am, azatutyun.am, and others). Thus, the Web sites were accessible
only through their IP addresses. Only one week later, the Armenian Internet Commu-
nity announced that this measure was to be enforced by the National Security Service
(NSS). After the order from the NSS, some ISPs blocked access to a number of Web sites
on a preselected blacklist.
Second, surveillance is regulated through the Code of Criminal Procedure of Arme-
nia. The code provides that surveillance should be carried out only pursuant to a court
warrant when applied to restrict legally guaranteed rights and freedoms (Article 284).
The warrant must indicate grounds for the measures, the data that are being obtained,
and the venue and duration of the surveillance and accompanying data substantiating
the necessity for the warrant.
There are some exceptions to the need for a warrant—for instance, when a delay in
the implementation of the search could lead to a terrorist attack or threats to national
security, military, or environmental interests. The court has to be notified within 48
hours of the measures being taken. If the court finds that the grounds for the imple-
mentation of the search are insufficient, surveillance shall be immediately stopped,
and the materials and data obtained deemed inadmissible as evidence.
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Finally, Article 50 (3) of the Law on Electronic Communications sets forth an obliga-
tion on operators and ISPs to assist law enforcement investigators in conducting sur-
veillance measures.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the ONI ran tests on the first-tier ISPs in the country: Arminco,
WEB, and Netsys. During Armenia’s state-of-emergency, ONI monitored the media
and Internet blackout in the country and concluded that pervasive filtering was occur-
ring. The ONI detected a large number of blocked Web sites, including regional sites
providing information on ethnic and religious freedom groups, Armenian opposition
sites, Russian opposition sites and youth movements, personal blogs, an Armenian
Internet portal, and a political and cultural site about Nagorno-Karabakh. A number
of international and regional (mainly Russian) media sites, e-mail services, and search
engines were also filtered. In addition, leading Armenian online media were intention-
ally blocked. Few pornographic, LGBTQ, and drug-related sites were blocked.
Conclusion
Armenia has struggled through political instability, regional conflict, and widespread
poverty and unemployment. The new president has pledged to carry out reforms that
would decrease corruption, improve living standards, and enhance foreign confidence
in the economic development of the country. The crackdown on the media and the
Internet in sensitive times, however, reveals that the government is likely to resort to
such measures in order to stifle public criticism.
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The Internet in Azerbaijan remains
largely free from direct censorship de-
spite the government’s heavy-handed
approach to political opposition
and evidence of second- and third-
generation controls. Azerbaijan has
a growing Internet population, sup-
ported by a national strategy to
develop the country into an informa-
tion and communication technology
(ICT) hub for the Caucasus region. The Azerbaijani government actively seeks to
attract foreign aid to help boost the telecommunications and ICT sectors.1
Investment in the ICT sector has been prioritized, with ICT seen as an essential pil-
lar for diversifying the country’s oil-dependent economy—an important policy
given that Azerbaijan’s rich oil and gas reserves are expected to run out in the
next 20 to 40 years. Azerbaijan’s transition from war and instability in the 1990s
under the charismatic former president, Heidar Aliev, has left the political opposi-
tion weak and fragmented and has led to certain authoritarian tendencies in the
government. The Internet is also beginning to surface as an important medium
and space for political communication, and there are some indications that
restrictions on content may emerge in the future.
Background
After a decade of civil unrest and a disastrous war over the territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh, Azerbaijan recovered and stabilized under the strong hand of former Presi-
dent Heidar Aliev (elected in 1993). Since then, the country’s political life has remained
dominated by the presidential apparatus. In 2003, Heidar Aliev was succeeded by his
son Ilham Aliev in an election whose fairness is questioned by international observers.2
In October 2008, President Ilham Aliev was re-elected. Transparency International has
ranked Azerbaijan as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.3
The high economic growth in the country over the last several years is largely due
to revenues coming in from oil and gas sales. Seeking to advance other sectors, the
first President Aliev strongly promoted ICT as a pillar for national development, enact-
ing a national ICT strategy in 2003 that set ambitious targets for the development
of Internet in government, education, and the industrial sector.4 However, the poor
infrastructure and slow regulatory reforms in the country proved to be a challenge in
developing medium-level local business and attracting foreign investors.
The Internet plays an increasingly important role in daily life, including politics.
Opposition groups as well as individuals use the Internet as a communications plat-
form, prompting sporadic crackdowns by authorities. The opposition in Azerbaijan is
weak, and its leaders are often targets of government repression. A number of cases
have been reported where journalists have been arrested for criticizing the government
policies.5
Opposition groups in Azerbaijan are ‘‘seasonal’’ and not well coordinated. Most of
the opposition and political media Web sites are created during elections and are not
periodically updated. After the elections, domain names used in the campaigns are
usually left to expire. Hardly any political media or opposition groups’ Web sites have
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been created since 2007 when elections were last held.6 Even though there were
expectations of increased political activity online from the opposition before the Octo-
ber 2008 presidential election, no notable political discussion was documented. By
contrast, the president and the government update their Web sites periodically.7
Online groups are popular with young Internet users. Most of these groups focus on
issues of practical interest—that is, free mailing lists, file-hosting services, forums, dat-
ing, blogs, and WAP services. A few opposition youth groups have focused on organiz-
ing public actions against corruption and freedom of speech (e.g., Dalga, OI). One
example of such youth activist groups is the ANTV—the first organized and moderated
Azerbaijani video channel on YouTube, which aims to reveal unpopular decisions
taken by officials.8 Based on the reaction of state officials to events highlighted by
ANTV, it is likely that officials are tracking it regularly.
The Internet has also become a source of information for government bodies and the
police. For example, at the beginning of 2008, the police tracked down online informa-
tion from a car drivers’ community Web site in relation to a forthcoming street race. As
a result, the police arrested 17 young drivers for speeding.
The longstanding ‘‘cyberwar’’ over the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict be-
tween Azerbaijani and Armenian hackers continues to take place, although rather
infrequently. No official sanctions have been imposed upon Azerbaijani hackers. The
attacks do not appear to be part of a government-organized campaign, but rather the
work of individuals acting on their own. Web site defacements and DoS attacks have
also led to disruptions in the Azerbaijani Internet.
Internet in Azerbaijan
During the Soviet era, Azerbaijan was a major center for IT development, particularly
in the area of process control systems. This legacy left the country with a reasonably
large and well-developed technical infrastructure, including several research institutes
and a political leadership savvy about the importance of the ICT sector. Internet devel-
opment is following the pattern typical of many developing countries, with access cen-
tered on major cities, particularly the capital city Baku. Overall Internet penetration is
rising as a result of the support of the government’s ICT strategy as well as the large
Azerbaijani diaspora, for whom the Internet is increasingly an important channel for
maintaining contact with their homeland. The number of Internet users has grown
over the last several years to 1.5 million users, or 18.2 percent of the population, as of
March 2009, estimated by the Ministry of Communications9 (or close to 17 percent for
2008 according to the latest estimates of ITU10).
Many Azerbaijanis access the Internet from shared connections, such as their
place of work or study, or from Internet cafés (with the latter providing access for 19
percent of users in 2007). The rate of ownership of computers is low (2.4 units per
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100 inhabitants), and Internet usage in homes is moderate—it accounts for 41.6 per-
cent of the total usage for 2007, up from 36.4 percent for 2006. For connectivity,
some individual subscribers rely on mobile telephony, though access remains expen-
sive, with most using dial-up services as their primary means. Official survey results
for 2007 indicate that economic and educational barriers are the main contributing
factors for these low figures, with 31.4 percent blaming the high cost of computer
equipment and 21.8 percent indicating a lack of necessary skills.11
The Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies (MCIT), together
with the Ministry of Education, Microsoft, and Hewlett Packard, has started the pilot
stage of the National PC Initiative aiming to provide conditions for a rapid increase of
the PC penetration rate (up to 15 percent) and e-society development.12 The state-
backed Program on Information of the Education System (2008–2012) plans to provide
Internet connectivity to all the schools of Azerbaijan. Currently, more than 200 sec-
ondary schools have been connected to the Internet (ADSL).
The cost of Internet service remains high for the average citizen: a DSL connection of
64 Kbps costs around USD 40–50 per month, and unlimited monthly access costs
around USD 35. For comparison, the average salary in the country is slightly over
USD 300 per month. While the cost of international traffic has gone down over the
last several years, the cost for usage of the local infrastructure remains unchanged. Ap-
proximately 50 percent of the expenses of small ISPs are local connection costs paid to
the state-owned company controlling the market. Because these expenses are the same
for all providers, they have agreed among themselves to charge end users the same
price for unlimited monthly dial-up service. Larger providers temporarily blocked the
ISPs that tried to contravene the concerted practice. In December 2007, for example,
two small providers—SuperOnline and AvirTel—were blocked by local ISPs (Adanet
and IntraNS) while trying to provide service at a lower price for the customers. Shortly
after the providers agreed to bring the price of their services into line, the block
was lifted. For similar reasons, the larger ISPs blocked another smaller local ISP—
Azeronline.
In Azerbaijan, fixed-line telephony is largely centralized in the hands of the state-
owned telecom provider AzTelecom, which also acts as a commercial ISP. Delta Telecom
(previously operating as AzerSat) is the main ISP in the country, supplying interna-
tional connectivity to at least 90–95 percent of all users. Delta Telecom also owns the
Internet international gateway and sells international traffic to almost all ISPs.
The nonprofit AZNET/AZRENA project provides connectivity to the educational
and research community and benefits from a satellite channel built under NATO’s
‘‘Silk Road’’ project. AzEuroTel started commercial activity as a telecommunications
company and thus managed to establish a relatively wide network infrastructure.
AzEuroTel and Adanet also have satellite channels to Russia. AzerOnline, which is
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funded predominantly by the largest mobile operator, AzerCell, has an additional sat-
ellite connection to Turkey. The cost of satellite connection is very high because of the
monopoly regime set by the MCIT.
Since the second half of 2007, Azerbaijan does not have a free Internet Exchange
Point (IXP). Delta Telecom controls the only IXP and charges the same amount for
local and international traffic. Providers have not been able to agree on setting up
another IXP. The external traffic of Azerbaijan is now 6 Gbps, which is a notable in-
crease from the 155 Mbps capacity of 2006. Delta Telecom has external fiber-optic con-
nections with Russia via TransTelecom and with Turkey via RosTelecom.13 (Indirectly,
Delta Telecom serves Georgian users because a local ISP, TransEuroCom, buys inter-
national traffic from Delta and carries it by fiber to Georgia. Through the TRACECA
Fiber Optic Cable line, TransEuroCom is connected also to the TurkTelecom in Turkey.)
State control over domain name registration is limited. The assignment of the coun-
try code domain name ‘‘.az’’ is controlled by AzNic, Ltd., a joint venture between three
Azerbaijani firms. The cost for a one-year registration is USD 34. Network Technologies
(a subsidiary of IntraNS) is the company that carries out the registration and adminis-
tration of the top-level domain level (TLD) in the country. Domain name registrations
cannot be done online. Instead, a client is required in most cases to go in person to the
offices of the domain name holder. Since 2002, the number of registered domain
names has rapidly increased, with approximately 3,000 first-level and more than
6,000 second-level domains registered under the ‘‘.az’’ domain.
The Azerbaijani Internet population is young, mostly male, and largely concentrated
in urban areas: more than 55 percent of the users are people in the age range of 16 to
24, and approximately 70 percent of the users are male. During the 1990s, the official
language of Azerbaijan switched from Russian to Azerbaijani, and the script from Cyril-
lic to Latin. As a result, the number of Web sites using Azerbaijani language increased.
Due to the increased use of blogs by young people, several local blog servers were cre-
ated in the Azerbaijani language. However, most of the bloggers still post on Russian
blog servers, and others on Western European and Turkish sites. The Azerbaijani lan-
guage is currently used on all official government Web sites, as well as within main-
stream media and the general Internet population.
Mobile telephony is increasingly popular among the younger population. This is
especially the case in rural areas where the fixed-line infrastructure is poor and people
are increasingly subscribing to mobile services. The major mobile operator in the
country is Azercell with more than 35 percent MCIT participation. Bakcell, the second
operator, is relatively small. Azercell recently started offering mobile e-mail services.
Both operators provide coverage of the whole Azerbaijani territory (except the terri-
tory of Nagorno-Karabakh). In March 2006, the MCIT agreed to grant a license to a
third GSM operator, Azerphone.14 Catel15 started operation earlier. The state telecom,
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AzTelecom, has participation in the two new mobile operators. Azercell, Bakcell, and
Azerphone provide WAP and GRPS services. Mobile providers also use Delta Telecom’s
external channel for Internet.16
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Even though Azerbaijan made telecommunications and Internet national development
priorities, the telecom regulatory framework remains insufficiently developed. The
MCIT acts as both regulator and operator. In 2008, the MCIT moved to separate the
two functions but has not yet completed this process. Some telecommunications serv-
ices must be licensed,17 including VoIP.18
The major public telecom operators are the government-owned AzTelecom, Azeron-
line, IntraNS, Adanet, and AzEuroTel (50 percent owned by the MCIT and 50 percent
by a British company). Around half of the telephone lines in Azerbaijan are analog,
and more than 85 percent of the main lines are in urban areas. The MCIT has adopted
a program for development of telecommunications aimed at modernizing the tele-
communications infrastructure.
Under foreign pressure, the government has taken steps to liberalize the ISP market.
Compulsory state licensing for ISPs was eliminated in 2002,19 although the MCIT has
continued to ignore this provision on isolated occasions. The MCIT continues to hold
about a 50 percent share in a few of the leading ISPs in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan applied
for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in 1997, and even though some
progress in liberalization of services was made, the country still remains on the acces-
sion agenda. It has been suggested that there is not enough political will to join the
WTO, mainly because local businesses fear the loss of their advantageous position in
the internal market.
From a regulatory perspective, the Internet is treated as mass media20 and included
on the list of telecommunications services regulated by the 2005 Law on Telecommu-
nications. Azerbaijani law does not provide for mandatory filtering or monitoring of
Internet content. However, as Web sites that criticize governmental policies have
emerged, the government has considered introducing a law that will impose restric-
tions on Web sites with obscene or antinational content, thereby strengthening
already existing defamation laws. Content filtering is practiced by AZNET, the educa-
tion and research ISP, but is regulated by an accepted usage policy and is restricted to
filtering out pornographic content. Anecdotal accounts claim that filtering of specific
Web sites occurs, which is seemingly the result of informal requests to ISP managers
by state officials from the Ministry of National Security, MCIT, or the presidency. These
instances have been infrequent, and the resulting public outcry has led to the swift
unblocking of affected sites.
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YouTube is also becoming increasingly popular among Azerbaijani Internet users.
Several youth groups are posting videos online and are using YouTube as a platform
to communicate with other YouTube members or members of the public at large. The
popularity of the multimedia site prompted the head of the National Council on TV
and Radio Broadcasting of Azerbaijan, Nushirevan Magerramli, to announce the gov-
ernment’s intention to regulate Internet TV and Internet Radio.21
The Telecommunications Act is expected to prohibit the same legal entity from con-
centrating more than three publications under one TV and radio company. In 2007,
the government announced that in some regions of the country, TV signals from
neighboring Armenia and Iran are stronger than the national TV broadcast.22 As a
result, the National Television and Radio Council ordered a discontinuation of the
broadcast of Russian and Turkish TV stations on Azerbaijani territory. In October
2008, the council announced its decision to suspend the licenses of some international
radio channels, such as the BBC, Radio Liberty, and others.
The Azerbaijani defamation legislation has been a frequent subject of criticism by
the international human rights community. The government has been under pressure
to decriminalize libel, especially after prosecution against journalists and bloggers has
intensified. For example, Eynulla Fatullayev, the editor of Azerbaijan’s largest inde-
pendent newspaper and an outspoken critic of the government, was sentenced to eight
years and six months in prison on charges of terrorism and inciting ethnic hatred.23
Fatullayev was sentenced earlier during the same year under the criminal libel provi-
sion to 30 months in prison for a posting attributed to him. The posting blamed the
Azerbaijani government for one of the massacres in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in
1992.24 Fatullayev denied writing the posting and argued that the charges were politi-
cally motivated. This case stirred massive protests in the country against the editor’s
conviction. The authorities shut down the publications in which Fatullayev partici-
pated. The hard disk drives of the computers of these publications were also seized.25
Another recent case shows that the government has exercised pressure on ISPs to
take down specific Internet content. Sensitive videos considered offensive to Azerbai-
jani national feelings were uploaded online to cause a massive uproar in the society.
In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an official letter to the ISP to express
its disapproval and have the videos removed.
Surveillance
Azerbaijani law does not include a formal legal foundation requiring Internet surveil-
lance. Nevertheless, surveillance does occur, mainly by means of sporadic visits of
the State Security Services to ISPs. In 2000–2001, there was an unsuccessful attempt
to adopt the Russian SORM-II model for Internet surveillance, but the project was
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interrupted because of financial difficulties and opposition from ISPs and the Internet
community.
In order to deal with cyber attacks, the MCIT is planning to establish a council deal-
ing with Internet-related problems.26 The Azerbaijani Internet community is hoping
that the proposed council will be able to decrease cyber security risks without under-
mining the privacy of users. Another recent MCIT initiative is the launch of an Inter-
net antihackers agency.
There are several reported cases of people arrested because of content posted online.
The author of the Web site http://www.pur.gen.az, infamous for its biting humorous
content, posted a caricature of the president of Azerbaijan in 2006. In 2007, the Min-
istry of National Security searched one of the Internet cafés in Baku and discovered
this caricature on the cache page. The author and the webmaster of the site, as well
as several café guests, were arrested and indicted for organized criminal activities. The
individuals were released several days later, but the Web site was shut down by its
owners in order to avoid further prosecution.
Another case followed the rapid increase of the price of petrol, gas, and electricity in
the country in January 2007. The author of http://www.susmayaq.biz27 published a
protest letter to the president online. As a result, the author was arrested, and the
Web site was temporarily inaccessible on ten Azerbaijani ISPs from January to March
2007.28 After a protest by youth organizations, the author was released without charges.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative tested for content filtering on four ISPs—
AzNet, DeltaTelecom, AzerOnline, and AzEuroTel, as well as several end user locations
(such as Internet cafés). Most of the ISPs in the country purchase international traffic
from Delta Telecom and utilize the infrastructure of AzTelecom for local traffic. It
appears that most of the filtering occurs on Delta Telecom lines. The ONI found reverse
filtering on a number of U.S. military sites.
Evidence of second-generation controls was also evident in the run-up to the 2008
parliamentary elections. The political section of the most popular online forum (http://
www.day.az/forum) in Azerbaijan was removed around 20 days before the elections
and was still inactive in May 2009.
The popular opposition Web blog Tinsohbeti.com was blocked in March 2008 after
it published an article detailing the political and economic problems in Azerbaijan.
Earlier, in 2006, the same Web site was blocked because it posted satirical cartoons of
the president.29 Before the presidential elections in October 2008, the Web site was
unblocked, but by then the original domain registration had expired and no longer
hosted the opposition Web blog.
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The autonomous republic of Nakhchivan, an exclave of Azerbaijan, closed down
Internet cafés for several days in March 2008, according to the Azerbaijani press.30
The reasons behind the ban remain unclear, but restrictive policies on seeking and
distributing information in the republic are not isolated cases. At the end of 2008, a
number of Web sites were locally blocked in Nakhchivan.31
At the Internet café level, many owners impose restrictions that prevent users from
downloading large attachments and visiting certain pornographic sites. But these poli-
cies are not universal, and they are implemented at the discretion of Internet café
owners.
At the business level, most employers limit access to the Internet through the use of
intelligent firewalls that restrict the downloading of files with certain extensions (.mp3,
.avi, .mpg, .mov, etc.), as well as access to storage file servers and to the servers of
instant messaging clients such as ICQ, MSN, Skype, and others.
The ongoing cyberwar between Azerbaijani and Armenian hackers has also caused
disruptions to some Web sites and ISPs. In early 2007, five Armenian Web sites were
inaccessible, and users were displayed a block page commenting on the political affil-
iation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.32 At the same time, the Web site of the
Azerbaijani Public Television ITV was taken down.33 Since most of the allegedly inac-
cessible sites contained oppositional political content, there are allegations that the
Azerbaijani government was involved in the attacks. However, ONI testing could not
confirm these suspicions. The ONI did not test for political issues related to the pro-
claimed independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.34
Conclusion
The Internet in Azerbaijan remains for the most part ‘‘free and open’’ as a result of the
government’s strong interest in converting the country into an ‘‘ICT hub’’ for the re-
gion. However, evidence of second- and third-generation controls is mounting. As the
IT market is not yet fully liberalized, the commercial ISPs operate under economically
inconvenient conditions set by the state monopolist, which stifle smaller competitors.
Government pressure on content providers is not isolated and takes different manifes-
tations ranging from surveillance to the shutting down of commercial activities.
Instances of ‘‘just-in-time’’ filtering appeared to result from ‘‘informal’’ requests by
state officials to ISP operators and were limited in duration and scope. Moreover, public
pressure led to a swift reversal of the policies. That said, the filtering requests appear to
be directed through informal channels. Given the prospect of increased use of the
Internet by Azerbaijani opposition groups and the government’s sensitivity to opposi-
tion, we may expect to see some attempts to regulate Internet content and further
instances of ‘‘just-in-time’’ filtering affecting opposition Web sites.
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Belarus
The Belarus government has moved
to second- and third-generation con-
trols to manage its national informa-
tion space. Control over the Internet
is centralized with the government-
owned Beltelecom managing the
country’s Internet gateway. Regula-
tion is heavy with strong state
involvement in the telecommunica-
tions and media market. Most users
who post online media practice a degree of self-censorship prompted by fears of
regulatory prosecution. The political climate is repressive and opposition leaders
and independent journalists are frequently detained and prosecuted.
Background
Under President Alexander Lukashenka, the Belarusian regime has been criticized for
its repressive and increasingly authoritarian tendencies. In 2008, it was announced
that Lukashenka would most likely run for a fourth term in 2011.1 During his rule a
number of independent and opposition leaders have been detained, opposition parties
banned, and public demonstrations suppressed. The economic and political system
remains highly centralized, with executive authority vested exclusively in the office of














Conflict and security 
Internet tools 





the president. Charges of election fraud have also been widespread. Human rights
organizations have been extremely critical of the current regime, including its steadily
increasing control over information during the last several years. Nevertheless, Luka-
shenka remains genuinely popular with many, particularly the middle-aged and rural
populations who have benefited most from his protectionist economic policies and
the overall stability that Belarus has enjoyed2 (which contrasts with political instability
in Ukraine, Georgia, and other CIS countries). Market analysts predict that economic
hardship will force the privatization of state assets, but such a move would most likely
benefit top Belarusian officials.3
Internet in Belarus
Steady economic growth in Belarus has stimulated the development of telecommu-
nications in recent years. However, because of excessive regulation and state control
of major participants in the telecommunications industry, the development of tele-
communications remains low compared to the rest of the region. The state retains a
dominant position over the telecommunications sector, with all external fixed-line
connections passing through the state-owned operator Beltelecom. Taking into ac-
count both the increase in Internet users and the potential of the Internet to spread
political ideas, the government is adopting restrictive policies, monitoring content,
and placing temporary limitations on access to politically sensitive Web sites, particu-
larly during times of public protest.
The cost of Internet access in Belarus has decreased in recent years prompting a
notable rise in Internet usage and a growing ISP market. As of 2008, Belarus had an
Internet penetration rate of approximately 29 percent.4 Prices for Internet access re-
main higher than those of neighboring countries. In 2008, the cost of dial-up Internet
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 10,238
Life expectancy at birth (years) 70
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 100
Human development index (out of 179) 67
Rule of law (out of 211) 184
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 182
Democracy index (out of 167) 132 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 78
Internet users (percent of population) 29
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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access through Beltelecom was around USD 0.68 per hour, while an ADSL connection
(512 Kbps) cost around USD 122 per month,5 placing the latter beyond the reach of
most citizens, given that the average salary was around USD 436 per month as of July
2008. Private operators are attempting to break into the market by offering lower prices.
Because Beltelecom controls the market, tariffs for residential local calls are below
cost. The government is preserving this policy in order to ensure that fixed voice ser-
vices are affordable for all.6 At the same time, Beltelecom is keeping prices high for
international calls and Internet access service, a policy that allows the operator to sub-
sidize local call services and remain a revenue-generating enterprise. This policy, how-
ever, hinders the establishment of a competitive market.
In recent years, broadband Internet services have developed rapidly. Beltelecom has
announced plans to provide broadband Internet service to a large number of its sub-
scribers and to launch Wi-Fi service. In April 2008, the Ministry of Communications
estimated that 170,000 Internet users were using broadband services and forecast that
by 2010 this number would reach 500,000 users.7
The most active Internet users in Belarus belong to the 17–22 age group (38 percent),
followed by users in the 23–29 age group.8 Internet access in Belarus is predominantly
urban, with 60 percent of users living in the capital Minsk. The profile of the average
Internet user is male, university educated, living in the capital, and working in a state
enterprise. The Ministry for Statistics and Analysis estimates that one in four families in
Belarus owns a computer at home.9 In 2005, 58 percent of schools in Belarus had com-
puters, and 25 percent of the schools had Internet access. The popularity of Internet
cafés has fallen in recent years, as most users prefer to access the Internet from home
or work. Russian is the most widely used language by Belarusians on the Internet, fol-
lowed by Belarusian, English, and Polish.
As Internet usage has risen, related services have developed into fast-growing and
profitable businesses in Belarus. According to ministry data, 150 ISPs had licenses to
operate in the country, while only 41 were active at the beginning of 2008.10 Con-
ditional on obtaining a license, ISPs and mobile operators can apparently enter the
market without facing any serious barriers. Fixed-line operators, however, are awaiting
further liberalization of the market. There are four mobile operators, and the govern-
ment owns stakes in all of them. The country’s first deputy IT and communications
minister, Ivan Rak, has announced that the tender for 3G licenses in Belarus would be
held by September 1, 2009.11 The state-controlled operator Beltelecom holds the big-
gest market share, with 187 public Internet access points in the country. Beltelecom’s
subsidiary Belpak is the main ISP in the country. Beltelecom holds exclusive rights over
the external channels of communications,12 and all ISPs are required to run their traffic
through its infrastructure, often at high prices.
Only the network of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus (BasNet) has its
own independent satellite connection,13 but it provides Internet access exclusively to
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academic institutions. In 2008, the speed of Beltelecom’s internal Internet channel
was significantly increased to 5.2 Gbps, with prospects to increase to 8 Gbps in 2010
(from a mere 1.5 Gbps in 2006). In comparison, BasNet’s speed is 12 Mbps. Beltelecom
routes its traffic predominantly through Russian operators (70 percent) to connect to
the Internet.14
Second-tier ISPs have the right to build their own infrastructure, except for the con-
struction of external liaison channels. Providers are also required to use Beltelecom
channels to connect users (so-called last mile).
Despite the state-proclaimed ‘‘liberalization’’ of the Belarusian mobile market, the
government continues to own a significant stake in four operators.15 The main ISPs
in the country apart from the state operator are Aichyna, Belinfonet, BN, and Solo.
Because VoIP services are considered international services over which Beltelecom has
exclusive rights, the state operator is the only operator licensed to provide commercial
VoIP services in Belarus. The high prices maintained by the monopoly encourage the
emergence of illegal VoIP providers, which are criminally prosecuted. Under decree of
the Ministry of Communications and Informatization, IP telephony is permitted only
for noncommercial purposes.16 Regulation of P2P connections is currently not a prior-
ity for the government.
Beltelecom controls the main IXP and charges other ISPs for using it.17 Nonetheless,
a large number of second-tier ISPs are using the IXP because it significantly cuts down
traffic costs. Interconnection tariffs between telecommunications operators are still not
regulated.
There are more than 22,300 Belarusian Web sites, of which around 13,500 domain
names were registered with the country-code top-level domain name ‘‘.by’’ by mid-
2008.
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Extensive governmental regulation, a strict licensing regime, and Beltelecom’s mo-
nopoly are major impediments to the development of competitive Internet services
in Belarus. Beltelecom is under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Communica-
tions and Informatization. This arrangement could change as a result of the WTO’s
accession requirements, which demand that Beltelecom be privatized and end its mo-
nopoly on external communication channels. The ministry declared that Beltelecom’s
control over external communication channels would remain after privatization, with
licenses given only to those operators that have built their own external communi-
cation infrastructure. Belarusian legislation has established a license-based regime for
the following types of telecommunications activities: fixed local/national telephony,
mobile telephony, radio trunk transmission, and data transmission.18
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The Ministry of Communications and Informatization is the main regulatory au-
thority of the telecommunications sector and is divided into six main departments:
statistics, telecommunications, postal communications, television and broadcasting,
certification, and technical regulation and standardization. The ministry is frequently
accused of placing unjustified limitations on commercial operators to reinforce Beltele-
com’s monopoly. The ministry is a founder of Beltelecom and regulates the activities of
the operator. This setup undermines regulatory independence, a principle essential for
the efficient functioning of the communications sector. Policy relating to ICT appears
to be created mostly on an ad hoc basis by President Lukashenka and his administra-
tion. The president frequently holds special meetings to issue directives regarding ICT
regulation and the implementation of particular policies. The Security Council, chaired
by the president, decides on a wide range of questions related to the security of the
regime, including information security. Additionally, a number of state entities have
significant power to influence and control the Internet. The Operational Analytics
Center (formerly the State Center for Information Security), under the supervision
of the president and initially a subdivision of the special security services (KGB), is a
specialized body responsible for protecting state secrets. The center has preserved its
close collaboration with the KGB. The center also manages the administration of the
country’s top-level domain (‘‘.by’’). The State Inspection on Electronic Communica-
tions is a subunit of the Ministry of Communications and Informatization and exer-
cises wide authority with regard to the Internet. The Inspection supervises the
electronic communications sector, and in the event of a violation of the rules, it can
impose sanctions on operators or propose the revocation of a wrongdoer’s license.
Department ‘‘K’’—a division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—is responsible for
investigating cyber crime (arts. 212, 349–355 of the Penal Code). The department coor-
dinates its work with the police and other authorities. Department ‘‘K’’ keeps 1,500
Belarusian hackers on its records. Records show that 4,642 criminal cases related to
usage of computer technologies commenced in the period of 1998 to 2006, of which
2,826 were registered in 2005. Belarus has witnessed a rapid growth of cyber crimes,
and authorities have estimated a 30 percent increase for the first half of 2007 in com-
parison to the whole of the previous year.19 The most common cyber crimes in the
country are unauthorized appropriation of information through usage of computer
technology (72 percent) and modification of computer information (13 percent).20
Although Belarus lacks a well-developed Internet regulatory framework, the author-
ities appear anxious to achieve control over the Internet. Conscious of the popularity
of the Internet among opposition groups and private media, authorities compel self-
censorship through frequent threats and prosecutions. In addition, in order to avoid
public debate of pending legal measures, authorities often delay publishing laws before
their final promulgation.
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A number of laws refer to the Internet, such as the Law on Informatization of 1995,21
the Law on SORM of 1999,22 and the Law on Electronic Communications of 2005.23
The Internet is within the ambit of regulation of the Law on Informatization, which
subjects Internet activities to a number of media restrictions. The Law on the Media
of June 2008 provides a similar regime for Web sites and media. The legal framework
allows for the application of restrictive measures on Web sites, such as blocking of con-
tent or the cessation of operation. This is a result of increasing intent on the part of a
number of state officials to control the Internet.
In 2006, the government approved the Program on Protection of Information. The
main objective of this program is to prevent illegal access to information by the special
services, to protect information systems, and to counteract excessive investigative mea-
sures. A new center was created in support of this program, but many activists have
questioned its independence and effectiveness.24
E-commerce is also regulated by the state. All Internet retailers are legally obligated
to register domain names with the State Center of Information Security, as well as to
obtain a license for retail trade by e-commerce activities. International electronic
payment systems are seriously limited in Belarus. All international monetary transfers
must occur through banks that notify the tax authorities of all fund transfers from
abroad.
Surveillance
Officially, Internet filtering and monitoring of telecommunications networks are illegal
in Belarus. However, authorities conduct surveillance of Internet activities under the
pretext of protecting national security. In 2001, the president extended the concept
of ‘‘national security’’ to include the Internet as a potential threat to the information
security of the country.25
Under the Law on Operational and Investigative Activities (SORM) and the Law on
Authorities of National Security in the Republic of Belarus, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the KGB have the right to monitor information carried through any com-
munication channel in order to ‘‘fight criminal activity’’ and ‘‘guarantee national secu-
rity.’’26 Such activity may be carried out only as provided for in the law; however, the
law gives the KGB the right to obtain any data from state entities and from private or
public organizations considered to be ‘‘necessary’’ for accomplishing the KGB’s objec-
tives, and gives it unlimited access to the information systems and databases (includ-
ing log files and so on) of communication providers. Article 17 of SORM establishes
that all persons who are providing any type of electronic communications services
should integrate additional certified equipment and program mechanisms into their
systems, as specified by the KGB.
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Belarus does not have systems monitoring Internet traffic analogous to the Russian
SORM-II. However, it is likely that the Belarusian and Russian special services cooperate
in this sphere. More than 70 percent of Belarusian Internet traffic goes through Russia,
and part of it is processed through the Russian system SORM-2. Nonetheless, some pro-
viders confirm that the authorities have unofficially requested that all user IDs be kept
for a few months and be turned over to the security services on demand.
On November 21, 2005, the leader of one of the opposition parties (Anatoliy
Lebedko) was called to the prosecutor’s office in relation to material published on his
party’s Web site (ucpb.org).27 Lebedko was subsequently interrogated about the source
of the information posted online and the person responsible for the article’s content.
Such examples of surveillance over Internet activities are not isolated.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the ONI tested seven main ISPs: Atlant, Aichyna, BASNET, Belinfo-
net, Belpak (Beltelecom), BN, and Solo. The testing confirmed blocking by almost
all ISPs. Many Web sites tested on the academic network BASNET were inaccessible
in Belarus, among which were opposition Web sites and local and global freedom-of-
expression Web sites, including a number of Web sites of international organizations,
some dedicated to Belarus. International social networking, hosting, e-mail, P2P, and
translation and multimedia Web sites were also filtered on BASNET, in addition to
Web sites containing information on drug and alcohol consumption, as well as terror-
ist activities. Anonymizer Web sites were blocked on commercial ISPs and on the aca-
demic network. Several LGBTQ Web sites have been filtered openly since the
beginning of 2005, on the basis that they contain pornographic material.28 Interest-
ingly, these Web sites were inaccessible on some ISPs but accessible on the state-owned
Beltelecom. Some erotic Web sites were blocked as well. Access to U.S. military Web
sites appears to be restricted through reverse filtering.29
Since April 2008, an association focused on promoting freedom of expression among
ISPs has started gaining popularity in Belarus.30 Nonetheless, most of the large opera-
tors are limiting access to the Internet when necessary to serve specific objectives. A
study carried out in the spring of 2008 compiled a list of Web sites that are currently
blocked by Belarusian companies. The results of this local survey are presented in the
following table.31
Internet access is forbidden in military and national security agencies, as well as in
the banking sector. Beltelecom’s monopoly control over international connections
provides the state with an effective and enforceable system for regulating and restrict-
ing Internet traffic. During presidential elections, access to opposition and indepen-
dent media Web sites was temporarily blocked. During the February 2006 presidential
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elections, ONI documented second-generation techniques, including ‘‘just-in-time’’ fil-
tering of opposition Web sites, which included DNS tampering, network disconnec-
tion, and allegations of DoS attacks.32 Some specialists have suggested that, during
presidential elections, Beltelecom established so-called traffic-shaping practices—that
is, deliberately slowing down access to specific IP addresses. Beltelecom allegedly
received special requests from authorities to block certain Web sites for a limited period
of time.
Self-censorship by Internet users has become a pervasive phenomenon. In 2005, the
popular Belarusian portal tut.by refused to put up banners advertising opposition Web
sites. It is unknown whether this activity was a result of pressure by the authorities or
merely an attempt to protect its own business.33
Researchers at ONI confirmed that most Internet cafés restrict access to Web sites
containing pornographic, terrorist, and proxy-related material. Internet cafés install
software that either blocks URLs in the list of forbidden Web sites or alerts the admin-
istrator if such a URL is visited. The restricted URL list includes Web sites forbidden for
distribution by the Republic Committee on Prevention of Pornography, Violence, and
Cruelty Propaganda. Administrators often require passport identification of customers.
Some Internet cafés also limit the volume of Internet traffic and decrease download
speeds when exceeded. On the request of state security services, administrators keep
logs of users’ network activity.
Conclusion
As Internet use in Belarus has risen significantly in recent years, the government is
intent on extending its firm control over the national information space. The level of
online piracy in the country is very high, but the government does not adequately
Position Restriction of Access to Certain Internet Content Percentage
1 Multimedia and P2P sites 28
2 No restrictions of Internet access 22
3 Access allowed only to a limited number of Web sites 20
4 Systems allowing for an instant exchange of messages 16
5 Erotic and porn sites 12
6 Limited traffic 10
7–8 Limitations on upload of large files 8
7–8 Social networks, Internet journals 8
9 Speed of download of information affected 6
10 Complete restriction of Internet access 4
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confront such activity. Instead, it heavily regulates market participants and is taking a
sluggish approach to technological innovation. All ISPs in Belarus must connect to the
Internet through channels of the state-owned ISP Beltelecom, thus facilitating the gov-
ernment’s control over all Internet traffic. The president has established a strong and
elaborate information security policy and has declared his intention to exercise strict
control over the Internet under the pretext of national security. Based on periodic test-
ing, ONI has detected sporadic but sophisticated blocking of Internet content,
prompted by political events in the country, suggesting that the regime is inclined
toward using second- and third-generation techniques.
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Access to Internet content in Georgia
is largely unrestricted as the legal con-
stitutional framework, developed after
the 2003 Rose Revolution, established
a series of provisions that should, in
theory, curtail any attempts by the
state to censor the Internet. At the
same time, these legal instruments
have not been sufficient to prevent
limited filtering. The ONI detected fil-
tering on corporate and educational networks. Evidence also shows that Internet
cafés limit access to some download sites (reportedly to conserve bandwidth and
cut down on costs). During the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008, Georgian ISPs
systematically filtered Russian Internet content. Georgian end users were also af-
fected by the March 2008 blocking of YouTube by Turkish Telecom. Internet pen-
etration remains low despite a liberal telecom market and comparatively
moderate service prices, and it is influenced by an unstable political climate that
has discouraged investment.
Background
Since 2003, Georgia has been governed by the reformist administration of President
Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power in the wake of the Rose Revolution. During
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this time, the government implemented tax reforms and liberalized the economy.
These measures resulted in significant foreign investment, including investments
from neighboring Russia and Kazakhstan. Georgia’s strategic position makes the coun-
try an important route for the oil and gas pipelines connecting the Caspian Sea with
the West—one of which is the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.1 The
country’s unemployment rate is high (12.6 percent), with more than a million Geor-
gians living outside the country.
Georgia has demonstrated a clear commitment to reform its economic and regula-
tory environment by enhancing transparency and efficiency as a means to improve
the business climate. These reforms have positioned the country among the world
leaders in the ‘‘ease of doing business’’ index prepared by the World Bank.2 Georgia
has also surpassed other CIS countries by obtaining the highest level of compliance
with international standards with regard to its telecommunications sector.3
In August 2008, Georgia and Russia were embroiled in an armed conflict in South
Ossetia (a semi-autonomous breakaway region bordering Russia). Georgia’s strained
relations with Russia have important economic and political consequences for the
country’s future.
Internet Infrastructure
In 2007, the government initiated a liberalization of the radio and television industry.
This effort resulted in an increase in the number of independent newspapers and cable
TV channels, several dozen of which now operate in the country. The state retains con-
trolling interest in a number of key television stations, which has led to some criticism
from international observers. Such criticism was especially apparent following the gov-
ernment’s decision to revoke the license of Imedi—a major private TV channel which
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 4,403
Life expectancy at birth (years) 71
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 100
Human development index (out of 179) 93
Rule of law (out of 211) 120
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 120
Democracy index (out of 167) 104 (Hybrid Regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 88
Internet users (percent of population) 7.8
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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was strongly aligned with opposition parties.4 This and other unilateral acts by the
government have led to accusations that the administration is attempting to exert
influence over the independent media.5
The fixed-line telecommunications network in Georgia remains outdated and is
in need of significant investment. The network has very limited coverage outside
Tbilisi—Georgia’s capital—but even inside the capital the quality of telecommunica-
tions varies greatly. In urban areas, there are around 20 lines per 100 inhabitants, but
in rural areas there are only around four lines per 1,000 inhabitants. At the same time,
the number of fixed-line customers dropped in 2006 to 553,000, compared to their
level in 2004 (596,000).6 In 2005, the main telecommunications operator, Georgian
Telecom, was privatized. There are currently three mobile phone operators in the coun-
try: Geocell (TeliaSonera), MagtiCom, and Beeline (VimpelCom).
The Internet emerged in Georgia in 1994 as an off-line e-mail service. By 1996, Sanet
Networks (one of the early Georgian ISPs) attracted U.S. financial support and was the
first entity in Georgia to provide full Internet services. In 1997, four more companies
started to provide Internet services using dial-up technology. In 2002, ADSL services
were introduced into the market.
During the 2000–2007 period, revenues earned by Internet operators increased from
3.7 million Georgian lari (GEL) to 42.5 million.7 In 2006, their combined annual prof-
its increased by 32 percent. Within the telecommunications market, the Internet is the
second fastest growing segment after mobile services. Georgian sources estimate that
by the end of 2007 the total number of Internet users of ADSL technologies went
beyond 41,000.8
In 2006, a Kazakh investor acquired the state-owned telecom operator and estab-
lished United Georgian Telecom (UGT). This operator is the owner of the cable infra-
structure in the country, which it leases to other ISPs. Using its monopoly position,
UGT charges higher rents on access to its network. Moreover, UGT frequently rejects
requests by some ISPs to install or terminate their fiber-optic lines at UGT operated
facilities and charges a fee for each DSL user.
In 2006, three of the largest ISPs on the market—Georgia Online, Sanet, and Cau-
casus Networks—merged to form Georgia’s largest ISP, Caucasus Online. The company
is the Internet market monopolist providing service to more than 80 percent of the
population. Caucasus Online has begun laying down its own fiber-optic metropolitan
network in Tbilisi. This development should lessen the dependence on the main fixed-
line operator, UGT, which leases the underground right-of-ways that carry cable to
Caucasus Online for USD 110 per kilometer.
A major countrywide survey on Internet use has not been carried out in Georgia.
Consequently, reliable statistics on average Internet use are unavailable. However, iso-
lated evidence can be gathered through small-scale surveys. Based on these sources, it
is estimated that in 2008 there were approximately 360,000 Internet users in Georgia,
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which represents 7.8 percent of the population.9 The majority of Georgian Internet
users are under 30 years of age.
The languages most commonly used among Georgian Internet users are English (90
percent), Russian (8 percent), and Georgian (2 percent). It is estimated that 50 percent
of users access the Internet from their workplace, 40 percent from their homes, and
10 percent from other places (such as schools, universities, Internet cafés, and mobile
networks). The monthly price of ADSL varies from USD 20 to USD 200 depending
largely on bandwidth. The local backbone connection varies from 3 to 20 Mbps. Inter-
net service is usually available in urban areas, with around 80 percent of the services
provided in Tbilisi.
The Georgian market for Internet services consists of the following companies: Cau-
casus Online (covering 80 percent of the market), UGT (10–15 percent), and others
that make up a combined 5 percent share of the market (Geonet, Service Net, Egrisi,
Maximali [WiMAX provider], Magti, Geocell, and Beeline). Magti signed a contract
with the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia to connect 2,000 public schools
(including schools in rural and high-mountain areas) to the Internet by the end of
2011. This will contribute to the growth of country’s Internet audience, with approxi-
mately 700,000 new users. Georgian Research and Educational Networks Association
(GRENA) is a noncommercial ISP that provides Internet access to academic and educa-
tional institutions. The market is open for foreign ISPs. At the end of 2008, Caucasus
Online established a new fiber-optic channel, which goes from Tbilisi to Poti and
through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and Romania, and connects to Cogent. The new
channel gave Caucasus Online the ability to offer speeds up to 20 Mbps. Other ISPs
route their commercial traffic through Turkey via Turk Telecom, Sweden via Baku, and
Rostelecom via Novorosiisk.
All ministries and almost all government agencies have Web sites. The number of
blogs is rapidly rising in the country, mainly among young people. No blogs are sup-
ported by opposition parties.
Legal and Regulatory Framework
The Constitution of August 24, 1995,10 enshrines freedom of expression and freedom
of information. The primary legislation that regulates the electronic communications
sector is the Law on Electronic Communications No. 1514 of June 6, 2005.11
The law establishes the principles for development of a competitive environment
in the communications sector; specifies the rights and obligations of persons owning,
using, or providing services by means of electronic communications networks and
facilities; and defines the scope of competence of the national regulatory authority in
the sector—the Georgian National Communications Commission (herein referred to
as the Commission). The provisions of the law step up the process of liberalization
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of the electronic communications market by (a) introducing a simple system of general
authorization instead of an individual licensing regime; (b) identifying operators hav-
ing significant market power in order to prevent the abuse of power and determining
the usage of methodological approaches when carrying out competition analysis on the
market segments; (c) recognizing principles of convergence and technological neutral-
ity; and (d) setting out a sanctions regime in the event of violations of the legislation or
the Commission’s decisions. Articles 41 and 42 of the law establish the procedures for
dealing with interconnection disputes.
The government has also implemented a strategic program for ensuring the de-
centralization of power in the regions, furthering transparency of governance, and
promoting ICT for maintaining sustainable democracy in the country. The ICT devel-
opment framework program has been elaborated under the initiative of the govern-
ment and the Commission with the support of the UNDP and the World Bank. With
its program for 2004–2009, the government has recognized that the development
of the telecommunications sector and of the information society constitutes a main
priority for the country’s strategic economic development. One of the main objectives
of the program is to overcome the uneven urban/rural coverage as communication sys-
tem operators and service providers focus mainly on the big cities and settlements with
little interest in developing networks for rural areas. As part of the National Strategy for
ICT Development, among others, the government plans on creating a single informa-
tion and communication network with integrated services, expanding the telephone
network and transfer to digital systems, converting to digital TV-radio broadcasting,
and increasing Internet usage among the population.
The Ministry of Economic Development, in particular its Telecommunications and
Information Technology Department, sets out the government policy in the electronic
communications sector and is responsible for monitoring communications and ICT
policy implementation. The sector regulator, the Commission, was established on
July 1, 2000. The Commission members are appointed for a period of six years by the
president, a fact which may affect their political independence. Otherwise, the Com-
mission is not financed by the state budget, and its source of revenue consists of the
license and regulation fees it collects from licensees. The Commission regulates legal,
technical, and economic issues on interconnection among telecommunications net-
work operators. Other statutes providing for the Commission’s regulatory authority
are the Georgian Law on Broadcasting12 and the Law on Independent Regulating
Authorities.13
The regulations of the Commission promote innovation in the communications
service sector, for example, by easing the procedures when consumers bring disputes
against operators and forbidding suspensions of service in the event of a dispute.14
Other decisions15 revise the legal regime to guarantee a consumer’s rights with regard
to the protection of personal information, higher accountability and responsibilities of
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the operators, effective complaint procedures, and better service. The Commission
plans to expand the market of broadband communications service to ensure competi-
tion in local access networks, in order to decrease bandwidth rates and to promote
VoIP technologies.
Any activity in the telecommunication sector in Georgia requires proper authoriza-
tion.16 In order to obtain an authorization,17 the operator must register with the Com-
mission and provide the required company information and type of services it intends
to offer. Receiving authorization is not a burdensome process, with 25 ISPs receiving
authorization to operate in 2007 alone.18 To ensure compliance with active legislation,
the Commission exerts direct control over the activities of operators in the electronic
communications sector.19
According to Article 24 of Georgia’s Constitution, any person has the right to receive
and disseminate information in writing or any other form. Media restrictions and cen-
sorship are prohibited. The rights provided for in Article 24 may be restricted by law
only to the extent needed to ensure the state’s security and territorial integrity, prevent
crimes, protect the rights and dignity of individuals, prevent the dissemination of
information that has been considered confidential, or ensure the independence and
impartiality of justice. Furthermore, the principle of freedom to disseminate informa-
tion is also enshrined in Article 13 of the Criminal Code of Georgia.
The Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression of 200420 elaborates on the content
of freedom of expression originally enshrined in the Constitution. This law also details
the narrow circumstances under which freedom of speech and expression may be
restricted.
Internet Filtering during the 2008 Russia-Georgia War
Despite the existence of legal safeguards that prohibit Internet censorship, the August
2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia witnessed unprecedented censorship of
Russian Web sites by Georgian ISPs. According to Georgian sources interviewed by the
ONI, Georgian ISPs filtered access to Russian media Web sites in the ‘‘.ru’’ domain to
prevent the dissemination of what was described as ‘‘inaccurate and inflammatory
reports by the Russian media.’’21 Whether these actions were legal under Georgia law
has not been adequately determined. From a factual perspective, President Saakashvili
declared a state-of-emergency based on Article 46 of the Constitution during the onset
of the conflict. As required by Georgian law, his decision was approved by Parliament
within 48 hours. Consequently, media rights and freedom of expression were tempo-
rarily restricted in line with Article 46(2) of the Georgian Constitution. The law does
not explicitly cover the Internet, however, at least two Georgian ISPs implemented
limited filtering aimed at ‘‘protecting the population’’ during the state-of-emergency.
ONI testing confirmed this filtering had occurred. One of the two ISPs, the GRENA,
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connects many of the country’s schools. Its director claimed that the decision to filter
content on the GRENA was taken by its leadership, and not a result of any government
orders or pressure. Filtering was also detected on Caucasus Online, the largest ISP in the
country.
During the conflict, Georgian authorities alleged that the Russian government
supported DoS attacks by Russian hackers and cyber criminals against Georgian ISPs
and Web sites. An investigation carried out by the Information Warfare Monitor, a sis-
ter project of the ONI, detected attacks against a variety of Georgian Internet resources,
including Web sites belonging to the government, media, blogs, and Internet forums.
This cyberwar received significant attention in the Western media, which implied
Russian government involvement, noting that the cyber attacks occurred at the same
time as Russian troops crossed the border and deployed in South Ossetia. In the after-
math of the conflict, independent experts did not find conclusive evidence that the
Russian government was directly involved in planning or carrying out cyber attacks
on Georgia. At the same time, it is clear that the Russian government did little to
curtail the activity of pro-government hackers and activists who used Russian online
forums and Web sites to coordinate denial-of-service attacks against Georgian Web sites
and Internet infrastructure.22
Surveillance
Article 20 of the Constitution of Georgia provides for the inviolability of private
records, correspondence, and telephone and other kinds of communications con-
ducted through technical means. These rights can be restricted only with an appropri-
ate court warrant, except for urgent cases as provided in certain statutes. Government
authorities have been reported to engage in the conduct of targeted and selective sur-
veillance. Allegations in the press point to illegal surveillance that is said to include
interception of mobile phones, landline phones, and e-mails.
ONI Testing Results
Despite existing legal restrictions, filtering and monitoring of the Internet has been
documented at Georgian ISPs. Evidence of filtering has also been documented on
academic networks. In addition to the blocking of Web sites during the conflict with
Russia in August 2008, the media reported that some Russian sites hosted on ‘‘.ru’’
were blocked again after the state-of-emergency was lifted.23
Limited cases of filtering in Georgia were detected by ONI. Over the course of several
months during 2007 and 2008, ONI tested the main ISPs: Caucasus Online, GRENA,
and Iberiapac. Several international gambling sites are filtered by most Georgian ISPs.
In addition, a global blogging site has been blocked. Sporadic filtering has also been
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observed on GRENA, where Web sites carrying pornography and drug, violence, and
hate speech are actively blocked.24
Commercial entities and public organizations filter some content mainly as a way of
reducing Internet traffic. Often, online gaming services and instant messaging services
are also affected. Researchers for ONI have observed that, in some Internet cafés, lim-
ited access to bandwidth is the result of intensive downloading.
Georgia is also subject to upstream filtering. The main Georgian ISP buys its inter-
national connectivity from Turk Telecom. Consequently, the access ban imposed by
Turk Telecom to YouTube in March 2008 caused a temporary blocking of the popular
video-sharing site in Georgia.
Conclusion
At present, Internet filtering in Georgia appears to be limited to corporate and educa-
tional networks. With the exception of the Russia-Georgia war, which witnessed lim-
ited state-sanctioned filtering of Russian Internet resources, access to Internet content
remains largely unfettered. Georgia’s dependence on international connectivity makes
it vulnerable to upstream filtering, evident in the March 2008 blocking of YouTube by
Turk Telecom. It is unlikely that the government would look to impose further controls
over Internet content (or force ISPs to do so) given its strong public desire to forge
stronger links with NATO, the European Union, and the United States.
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The Kazakh government has extended
its control over the Internet, even as it
seeks to liberalize the telecommunica-
tions market and position itself as a
major IT power in the region. The
state uses its significant regulatory
authority to ensure that all Internet
traffic passes through infrastructure
controlled by the dominant telecom-
munications provider KazakhTelecom.
Selective content filtering is widely used, and second- and third-generation con-
trol strategies are evident. Independent media and bloggers reportedly practice
self-censorship for fear of government reprisal.
Background
Kazakhstan has taken an authoritarian turn under the rule of President Nazarbayev,
who has served as head of state since national independence in 1991. Nazarbayev is
widely alleged to have manipulated results of elections and suppressed opposition to
remain in power.1 Although press freedom is enshrined in the Constitution, the gov-
ernment controls mass media outlets and exerts influence over most printing and dis-
tribution establishments.2 Anecdotal evidence points to online media and bloggers
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practicing self-censorship for fear of prosecution by the state under highly restrictive
defamation laws.
Pressed by growing domestic discontent and international criticism, President Nazar-
bayev agreed to a constitutional reform. In May 2007, the Parliament adopted amend-
ments to the Constitution, including cutting the presidential mandate from seven to
five years and increasing the role of Parliament. These changes are not expected
to enter into force until the next presidential elections in 2012. The proposed reforms
remove restrictions on how many terms a head of state may serve. Consequently, Pres-
ident Nazarbayev can stay in power indefinitely.
Internet in Kazakhstan
The Kazakh Internet community is growing rapidly. Between 2001 and 2005, the
number of Internet users increased from 200,000 to 1 million. By 2007, Kazakhstan
reported Internet penetration levels of 8.5 percent, rising to 12.4 percent in 2008.3
The National Statistical Agency reports that 73 percent of users access the Internet by
dial-up, 15 percent by means of ADSL, and 6 percent using satellite access. Over 50 per-
cent of users accessed the Internet from home in 2008.4 Forty-two percent of families
living in towns with populations of at least 70,000 people have a personal computer.
KazakhTelekom (KT) reported an increase in its broadband subscriber base from
270,000 to 456,000 in 2008.5 Despite these increases, Internet usage is concentrated
in urban centers, while outside those centers access remains beyond the reach of most
Kazakhs.6
The official language in the country is Kazakh, spoken by 64 percent of the popula-
tion. Russian, spoken by 95 percent, is recognized as the official language of inter-
national communication. Russian is the most popular language used on the Internet
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 10,259
Life expectancy at birth (years) 66
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 100
Human development index (out of 179) 71
Rule of law (out of 211) 160
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 171
Democracy index (out of 167) 127 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 94
Internet users (percent of population) 12.4
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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(94.1 percent), followed by Kazakh (4.5 percent), and English (1.4 percent), a figure
which may account for the high percentage of Kazakh Web sites hosted in Russia
(including those on the country-code domain name ‘‘.kz’’). Six percent of ‘‘.kz’’ do-
main Web sites are hosted in Kazakhstan, with the remainder hosted in Russia and
elsewhere.
The cost of Internet access remains high relative to the average salary (54,500 tenge
in 2008, or USD 363).7 KazakhTelecom’s tariffs for unlimited ADSL access with capacity
of 128 Kbps were USD 30. However, as a result of the ongoing liberalization in the tele-
communications sector in 2007, the operators’ tariffs fell considerably. Since 2007,
schools in Kazakhstan are provided with free dial-up access, which is being expanded
to include broadband connections (although access is restricted to Web sites and other
Internet resources within the ‘‘.kz’’ domain).8
Liberalization of the telecommunications market in 2004 increased competition
among the five licensed operators: KazakhTelecom (the former state monopoly, now
with 51 percent state participation), Transtelecom, Kaztranscom, Arna (DUCAT), and
Astel. The first-tier ISPs with international Internet connections and their own infra-
structure are KazakhTelecom, Nursat, Transtelecom, Kaztranscom, Arna, Astel, and
TNS Plus. There are approximately 100 second-tier ISPs that are purchasing Internet
traffic from the first-tier ISPs. Market liberalization has not been completely carried
out, as there are restrictions on foreign ownership for fixed-line operators providing
long-distance and international services. In addition, KazakhTelecom retains domi-
nance over the telecommunications market, making it difficult for other operators to
compete.9
One of the largest ISPs, Arna (DUCAT), accused KazakhTelecom of breaching the
Law for Promoting Competition and Limiting Monopolist Activities. Arna claimed
that KazakhTelecom used uncertified systems that monitor and interfere with the tele-
communications of customers who are using services offered by competing companies.
An investigation of the Kazakh government revealed that such systems indeed existed
and were used by KazakhTelecom, but no evidence was found to prove KazakhTelecom
was intentionally interfering with competitor activities.
KazakhTelecom is the operator of the national data transfer network, which con-
nects the major cities of Kazakhstan with a total bandwidth of 957 Mbps10 and car-
rying capacity in separate local segments of up to 10 Gbps.11 KazakhTelecom had
about 2.5 million fixed-line subscribers in 2005 and accounted for approximately
90 percent of the country’s fixed-line market. It also controls 49 percent of the coun-
try’s leading mobile operator, GSM Kazakhstan, and 50 percent of another cellular
operator, Altel.12 KazakhTelecom is also launching an interactive IP TV service, as it
attempts to maintain its dominance in the fixed-line market.13 Other leading first-tier
ISPs, Nursat and Astel, operate terrestrial and satellite-based infrastructure. There are
five mobile operators in the country. Three operators are offering GSM services and
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two CDMA. The government estimates that 60 percent of the population uses mobile
services.
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The Kazakh government exhibits an ambiguous and at times contradictory approach
to the Internet. The long-term development strategy of Kazakhstan for 203014 demon-
strates the government’s strong commitment to create a modern national information
infrastructure. The government has announced plans to develop e-government as a
part of a 2005–2007 program.15 Since 2008, government officials have been encour-
aged to create their own personal blogs.16 At the same time, the government follows a
multilevel information security policy, which maintains surveillance of telecommuni-
cations and Internet traffic in the country.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) is the main policymaker and
regulator in the telecommunications market. The Agency for Informatization and
Communication (AIC), a central executive body in the IT field, is authorized to imple-
ment state policy in telecommunications and information technology development
industries, exercise control in these sectors, and issue licenses to every type of telecom-
munications service.17 The Security Council (SC), a body chaired by the president, is
responsible for drafting decisions and providing assistance to the head of state on
issues of defense and national security.18 The SC also prepares a list of Web sites every
six months that should be blocked or forbidden from distribution. A 2005 SC decision
made it illegal for key national security bodies to connect to the Internet (namely, the
Ministries of Emergency Situations, Internal Affairs, and Defense, and the National
Security Committee). However, despite this prohibition, ONI field researchers found
evidence that state officials access forbidden Web sites using dial-up accounts and ano-
nymizer applications.
The security system in Kazakhstan is complex and multilayered. The Inter-
Departmental Commission is charged with coordinating and developing the national
information infrastructure. The National Security Committee (NSC) monitors presi-
dential, government, and military communications. The Office of the Prime Minister
is an authorized state body responsible for the protection of state secrets and mainte-
nance of information security. Broadly defined, a ‘‘state secret’’ encompasses various
government policies as well as information about the president’s private life, health,
and financial affairs. The NSC has issued a general license to the private Agency on
Information Security to establish and organize facilities for cryptographic protection
of information, as well as to formulate proposals on information security to state
organizations, corporate clients, banks, and other large commercial companies.
The Kazakh Ministry of Internal Affairs operates Department ‘‘K’’, which bears the
functions of its counterpart in the Russian Federation. This department is tasked
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with investigating and prosecuting cyber crime and cyber attacks. At present, ISPs are
required to prohibit their customers from disseminating pornographic, extremist, or
terrorist materials or any other information that is not in accordance with the coun-
try’s laws.19 Kazakh officials are also considering additional laws to further regulate
the Kazakh Internet.20 One draft law presently under consideration envisions liability
for owners of Web sites hosting weblogs and forums, as well as users of chat rooms.
The draft law equates Internet sites to media outlets and applies similar regulations
with respect to content. The authors of the law justified tighter oversight by the need
to fight cyber crime and provide greater accountability for Internet users.
The Kazakhstan Association of IT Companies is the officially recognized administra-
tor of the ‘‘.kz’’ domain. It is registered as a NGO, but it has 80 percent government
ownership. The rules of registration and management of the ‘‘.kz’’ domain were issued
by the State Agency on Informatization and Communication of the Republic of
Kazakhstan in 2005. In recent years, the cost for registering and maintaining a domain
name have significantly decreased, thereby boosting the development of the Kazakh
portion of the Internet. Registrations are subject to strict regulation. Applications may
be denied if the server on which they are located resides outside Kazakhstan. Even
though the primary legislation guarantees freedom of speech and prohibits censorship,
the government often resorts to various legal mechanisms to suppress ‘‘inappropriate’’
information or to ensure that domain names used by opposition groups are frozen, or
withdrawn. As a result, very few political parties in Kazakhstan use the Internet, and
few opposition or illegal parties have an online presence (at least within the ‘‘.kz’’
domain).
The ICT sector in Kazakhstan is overregulated, as evidenced by some 300 legislative
acts that expressly or implicitly control the ICT environment. All telecommunications
operators are legally obliged, as part of the licensing requirement, to connect their
channels to a public network controlled by KazakhTelecom. The so-called Billing
Center of Telecommunication Traffic, established by the government in 1999, helps
monitor the activity of private companies and strengthen the monopolist position of
KazakhTelecom in the IT sphere. In the past, some telecommunications operators cir-
cumvented such regulations by using VoIP for their interregional and international
traffic, but the imposition of VoIP telephony tariffs eliminated this option.
Surveillance
The government has established systems to monitor and filter Internet traffic. Since the
traffic of all first-tier ISPs goes through KazakhTelecom’s channels, surveillance and
filtering is centralized. The ONI suspects that state officials informally ask Kazakh-
Telecom to filter certain content. KazakhTelecom, along with some Russian companies,
has openly signed an agreement to provide filtering, censorship, and surveillance on
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the basis of Security Council resolutions. There are several recorded cases of journalists
and Web site owners that have been prosecuted under broad media and criminal pro-
visions.21 Oppositional and independent media sites have been permanently sus-
pended, allegedly for providing links to publications concerning corruption among
senior state officers and the president.22
In 2004, the chairs of the National Security Committee and the Agency for Infor-
matization and Communications approved Rules Providing for Mechanisms for Moni-
toring the Telecommunications Operators and Networks. These rules prescribe full
collaboration and information sharing between the government agencies. This system
is similar to that of the Russian SORM, introduced to monitor activities of users and
any related information. The rules oblige ISPs to register and maintain electronic
records of customer Internet activity. Providers are required to install special software
and hardware equipment in order to create and store records for a specified amount of
time, including log-in times, connection types, transmitted and received traffic be-
tween parties of the connection, identification number of the session, duration of
time spent online, IP address of the user, and speed of data receipt and transmission.
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative conducted testing on two main ISPs: KazakhTelecom and Nur-
sat. KazakhTelecom blocks opposition groups’ Web sites, regional media sites that carry
political content, and selected social networking sites. A number of proxy sites provid-
ing anonymous access to the Internet have also been blocked. The ONI suspects that
filtering practices in Kazakhstan are evolving and are performed at the network back-
bone by KazakhTelecom, which filters traffic it provides to downstream operators. Con-
sequently, Kazakh ISPs may unknowingly receive pre-filtered content. At the same
time, not all incoming and outgoing traffic passes through KazakhTelecom’s central-
ized network, resulting in inconsistent patterns of blocking.
The majority of Internet users are on ‘‘edge’’ networks, such as Internet cafés and
corporate networks. Kazakhstan companies apply filtering mechanisms at the user
level to prevent employees from accessing pornography, music, film, and dating Web
sites. However, ONI testing found that Kazakhstan does not block any pornographic
content or sites related to drug and alcohol use.
Conclusion
The Kazakh government has harnessed efforts to modernize the IT sector, promote
ICTs, and encourage e-government in order to spur social development. Nevertheless,
the lack of a competitive fixed-line market and the partial market liberalization leaves
the growing demand unsatisfied and slows down development of the IT sector in the
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country. The government has put in place a complex security system that is capable of
state surveillance of Internet traffic and suppression of undesirable Internet content.
Given government pressure on opposition media, self-censorship may also be an issue
among online media publishers and bloggers. The technical sophistication of the
Kazakhstan Internet environment is evolving and the government’s tendency toward
stricter online controls warrant closer examination and monitoring.
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Access to the Internet in Kyrgyzstan
has deteriorated as heightened politi-
cal tensions have led to more fre-
quent instances of second- and third-
generation controls. The government
has become more sensitive to the
Internet’s influence on domestic poli-
tics and enacted laws that increase
its authority to regulate the sector. Re-
cent liberalization of the telecommu-
nications market in Kyrgyzstan has made the Internet affordable for the majority
of the population. However, Kyrgyzstan is an effectively cyberlocked country de-
pendent on purchasing bandwidth from Kazakhstan and Russia. The increasingly
authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan is shifting toward more restrictive Internet
controls, which is leading to instances of ‘‘upstream filtering’’ affecting ISPs in
Kyrgyzstan.
Background
In 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiev won the presidential elections after the violent downfall of
the 14-year authoritarian regime of the former president, Askar Akayev. The new head
of state vowed to distribute more powers to the parliament, encourage free speech,
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fight corruption, and tackle poverty. However, Bakiev’s enthusiasm to introduce dem-
ocratic constitutional amendments seemed to have died away soon after his inaugura-
tion. The political shift in power did not result in significant economic improvements
in Kyrgyzstan, as the country entered economic stagnation and two-thirds of the pop-
ulation remained below the poverty line. International observers predict that new civil
conflicts may erupt if the country does not adopt urgent economic measures.1
The Internet is one of the few free outlets for expressing public criticism in Kyrgyz-
stan, and it has been used as an instrument to mobilize protest and opposition against
the government. Kyrgyzstan’s UN global ranking for e-government for 2008 (0.4195)
has deteriorated; however, compared to its Central Asian neighbors, the country re-
mains in second place after Kazakhstan.2
Internet Infrastructure
Kyrgyzstan has one of the highest Internet penetration rates in Central Asia, although
the figures gathered from different sources vary widely. According to local sources,
around 7 percent of the population had access at the end of 2008 (760,664 people).3
The ITU reports a high figure for Internet penetration for 2008 (13.8). The government
estimated that Internet penetration would reach 10 percent by 2008,4 while the United
Nations e-Government Survey states that Internet penetration was no more than 5.6 per-
cent for 2008.5 Broadband users in Kyrgyzstan are estimated to be only 0.05 percent
for 2008.6 Personal computers (PCs) remain unaffordable for the vast majority: only
1.9 percent of the population own a PC.7 There are more than 150 public Internet
access centers in the country, including commercial Internet cafés and free-access cen-
ters sponsored by NGOs. The majority (51 percent) of users access the Internet from
their workplace, 21 percent through their mobile telephone, 20 percent from Internet
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 1,894
Life expectancy at birth (years) 68
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 122
Rule of law (out of 211) 191
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 149
Democracy index (out of 167) 114 (Hybrid regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 135
Internet users (percent of population) 13.8
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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cafés, and only 8 percent from home.8 Development of the Internet infrastructure still
targets only the urban markets, in particular the two largest cities—Bishkek (in which
77 percent of the Internet users are concentrated) and Osh.
There are slightly more female than male users. Forty percent of all users are aged
between 10 and 20, 35 percent are aged 20 to 30, and 16 percent are between 30 and
40. Most of the users are students (50 percent), and they prevail over the users who
work (34 percent of users are employees in private companies, and 9 percent are
employees in the state administration). Interestingly, the 25 percent of users who
have defined themselves as unemployed make up the third largest group of Internet
users. Russian sites remain the most visited among Kyrgyz Internet users (90 percent),
compared with only 8 percent Kyrgyz and 2 percent English-language sites.9 In spite of
the popularity of the Russian language in everyday life, the Kyrgyz language portion
of the Internet is expanding.
Kyrgyzstan has made relatively early progress in the liberalization of its economy
compared to other CIS countries. The republic joined the WTO in the second half
of 1998. In order to comply with the requirements for liberalization of the telecom
sector in 2006, the government agreed to put more than 77 percent of the incumbent
KyrgyzTelecom up for sale. Nonetheless, only 10 percent of the shares were transferred
to private hands by 2007, and 77.84 percent of the incumbent is still owned by
the state. In 2008, around 61 percent of all users connected to the Internet through
KyrgyzTelecom.10
Notwithstanding the pending privatization of the main incumbent, the liberaliza-
tion of telecommunications services, driven by foreign investment and financial assis-
tance, has resulted in an increasingly competitive, profitable, and growing Internet
sector in the last few years. The Law on Electronic and Postal Communications, drafted
on the basis of sector best practices, has opened the market for competition. The com-
munications regulator has developed and implemented new access, interconnection,
and tariff regulations after extensive consultations with stakeholders.11 The competi-
tive market has provided a wide choice of telephone connection service, Internet ac-
cess, mobile connection, and television and radio channels to the population. This
has led to increased competition among the operators, and in particular Internet ser-
vice providers. In 1996, there were only two operators—AsiaInfo and Elcat—that
charged USD 2.50 per hour for Internet use. By 2000, there already were 16 companies
providing Internet access for USD 0.90 an hour, and finally in 2005 there were 38 com-
panies on the market, which dropped the cost for Internet access to USD 0.30 an hour.
To win competitive advantage on the market, ISPs have introduced Internet cards, and
these have become very popular.
Out of the 38 active ISPs, only three have independent external connections to the
international Internet (KyrgyzTelecom, Saima Telecom, and Elcat). Also, only three
providers own the infrastructure they use (KyrgyzTelecom, Saima Telecom, and Elcat).
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The others lease lines and cables from the state-controlled top-tier ISP KyrgyzTelecom.
The government has a major stake (50 percent) in Elcat, another top-tier ISP. All other
ISPs are private except for the research and educational networks. All ISPs are based in
the capital and very few of them operate in other regions. The majority of ISPs connect
to the Russian portion of the Internet by fiber-optic cable. In addition to its major
Russian connection, KyrgyzTelecom has built external connection ports to China
and Kazakhstan. On a number of occasions, KyrgyzTelecom has been affected by
KazakhTelecom’s filtering practices, since it is buying international traffic from the for-
eign provider. For Internet data transfer, two of the largest ISPs—AsiaInfo and Totel—
use fiber-optic lines financed by the Soros Foundation and extend parts of the infra-
structure themselves where necessary. There are a number of Internet cafés in the cap-
ital, and although Internet cafés can be found in the regions, the connection is often
unreliable.
The Soros Foundation also financed the national Internet Traffic Exchange Point
(IXP). This IXP is governed by the Association of Telecommunications Operators and
distributes local traffic among the local ISPs. The international Internet bandwidth in
the country is 300 Mbps, and the most popular means for Internet access is through
dial-up connection. Leased lines with transfer speeds of up to 64 Kbps are widely avail-
able for businesses, while higher-speed broadband access lines are very limited.12 A pri-
vate company, AsiaInfo, administers the country’s top-level domain zone ‘‘.kg.’’13
There are around 1,500 top-level domain names registered in the Kyrgyz Internet
zone. The two most-visited Web sites are local media sites, while most information
sought online is education related.
In recent years, the mobile sector in Kyrgyzstan has grown significantly. As a result,
the government has expressed its intention to exert control over the mobile services.
The number of mobile users in 2006 topped 1,000,000 (or 20 percent of the popula-
tion), which is an increase of almost 50 percent compared to the previous year. As
of September 2007, there were five mobile operators in the country. The dominant
operator is Bitel GSM, which owns 78 percent of the market. The other operators,
MegaCom, FONEX, and Katel, have a limited presence with 10 percent, 8 percent,
and 4 percent, respectively.14 A new operator, NEXI (offering CDMA service), became
active in 2007.
Overall, state regulation in the communications sector created favorable conditions
for establishing a competitive communications market. By 2008, the government
issued 429 licenses to over 280 telecommunication companies.
VoIP licenses are readily available. To obtain a license, companies are required to
contribute 20 million som (approximately USD 517,000) to a national IT development
fund. Once an applicant obtains the license, they are licensed as an operator, or can
resell their services to other companies. There are no restrictions on the provision of
P2P services in the country.
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Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Compared with its neighbor Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan does not compel local ISPs to
work with the state-owned provider and respects the rules of competition in the
market. Previously, in order to ensure that a USD 500 million loan from the World
Bank to build Kyrgyzstan’s telecom infrastructure was repaid, a state decree granted
KyrgyzTelecom the exclusive rights to international long-distance services until
2003.15 This decree has since been overruled, and ISPs now have independent chan-
nels for international connections. Operators have built their own data transmis-
sion networks within the capital, Bishkek, providing an alternative to the incumbent
KyrgyzTelecom’s infrastructure. Outside of Bishkek, however, IT development is
hindered by poor infrastructure, and only the incumbent KyrgyzTelecom provides
Internet access. Internet companies are not investing in building their own networks,
leading to very low Internet availability outside the capital. A retail-tariff-rebalancing
plan was proposed in 2008, which is expected to begin improving investment in local
infrastructure.
In 2002, the state declared ICT development a priority by way of the National Strat-
egy on Information and Communication Technologies for Development of the Kyrgyz
Republic. The national ICT plan was reviewed by the ICT Council and approved by the
president in 2003. Eager to harness Internet capabilities in order to stimulate economic
growth, the government is implementing action plans and ICT strategies to encourage
development of e-government, e-education, and the e-economy. Moreover, under a
joint program between the government and international organizations, 95 percent of
central government bodies, as well as 50 percent of local ones, were connected to the
Internet and now provide online information about their services.16 However, the
cyber presence of political opposition is limited. Only three Kyrgyz Web sites belong-
ing to political parties were detected by ONI.17
The communications regulator in the country is the National Communications
Agency (NCA) whose chairman is appointed by the president of Kyrgyzstan. The NCA
is financed by fixed-percentage contributions from operators, and therefore it is not
dependent on the state budget. The NCA regulates and supervises postal and electronic
communication companies, issues licenses, monitors the Internet, and settles disputes
among operators. The Ministry for Transport and Communications is the policy-
making body in the communications sector, responsible for formulating the sector
development policy, including designing privatization programs, enhancing com-
petition, and exercising monitoring functions. Although the functions of NCA and
the ministry are legislatively separate, the two entities often enter into disputes with
regard to their authority to regulate some activities, in particular licensing, radio
frequencies, telephone number capacity, and tariffs. The process is quite political and
there are frequent disagreements concerning the development of communications
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regulatory programs and regulations. Since 2008, the legal framework has been under
revision as a working group is debating new amendments to the 1998 Law on Elec-
tronic and Postal Communications. At the same time, the government has introduced
new restrictions on the media. The recently introduced amendments to the Media Law
have attracted criticism from local journalists.18
The presidential administration has made efforts to introduce restrictive measures to
control Internet content. In the spring of 2005, members of the government proposed
amendments to the Law on Mass Media that would have led to blocking all ‘‘.ru’’ do-
main sites containing content ‘‘offensive’’ to Kyrgyzstan. In turn, these amendments
would have limited Kyrgyz access to sources solely on the ‘‘.kg’’ domain, which is regu-
lated by local authorities, effectively creating a national ‘‘intranet.’’ Although this pro-
posal was rejected, it revealed a shift in official attitudes toward reigning in Internet
development in the country.19
Kyrgyz national security laws do not directly apply to Internet activities. Never-
theless, in 2003 the National Security Council proposed the creation of specialized
communication and information security within the Security Council. The Security
Council would be, inter alia, responsible for examining internal and external policy
questions in the field of information security. In 2005, a government resolution on
the Program for Information Security was adopted. The program’s main objective is
to create protection for the individual, the society, and the state in the information
space, but even after its amendments of 2005 it continues to lack precise definitions
for what constitutes commercial secrets, state secrets, and private information. This ab-
sence of clear terminology may lead to variable interpretations, which could create
space for potential abuse. Furthermore, the program does not explicitly define what
information can be restricted, which broadens the scope for potential abuse, including
the possibility that these provisions will be used as a justification for filtering Internet
content.
Surveillance
There is no legislation in Kyrgyzstan that allows national security bodies to organize
surveillance over the Internet. KyrgyzTelecom itself launched a technical investigation
to prevent ‘‘gray traffic’’ generated by other ISPs, meaning spam or other illegitimate
requests for information.
Proposals have been made for conducting state-led surveillance activities at the ISP
level. In July 2006, the State Agency for Intellectual Property proposed the creation of
an ‘‘Inter-Departmental Commission on State Regulation of the Kyrgyz Segment of the
Internet.’’ This institution, based on an existing Russian model, would have coordi-
nated the activity of the executive power bodies and organizations participating in
the Kyrgyz segment of the Internet. The proposal was rejected.
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On a few isolated occasions, the government has attempted to track down the IP
addresses of users accessing forums or chats.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative conducted testing from various access points
on four main first-tier ISPs: AsiaInfo, Elcat, KyrgyzTelecom, and Saima Telecom. The
ONI could not officially detect filtering by the providers at the time testing was carried
out.
In 2008 and 2009, ONI observed a number of Web sites periodically unavailable
on KyrgyzTelecom and Saima Telecom, such as http://www.kyrgyzpress.com, http://
www.prezident.kg (a site containing materials derisive to Kyrgyz state officials), and
http://www.24.kg (a media site). The reasons why these sites were targeted have not
been clarified, although these observations are consistent with second-generation con-
trols. In 2005, during the parliamentary elections, ONI documented the extensive use
of DDoS attacks against opposition and media Web sites and Kyrgyz ISPs.20
Filtering by upstream providers (upstream filtering) was also detected in early 2009,
with a number of Web sites blocked by the Kazakh state Internet provider, which in-
cluded http://www.livejournal.com (a popular blogging site), http://www.internews.fr,
http://www.posit.ru, and others. Access to these sites was inaccessible for the majority
of users in Kyrgyzstan because of filters implemented by the main Kazakh telecommu-
nication operator, which sells its services to KyrgyzTelecom. Filtering also exists at the
enterprise level (i.e., NGOs, corporate clients) in order to block access to content
deemed irrelevant and to economize on Internet traffic.
Conclusion
The Kyrgyz government has implemented policies aimed at fostering the development
of the communications sector, which is seen as an instrument for attracting foreign in-
vestment. Potential limits in Internet freedom are posed by generally poor access and
‘‘upstream filtering’’ resulting from dependence on Kazakh and Chinese connections.
There is also evidence of emerging second-generation methods, which are employed
during periods of heightened political tension in the country. While the Kyrgyz gov-
ernment has shown determination in opening up the market to competition and abol-
ishing measures leading to state-controlled access, much remains to be done in order to
establish stable mechanisms guaranteeing media freedom and freedom of information.
Kyrgyzstan is unlikely to follow the example of its neighbors that have introduced
first-generation controls on Internet access, but second- and third-generation controls
are likely to continue to evolve as the government grapples with the increasing signifi-
cance of the Internet in domestic politics.
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Internet users in Moldova enjoy
largely unfettered access despite the
government’s restrictive and increas-
ingly authoritarian tendencies. Evi-
dence of second- and third-generation
controls is mounting. Although filter-
ing does not occur at the backbone
level, the majority of filtering and sur-
veillance takes place at the sites where
most Moldovans access the Internet:
Internet cafés and workplaces. Moldovan security forces have developed the
capacity to monitor the Internet, and national legislation concerning ‘‘illegal
activities’’ is strict.
Background
Moldova is a parliamentary republic with a president at the head of the state. A newly
sovereign state as of the early 1990s, Moldova experienced both political and economic
turmoil. Separatist movements erupted in the Transnistria region, which operates as an
independent (albeit unrecognized) state with separate telecommunications and broad-
casting networks.
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Moldova has one of the lowest Internet development levels in Eastern Europe
and ranks 93rd worldwide on the United Nations e-Readiness Survey of 2008.1 The
government has prioritized information and communication technology (ICT) as a
means for national development and adopted a national ICT strategy designed to
harmonize the sector with European standards by means of the European Union–
sponsored Electronic South Eastern Europe initiative (eSEE). The telecommunications
sector in Moldova is formally liberalized, but the government has faced problems priva-
tizing the main operator. Privatization of the national operator is still under discussion.
Internet in Moldova
Internet penetration in Moldova has increased significantly in the past few years.
According to the ITU, at the end of 2006 approximately 10.6 percent of the country’s
population had Internet access. By 2008, penetration rates had risen to 16.2 percent.2
Despite this high rate of growth, development of the Internet has been constrained by
a lack of quality infrastructure, low affordability, and the slow development of the
fixed-line sector. In 2007, the number of subscribers to Internet access services at fixed
locations increased by 33.2 percent, amounting to 110,200.3
More than 93 percent of ADSL access is provided by a single ISP, Moldtelecom.4
Broadband usage is increasing, driven by rising demand and falling prices.5 The cost
for unlimited Internet ADSL access is approximately USD 11 a month (February
2009)6 compared to EUR 25 a month a couple of years earlier. Broadband subscriber
penetration reached 3.23 percent, up 1.86 percent, with two-thirds of the subscriptions
concentrated in the capital, Chisinau, where household penetration was 30.8 percent.
Ownership of personal computers is also increasing, with 15.3 percent penetration as
of 2006.7 Most users are under 35 years.8 Nearly half access the Internet from their
place of work, 33.6 percent use Internet at home, and 8.1 percent use public access
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 2,409
Life expectancy at birth (years) 69
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 113
Rule of law (out of 211) 148
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 132
Democracy index (out of 167) 62 (Flawed democracy)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 111
Internet users (percent of population) 16.2
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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points. The Internet subscriber statistics follow news that the growth of fixed-line tele-
phony penetration in the country dropped to 3 percent in 2008 while mobile penetra-
tion rose by 28.7 percent over the same period. 9 Nearly 85 percent of Internet access
connections are mobile phone connections. In 2008, the Moldovan regulator reported
that the number of mobile Internet connections rose by 115.4 percent to 1,437,000.10
Moldova has five tier-one providers: Moldtelecom, Telemedia Group,11 Dynamic
Network Technologies (DNT), Relsoft, and Riscom. A further 11 ISPs provide access
to all regions of the country. The telecommunications market is dominated by Mold-
telecom, which retains its near monopoly position in the market (98 percent). Market
liberalization in Moldova started before 2004, partly as a result of pressure to join the
WTO and harmonize its standards with the EU telecommunications legal framework.
Most of the ISPs rent infrastructure from Moldtelecom. Almost all ISPs exchange traffic
through an IXP controlled by Moldtelecom. Interdnestrcom is the only ISP offering
services on a wide scale throughout the breakaway region, Transnistria.
Fixed-line remains underdeveloped compared to other European nations, much like
Internet and broadband penetration. However, communications have recorded solid
growth, reaching more than 10 percent of the country’s GDP in 2007 (9.11 percent in
2008).12 International Internet bandwidth in the country is currently 4,500 Mbps.13
Between 2004 and 2007, mobile phone ownership increased from to 790,000 (23.2
percent) to 1,880,000 (55 percent).14 There are more than 14 operators providing
VoIP services on the international voice market, although Moldtelecom has retained
the largest share.15 The taxes on VoIP operators were reduced several times in recent
years. Operators need to obtain a license in order to offer IP services.
Approximately 5,000 domain names are registered in the ‘‘.md’’ domain, some of
which are foreign Web sites.16 The most popular languages accessed by Internet users
are Romanian, Russian, and English. The most-visited local Web sites are local media
sites, forums, and advertising sites. The most-used local search engines are google.md,
ournet.md, super.md, and mail.ru. The main purposes for accessing the Internet,
according to respondents to a local survey, are sending and receiving e-mails, reading
political news, and looking up educational information.17
Opposition groups have recognized the importance of the Internet. Most Moldovan
political parties have a solid online presence and frequently update their Web sites.18
The government has invested in the Internet and actively supports an effort to ensure
that ministries and other public bodies maintain Web sites in order to bring more
transparency to their operation. More than 40.6 percent of Internet users report that
they frequently access government Web sites.19
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
In order to meet requirements for WTO and the EU accession, the telecommunications
market has been liberalized and no exclusive rights remain.20 Moldtelecom—the
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incumbent telecom operator—decreased its tariffs, allowing other providers into the
market. However, low computer penetration rates and inconsistent government policy
remain major impediments to Internet growth.
The state has officially committed to developing Moldova as an information society,
although many of its policies undermine this objective. Moldtelecom, which is also
the major national ISP, remains under state control despite large-scale criticism and
four failed privatization attempts. Moldtelecom also controls Unite, one of the four
mobile operators created in 2007. At present, ISPs are forced to rent access from Mold-
telecom’s well-developed infrastructure, a necessity which increases their costs and
diminishes their competitiveness. Moldtelecom provides the nondiscriminatory Refer-
ence Interconnection Offer, the last version having been approved by the regulator
after much delay in December 2007. Even though some interconnection agreements
are now agreed between the incumbent and IP and data transmission operators, some
new entrants have complained about insufficient access to Moldtelecom’s network
leading to inefficient usage of infrastructure.21 In April 2009, the Moldovan regulator
introduced new guidelines on interconnection tariffs. The regulation addresses the
issues of obligations imposed on operators, with emphasis on transparency and non-
discriminatory stances toward competitors.22 It remains to be seen in practice how the
new guideline will be applied by Moldtelecom.
The Ministry of Information Development is the main policymaker in the field of
information and communications and was drafting new Policy Strategy 2009–2011.
The ministry’s objective is to implement the National Strategy and Program on estab-
lishing ‘‘e- Moldova.’’
The main law regulating the Internet is the 2007 Law on Electronic Communication.
The law established the National Agency for Telecommunications and Information
Regulation (NATIR) as the telecommunications regulator in Moldova. This law man-
dates the government to harmonize national legislation with European standards. The
law is intended to give NATIR full autonomy over the sector and replaces the licensing
regime. Internet service providers can now start operating immediately after notifying
NATIR.23
This agency is responsible for monitoring ISPs’ compliance with the law and keeping
the Public Register of Electronic Communications Network and Service Providers. The
law specifically provides for the possibility of introducing anticompetitive restrictions
on service providers. The agency can demand that ISPs provide additional accounting
information, can make them change to cost-oriented tariffs, and can introduce other
measures in order to stimulate efficient market competition; and NATIR also regulates
the management of the country’s highest-level Internet domain (‘‘.md’’). The National
Security Doctrine of Moldova as of 1995 did not include the Internet. The Supreme Se-
curity Council (SSC), which oversees implementation of the president’s decrees related
to national security, monitors ministries’ and state agencies’ various activities to ensure
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national security. The Ministry of Information Development carries out government
policies related to information and communications and encourages collaboration be-
tween state and private organizations. The Moldovan legislation does not provide for
comprehensive regulation of information security. Rather, the National Security and
Information Service is endowed with broad authority to monitor and gather informa-
tion on Internet usage and data transmission related to national security issues.
In July 2008, a Moldovan court ordered the seizure of the PCs of 12 young Internet
users for posting critical comments online against the governing party. The suspects
were accused of illegally inciting people ‘‘to overthrow the constitutional order’’ and
‘‘threaten the stability and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.’’ It is un-
known how the authorities obtained the names of the people, but some suggest that
an ISP provided them with the IP addresses of the users.24
Even though Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe, Internet and cell
phones are used extensively by opposition and civil society groups to organize protests
and voice their opinion. After the parliamentary elections on April 5, 2009, thousands
of Moldovans attempted to gather in Chisinau’s main square to protest the results. The
protesters set the Parliament and president’s offices on fire, images of which were
broadcast around the world. As the guarantees for press freedom are still weak, Mold-
ovan state television continued to show regular TV programming rather than broad-
casting events occurring in the capital.25 The authorities disconnected cell phone
coverage in the main square. More than 10,000 Moldovans joined in on Twitter
(some with GPRS technology on their mobiles) to share their opinions and spread the
news of Chisinau’s political protests. The authorities attempted to shut down a number
of Web sites for a few days, demonstrating a resolute hand in dealing with protesters.
This incident, like others that have transpired in the region (e.g., the Ukrainian Orange
Revolution), reveals the growing role of the social media in Eastern Europe as a tool
for organizing protests and diffusing them online.26 At the same time, it creates the
concern that governments in the region, aware of the increasing importance of social
media, might attempt to close down free speech outlets anytime they feel threatened.
Surveillance
The National Security and Information Service is authorized to monitor the Internet
and collect any information necessary to prevent infringements of the laws. Surveil-
lance in Moldova is permitted only after obtaining a court order. There is no special
legal act providing for Internet surveillance per se. Nevertheless, surveillance may effec-
tively be carried out on the provider level or at companies. The Parliament is deliberat-
ing on legislative proposals, including changes to the Law on Operative-Investigative
Activities and the Law on Telecommunications that would allow government agencies
to carry out surveillance on telephone and electronic communications. The law is
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still under consideration, but if it is approved, it is expected that it might follow the
Russian Law on Surveillance (SORM).
Moldova has established two departments responsible for overseeing the activities of
participants in the ICT sector. The first structure, within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, is charged with prevention of interregional and informational infringements.
The other body, within the Center on Prevention of Economic Crimes and Corruption,
has special powers to prevent infringements in the IT and other fields.
Moldova also possesses a comprehensive centralized database of information on all
its citizens. This system, called registru (registry), has been heavily criticized by human
rights groups for being too comprehensive and lacking oversight. Privacy rights are
poorly developed in Moldova, and not yet defined in law. The information held by
registru is extremely comprehensive and brings together data collected by all state
agencies. Consequently, human rights groups fear that it represents unwarranted and
unprecedented surveillance. The system has proven highly successful, and it is a model
for governments in the CIS. It has been exported to several other countries in the
region. The current Moldovan president, a former internal ministry general, supports
registru—in part because it was originally developed within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative carried out testing on three first-tier ISPs
in Moldova: Moldtelecom, Telemedia, and DNT SunCommunications. Results did not
reveal any filtering carried out on the Internet backbone.
In Internet cafés, access is limited more by surveillance than by direct filtering.
Specific content is prohibited, and, if it is accessed, the user is fined. Approximately
56 percent of Internet cafés’ administrators surveyed by ONI admitted to filtering and
surveillance activities in 2006. Other administrators stated that they noted that some
Web sites were inaccessible, but would not confirm that they used any specific filtering
system in the Internet cafés.
Conclusion
Moldovan authorities have recognized the political and social importance of the Inter-
net. State authorities have interfered with mobile and Internet connections in an
attempt to silence protestors and influence the results of elections. Generally, the Inter-
net remains largely unfettered. Previous research by ONI revealed that at ‘‘edge’’ loca-
tions, such as Internet cafés and some enterprises, monitoring or filtering of certain
content and services occasionally occurs. Research also suggests that Moldovan secu-
rity forces have developed mechanisms to monitor Internet content. Given the low
206 Moldova
implementation of the laws protecting citizen’s rights and privacy, as well as the insuf-
ficient independence of the regulator and the courts with regard to the state-owned
Moldtelecom, there are few checks and balances in place to prevent authorities from
taking a more aggressive stance on policing Internet content or from hindering new
entrants on the market.
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The absence of overt state-mandated
Internet filtering in Russia has led
some observers to conclude that the
Russian Internet represents an open
and uncontested space. In fact, the
opposite is true. The Russian govern-
ment actively competes in Russian
cyberspace employing second- and
third-generation strategies as a means
to shape the national information
space and promote pro-government political messages and strategies. This
approach is consistent with the government’s strategic view of cyberspace that is
articulated in strategies such as the doctrine of information security. The DoS
attacks against Estonia (May 2007) and Georgia (August 2008) may be an indica-
tion of the government’s active interest in mobilizing and shaping activities in
Russian cyberspace.
Background
Under Vladimir Putin, the federal government of the Russian Federation (RF) has con-
solidated its power, stripping regional government representatives of some of their
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authority.1 Putin abolished the principle of electing regional heads by regional parlia-
ments and channeled a number of legal and institutional reforms that demonstrate a
gradual tendency to reintroduce a more centralized form of governance over its sub-
jects. These shifts have been felt in all sectors of public life.
Putin’s administration after eight years in power brought Russia back to the inter-
national scene as a strong global player, and this success has inspired a wave of nation-
alism fueled by government policies. Putin enjoyed high approval ratings in Russia up
to 87 percent ( July 2006)2 largely because of the improved economic indicators of the
country. The economy has performed well under his watch, especially in comparison
to the period between 1991 and 1999. It has been growing steadily, bolstered by high
global energy prices. The growing popularity for Putin, however, was coupled with a
significant drop in political rights and civil liberties.3 Putin’s administration effectively
silenced the opposition, cracked down on antigovernment protests, reimposed control
over the media, and concentrated power in the presidency. The policy line introduced
by Putin remains largely unchallenged during the first year of Dmitri Medvedev’s pres-
idency. Putin and his supporters refer to the current system of governance in Russia as
‘‘sovereign democracy.’’ International observers disagree, describing the established
system of government as an increasingly authoritarian state, albeit one that is sup-
ported ‘‘with the consent of the governed.’’4
As President, Putin strengthened state control over major outlets, focusing especially
on media owned at the time by Russian oligarchs. As a sanction for unpaid debts, Putin
took away owners’ shares in television channels and placed the media under state con-
trol. This action sharply influenced the flow of information and the management of
the outlets. Major federal television channels are either directly or indirectly controlled
by the government, with the sole exception of RenTV, which openly criticizes the gov-
ernment but, ironically, is owned by a Kremlin supporter, Vladimir Potanin.5 Print me-
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 13,873
Life expectancy at birth (years) 68
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 100
Human development index (out of 179) 73
Rule of law (out of 211) 175
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 166
Democracy index (out of 167) 107 (Hybrid regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 51
Internet users (percent of population) 27
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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dia are the least controlled part of the Russian media, but their influence may not be as
strong as that of other media. The control on the media tightened particularly during
and after the 2004 ‘‘Beslan Crisis,’’ in which 1,100 students were taken hostage in
Beslan in the North Caucasus by terrorists demanding an end to the second Chechen
war.6
The Russian government has deliberately created mechanisms to centralize power in
the Kremlin and influence major information outlets. This policy has been expanded
to reach the Internet through a range of approaches from censorship to propaganda,
resulting in self-censorship.
Although Putin admittedly has never sent an e-mail in his life,7 his administration
has been increasingly interested in regulating the Internet. Under Medvedev’s presi-
dency (since May 2008), Putin, now as the prime minister, continues to have signifi-
cant influence over the internal and foreign politics of the state.
Dmitri Medvedev has demonstrated familiarity with Internet communications. Dur-
ing the election campaign, he addressed questions about the Russian blogosphere,
promising clement conditions for its development. In October 2008, Medvedev
launched his own video blog.8 However, no significant changes have been introduced
to promote media freedom and freedom of expression in Russia. Nonetheless, Russian
media have surmised that Medvedev’s involvement has led to the removal of the
restrictions on foreign participation in ISPs, which were envisioned in the Draft Bill
for Amendments to the Law ‘‘On the Order of Foreign Investment in Companies and
Organizations Having Strategic Importance for National Security.’’
Internet Infrastructure
Internet use grew in Russia in the 1990s with a regime unprepared to deal with
new information and communication technology (ICT) challenges. The post-Soviet
government seemed to prefer to have strong control over the Internet, similar to the
way it already controlled traditional media, but left it alone for lack of viable ap-
proaches. Internet penetration in Russia was low during this period, and access was dif-
ficult, factors that may explain why the Internet was not a major government concern.9
With the election of President Putin came a new focus on regulating the Internet. He
issued the Information Security Doctrine in 2000, which outlined Russia’s desire to
encourage development of the information space amid growing security concerns.
This document regulates traditional media but also indirectly positions the Internet at
the core of national security policies.10 Within a few years, the majority of other CIS
countries adopted laws similar to Russia’s Information Doctrine.
As of December 2008, the number of Internet users in Russia had reached 38 mil-
lion.11 Internet penetration is growing notably, though it remains predominantly
two-tiered, with much higher Internet and PC penetration rates in Moscow and
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St. Petersburg than in the rest of the country. The ‘‘e-readiness’’ standing of Russia as
measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit12 is 59th out of 70 countries surveyed in
2008.13 The Ministry of Education and Science has initiated national programs for
providing Internet access to all general educational institutions in the country.14 Fifty
thousand schools were connected to the Internet by the end of 2007.15 Moreover, the
government has announced its plans to install open-source software on every school
computer by 2009.
The majority of Russian Internet users are connected by broadband (40 percent), fol-
lowed by dial-up (27 percent), and ADSL (23 percent). Seven million PCs were sold in
Russia in 2006, of which 1.9 million were laptops, representing a 62 percent annual
increase from the year before.16
A significant portion of the telecom market has remained under state control. Tele-
communication Investment Joint Stock Company SvyazInvest is one of the largest
telecommunications holding companies in the world. It was created during the market
transition by a regulation providing for the merger of a majority of the regional state
telecommunications enterprises.17 About 89 percent of the Russian telecommuni-
cations infrastructure now belongs to SvyazInvest,18 with the remaining 11 percent
divided among several other operators.19 The main shareholder of SvyazInvest is the
Russian government through the Federal Property Agency (75 percent minus 1 share),
and Comstar-UTS owns 17.31 percent plus 1 share. Some of the main regional ISPs are
SvyazInvest’s subsidiaries: Central Telecommunication Company, North-West Tele-
com, VolgaTelecom, Southern Telecom, Uralsvyazinform, Sibirtelecom, Dalsvyaz, and
Central Telegraph.20
Rostelecom is another large telecommunications operator and ISP. Despite strong
international pressure for privatization, SvyazInvest continues to hold 51 percent of
Rostelecom shares. Historically, Rostelecom has been the primary long-distance and
international telephone operator, collecting mandatory intermediary fees from other
providers. Before the adoption of the new regulatory framework on communications,
Rostelecom had a monopoly over the provision of international long-distance services.
Under the new regime, providers of long-distance services may offer their services
directly to users without paying intermediary charges, provided certain prerequisites
apply. These include that the providers ‘‘are in technical conformity with the local
and long-distance network operators, with a point of presence in every Russian admin-
istrative region, and are operationally ready to provide long-distance services to any
local network subscriber.’’
Russia has more than a dozen main first-tier ISPs, which have independent con-
nections to foreign networks, and several other influential ISPs. First-tier ISPs in the
Russian Federation are Rostelecom,21 GoldenTelecom,22 TransTeleCom,23 Makomnet,24
TeliaSonera,25 Comstar-Direct (previously MTU-Intel),26 Metrocom,27 Corbina,28 ER-
Telecom, CentrTelecom,29 RTComm,30 RETN.net,31 and RiNet.32 The major ISPs in
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Russia either are state owned or include significant state participation. State participa-
tion is either direct or through a state-controlled entity.
There are hundreds of ISPs throughout the country functioning on a divided market
of well-connected big cities and underdeveloped infrastructure in towns and villages.
The established fixed-line providers have been traditionally the largest ISPs, though
many small ISPs have started to emerge. Under a regulation that entered into force
at the beginning of 2006, all companies that control more than 25 percent of the ca-
pacity of communication traffic need to publish a list of prices for interconnection and
data transmission within 20 days for the inspection and approval of the regulatory
agency.33
There are several Internet exchange points (IXP) in Russia. The main ones are
Moscow IX,34 independent, comprising various locations in Moscow;35 SPB-IX in St.
Petersburg, jointly with the MSK-IX; SAMARA-IX in Samara; NSK-IX in Novosibirsk;
and KRS-IX in Krasnoyarsk. Other IXPs are the North-West Internet Exchange based
in St. Petersburg and Ural-IX in Ekaterinburg and Perm.
The cable television market and broadband Internet access market significantly
increased penetration to around 40 percent in 2007.36 Broadband connections are
growing as operators invest in modernized networks. However, broadband is emerging
mainly in large urban areas (ADSL, cable, and FttH/FttB-based services). A large portion
of residential areas use Ethernet local area networks (LANs), followed by dial-up (27
percent), and ADSL (23 percent). Wireless broadband networks have become popular
mainly in large tourist cities, especially St. Petersburg and Moscow, and some operators
have announced plans to launch Wi-Fi coverage on a large scale. Also, IPTV services
have been launched.37
In remote regions, satellite connection is very attractive to the Russian population,
in comparison to fixed-line charges. Two main educational networks in Russia (Radio-
MSU and the university network RUNET) are supported by satellite.
There are about 250 mobile operators on the Russian market. The mobile market
represents about 40 percent of telecom revenue. As of September 2006, the market
was divided as follows: MTS, 34 percent; Vimpelcom, 32 percent; Megafon, 19 percent;
and others, 15 percent. According to studies, some 40 percent of the population does
not have a mobile phone. Russia’s three biggest operators were issued 3G licenses
in 2007.
The importance of the blogosphere to Russians is increasing rapidly. The Russian-
language part of the Internet, or the RUNET, is an active and vibrant environment. As
a Russian-language platform, the RUNET has grown as the center of modern culture
connecting Internet users from Russia and the rest of the CIS region, and ethnic Rus-
sians in Germany, Israel, and the United States. It brings together people sharing the
same language and similar history and culture, and is a self-sufficient online environ-
ment with its own search engines, Web portals, free e-mail services, and social network
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Web sites (most of them modeled after U.S. services). The most popular blog servers are
LiveJournal.com and LiveInternet.ru. The Russian site of LiveJournal has more than
2 million38 registered users, while the site’s readership amounts to nearly 10 million
people, according to Anton Nossik, one of the RUNET pioneers.39
The Russian blogosphere operates within an environment where the state directly
competes with other actors for influence. During election times, the Kremlin maintains
a network of supportive bloggers and online media experts, similar to China’s so-called
fifty cent party. This squadron of Kremlin bloggers has engaged in public discussions,
trying to keep the level of political criticism low, to nurture nationalism, and to flood
the Russian blogosphere with blogs that favor the regime during times of oppositional
protests.40 Instead of giving publicity to its efforts to control the Internet through
direct censorship, the government has turned to these soft approaches to combat
undesired content.
Recently, the Russian government has implemented an unprecedented, and so far
surprisingly effective, initiative to engage with political dissent in order to weaken it.
A number of pro-Kremlin blogs have been created; in number, they overshadow blogs
not favoring the regime, and they were especially prevalent toward the end of 2007,
when national political campaigns were under way for parliamentary and presidential
elections. This strategy could also be intended to drown out the voices of opposition
blogs.
Effective strategic blogging has been seen to have an impact. In April 2007, for ex-
ample, an opposition movement held a march in Moscow. To interfere with the infor-
mation about the march, blogger Pavel Danilin, a Putin supporter, together with his
team, started blogging about a smaller pro-Kremlin march being held the same day.
European Digital Rights noted, ‘‘they blogged so much and linked to each other so
effectively, that they crowded out all the items about the opposition march from the
very influential top-five blog post listing on the Yandex Web portal.’’41 A consistent
and motivated group of supporters is likely to channel the Kremlin’s message to large
online communities. According to Masha Lipman, a political expert at the Moscow
Carnegie Center, ‘‘The Kremlin has lots of sites under its control, financed by busi-
nesses associated with the Kremlin or otherwise, which create an environment in
which those more independent ones are easily dissolved. This [dissolution of indepen-
dent sites] . . . is one thing that the Kremlin is using to counter or neutralize the poten-
tially stirring effect.’’42 The blogs are not based on simple propaganda, and some of the
bloggers are not even necessarily loyal; ‘‘they may be critical themselves, but this will
be criticism that the Kremlin itself sort of oversees.’’43
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees free speech and prohibits any
restraint on the freedom of expression (Article 29). The constitution recognizes the
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rights to privacy and data protection, the right to information, and secrecy of commu-
nications (Articles 23, 24, and 25).
The Law on Communications of 200344 further protects the secrecy of communica-
tions and guarantees that restrictions on individual privacy are allowed only after a
court order, unless otherwise envisioned by federal law.45 To meet its obligations as a
member of the Council of Europe, Russia adopted the Law on Personal Data in 2006.46
Although the law guarantees the privacy of the individual, it provides for broad exemp-
tions to the government in processing personal data. Also in 2006, Russia modified its
information law, adopting the new Law on Information, Information Technologies,
and Protection of Information.47 The new laws, together with the Labor Law, establish
a legal framework for handling personal data, including employee data. Russian experts
claim that even though the new law on information guarantees citizens’ access to pub-
lic information held by federal or regional authorities, not more than 23.6 percent of
the relevant information is publicly available.48
A presidential decree titled ‘‘Measures Providing Information Security to the Russian
Federation in the Information Exchange Area,’’ signed in May 2004, restricts the access
of officials’ computers to the Internet.49 The decree prevents computers and communi-
cation networks from connecting to the Internet if they hold (have on their servers)
state and official secrets, as well as other classified information.
The Internet in Russia is largely seen as an extension of media space. The mass media
regime carries certain responsibilities, such as registration, necessary attestation, and
others. The Internet escaped regulation in the Law on Mass Media, No.2124-1,50 as
the Law entered into force in 1991. However, it is held that the Internet should be
regulated under this law anyway. Article 2 of the law states that it shall cover ‘‘other
forms of periodic distribution of mass information’’ as purported by officials.51 This
interpretation has given grounds for detaining and prosecuting Web site owners and
bloggers by authorities on the grounds of violation of media laws. Officials view Inter-
net proliferation as increasing the government’s responsibility for regulating the Inter-
net space and ensuring that users act in accordance with legal and ethical norms of
society. In at least one instance, the court included an online forum in the definition
of mass media, setting a precedent for prosecution under mass media provisions.
On several occasions, the authorities have expressed interest in subjecting content
on the Internet, specifically online media, to media law. Federation Council member
Vladimir Slutsker initiated amendments to the Law on Mass Media: one of the amend-
ments provides that Web sites visited more than 1,000 times a day should be subjected
to registration as mass media outlets.52 However, it was deemed impossible to find all
applicable sites and force Web site owners to register. For this reason, unofficially, it
was agreed that the Web sites would register only voluntarily as mass media.53
According to its supporters, the envisioned proposal would give official recognition
to the registered Web sites and would be important for controlling child pornography
and defamatory materials, and even for providing information about terrorist and
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extremist organizations. There are incentives for Web sites to register as mass media
outlets, including an official stamp of legitimacy and permission to attend press
conferences, request information from authorities, and be present at sites of emergen-
cies or mass protests. Another push for registration came in 2004 when the head of the
Federal Agency for Print and Mass Communications, Michail Seslavinski, called for
‘‘important’’ Web sites to register as mass media.54 In 2004, there were 1,296 registered
Web sites, a figure which had increased to nearly 20,000 registered Web sites by
2009.55
There have been several proposals to introduce ISP liability for content found on
their servers.56 In March 2008, a new initiative was suggested by the Russian prosecu-
tor general’s office to hold ISPs jointly liable with extremists for extremist content
posted online.57 However, currently no draft law is known to have been proposed.
The ICT sector does not have an independent regulatory authority. Until 2007, the
regulation of the sector was managed by the Ministry of Communications and Infor-
matization through RosSvyazNadzor (the Federal Service on the Supervision of Com-
munications), which reported directly to it. After the Russian Television and Radio
Broadcasting Network (RTDN) lodged complaints in court against RosSvyazNadzor
that the control it was exercising exceeded the limits provided by law, the agencies
were reorganized. RosSvyazNadzor merged with another regulatory agency, the Federal
Service on the Supervision of the Mass Media and the Protection of Cultural Inheri-
tance. In addition to current responsibilities, the newly formed agency will also be
responsible for protecting personal data and monitoring the processing of such data.
The Federal Law on Communications of 2003 provides a simplified licensing regime
for ISPs. In order to conduct business in Russia, operators need to obtain two licenses:
one for data transfer and another for ‘‘telematic’’ (data transmission and storage) ser-
vices. In 2005, the Ministry of Communications introduced a licensing regime for
VoIP services. Any VoIP service must be processed through a licensed long-distance
telephone operator.
Libel incurred through the media is a crime regulated by the Criminal Code. It is also
addressed in the Law on Mass Media. Articles 43 through 45 of the law describe the
circumstances for publishing a refutation in libel suits when the information spread
through the mass medium does not correspond to reality and denigrates honor and
dignity.58 Registered Web sites and producers of online content can be liable for defa-
mation for published information under the Criminal Code and in the Law on Mass
Media. In at least one instance, the court included an online forum in the definition
of mass media, setting a precedent for prosecution under mass media provisions.59
In December 2007, the Russian Supreme (Arbitrazh) Court upheld the seizure of
media archives. According to the Internet outlet Regnum.ru, the court did not apply
Article 57, which provides a media libel exception for published information.60 This
precedent establishes that Internet outlets do not receive the protection of the law,
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since they are not treated as mass media outlets, thus leaving the door open to any
potential defamatory claims.
At present, the Criminal Code includes numerous provisions that may be grounds
for criminal charges in connection with Internet activities. Article 278, for example,
criminalizes ‘‘forced assumption of and retention of authority.’’ The Criminal Code
provides for government officials to prosecute individuals for posting objectionable
content online. The text against terrorist activities in Article 282, in the section
‘‘Crimes against the Government,’’ can be applied to online activities. The text states,
‘‘incitement of national, racial, or religious enmity, abasement of human dignity, and
also propaganda of the exceptionality, superiority, or inferiority of individuals by
reason of their attitude to religion, national, or racial affiliation, if these acts have
been committed in public or with the use of mass media’’ are punishable by fines
equaling up to two years of salary and up to two years imprisonment. This broad lan-
guage leaves space for open interpretation of the statute, as it can apply to anything
ranging from commentary on the infamous Danish cartoons,61 to racial slurs and hate
speech. Insulting a government official is an aggravated crime covered in Article 319,
which may bring a fine of up to one month of salary or corrective labor of up to one
year.62
The government and private individuals can and do attempt to find broad inter-
pretations of the laws in order to silence independent Web sites. For example, the con-
tent provider Bankfax was charged under Article 282 with insulting a group of people
by referring to them as ‘‘oligarchs.’’
The government has adopted the Law against Extremist Activities.63 Under this law,
effectively any Web site hosting a forum section is vulnerable. An individual needs
only to post hate or extremist (or other objectionable) speech in a forum and report it
to the authorities before a moderator notices it to kick off legal prosecution. Violations
are not uniformly prosecuted—most reported content does not lead to penalties,
making the Internet a source of information that is not found in print media. If such
speech is detected, however, owners risk closure of their Web sites or fines.64
Censorship has not been legally introduced in the country, though informally it has
been applied as a tool for use during a national crisis. Internet censorship has occurred
or been discussed in several other ways—for example, interference with the work of
oppositional and independent Web sites and restrictions imposed by a court.
Russia’s government officials are sensitive to offensive speech posted online. The
Criminal Code and the Law against Extremist Activities establish individual liability
for a broad range of ‘‘illegal’’ content. A special enforcement agency, Department ‘‘K,’’
was established within the Ministry of Internal Affairs to monitor for compliance with
the regulations in cyberspace. Department ‘‘K’’ has branches in various regions and is
mandated to investigate crimes in the sphere of information technologies, including
online hate speech and defamation. Aside from monitoring for possible defamation of
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officials online, the ‘‘cyber police’’ deal with unauthorized access to computer systems
and networks, and the distribution of pirated software.
An example of the activities of this cyber police department was the September 2007
case involving the sports site hc-rodina.ru.65 The ISP of the sports Web site stopped
maintaining service following an order from Department ‘‘K.’’ The reasons for this
censorship were ‘‘inaccurate’’ comments about representatives of the government
posted on the Web site’s forum section. In another example, a blogger was sentenced
to a year in jail for posting a caricature of Putin depicted as a skinhead.66
On several occasions, Russian politicians have proposed establishing a legal frame-
work that would directly control the Internet. At the end of January 2007, the Fed-
eration Council Commission on Information Policy discussed the possibility of
introducing a law regulating the Internet in order to establish a ‘‘safe’’ online environ-
ment to protect people against the growing cases of illegal activities.67
In July 2007, Putin spoke of making Russia ‘‘a global information technology power-
house.’’ Following his statement, the Kremlin announced plans to create a Cyrillic
Web for Russia and the rest of the CIS and Bulgaria. The Russian Federation is the
only country other than China that has decisively announced plans to launch a self-
contained and independent language Web parallel to the World Wide Web. At the
end of June 2008, ICANN spoke in favor of proposals to establish Cyrillic and Chinese
language-based domains. Although this idea moves toward further development of
the Internet, there are shared fears that this step might also lead to the division of the
Internet and facilitate state censorship through the registration and management pro-
cess. If the administration of Russian Web sites is concentrated in the hands of a gov-
ernment agency, it could have chilling effects on independent-minded online media
and bloggers.
In the past few years, Russia’s government has recognized the need to develop a
favorable environment for information technology by providing legal and tax incen-
tives for companies in this market. The development of the ICT sector has risen to
become a national policy priority. Yet, while the government is hoping to attract for-
eign investment, it is not ready to abandon centralized decision making and end its
monitoring of ISPs.
Surveillance
The Russian government has been advancing justifications for surveillance, ostensibly
to aid in the investigation of crimes and the prevention of terrorism. The Law on
Systems for Operational Investigation Activity (SORM)68 of 1995 authorized the FSB
monitoring of telecommunication transmission. In 1999, formulated as an amend-
ment to SORM, SORM-II was enacted to allow for the monitoring of Internet traffic.
SORM-II is still effective and ‘‘reinforced,’’ and in April 2008, Leonid Reiman, the Min-
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ister of Communications, signed an order that essentially restated the obligations of
ISPs under SORM-II to allow monitoring of users’ Internet activities.
Under SORM-II, ISPs are required to provide the FSB with statistics on all Internet
traffic that passes through their servers. In addition, ISPs are required to install moni-
toring devices on their servers and route all transmissions in real time through the
FSB’s local offices, which would allow the FSB to track all users’ transactions, e-mail
communications, and online browsing. Even though the FSB still needs to obtain a
warrant to read the contents, many doubt that they would obtain the warrant before-
hand consistently, since there is no mechanism to prevent the FSB from having unau-
thorized access. Providers must also provide the FSB with information on users’ names,
telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, one or more IP addresses, key words, user identi-
fication numbers, and users’ ICQ number (instant messaging client), among others.
Under Putin, Minister of Communications Reiman entered an order stating that the
FSB officials shall not provide information to the ISPs either on users who are being
investigated or regarding the decision on the grounds of which such investigations
are made.69 Consequently, this Order offered a ‘‘carte blanche’’ to the Special Services
to police the activities of Internet users without supplying any further information to
the provider or any other interested party.
Only a few days after assuming office, President Putin expanded the list of state
agencies that can monitor communications under SORM to include the tax police,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, Kremlin Security Service, Presidential Secu-
rity Service, parliamentary security services, and Foreign Intelligence Service.
SORM places the substantial financial burden of installing routers on the FSB servers
on the balance sheets of ISPs, with minimal benefit to them for the technology. The
cost of equipment at the time the regulation was adopted was close to USD 25,000.70
This expense has caused many small and independent ISPs to shut down. In one
recorded case a small regional ISP in Volgograd, Bayard-Slaviya Communications,
resisted the new law and refused to install the required equipment. As a result, the
Ministry of Communications suspended the provider’s license. However, when the ISP
brought the question to court, the ministry renewed its license.
SORM-II drastically expanded the ability of the FSB to carry out surveillance of oper-
ators and individuals. Some reports reveal that ISP owners prefer to negotiate their own
confidential agreements with the FSB office rather than take on the cost of complying
with SORM-II or risk losing their licenses.71
In reality, however, many doubt that the FSB possesses the capability of monitoring
all Internet traffic.72 Increased Internet traffic renders ubiquitous surveillance practi-
cally impossible. Unless the authorities know ahead of time what they are searching
for, random surveillance is unlikely to produce any meaningful results.73 Nevertheless,
as there is no independent authority that controls or supervises the FSB, their activities
are not publicly known.
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ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative tested from different locations and several access points on a
number of main ISPs in the major cities and regions. The ONI tested on the following
ISPs: AltaiTelecom, ASN-Yartelecom, Comstar, Corvette, Metrocom, North-West Tele-
com (ASN SPBNIT), Rosnet, RiNet, St. Petersburg State University (ASN-SPBGU), and
Wiland. The ONI found first-generation filtering that targeted erotic and pornographic
content. Second-generation filtering methods were largely undetected by the ONI, as
they occur only during significant political events. The ONI did not monitor the 2007
parliamentary or 2008 presidential elections, during which numerous instances of
second-generation and third-generation controls were reported in the Russian and
foreign press.
Conclusion
Control of media has a long-established history in Russia. As the Internet has prolifer-
ated, the government has moved to design suitable control mechanisms. Compared to
other countries, the Russian approach represents a notably different method of con-
trolling Internet activity. Instead of utilizing Chinese-style filtering to control Internet
access, the Russian government prefers to employ second- and third-generation tech-
niques such as legal and technical instruments and national information campaigns
to shape the information environment and stifle dissent and opposition.
As many countries around the world struggle with Internet regulation, it is likely
that this Russian model will be emulated by other governments, in the CIS and beyond.
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Internet access in Tajikistan remains
largely unrestricted, but emerging
second-generation controls have
threatened to erode these freedoms
just as Internet penetration is starting
to have an impact on political life in
the country. In the run-up to the 2006
presidential elections, ISPs were asked
to voluntarily censor access to an op-
position Web site, and recently other
second-generation controls have begun to emerge. Internet penetration remains
low because of widespread poverty and the relatively high cost of Internet access.
Background
Tajikistan constitutional law gives the president unprecedented authority over the
media. The incumbent president, Emomali Rahmon, who is presently in his third
seven-year mandate,1 suppresses opposition through prosecutions based on broad and
inconsistent interpretations of Tajik laws.2 Three of Tajikistan’s eight political parties
are represented in parliament, but few are politically active because of the increasingly
authoritarian practices of the regime.3
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Government claims of an improving economic and political situation and investor
confidence in the telecommunications and Internet market4 are difficult to substantiate
given that the majority of the population live below the poverty line.5 The unemploy-
ment rate is high, and remittances from economic migrants form the backbone of the
economy. According to World Bank statistics, in 2008 Tajikistan received USD 1.25 bil-
lion in remittances from workers abroad, while unofficial sources claim that this figure
amounts to 60 percent of the country’s GDP.6
Opposition parties are only beginning to explore the Internet’s potential, in part
owing to the low levels of Internet penetration throughout the country. None of the
registered opposition parties have domain names registered in the ‘‘.tj’’ Internet zone,
and only one party has its Web site available in Tajik.7
Internet in Tajikistan
The Internet in Tajikistan emerged as the country was ending a bloody civil war that
followed the demise of Soviet rule in the early 1990s. The resulting fragmentation of
power also meant that Internet services developed largely without state interference
and the Ministry of Transport and Communications played a weak role in the develop-
ment of the sector as a whole. Telecommunications remained fragmented up until the
end of the 1990s, with several companies failing to interconnect because of fierce (and
at times violent and armed) competition. During this period of instability, ISPs were
aligned with feuding political and criminal interests that spilled over to the competi-
tion among the ISPs themselves.
Since the end of the civil war, the government has taken steps to attract investors
and liberalize the sector prompted by expectations of accession to the WTO. However,
important steps are still pending, such as the privatization of Tajiktelecom (the na-
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 1,657
Life expectancy at birth (years) 67
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 100
Human development index (out of 179) 124
Rule of law (out of 211) 188
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 186
Democracy index (out of 167) 150 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 143
Internet users (percent of population) 6.6
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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tional operator) and the establishment of an independent regulatory authority.8 In
recent years, the telecommunications sector has boosted Tajikistan’s GDP, and the
number of licensed Internet and mobile operators has been increasing. In 2008, more
than 180 companies were licensed in the ICT market.9
Internet penetration in Tajikistan is estimated at 6.6 percent (2008).10 In 2009, the
cost of accessing the Internet increased, further restricting development of the sector.
Access costs of USD 73 per hour at Internet cafés and up to USD 300 for unlimited
Wi-Fi traffic compare poorly with average wages of USD 35 per month and a minimum
salary of USD 7 per month. The price for one hour of Internet access in Internet cafés
is USD 0.73; unlimited monthly traffic by dial-up access costs USD 26.41; xDSL with
capacity of 128/64 Kbps amounts to USD 200; and Wi-Fi unlimited traffic per month
with the same capacity is USD 300.11
One respected Tajik NGO estimates that 1 percent of households own personal
computers and that most people access the Internet from home by way of dial-up
connections.12 Access with DSL and wireless (Wi-Fi and WiMAX) technologies is lim-
ited by relatively high costs, and therefore restricted to a small number of commercial
companies.
In 2009, there are ten main ISPs in Tajikistan actively providing Internet services to
all major cities in the country.13 The state-owned telecommunications company Tajik-
telecom, which provides local, long-distance, and international telephone, mobile tele-
phony, and Internet services, lost its unrivaled dominance of the telecoms market in
2007, when Babilon-Mobile seized more than 30 percent of the market.
Tajikistan remains dependent on satellite-based connections, as the cost of fiber re-
mains high—approximately 30 percent higher than using the same-capacity channel
over VSAT. The country is connected to the Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE)14 fiber-optic high-
way passing through Uzbekistan, and a second connection is under construction to
Kyrgyzstan. In part to overcome this bottleneck, both Tajiktelecom and Babilon-T
have an ambitious plan to expand their fiber-optic infrastructure across the country
and establish connections with China.15
The ISPs are reluctant to share information about their bandwidth because of the
concern that the data would be used by their competitors to undermine their market
position. They are also reluctant to discuss their international points of connection
from which they buy bandwidth. The ONI data reveal that with the exception of
TARENA (an educational network), all Tajik ISPs maintained two international points
of access, one located in Russia and the other in Western Europe. Tajik providers are
aggressive in adopting new technologies. Three of the operators, Babilon-T, Telecom
Technology, and Eastera, provide a commercial Next Generation Network (NGN)
service.16
In 2005, the Association of Tajik ISPs established a national Internet exchange point
(IXP) that connected only four of the ten commercial ISPs (Babilon-T, Compuworld,
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Eastera, and MKF Networks), as well as TARENA.17 At the time of writing, the IXP is
not operational as ISPs prefer to maintain bilateral peering connections between
them.
Most Internet users are young and access the Internet through Internet cafés close to
schools and universities. In January 2006, the Ministry of Transport and Communi-
cations estimated that some 400 Internet cafés, mostly concentrated in large cities,
operated in the country. Many Internet cafés act as second-tier ISPs and buy their
bandwidth from the first-level ISPs (i.e., main ISPs in the country with independent
international connection). Recent changes in licensing regulations require Internet
cafés operating as ISPs to obtain a license from the Ministry, a requirement which has
brought about a decrease of the overall number of Internet cafés.18
Although more than 70 percent of the population resides in rural areas, Internet
access is mainly restricted to urban areas because of poor infrastructure and low afford-
ability. A 2005 study by the local Civil Initiative on Internet Policy (CIPI) shows a great
disparity between the percentage of men accessing Internet (77.5) and that of women
(22.5).19 About 12 percent of users are secondary school students, with around 100
schools across the country connected to the Internet. The most active users are univer-
sity students, employees of international organizations, commercial companies, and
public sector institutions.
Tajik is the official national language. Nevertheless, Russian remains the most popu-
lar language for Internet use. According to data obtained from the national informa-
tion portal (TopTJ.com), the top-ten most-visited Web sites in October 2007 were
informational and analytical portals (AsiaPlus, Varorud, Watanweb, Ariana), a commer-
cial bank, and entertainment sites. Other popular Web sites include mail.ru; popular
research engines are rambler.ru, google.com, yahoo.com, and yandex.ru. Among Tajik
youth, the most popular applications include instant messenger, followed by social
networking sites (odnokassniki.ru, my.mail.ru), and online educational resources.
Local Tajik content on the Internet is poorly developed. Most Internet content is
available in Russian, but the knowledge of Russian among the younger generation is
gradually decreasing. A survey conducted among 342 students and professors from nine
universities showed 60 percent of respondents saw the Internet as an informational
and educational resource, but not as a means to create local information resources.20
The Tajik top-level domain name was registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) in 1997, but the domain name was later suspended because it was
used mainly for registering pornography sites. In 2003, the domain name registration
was delegated to the Information and Technical Center of the President of Tajikistan
Administration, a state entity that now supervises registrations within the ‘‘.tj’’ do-
main.21 Any operator that has a license for providing telecommunication services
(including Internet) is eligible to act as a domain registrar. By January 19, 2008, 4,894
second-level domain names were registered within the ‘‘.tj’’ domain.22
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Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
All Tajik ISPs operate under a license from the Tajik Ministry of Transport and Com-
munication. Internet service providers are permitted to operate VoIP services under an
IP-telephony license, although the ministry has introduced amendments that require
VoIP providers to obtain a special license, presumably as a means to further regulate
the sector.23 In Tajikistan, P2P services are not popular, and the government has not
shown ambitions to regulate them at this time.
The main state entities regulating the Internet in Tajikistan are the Security Council
(SC), the ICT Council, and the MTC (an entity established in February 2007, replacing
the former Ministry of Communications). The Communications and Informatization
Department of the MTC is the main regulator in the telecommunications industry
and is empowered to issue licenses for any related activities.24 In 2003, the government
adopted the Conception on Information Security,25 which serves as a platform for pro-
claiming official views and policy directions to preserve state information security.
The president remains the key authority that ratifies the main legal documents in
the IT sector and directs ICT policy in the country. The SC controls the implemen-
tation of the State Strategy on Information and Communication Technologies for
Development of the Republic of Tajikistan (e-Strategy),26 aimed at developing the
information society and exploiting the country’s ICT potential. The SC monitors tele-
communications, including the Internet, for national security reasons. The ICT Coun-
cil,27 where the president sits as chairman alongside members of the government, is
responsible for implementing and coordinating work under the e-Strategy and advising
the president. However, although the council was established in February 2006, it has
yet to be convened.
The government restricts the distribution of state secrets and other privileged data
intending to ‘‘discredit the dignity and honor of the state and the President,’’ or
that which contains ‘‘violence and cruelty, racial, national and religious hostility . . .
pornography . . . and any other information prohibited by law.’’28 The provisions of
this regulation are broad and allow state bodies wide discretion in their application.
The control over information security is assigned to the Main Department of State
Secrets and the Ministry of Security.
The lower chamber (Majlisi Namoyandagon) and the president ratified the Law on
Changes and Amendments to the Criminal Code in June and July 2007, respectively.
The changes introduced, inter alia, provisions on defamation (Article 135, part 2, Slan-
der) and provisions on illegal collection and distribution of private data (Article 144,
part 1). Defamation incurred over ‘‘mass media or Internet’’ is prosecuted according to
local laws when it contains ‘‘intentional distribution via the Internet of knowingly
false, libelous and insulting information, as well as expletive words and phrases which
denigrate the dignity of human personality.’’
Tajikistan 231
Tajikistan does not have an official policy on Internet filtering. However, state
authorities have been known to restrict access to some Web sites at politically sensitive
times by communicating their ‘‘recommendations’’ to all top-level ISPs—an example
of second-generation controls. Prior to the 2006 presidential election, the govern-
ment-controlled Communications Regulation Agency issued a ‘‘Recommendation on
Filtering’’ that advised ISPs that, ‘‘for the purpose of information security,’’ they should
‘‘engage in filtering and block access to Web sites that aim to undermine the state
policy in the sphere of information.’’29 As a result, several oppositional news Web sites
hosted in Russia or Tajikistan were inaccessible to Tajik users for several days.30 Al-
though officials offered unclear reasons for shutting down the Web sites, independent
media sources believe that the block list will grow in the future.31
Surveillance
Several government agencies possess the right to inspect ISPs’ activities and premises,
and require information on their users. The rights and obligations of ISPs in this regard
are envisioned in the Annex to the ‘‘Internet Services Provision Rules within the
Republic of Tajikistan’’ (herein referred to as the Rules). According to Section 4, para-
graph 15, of the Rules, the provider is obliged to ‘‘render its activity in accordance
with the current Rules’’ and ‘‘provide an easy access to its facilities for employees of
the State Communications Inspectorate of the Ministry of Transport and Communica-
tions, Ministry of Security and other state agencies granted under the corresponding
rules, provide on their demand information, for which they are authorized to ask and
fulfill their instructions on time.’’
In 2006, the government signaled its intention to create an agency under the aus-
pices of the Ministry of Transport and Communications that would control the
ISP sector. All telecoms and ISPs were required to provide direct access to the state
inspectorate in a manner similar to Russian surveillance legislation (SORM). In 2009,
the high cost of the project as well as lobbying from telecom operators halted its
realization.32
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative tested in Tajikistan on four key ISPs: Babilon-T,
Eastera, Tajiktelecom, and TARENA. Testing in Tajikistan yielded no evidence of Inter-
net filtering. This extends to pornographic content, and with the exception of TARENA
(which services schools and universities), the major ISPs do not filter such content on
the backbone level. However, accessing pornographic content at Internet cafés is ille-
gal. Any persons caught accessing such content is subject to a fine ranging from USD
15 to USD 100, and violators may be criminally prosecuted. The ONI’s investigation
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concluded that currently most Internet cafés do not filter access to pornographic con-
tent. However, they do employ monitoring software that notifies them when a client is
attempting to retrieve such content.
Conclusion
The Tajik government has adopted an e-strategy aimed at developing an information
society and employing ICT potential for spurring economic growth. At the same time
it does not seek to encourage independent online publishers, journalists, and bloggers.
Media freedom is widely challenged and subject to de facto censorship, although the
constitution provides that ‘‘state censorship and prosecution for criticism are forbid-
den.’’33 State filtering is unlikely to be officially supported as ISPs remain independent,
often linked to political or criminal interests with influence within state bodies. Tajiki-
stan is also dependent on international aid, which has some influence over the direc-
tion of state policy in this sector, although this may change as Tajikistan moves closer
to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (discussed further below). The Tajik govern-
ment, however, has in place policies and instruments to maintain firm control over the
distribution of information, particularly before elections. The government is engaged
in developing programs aimed at restricting citizens’ Internet access, following on
from President Rahmon’s message that ‘‘Western values aren’t always applicable’’ to
Eastern countries.34
Future tendencies on the political agenda include the increasing role of regional
organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union, which may lead to a harmonization of more repressive laws. This possi-
bility combined with the regime’s authoritarian tendencies may lead to the emergence
of further second-generation controls (especially event-driven filtering and legal restric-
tions on categories of content).
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Turkmenistan ranks among the most
repressive and closed societies in the
world. The Internet is heavily regu-
lated and available only to a small
fraction of the population. Among
the countries of the CIS, it has the
lowest penetration rate of Internet ac-
cess and the highest degree of first-
generation controls. Censorship is
ubiquitous and extensive. Surveil-
lance is significant, and the few citizens who benefit from access to the Internet
are closely monitored by state agencies.
Background
A Central Asian republic with a population of around 5 million and land area of
488,100 square kilometers,1 Turkmenistan is a country rich in natural gas and oil
resources.2 The government has undertaken efforts to develop the gas and cotton in-
dustry but has failed to encourage development in other economic sectors.
Turkmenistan was a closed society under the proclaimed ‘‘President for Life,’’ Sapar-
murat Niyazov.3 To nourish his personality cult, Niyazov—in power for 15 years—
frequently rotated, dismissed, or brought charges against government officials and
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judicial representatives to create a situation of permanent instability in the society.4
The death of Niyazov in December 2006 brought about a glimmer of hope for those
pining for reform.5 In February 2007, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov won the coun-
try’s largely symbolic presidential elections. The post-Niyazov transition was surpris-
ingly smooth, with Berdymukhamedov promptly securing support from the most
important behind-the-scenes players, whom he then removed once becoming presi-
dent. During the time of Niyazov, the president headed both the legislative and judi-
cial branches of the state. Berdymukhamedov pledged to introduce democratic
reforms and separation of powers. In September 2008, a new constitution entered into
force that dissolved the People’s Council (the highest representative body, which
included parliament and cabinet members) and divided its powers between the presi-
dent and the new 125-member parliament.
During Niyazov’s rule, all opposition parties were banned. Dissenters were harassed
or exiled, and a small and weakened opposition existed either underground or abroad.6
By contrast, the new constitution promotes multiparty politics, thus formally legaliz-
ing opposition. However, in the 2008 parliamentary elections, the Democratic Party—
the current ruling party—was the only one registered to participate. The leaders of the
main political opposition parties—the Social and Political Movement of Watan and
the Turkmenistan Republican Party—continue to reside abroad to avoid potential
repression.
The people of Turkmenistan were positive about some of the reforms promised by
Berdymukhamedov, including reinstating the recently abolished ten-year mandatory
period of education, reversing measures aimed at denying pensions for the elderly,
and guaranteeing Internet access to all.7
The ethnic composition of the population is Turkmen (85 percent), Russian (7 per-
cent), Uzbek (5 percent), and other minorities (3 percent).8 The largest percentage of
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 4,677
Life expectancy at birth (years) 63
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 100
Human development index (out of 179) 108
Rule of law (out of 211) 195
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 205
Democracy index (out of 167) 165 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 139
Internet users (percent of population) 1.4
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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the population shares orthodox Turkmen and Islamic values (89 percent), although
Muslim traditions have been, to some extent, modulated by local customs and the
country’s Soviet past. Important factors in determining one’s position in the Turkmen
society remain kinship, regional links, and tribal affiliation. The state traditionally mar-
ginalizes ethnic and religious groups. Except for officially recognized Sunni Muslim
and Russian Orthodox denominations, religious activities are severely limited. Religious
congregations are required to register with the government to gain legal status.9
Internet Infrastructure
The telecommunications sector in Turkmenistan is developing slowly, encumbered by
heavy government subsidies of basic services, contradictory procedures for obtaining
licenses, and low levels of foreign investment.10 In the late 1990s, two German compa-
nies, Siemens and Alcatel, were approved by the government to develop the telecom-
munications system. In addition, the TurkmenTelecom Company and the U.S.-based
Verizon have agreed to provide Turkmenistan with direct access to the Internet.11 Chi-
nese telecommunication companies, financially supported by the Chinese govern-
ment, have also entered the market. According to the U.S. Embassy in Turkmenistan,
prior to 2004 there were no broadband fixed wireless service providers in the country,
and the difficulties involved in obtaining operating licenses from the Ministry of Com-
munications made the involvement of foreign companies impossible.12
Since the emergence of the Internet, the government has sought to establish com-
plete control of the Internet to avoid any potential threat that unmonitored access
may pose to the regime. In 2001, the largest ISP, Ariana, struggled to survive for
months while appealing the revocation of its license. It continued to provide free Inter-
net access to NGOs until the government finally closed it down. Thereafter, only the
state-run provider, TurkmenTelecom, continued operations. Under the former admin-
istration, there was very little public Internet access. It was available only to those who
could afford to pay USD 8 per hour at the few hotels catering to foreigners and less
than ten public access points in the country, all sponsored by foreign aid programs.
Private use was restricted to a few foreign-owned businesses that could acquire two-
way satellites or the few USD 1,000 a month DSL lines, a few dozen universities and
institutions connected through the NATO-established Virtual Silk Highway project,
and a small number of local individuals and businesses that managed to acquire
dial-up access accounts.13
There is only one legal provider of Internet in Turkmenistan, the official government
body, TurkmenTelecom. All channels pass through TurkmenTelecom’s central hub, and
all are thoroughly monitored by the security services. TurkmenTelecom offers a small
range of service connections for individuals and organizations, all of which are offi-
cially limited to the holder of the account. It remains illegal for a private organization,
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for-profit or otherwise, to open an Internet café. Should an organization manage to
acquire a dial-up account, it would be presented with a contract obligating it to use
the account solely for private personal use and not to share it with anyone. Those in
breach of the rules are sanctioned.
In order to receive Internet access, users must register with TurkmenTelecom by sub-
mitting a declaration and their passport. In addition, TurkmenTelecom warns users on
its Web site that the Internet is not a ‘‘place for unconsidered behavior.’’ Accordingly,
users have to refrain from undertaking a wide array of broadly defined activities when
they are online—for example, posting materials containing foul language, showing
‘‘inappropriate behavior’’ online, posting information that conflicts with the standard
norms of behavior and legislation, and uploading pornographic materials.14 The con-
tract signed by the operator and user contains even more restrictions, such as a ban
on accessing Web sites that contain violent content and Web sites that disseminate
‘‘untruthful and defamatory information’’ (a definition that includes opposition Web
sites). If, after a warning, a user insists on accessing forbidden Web sites, the operator
shuts down his or her Internet service. Users are liable for any actions that might cause
damage to the government or ‘‘anyone else.’’
Foreign aid organizations and expensive hotels continue to provide Internet access,
though there is consensus among users that the speed of connections provided by
TurkmenTelecom has declined over the last two years. These organizations and hotels,
as a self-imposed measure, filter some opposition and freedom-of-expression Web sites.
They defend such policies as necessary in order for them to continue providing Inter-
net services. Their activities, as well as those of their patrons, continue to be monitored
by the authorities.
Similar self-censorship behavior has been observed in schools. After Niyazov’s death,
the new president promised to install Internet access in every school and demanded
that no new school or kindergarten be opened without Internet access.15 This massive
state computerization program led to the purchase of thousands of computers for the
country’s schools. However, lack of training in ICT among teachers and remaining
fears among administrators that access to the Internet may lead to repression have left
many of the computer rooms locked.
The results of the computerization program have been far more modest than the
rhetoric behind it, and the country has largely failed to implement policies guarantee-
ing free and accessible Internet. The president legalized Internet cafés in 2007, but they
continue to number only a few, are not advanced technologically, and are closely
monitored by the state security service.16 Since February 2007, 15 TurkmenTelecom-
operated Internet cafés have been opened in the country’s six largest cities.17 Their
hours of operation were limited to normal government business hours, and the
price in 2007 was set at about USD 4 per hour (at this time the average salary in
Turkmenistan was less than USD 100 a month).18 All Internet café users are required
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to present a passport, and their activities are recorded and logs are sent to a govern-
ment server.
Nearly two years after the transition several of the 15 official access points were
closed, and all have suffered repeated service outages and closures. In 2007, President
Berdymukhamedov reprimanded the minister of communications for the high prices
at Internet cafés.19 As a consequence, access prices dropped by more than 60 percent,
and Internet access at Internet cafés now costs around USD 2. Aside from the obvious
submission to monitoring inherent in presenting one’s passport, Internet cafés are
staffed mostly by youth; furthermore, anyone who uses an Internet café is mindful of
what he or she accesses. Nevertheless, administrators report that most Internet cafés re-
ceive only up to ten visitors a day.
Contact with the outside world is still difficult in Turkmenistan. Prices for home
access to the Internet are steep, creating an additional economic barrier to widespread
Internet use. Thus, the Internet largely remains a privilege to those working for foreign
companies, the government, and, in a small number of cases, those studying or work-
ing at universities. International organizations are trying to improve the local climate
by providing regional centers and administrations with modern computer equipment
and Internet access, as well as establishing satellite connections of Turkmen science
centers to the worldwide network.20
In March 2008, the official government Web site Turkmenistan.ru announced that
TurkmenTelecom was finally offering dial-up home Internet connection to the public.
The rates were set at USD 42 to open an account, a flat USD 5 per month fee, and USD
4 per hour for browsing, with speeds of 45 Kbps.21 These rates are unaffordable for the
vast majority of the population and more than six times higher than in neighboring
Uzbekistan. New leased lines were also to be connected starting immediately, at high
monthly rates of USD 1,000–USD 2,000.
Internet use in the CIS region has increased significantly in the last several years in
all countries except for Turkmenistan. Various attempts at measuring Internet penetra-
tion have posited that between 0.17 and 4 percent of the population use the Internet,
with ITU estimates being 1.4 percent.22 Notwithstanding the low level of penetration,
the number of users has increased significantly since the offer of home Internet access.
Fixed-line penetration is less than 10 percent, with negligible broadband. Permission
has now been given for broadband national WiMAX frequencies. There are fewer than
500 Web sites hosted in the country under the top-level domain ‘‘.tm,’’ more than half
by a foreign-funded development project. The rest consist almost entirely of official
Web sites of government entities. Nearly 95 percent of regular Internet users are in
the capital, Ashgabat.
There are two mobile operators in the country. Atlyn Asyr is wholly controlled by
the state, with roughly 160,000 subscribers. In November 2007, MTS, a Russian mobile
service provider (100 percent privately owned), began offering GPRS/EDGE service to
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its corporate clients in Turkmenistan. In May 2008, the same service was offered to
individual users for USD 50/Mbit plus a one-time fee of USD 5. As of 2008, MTS had
around 500,000 users in Turkmenistan.23 The service provided by MTS is considerably
cheaper than TurkmenTelecom’s: it costs USD 5 to connect (one-time fee); 1 MB is 58
cents (day) and 29 cents (night). For users who live in rural areas where fixed lines are
not modernized, MTS remains the only option to connect to the Internet. Interest-
ingly, MTS’s introduction of GPRS Internet seems not to have been supported by the
government, and the service was never announced in official media. The price is
still quite high for most users, the service slow and unreliable, and Internet traffic still
monitored and filtered through TurkmenTelecom. Focusing on GPRS, however, would
herald a leap forward in public access to the Internet, bypassing the high-cost infra-
structure of land and telephone lines. If the state does not encourage the establishment
of independent networks, however, the service could remain slow, expensive, and
unreliable, and will most likely remain filtered.24
Turkmenistan recently sold the rights of administration of top-level ‘‘.tm’’ domains
to a U.S.-based contractor. Foreign companies are willing to pay high prices for ‘‘.tm’’
domain names because the abbreviation evokes the term ‘‘trademark.’’ The vast major-
ity of Turkmenistan-based Web sites are within second-level domains of international
or official government bureaus, such as ‘‘.gov.tm’’ or ‘‘.edu.tm.’’
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The president and the Cabinet of Ministers are the policymakers in the communi-
cations sector. The Ministry of Communications implements policy; it is the sector’s
regulator, issuing licenses to operators, approving tariffs, and carrying out investiga-
tions to ensure that operators conform to all laws and regulations. The ministry super-
vises eight bodies in the post and telecommunications sectors: TurkmenTelecom (fixed
operator), Ashgabat City Network, Altyn Asyr (GSM), TV Radio/TV Broadcasting, Spec-
trum Administration, Turkmenistan Post, Special Delivery service (Postal), and Train-
ing Center. The deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers oversees the work of the
ministry and the minister of communications reports directly to him.25
The role of the sector minister in controlling the state operator is de facto marginal
as the general director of TurkmenTelecom reports directly to the Cabinet of Ministers
without referring to the minister. The Internet market is strictly controlled by the
Cabinet of Ministers, and receiving an Internet license entails close monitoring of all
providers’ commercial activities. Each license is for a period of three years, and there
are more than 30 different license types in the communications sector. It is anticipated
that revisions will be introduced to the Law on Communications (2000), which would
provide easier conditions for new technologies to enter the market. President Berdymu-
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khamedov has encouraged some liberalization in the market by allowing alternative
Internet operators to apply for licenses. In fact, by law, the state operator does not en-
joy exclusive rights. Nonetheless, TurkmenTelecom remains the only ISP in the market
with a valid license to operate. The tariffs are set by the operators themselves, while the
ministry reviews the tariff proposals when granting the license.
According to existing rules, when an alternative ISP or broadband provider expresses
an interest in using an incumbent operator’s network, an inspection commission is
formed to investigate the operator’s proposal. However, as yet, no alternative provider
is known to have applied to provide such services.26
Although both the old and the new constitutions guarantee freedom of expression
and free dissemination of information, the government largely controls all media out-
lets (television, press, and radio). The Turkmen television is state-owned and provides
four channels. Channel One, or ORT, broadcasts of Russian television are restricted to
only two hours per day and rarely broadcast live. Any reference related to the Soviet
past, erotic topics, prostitution, alcoholism, or drug addiction is removed from movies
and soap operas.27 Foreign television stations and radio are accessible only to the hand-
ful of people who have satellite dishes or shortwave radios. The press is controlled
by the government, and even the nominally independent newspapers Adalat and
Galkynysh were created by decrees of the former president. Other government-
approved newspapers are Turkmenistan (published in Turkmen) and Neutral Turkmeni-
stan (in Russian).
Publishing houses and photocopying establishments have to receive registration
licenses from the government before starting their operations.28 State media employees
cannot establish contacts freely with foreign media.
The lack of mechanisms guaranteeing media freedom, the extensive provisions sanc-
tioning libel and defamation in the Criminal Code, and the broad provisions related to
terrorist activities in the Law on Terrorism29 have imposed total self-censorship on
Turkmen society under the former and current governments. Article 132 of the Crimi-
nal Code makes libel by way of channels of mass information punishable by fines, up
to two years of forced labor, or up to one year in prison. Article 133 of the Criminal
Code provides for similar sanctions for certain insults against government agents
(who are defined as anyone who permanently or temporarily represents a branch
of the government). Article 176 of the Criminal Code seeks to protect the president.
Under part 1, any attempts on the life or health of the president are punishable by
imprisonment for life or death. Part 2 of this article provides for a prison term of up
to five years for libel directed against the president. No specific mention is made of
mass media—libel in any form can lead to charges.30 Libel charges are usually used to
arrest journalists, and there is always a danger of false charges being laid for crimes
such as embezzlement.
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As reported by Radio Free Europe, during the previous regime most of the trials
of journalists, government opponents, or any person who was considered a ‘‘threat’’
to the regime were held in secrecy.31 Under Niyazov, repression of dissenters in Turk-
menistan often involved beatings, threats, and arrests.32 The current president has
granted amnesty to many dissidents and journalists who were jailed by the Niyazov
regime.33 However, in spite of the few positive steps taken by President Berdymukha-
medov, media groups continue to place Turkmenistan among the ‘‘ten worst countries
to be a blogger’’ because of the lack of guarantees for freedom of expression.34
Surveillance
In Turkmenistan, few users with access to the Internet are able to read English. Accord-
ingly, only information in Russian disseminated on the Internet might raise serious
concerns for the regime. Nonetheless, the preferred method of limiting information
on the Internet is simply blocking undesirable content. Such a policy, documented
during Niyazov’s reign, is still in place.
Reporters Without Borders has declared Turkmenistan, along with Belarus and Uzbe-
kistan, an ‘‘Enemy of the Internet,’’ because of a combination of monitoring Internet
browsing, filtering Web content, imprisonment, harassment, and the prevention of the
posting of political materials.35
The Turkmen government maintains tight control on the flow of information
through the official mass media. Any dissident criticizing the lack of expression and
tight censorship is likely to be included in the government-held blacklist, which can
restrict the right to travel abroad.36 Authorities remain hostile to religious sects, and
unregistered religious groups are still not allowed to perform religious activities. The
government is also engaged in a long-standing practice of deporting citizens belonging
to different religious sects.37 There has been no stark change in the monitoring and
interception of communications over the last two years. Sensitive issues such as dis-
crimination against women, terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism are still
censored by the government. Because of the overall restrictive climate, people commit
themselves to broad self-censorship.
There are reports that Turkmenistan’s security services have put into place a system for
Internet surveillance of all ISPs throughout the country.38 The OpenNet Initiative sus-
pects that an automatic Internet surveillance and filtering system based on deep-
packet-inspection technology has been installed on TurkmenTelecom routers. Since all
incoming and outgoing information passes through TurkmenTelecom systems, Internet
traffic can easily be intercepted. Any traffic can be monitored by authorities, and cer-
tain preselected Web sites containing information that could be harmful to the regime
are filtered. Other reports confirm that users can be identified if they send encrypted
messages and materials containing certain keywords, such as the president’s name.39
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ONI Testing Results
In 2008, OpenNet Initiative testing was conducted in Turkmenistan on a direct land-
line connection to TurkmenTelecom. The tests detected substantial filtering of local
and regional media and freedom-of-expression Web sites. Significantly, Azeri media
sites, including a popular multimedia site with an ‘‘.az’’ extension and an Azeri Web
site targeting corrupt officials, were blocked. The ONI revealed targeted filtering on a
number of other Web sites including those covering local and international women’s
rights, human rights, and narcotics, and one Web site containing information about
religious beliefs. An environmental site and a P2P site were also blocked. In addition,
a number of pornographic and gambling sites were blocked. The ONI also observed
reverse filtering of U.S. military domains.40
Conclusion
The former Turkmen president exercised strict control over Turkmen society and
media, and restricted any information inconsistent with his widely propagandized
policies. The current president has pledged to seek a more lenient approach to leading
the country, but much still remains to be done. The scope of sensitive issues in Turk-
menistan continues to be broad and may involve any criticism of the regime or inde-
pendent opinion. Few citizens have access to the Internet, and most continue to fear
censorship and other unpredictable centralized methods of control. Until liberalization
of the Internet market occurs, such measures will continue to be a concern for most
Internet users in the country. The few international organizations providing Internet
access practice self-censorship in order to protect their staff and their diplomatic posi-
tion. With so few users of the Internet and the massive risks facing any advocates of
freedom of speech, the government continues to hold the future of the Internet in
Turkmenistan entirely in its hands.
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Ukraine
Access to Internet content in Ukraine
remains largely unfettered, in part as
a consequence of the 2005 Orange
Revolution in which communication
technologies played a significant role.
Ukraine possesses relatively liberal
legislation governing the Internet and
access to information. A number of
state initiatives aimed at controlling
electronic media have emerged, in-
cluding regulations to exercise surveillance over Internet content in order to
‘‘protect national security’’ and limit other forms of ‘‘undesirable’’ content. These
regulations embody the potential for expanded formal and informal controls, al-
though they are unlikely to be enacted in the near future.
Background
Among the countries of the CIS, Ukraine is second only to Russia in the size and
strength of its IT establishment. Ukraine was the birthplace of Soviet computing and
Kyiv remains a major center for IT development. Ukraine is an early adopter of policies
aimed at supporting ICT, considered by the government to be a main pillar of national
development. The state has demonstrated the political will to undertake vital reforms
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in the telecommunications sector, although much remains to be done to promote a
favorable environment for developing the Internet, fostering e-commerce, and intro-
ducing e-governance. In 2008–2009, Ukraine moved up in the global ranking of the
Networked Readiness Index to 62nd from 75th place—a notable improvement.1
In early 2000, the government invested in developing the country’s ICT infrastruc-
ture extensively, but more recently the government has deprioritized ICT develop-
ment. This policy change explains the low position of Ukraine in two separate
rankings, both carried out by the World Economic Forum in 2009: ‘‘Government Pri-
oritization of ICT’’ (ranked 110th out of 134 countries) and ‘‘Importance of ICT to
Government Vision of the Future’’ (ranked 114th).2
The January 2005 Orange Revolution—when opposition groups successfully chal-
lenged the outcome of the November 2004 presidential elections that were allegedly
unfair—highlighted the latent political power resulting from the ‘‘convergence’’ of
information infrastructures (cell phones, Internet, and independent media) and politi-
cal mobilization. The opposition made full use of these technologies to mobilize and
direct supporters in acts of civil disobedience, sit-ins, and general strikes. Although
the Internet did not play a determining role in the success of the Orange Revolution,
its use by the opposition helped to foster the perception that these technologies served
an important strategic role in organizing political opposition (which observers have
termed ‘‘hyper-democracy’’).3 This perception, in turn, prompted neighboring author-
itarian governments such as Belarus to crack down on Internet openness.
Following the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian society has become more aware of its
power to bring about political changes. Political parties and the government have
started using the Internet as an effective tool of political competition while employing
techniques such as online political games, unofficial voting, e-meetings, and blogs.
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 6,529
Life expectancy at birth (years) 68
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 100
Human development index (out of 179) 82
Rule of law (out of 211) 152
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 114
Democracy index (out of 167) 53 (Flawed democracy)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 90
Internet users (percent of population) 14.6
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World




The partly liberalized Ukrainian telecommunications market is not fully developed.
Fixed-line penetration remains low (27.8 percent),4 and the telephone system requires
modernization. The demand for mobile services has expanded rapidly, to reach a pen-
etration of nearly 50 percent. The largest telecom and top-tier ISP, Ukrtelecom, has
92.86 percent state ownership. President Viktor Yushchenko has announced the forth-
coming privatization of the state-owned telecom operator Ukrtelecom. The sale of the
operator, however, has been delayed a number of times. The government envisages
that 50 percent of the shares will be sold for USD 3 billion, though analysts predict a
much lower figure. The outdated equipment of Ukrtelecom makes the company less at-
tractive to investors.5 The state monopolies Ukrtelecom and Utel, the latter controlled
by Ukrtelecom, together own 95 percent of the long-distance and international call
market.6
State-owned Ukrtelecom is the largest ISP in the country, but it does not decisively
control the other major ISPs. Ukrtelecom dominates the fixed-line sector7 and pos-
sesses Ukraine’s primary network, trunk, and zone telecom lines. Alternative telecom-
munications providers are dependent on leased lines, because Ukrtelecom owns the
majority of the infrastructure and many alternative providers do not have sufficient
resources to build their own networks and consequently have to rely on Ukrtelecom’s
infrastructure. Prices for long-distance and international calls of local operators made
over Ukrtelecom lines were regulated by the Order of the Ministry of Communications
of November 21, 1996, No. 234, on the basis of revenue sharing (which depends on
the number of lines, equipment used, and administrative costs). New interconnection
rules were introduced in January 2007, under which interconnection fees are calcu-
lated on the basis of traffic volume.
Although ISPs have considerably reduced their access costs (by, for example, leasing
outdated or redundant infrastructure from Ukrtelecom) and a few providers offer free
access during the night, most Ukrainians cannot afford to use the Internet. Internet
penetration increased to 14.6 percent in 2008.8 With regard to frequency of connect-
ing to the Internet, local sources9 estimated that in March 2009 almost 8 million Ukrai-
nian users accessed the Internet on at least one occasion over the course of the
previous month.10 There is a significant urban-rural digital divide: As of December
2008, 41 percent of Internet users lived in settlements with more than 50,000 inhabi-
tants. The share of Internet users in rural areas is very low.11 The majority of users are
concentrated in large cities, with Kyiv accounting for nearly 60 percent of Internet
users, and the next seven largest cities a further 30 percent of all users.12 Obstacles
impeding expansion include high access costs, poor infrastructure in the regions, high
call rates, and low levels of PC ownership.
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Men are more frequent users than women (59.3 percent), and most users access the
Internet at the office, Internet cafés, or home. Various efforts have been made to boost
Internet access at public Internet access places (PIAPs).13 Pilot projects have also been
launched in an effort to improve universal service provision in remote areas. There are
more than 3,000 Internet cafés in Ukraine (or one for every 16,000 people in the coun-
try).14 In 2007, 70 percent of all Internet cafés accessed the Internet through a dial-up
connection, 20 percent through dedicated lines, and 10 percent through cable TV net-
works and others.15
There are about 400 ISPs in Ukraine according to the State Committee on Communi-
cation and Informatization.16 As of March 2009, there were around 90 ISPs connected
to the two Internet traffic exchange points. Ukrtelecom has recently taken steps to en-
courage massive use of broadband services, and the number of ISPs offering broadband
access services has rapidly increased.17 In March 2005, there were only 10,000 DSL
lines in Ukraine.18 At that time, DSLAMs were installed in 450 cities in Ukraine, and
work was under way with Cisco to permit a 1,000 percent increase in DSL subscribers
by the second half of 2006. In Ukraine, DSL is used by ISPs as high-speed leased lines.
The most widespread technology used for this purpose is HDSL, reaching 2 Mbps data-
exchange speeds in both directions.19 By the end of 2008, there were approximately
1.5 million broadband subscribers (of whom about 500,000 were Ukrtelecom sub-
scribers). Penetration of broadband access in the country exceeded 8 percent.20
The government, recognizing the need for attracting foreign investment and stimu-
lating a favorable Internet environment, has also announced plans to provide low-cost
access to the Internet in the major cities using WiMAX technology.21 Indeed, the wire-
less broadband sector has experienced an increased level of activity as the number of
Wi-Fi ISPs has been augmented.
Mobile operators plan to launch fixed-broadband services using frequencies previ-
ously used by analog mobile services. Although cable operators have a significant pres-
ence throughout the country, the lack of investment has prevented them from offering
broadband and digital cable services in most places in Ukraine. A new DTH platform
has been launched, and the Ukrainian broadcasting council has allocated Digital Ter-
restrial TV licenses, opening the way for new services.
There are a number of companies providing Internet access using satellite tech-
nologies in Ukraine (these include Ukrsat, Infocom-SK, Spacegate, Adamant, LuckyNet,
Ukrnet, and Itelsat). With the exception of Infocom-SK, all these companies are private
operators. Ukrchastotnagliad, the Ukrainian frequencies supervisory center, reports
that 86 operators have licenses to provide satellite communications services in
Ukraine. Despite the large number of operators on the market, however, satellite tele-
communications is limited because of its high cost compared to the low average
income in the country. The government is nevertheless deploying a digital satellite
television and radio broadcasting system, which will also be used for Internet via satel-
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lite. In 2007, there were five types of licenses for the provision of direct satellite com-
munications services.
There are currently two industry associations in the Internet sector, the Internet
Association of Ukraine,22 which owns the Ukrainian Internet Exchange (UIE),23 and
the Ukrainian Wireless Association.24 The Internet Association of Ukraine aims to safe-
guard the interests of all participants in the Internet market and has successfully
ensured a reduction in the price of internal traffic in Ukraine.25
Since 2001, the Ukrainian national country code top-level domain (‘‘.ua’’) has been
administered by LLC ‘‘Hostmaster’’ founded by representatives of the Ukrainian Inter-
net community.26 The number of domain names registered under ‘‘.ua’’ is steadily
increasing. For example, under ‘‘.com.ua,’’ the total number of domain names
increased from 31,153 in 2004 to 145,114 in April 2009. The overall number of
domain names under ‘‘.ua’’ had increased from 133,907 to 390,197 as of January 1,
2009.27
Blogging has also been on the rise. Ukrainian Internet users have opened more
than 80,000 blogs on popular portals such as livejournal.com (35,000), liveInternet.ru
(27,500), dnevnik.bigmir.net (11,000), drevo.uaportal.com (4,000), diary.ru (2,500),
Jeans.com.ua/blogs.php (2,300), and Dnevnik.org.ua (1,200).28
The most popular search engines in Ukraine are Ukrainian-based BigMir.net and
ukr.net, Russian-based Yandex and Rambler, and Google. The majority (60.3 percent)
of online searches in Ukraine are performed through Google, followed by Russian and
Ukrainian search engines Yandex (18.3 percent), ukr.net (2.64 percent), Rambler (2.16
percent), and Meta.ua (2.11 percent).29
Ukraine’s mobile sector is very dynamic. There are six mobile providers in the coun-
try: UMS30 (GSM-900/1800 and NMT-450i), Kyivstar31 GSM (GSM-900/1800), Astelit32
(GSM-1800), Ukrainskie Radiosystemy (GSM-1800),33 and Utel (UMTS/WCDMA).34
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (through the State Administration for
Communications) is the policymaker in the electronic communications sector. The
Law on Communications (2003) established the sector regulator—the National Com-
munication Regulation Commission (NCRC), which was set up two years later. The
law of 2003 does not guarantee the independence of the NCRC. Instead, a number of
inconsistencies between sector laws have increased the uncertainty about who has the
power to appoint the commissioners. The NCRC is responsible for licensing operators,
monitoring the market, price regulation, frequency assignment, numbering, ensuring
compliance with the legal framework, imposing sanctions, and resolving disputes when
interconnection agreements are not reached between operators. The NCRC’s work has
often been obstructed by claims of unlawful appointments and operation.35
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Under the Law on Communications, operators are required to have a license before
starting activity.36 License fees vary from around EUR 1.5 million for fixed interna-
tional telephony down to less than EUR 1,500 for network capacity and 10,000 tele-
phone numbers. A 15-year national license for VoIP costs EUR 150,000.37 The law
specifies that local, intercity, and international telecommunications services, as well
as mobile telephone communications and television and radio broadcasting, must be
licensed. The term of the license (except for IP-telephony) is determined by the NCRC
and cannot be less than five years.38 With the present government, Internet activity is
not subject to licensing or other forms of regulation. Liberalization of the market has
also led to a rapid increase in the number of ISPs.
The Law on Communications offers the NCRC a variety of tools to ensure competi-
tive neutrality with regard to building communications infrastructure. According to
the current legislation, all telecommunications operators have the right to build tele-
communications networks in accordance with a plan that has been approved by the
Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC). Companies must submit their
plans to Ukrtelecom or the local government to receive permission to develop telecom
networks.
Monopolization by Ukrtelecom, lack of strategy for international telecommunica-
tions services market development, and the absence of long-distance and international
traffic control mechanisms are major problems for the long-distance and international
communications market. Interconnection is governed by Chapter IX of the 2003 Law
on Communications and the subsequent NCRC Order on Interconnection and Calcu-
lation among Operators. Interconnection is very heavily regulated: the cost of calls
from fixed phones to mobile phones is determined by a government decree, and the
redistribution of incomes from such calls is based on agreements between Ukrtelecom
and the mobile operators. This rate is currently UAH 0.6 per minute. These agreements
between Ukrtelecom and mobile operators are signed on a yearly basis. At present,
it is difficult to obtain data on interconnection between telephony operators be-
cause all parties have an interest in concealing actual conditions of their agreements.39
There is also no public information available regarding the existence of complaints
against interconnection regulation. For fixed-to-mobile interconnection, the termina-
tion fee is UAH 0.25 per minute. The price of call termination in the mobile-to-fixed
market is decided by commercial agreement between the parties, but the tariff cannot
be more than UAH 0.25. Mobile-to-mobile interconnection is negotiated between the
parties.
The Law on Communications classifies market players in the telecom sectors as
either ‘‘operators’’ or ‘‘providers.’’ Under Article 1 of the law, ‘‘providers’’ do not have
the right to maintain or operate networks, or to provide channels. Operators are div-
ided into mobile operators, landline operators, and landline wireless operators. Mobile
254 Ukraine
operators need to obtain a license for provision of phone services and for the frequen-
cies they use. Fixed operators are required to have a license for local, national, and in-
ternational services, while fixed wireless providers need a license for fixed operators as
well as for the frequency they operate.
The legal status of VoIP providers has yet to be defined. Within the context of the
current definitions, VoIP providers could be considered ‘‘operators’’ and therefore be
required to undertake the same licensing procedures as the other categories of opera-
tors. Obviously there is a degree of uncertainty in the market. The losses from the
illegal termination of voice calls in Ukraine have been calculated. Ukrtelecom offers a
termination rate for IP calls of USD 0.75–0.77. It is not known how many (if any) IP
telephony companies take advantage of this offer.
The country-code top-level domain (CC TLD) ‘‘.ua’’ is administered by the indepen-
dent company Hostmaster. In 2008, there were two separate legislative initiatives pro-
posing to establish governmental control over the administrative body. Oleg Shevchuk
(Prime Minister of Ukraine, Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko) suggested that the administra-
tion of the CC TLD be performed by a nonprofit NGO representing the IT sector. How-
ever, any final appointment decision would be enacted only after approval by a
supervisory board, including representatives of the National Communication Regula-
tion Commission (NCRC), the Anti-Monopoly Committee, and other central executive
bodies.40 Another draft law envisioned stricter measures.41 According to the draft law,
the administrator—a noncommercial organization—should be founded by associa-
tions of communication providers as well as authorized governmental bodies. The
administrator would be approved by the Cabinet of Ministries following a proposal by
the State Informatization Committee and the NCRC. Furthermore, the administrator’s
activity would be organized by a coordination council composed of executive bodies
and self-regulated organizations. However, these two proposals were not successful.
At present, there are no controls on Internet access or content. However, this situa-
tion may be changing as government figures have made public calls for stricter re-
gulation of the Internet, citing national security concerns.42 Suggested measures
include licensing ISPs, registering Internet resources, and monitoring content related
to obscene or harmful material. The threat of Internet censorship was raised in 2005
when the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications introduced, and subse-
quently withdrew, a decree regulating registration of Web sites hosted in Ukraine for
the purposes of national security.43 In 2009, the Ukrainian Security Service was
instructed to prepare draft legislation that would obligate news Web sites to register as
media.44
The Law on Protection of Public Morals of November 20, 2003, enacted during the
term of the previous government, is still effective. It prohibits the production and cir-
culation of pornography; dissemination of products that propagandize war or spread
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national and religious intolerance; humiliation or insult to an individual or nation on
the grounds of nationality, religion, or ignorance; and the propagation of ‘‘drug addi-
tion, toxicology, alcoholism, smoking and other bad habits.’’ (Article 161 of the Crim-
inal Code provides for punishment for incitement of national, racial, and religious
intolerance, and demeaning of national honor and religious beliefs.)
The National Expert Commission for the Protection of Public Morals (NECPPM) has
the authority to monitor and evaluate media materials (including the Internet), issue
conclusions on their compliance with the Law on Protection of Public Morals, and pro-
pose revocation of operators’ licenses in case of violation.45 The commissioners of the
NECPPM are approved by the Cabinet of Ministries. Since 2008, the NECPPM has
made several decisions about TV broadcasts, movies, and books that provoked signi-
ficant controversy in the electronic media community. For example, in November
2008 the commission decided that the Russian-based social network ‘‘V kontakte’’
(vkontakte.ru) contained pornographic materials and instructed the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs to address the embassy of the Russian Federation to Ukraine on this issue,
in order to prevent further dissemination of such materials by the social network.46
Subsequently, on March 20, 2009, the Internet Association of Ukraine and the com-
mission signed the Memorandum on Cooperation about Security Issues in the ‘‘.ua’’
Domain.47 The association and its members took on the responsibility for monitoring
the Ukrainian domain and preventing dissemination of materials violating the Law on
Protection of Public Morals.
In September 2005, the Cybercrime Convention of the Council of Europe was rati-
fied by President Yushchenko, with reservations regarding the possession of child por-
nography and misuse of devices. Ukraine has also signed and ratified the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and Child Pornography. Prohibition of the importation, production,
sale, and distribution of child pornography in Ukraine is detailed in Article 301 of the
Ukrainian criminal code. However, there is no prohibition of the possession of such
material.
In December 2008, the Ministry of Internal Affairs searched the premises of one of
the most popular Ukrainian file-exchange networks (infostore.org) and confiscated
servers and other equipment under the pretext that the network was hosting porno-
graphic materials. The owners insisted they provided the required information before-
hand and protested against the actions of the law enforcement authorities. Since this
incident, infostore.org has been unavailable.48 The ministry’s actions were under-
pinned by a decision of the National Expert Commission for the Protection of Public
Morals.
In October 2008, MP Pavlo Ungurjan (Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko) submitted a draft
law on combating child pornography.49 He suggested imposing obligations on ISPs to
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track URLs visited by subscribers and to inform law enforcement about users who
attempt to open Web sites containing child pornography. The draft recommends
blocking child pornography sites, and envisions criminal liability for ISPs that host
such Web sites. The draft law has been widely criticized, but the author has not with-
drawn it.50
The Supreme Economic Court accepted the 2004 Resolution on Certain Issues Con-
cerning the Resolution of Disputes Related to Copyright and Intellectual Property
Rights Protection, which provides procedures for the protection of intellectual property
rights—in particular, sales of various computer software programs. Ukrainian legisla-
tion has been enhanced and brought into line with the TRIPS requirements by several
laws amending Ukrainian Intellectual Property Laws.51 However, most of the focus in
Ukraine in relation to music and software piracy has been on offline infringements,
because of the existence of large pirate CD plants in the country. New legislation
adopted in May 2005 was intended to resolve legal loopholes with regard to piracy. In
subsequent years, further legislation in this field was passed providing legal protection
for computer programs, broadcasting and cable retransmission, databases, and resale
rights, as well as adequate enforcement measures. According to the Ukrainian Ministry
of Justice, around 80–90 percent of legislation in almost all key intellectual-property-
rights fields corresponds to the EU acquis communautaire.52
In February 2007, the Verkhovna Rada adopted amendments to the Criminal Code.
Now individuals charged with piracy can face three to six year imprisonment (up from
the previous two-year sentence) or a fine that could reach a maximum of UAH 51,000
(USD 10,000).53 Microsoft Ukraine stated that 80 percent of software used in Ukraine
was unlicensed.
In 2004, the Regulation on the Fundamentals of Revealing General Crimes was
adopted by Authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This regulation authorizes
the use of the police database for crime-fighting purposes. The police database includes
data on the crimes, the persons involved, the items installed, and other relevant inves-
tigative data. The regulation does not correspond to the personal data protection pro-
visions of the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention of 1981. There are no
national laws on data retention.
Surveillance
The Council of National Security and Defense is the main governmental body respon-
sible for national security and defense. The Council monitors information security and
coordinates the work of the other executive bodies in the field. The Security Service of
Ukraine is empowered to initiate criminal investigations and use wiretapping devices
on communications. Existing legislation has specified neither the circumstances that
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justify interception of information from communication channels nor the time limits
of any such interception. The recently established State Service for Special Communi-
cations and Information Protection implements governmental policy on protecting
state information and confidential communication, and exercises control over crypto-
graphic and technical information security.54
On June 17, 2002, the State Committee on Communications issued Order No. 122,
which introduced mechanisms for Internet monitoring. The order required ISPs to
install black-box monitoring systems in order to provide access for state organiza-
tions. The purpose of this monitoring was to control unsanctioned transmission of
data containing state secrets. However, ‘‘state secret’’ is not clearly defined in current
regulations, allowing authorities broad discretion in interpretation. The difficulties in
separating state from nonstate users also expose the latter to monitoring. By 2006, a
significant number of large ISPs installed black boxes, and the Security Service of
Ukraine sent out letters to governmental authorities insisting they use their access
services.
Under the pressure of public protests and complaints raised by the Internet Associa-
tion of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, the Ministry of
Justice abolished this order in August 2006. Some human rights groups claim the Secu-
rity Service of Ukraine is keeping intercepted messages and carrying out Internet sur-
veillance on a large scale.55 Since the revocation of Order No. 122, the service has
acted within the limits prescribed by the Law on Operative Investigative Activity.
According to estimates from the Internet Association of Ukraine, the service may have
the technological capability to do so in 50–60 percent of the cases.56 The level of sur-
veillance may rise up to 90 percent in regions where it is harder for access providers to
oppose the Security Service and other law enforcement bodies.
To compensate for the lack of comprehensive legislative regulation of communica-
tion interception and surveillance, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted Order No. 1169
in September 2007. This order decrees that permission must be obtained from a judge
or head of the respective Court of Appeals to carry out surveillance. Human rights
groups, such as the Internet Association of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Human Rights
Ombudswoman, protested against the order, claiming it legalized unlawful infringe-
ment upon the right to privacy. Notwithstanding the attacks against it, Order
No. 1169 remains active.57 Statistics also reveal the growing use of interception and
surveillance by law enforcement agencies in Ukraine. According to the Supreme Court
of Ukraine, the number of applications authorizing the use of monitoring and surveil-
lance tools to the Ukrainian Courts of Appeals initiated by law enforcement bodies
grew from 15,000 in 2005 to 19,989 in 2007 and reached 25,086 in 2008. In 2008,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs made 14,815 submissions; the Security Service of
Ukraine, 8,323; and the tax police, 1,655. It is not known how many submissions
were granted, nor is it clear how many were directly related to electronic surveillance.58
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ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative conducted tests in Ukraine from different
access points on six main ISPs: Alkar, Intertelecom, Visti Net, Volz, Volia, and UkrTele-
com. The ONI concluded that there is no filtering on the backbone in Ukraine. How-
ever, the ONI found that a number of U.S. military Web sites as well as one gambling
site were subject to reverse blocking and hence inaccessible in Ukraine.59
Conclusion
The citizens of Ukraine enjoy unfettered access to the Internet. The country’s Internet
infrastructure is rapidly developing, and ICTs are beginning to have a more notable
influence over the political process. The country possesses an Internet infrastructure
that is more oriented toward European ISPs, and this orientation diminishes the influ-
ence of any filtering behavior on the part of Russian ISPs. The government has built up
an intricate system of bodies and content regulations that can be geared toward surveil-
lance of information carried on telecommunications networks, including the Internet.
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Uzbekistan’s tight control of the Inter-
net has resulted in the most pervasive
regime of filtering and censorship in
the CIS. Filtering is comprehensive
and, until 2006, largely undeclared,
with the government denying the ex-
istence of these practices. At present,
the government employs sophisti-
cated multilayered mechanisms to
exercise control over the Internet,
including adopting restrictive policies, applying technological measures, and
compelling self-censorship of the media.
Background
At present, and in spite of the formal separation of powers enshrined in the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Uzbekistan, virtually all power is invested in President Islam
Karimov. A former first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party (UCP) during the
Soviet period, Islam Karimov started his current term of office in January 2000. A refer-
endum in January 2002 extended the presidential term of office from five to seven
years. The president has almost complete control over the parliament, which supports
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him overwhelmingly. On a few occasions, the government has resorted to the use of
force in order to maintain its control over the country. One such occasion were the
events in Andijan in 2005 when hundreds of civilians were killed.1 During the clamp-
down that followed the public demonstrations, most of the foreign media were ex-
pelled from the country. The majority of human rights organizations were ousted and
their activities banned.2
During his extended authoritarian rule, President Karimov has demonstrated an
active commitment to controlling the information environment in the country and
constraining the expression of dissident viewpoints. The active opposition has been
forced to leave Uzbekistan and has been banned.3 The Internet often remains the
only way for the opposition to communicate with Uzbek society. In 2004, Internews
International—a nonprofit organization that supports open media and Internet devel-
opment worldwide—was banned from Uzbekistan.4
In the beginning of October 2008, an unprecedented two-day media seminar in
Tashkent focused on freedom of speech in the country. The government did not allow
foreign media and independent Uzbek journalists to cover this seminar. The only
media admitted were representatives of the state-controlled electronic and print media.
The complex laws and regulations in Uzbekistan have resulted in self-censorship of
online publishers, independent journalists, and bloggers. This self-censorship, coupled
with a highly sophisticated Internet filtering regime, significantly stifles public dis-
course on political and human-rights topics.
State control of the Internet stands in stark contrast to the government’s official
enthusiasm for promoting ICTs. Until 2001, Uzbekistan was a regional leader in the
adoption of the Internet and the prioritization of ICT as a mechanism for national
development. Uzbekistan was among the first of the post-Soviet republics to establish
a national agency responsible for ICT development (UzInfoCom), to contribute state
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 2,290
Life expectancy at birth (years) 67
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 97
Human development index (out of 179) 119
Rule of law (out of 211) 182
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 202
Democracy index (out of 167) 164 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 123
Internet users (percent of population) 8.8
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, Miniwatts Marketing
Group 2009.
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resources to building a sizable academic and research network (UzSCINET), and to
launch an ambitious project to provide Internet to the main government institutions
(Cabinet of Ministers and presidency). After 2001, Uzbekistan continued to receive
sizable foreign support aimed at developing its ICT infrastructure, including a large
network of Internet access points in the regions. Uzbek government officials at all
levels were sent abroad to study e-government systems and ICT. Until 2001–2002, the
Internet remained open and free from filtering, with the exception of some limited
filters for pornography that were implemented on UzSCINET.
The turning point in the state’s relationship to Internet freedom began following
a series of attacks in Tashkent in 2004 blamed on the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Hit) and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These attacks have been generally associated with a
deepening crackdown on Uzbek society that encompasses all forms and channels of
dissent, including the Internet.
Internet in Uzbekistan
Uzbektelecom JSC has retained the status of a legal monopoly on services of access to
international telecommunication networks, including the use of VoIP technologies.
According to the government resolution, monopoly status will be retained after priva-
tization of Uzbektelecom JSC (at present the state owns 94 percent of Uzbektelecom).
As a result, operators and providers are entitled to access international telecommuni-
cation networks exclusively through the infrastructure of Uzbektelecom JSC, which
facilitates control over Internet content and hinders active competition on the
communications market. Uzbektelecom dominates around 90 percent of the fixed mar-
ket and owns 14 regional and five specialist subsidiaries, which include the national
Internet (UzPAK) and a mobile operator.5
The legal regime permits competition of the services providing Internet access. The
number of ISPs in Uzbekistan has grown considerably: from 25 in 1999 to 539 in 2005.
Because of increased legal requirements for operation, the number of ISPs dropped
to 430 in 2006 but subsequently increased to 859 as of April 2009.6 There are seven
top-tier ISPs with connections to China, Russia, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Uzbekistan’s telecommunications infrastructure supporting Internet access is quite
robust compared to neighboring countries. The backbone is connected to the Trans-
Asia-Europe Fiber-Optic Communications Line (TAE FOCL), which links China and
Europe and has several offshoots. The country also has a network of microwave radio
relay lines that provide high-speed data transmission.7 The sole Internet exchange
point, Tas-IX, used by 26 ISPs,8 is located in Uzbek Central Telegraph’s premises.9
As of January 2007, the digital communication network in Uzbekistan covered 100
percent of cities, towns, and regional centers.10 Telecommunication networks (includ-
ing 89 percent of digital ones) covered 93 percent of rural settlements.11 The number
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of Internet users as of 2008 was 2.4 million—approximately 8.8 percent of the coun-
try’s population.12 According to local surveys, in contrast to neighboring countries,
Uzbek women use the Internet at a rate almost equal to that of their male counterparts,
with a difference of 3 percent.13 About 41.3 percent of Internet users are in the 16 to 20
age range.14 Uzbek users most commonly access the Internet from their home (42.73
percent) and work (44.60 percent), and over 70 percent of Internet users are in the
capital Tashkent. Approximately 30 percent of the Internet users visit Internet cafés.15
According to official data as of April 2009, there were 873 Internet access centers in
Uzbekistan.16
Residential Internet services are unaffordable for the majority of the population. The
average cost of dial-up services is USD 0.37 per hour, and unlimited access is USD 67.14
per month. The cost of ADSL access is significantly lower: on average, it does not
exceed USD 15 per month and offers a speed of 128 Kbps. The quality of Internet ac-
cess and communication services in Uzbekistan is rapidly improving. The bandwidth
capacity of the external channels of Internet access has shown steady growth.17 As of
2009, it totaled 825 Mbps, up from 44 Mbps in July 2004.18
The domain registration of the national ‘‘.uz’’ zone has been decentralized since
December 2005 when five operators (now seven)19 were granted the status of registrars.
Created with the support of foreign organizations, the Computerization and Informa-
tion Technology Developing Center (UzInfoCom) is a NGO that develops computer
and information technologies and administers the country-code top-level domain
name ‘‘.uz.’’20 According to UzInfoCom, as of April 2009 the number of domains regis-
tered in the ‘‘.uz’’ zone was 8,298.21
The most popular language among Uzbek Internet users is Russian (up to 70 per-
cent), followed by Uzbek (25 percent), and English (just about 1 percent). The most vis-
ited Web sites in Uzbekistan are media sites and search engines located in the Russian
Internet zone (‘‘.ru’’).
According to information published by the State Committee on Radio Frequencies of
the Republic of Uzbekistan, the number of cellular phone customers in Uzbekistan has
nearly doubled during the last year, and as of November 1, 2008, it had reached the
level of 12.5 million.22 There are five cellular operators currently active on the market
of Uzbekistan: MTS-Uzbekistan (GSM), Unitel or Beeline (GSM), Coscom (GSM), Rubi-
con Wireless Communication–Perfectum Mobile (CDMA), and Uzmobile (CDMA).
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The Uzbekistan government has approved the Program for Development of Computer-
ization and Information and Communication Technologies for 2002–2010.23 This pro-
gram envisions the establishment of a national segment of the Internet and aims to
cover all cities and settlements in the country with ICT services by the end of 2010.
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The Internet is legally considered mass media in Uzbekistan. Article 29 of the Uzbek
Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, and Article 67 bans censorship. Free-
dom of information, however, can be legally restricted to protect the moral values of
society, national security, and Uzbekistan’s spiritual, cultural, and scientific potential.
The Central Inspection on Protecting State Secrets in the Press officially censored media
until 2002. Since then, the government increasingly imposes self-censorship on online
media publishers, bloggers, and opposition leaders.24 A recent example is the Mass
Media Law.25 Discussions on texts of this law were closed to the public to minimize
media criticism against restrictive provisions. The law holds media owners, editors,
and staff members responsible for the objectivity of published materials.26 Indepen-
dent and foreign media, including online publishers, need to register with the Cabinet
of Ministers in Uzbekistan. In addition, the law forbids entities with 30 percent or
more foreign participation from establishing their own media outlets in the country.
Online versions of newspapers are within the scope of the law and as such are subject
to registration if their content differs from the printed publication. In order to gain
more control over the Internet, the government has stated that subsequent regulations
would specify the type of Web sites that would need to be registered.27
Formal regulation of the Internet and electronic mass media commenced with the
adoption of Regulation No. 52 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan.28 In particu-
lar, Regulation No. 52 established the National Network of Information Transmission
(UzPAK) and ensured its monopoly on international Internet connectivity for purposes
of preserving national information security. The government forced ISPs to route their
traffic through the state network to access international traffic.29 Thus, Internet cafés
and other clients were subjected to UzPAK’s filtering system, and a number of Web
sites were temporarily inaccessible. In July 2002, the Communications and Informa-
tion Agency of Uzbekistan (UzCIA) suspended the work of EastLink, one of the major
Uzbekistan-based ISPs, because the ISP had connected to international networks
circumventing the national data-transmission network run by UzPAK.30 Regulation
No. 35231 attempted to abolish UzPAK’s monopoly on international connections and
foster a decentralization process in the field of Internet providers. However, more than
80 percent of the ISPs still run their connection through UzPAK despite the high tariffs.
Only a few ISPs have their own international satellite connections that provide better
service than UzPAK, for lower fees.32 A growing trend among ISPs is using UzPAK’s
lines to send messages and satellite networks to view or download information. This
solution allows the providers to circumvent UzPAK’s monitoring network and chan-
nels’ low capacities.
UzPAK was established within the UzCIA.33 Under Resolution of the Cabinet of Min-
isters No. 232 of 2002, UzCIA is responsible for providing information security and reg-
ulating providers’ activities in the area of communications, including the Internet.34
The director general of the agency is also the deputy prime minister responsible for
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telecommunications, and also acts as chairman of the board of Uzbektelecom and as
chairman of the State Commission on Radio Frequencies.35 Since most of the key reg-
ulatory functions in the sector are concentrated in the hands of the deputy minister,
regulatory independence is practically nonexistent. All ISPs and operators must obtain
a license from UzCIA.36 The licenses are usually very specific, with a typical duration of
ten years. Under Order No. 216, Internet providers and operators cannot disseminate
information that, inter alia, calls for violent overthrow of the constitutional order of
Uzbekistan, instigates war and violence, contains pornography, or degrades and
defames human dignity.37 Uzbektelecom, the national telecommunication operator,
has discretionary power to oversee the ISPs’ observance of this order.38 In 2005, the
ISPs in Uzbekistan faced another regulatory hindrance to their operation. The new Res-
olution No. 155 of the Cabinet of Ministers stipulated that only legal entities should be
entitled to provide licensed telecommunication services. Individuals have to register as
legal entities and obtain new licenses before continuing to provide Internet services.
In 2004, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted Regulation No. 555, establishing the Cen-
ter for Mass Media Monitoring within UzCIA. The center’s key objectives are to analyze
the contents of information disseminated online and ensure its consistency with exist-
ing laws and regulations.39 Another regulatory body, the Uzbek Agency for Press and
Information (UzPIA), monitors the observance of media law and issues registrations
and licenses for media outlets.40 This agency has the power to suspend media licenses
for ‘‘systematic’’ breaches of Uzbekistan’s restrictive media and information laws.
The 2002 Law on Principles and Guarantees on Access to Information reserves the
government’s right to restrict access to information when necessary to protect the
individual ‘‘from negative informational psychological influence.’’41 The government
further controls information streams by authorizing the use of political, economic, or
other measures when necessary to counteract ‘‘threats in the sphere of information
security’’ or ‘‘ideas of terrorism and religious extremism.’’42
Surveillance
Internet filtering in Uzbekistan did not begin with the security forces, but rather with
the academic and research network, which was funded with foreign development assis-
tance. The first Uzbek ISP to implement a filtering policy was UzSCINET, which used
an open-source filtering product (SquidGuard) and a publicly available list of porno-
graphic sites. The network justified its position favoring the filtering of pornography
on the basis that it was a provider to schools and universities, as well as the need to
conserve bandwidth. However, UzSCINET lacked formal legal status in Uzbekistan
and as a result was dependent on UzInfoCom for maintaining its license as a service
provider. The formal head of UzSCINET was also the director of UzInfoCom and a dep-
uty director of UzCIA. Simultaneously, he was also acting as an adviser to the presiden-
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tial Security Council. As a result, pressure was exerted on UzSCINET to cooperate with
authorities, and over time the network became a ‘‘testing ground’’ that security forces
used to develop a system for selecting and blocking unwanted Web sites. As late as
2005, the system was far from comprehensive, with previous ONI research showing a
great deal of divergence among the various ISPs—some comprehensively blocked con-
tent, while others allowed unfettered access. The suspicion is that some commercial
ISPs had close connections with President Karimov’s inner circle and hence were able
to withstand pressure to implement filtering, which gave them a commercial advan-
tage (as users who wished to access such content would pay to access the Internet
through these ISPs).
Uzbekistan’s principal intelligence agency, the National Security Service (SNB), mon-
itors the Uzbek sector of the Internet and ‘‘stimulates’’ ISPs and Internet cafés to prac-
tice self-censorship. Soviet-style censorship structures were replaced by ‘‘monitoring
sections’’ that work under SNB’s guidance. There is no mandatory government prepub-
lication review, but ISPs risk having their licenses revoked if they post ‘‘inappropriate’’
information. Occasionally, the SNB orders ISPs to block access to opposition or reli-
gious Web sites.43 A survey of internet filtering practices among Uzbek ISPs was con-
ducted by ONI in January 2007. Respondents confirmed that they use filtering
applications including SquidGuard and FortiGuard. The SNB’s censorship is selective
and often targets articles on government corruption, violations of human rights, and
organized crime. Usually, it affects URL-specific pages instead of top-level domain
names. Uzbek ISPs block entire Web sites or individual pages upon SNB’s unofficial
requests. Accessing a blocked page redirects the user to a search engine or to an error
message such as ‘‘You are not authorized to view this page.’’ The retransmission of
blocked channels is also prohibited.
The SNB regularly exchanges data with Russian intelligence sources and allegedly
collaborates with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Academy. The SNB also utilizes a
blacklist and keyword approach. The SNB practice of active surveillance contributes to
self-censorship among Internet operators and the Internet community as a whole.
Most users will not engage in topics that touch on unpopular government policies
relating to human rights in the country out of fear of arbitrary prosecution by the
authorities.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative conducted testing on five main ISPs in the
country: ArsInform, Buzton, Sharq Telecom, Sarkor Telecom, and Uzbektelecom. The
test results show pervasive blocking of different categories of Internet content, includ-
ing local and international human rights sites (inter alia, content promoting the rights
of journalists working in repressive regimes), local and regional media sites, opposition
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sites (inter alia, content criticizing the president), local NGOs, sites of religious organi-
zations, and terrorist groups. Interestingly, a large number of sites (including forum
sites, media sites, and others) remain inaccessible for the user even though they are
not blocked outright.
Conclusion
Through investment and legal mechanisms, the government has demonstrated its
willingness to promote ICT in Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan maintains
the most extensive and pervasive filtering system among the CIS countries. Although
expressly banned in Uzbek law, filtering is widespread and apparently growing. A large
number of sites with political and human rights content sensitive to the government
remain inaccessible to Internet users. The security forces in Uzbekistan manually check
Internet access at ‘‘edge locations’’ (such as Internet cafés) and monitor users’ activities.
The regulatory framework is so intricately woven that in most cases ISPs and Internet
publishers are unaware of the governing law. To avoid sanctions from the authorities,
Internet users frequently commit themselves to self-censorship.
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The Internet in Europe is controlled predominantly through a combination of govern-
ments and information and communication technology (ICT) companies. Countries,
whether members of the 27 member European Union (EU) or otherwise, have all regu-
lated the Internet in some way, with a number of them censoring defamatory speech
or monitoring copyright infringement. Meanwhile, ICT firms have taken it upon
themselves to censor child pornography and hate speech.
Unlike in other parts of the world, however, the Internet in Europe is regulated to a
large degree through the coordinated action of states, usually through the processes of
the EU. As European governments look to harmonize their cyber-law policies over the
coming years, they will increasingly turn to the EU to decide what to regulate and how
to regulate the Internet.
Regional Regulation
There is no explicit obligation at the EU level mandating either governments or ICT
firms to filter or remove online content, though this position may soon change. In
December 2008, the EU approved the next phase of studies of new filtering technolo-
gies to fight illegal content. The Safer Internet Program adopted by the EU Council of
Ministers intends to protect minors from illegal and harmful content online, in partic-
ular, ‘‘child sexual abuse material, grooming and cyber bullying.’’ This program will
operate from 2009 to 2013 and cost EUR 55 million.1 Part of the program involves the
development of tracking technologies that will monitor child pornography and help
build a Europol database of illegal online behavior.2
This program is the latest in a series of related initiatives introduced by the EU. The
first EU attempt, ‘‘Action Plan for a Safer Internet,’’ aimed at regulating content
deemed illegal or harmful by individual states, was passed in 1999 and has been in
force since 2002.3 Illegal content varies between countries; Nazi propaganda, for exam-
ple, is illegal in France and Germany but not in the United Kingdom. Harmful content
is defined more broadly and can include anything that would offend the values and
sentiments of races, religious groups, or other minorities. The action plan emphasized
the need to take steps in five broad areas in order to curb illegal and harmful content
on the Internet:
1. Promoting voluntary industry self-regulation and content monitoring schemes,
including the use of hotlines for the public to report illegal or harmful content;
2. Encouraging Internet service provider(s) to provide filtering tools and rating systems
that enable parents or teachers to regulate the access of Internet content by children in
their care, while allowing adults access to legal content;
3. Raising awareness about services offered by ICT firms to allow users to control access
to content;
4. Exploring the legal implications of promoting the safer use of the Internet; and
5. Encouraging international cooperation in the area of regulation.
For the most part, the 2002 action plan left it to individual states to take these steps.
The Safer Internet Program, passed in 2005, aims to give the EU broader powers and
new tools to achieve these goals itself. Among other things, the 2005 program funded
hotlines for citizens to report offending content, sponsored education efforts on con-
sumer and data protection, and authorized new studies into filtering technology for
illegal content.4
Two European directives may form the basis of expansive legislation regulating the
Internet in the coming years. The Electronic Commerce Directive limits the liability of
online providers for transferring, caching, and hosting illegal content.5 The Audio-
visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), meanwhile, aims to extend current EU regu-
lation for broadcast television content to the Internet.6 The regulations include, among
other things, the right of member states to sue content providers living outside their
jurisdictions and the responsibility to make harmful content inaccessible to minors.
Because the AVMSD was passed only in 2008, it remains unclear whether or not the
directive applies to all Internet video content, or just on-demand programming sent
over TCP/IP.
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Most existing EU regulation regarding filtering overlaps with or supplements the
existing policies of individual states. On issues of child pornography, human traffick-
ing, terrorist propaganda, and fraud, there exists a broad consensus to monitor and
block offending material. Surprisingly, no such consensus exists on who or what
should be held responsible for such material. Most countries have agreed to treat ISPs
as mere conduits of information. However, some countries have held these entities
responsible for offending material.
The EU maintains a liberal regional policy toward ISPs, limiting their liability under
the Electronic Commerce Directive,7 however, member states have been inconsistent
in applying the directive. In July 2007, a Belgian court required an ISP to implement
technical measures in order to stop copyright infringements committed by its sub-
scribers through P2P networks.8 In 2008, the British government warned that, absent
ISPs’ ‘‘voluntary self-regulation,’’ it would hold service providers legally responsible for
allowing unlawful file sharing.9 British ISPs have, by all appearances, already chosen to
self-regulate.10
Despite the lack of strong EU-level regulation, many member states have taken
it upon themselves to filter unwanted content. Many countries, such as the United
Kingdom,11 Sweden,12 Finland,13 Denmark,14 Germany,15 and Italy,16 filter child por-
nography, and some governments (e.g., United Kingdom, France) have pressured ISPs
to prevent copyright infringements by filtering.17 Quite recently, it was reported that a
number of Web sites in Belgium were blocked. In contrast to other countries, the Web
sites were filtered not because of displaying pornographic content but in order to guar-
antee the privacy rights of suspects or criminals who committed sexual offenses against
children and whose identity was accordingly revealed in the targeted Web sites.18
In addition to filtering directed by governments, ISPs and search engines within
countries have often taken it upon themselves to monitor and filter controversial con-
tent. Often, these companies have decided to self-regulate in order to preempt govern-
ment regulation.
Copyright
Film studios, record labels, and their associations have all strongly lobbied the EU to
require ISPs to block potential copyright infringements and terminate the contracts of
subscribers who visit particular Web sites. Yet the EU has been slow to act, authorizing
studies but rarely taking action. Generally, however, where the EU has failed to assist
the content industries, individual states have been quick to act, enthusiastically prose-
cuting companies and individuals who violate copyright law, both within and outside
their borders.
The EU’s policy on intellectual property and illegal file sharing is laid out in
three directives. The Electronic Commerce Directive standardizes information and
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transparency requirements for ISPs, commercial communications, and electronic con-
tracts.19 The 2001 Directive on Copyright and Related Rights gives authors, performers,
and film producers the sole right to reproduce and distribute their respective writings,
performances, sound recordings, and films.20 And the 2004 Directive on the Enforce-
ment of Intellectual Property Rights aims to harmonize intellectual property protection
regimes across the EU and allows member states’ judges to issue injunctions against
ongoing or impending intellectual property violations.21 None of these directives
have mandated the use of filtering technologies to protect intellectual property
regimes. However, where the EU has been slow to respond to the demands of the film
and music industry, individual countries have been more proactive. In 2007, a Danish
court ordered the country’s largest ISP to block Allofmp3.com, a Web site offering
illegal music downloads.22 In March 2007, Bulgarian police arrested the owner of
Arenabg.com, one of Bulgaria’s largest BitTorrent trackers, and blocked the Web site
for four days.23 Most seriously, in June 2008, France established the High Authority
for Copyright Protection and Dissemination of Works on the Internet to monitor
Internet content for illegal file sharing and eventually suspend the Internet connec-
tions of repeat file sharers.24
European courts have been skeptical of claims to fair use of copyrighted content. In
February 2007, a court in Brussels found that Google, Inc., had violated the copyrights
of Copiepresse, a Belgian newspaper consortium. The court ruled that by taking head-
lines and short news extracts from Copiepresse’s newspapers, Google’s news feature
illegally allowed Internet users to read articles without paying proper subscription fees
and without viewing the advertisements on Copiepresse’s sites. The court fined Google
GBP 2.4 million and prohibited it from sampling Copiepresse members’ articles, pic-
tures, or drawings.25 The court also required that Google remove, within 24 hours,
any future content that copyright holders said infringed on its rights, or pay a fine of
EUR 1,000 per day.26 Google had similar fair use problems in France when Agence
France-Presse (AFP) sued the company for USD 17.5 million in 2005. The suit was
dropped in April 2007, following a licensing agreement under which Google could
use stories and photographs from AFP for its news aggregator and for other Google
services. The financial terms of this arrangement have not been publicly disclosed.27
Overall, where the EU has hesitated to take aggressive action on intellectual property
regime enforcement, individual states have been eager to step in, enforcing the laws
of their individual regimes on companies both inside and outside their borders.
A controversial Internet piracy bill was adopted by the French Parliament in March
2009. According to the so-called three-strikes bill, the French government will launch a
new agency, HADOPI (High Authority for the Diffusion of Works and the Protection of
Rights on the Internet), that would assess whether a suspect is guilty of having violated
copyright provisions when downloading material online. If it is determined that the
user violated a copyright provision, he or she would receive a warning, followed by a
suspension of Internet access for a maximum of 12 months if he or she did
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not comply. Critics of the bill stress that cutting Internet access would require a court
order, which is not guaranteed by the law at this stage.
Social Filtering
On issues of child pornography, European nations have worked well together to block
offending content, often recruiting private companies to help them in their cause.
However, on other social issues, such as gambling, states have been less effective in
controlling content, either individually or in coordination with each other.
The landmark model of large-scale voluntary ISP filtering in Europe originated in the
United Kingdom. Britain’s largest ISP, BT, launched Project Cleanfeed in June 2004,28
in consultation with the British Home Office. Under the auspices of this program,
BT blocks Web sites that the nonprofit Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) declares as
hosting images of child abuse. When individuals attempt to access Web sites on IWF’s
list, they receive an error message.29 If the Web sites are hosted within the United
Kingdom, the ISP is required to take down the offending material. Cleanfeed’s success
has inspired imitators: in 2008, the ISP Brightview began offering a filtering device,
WebMinder, free to other service providers. Today, some 90 percent of broadband sub-
scribers in the United Kingdom have filtering programs of one form or another.30
Other countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy, have implemented
similar programs, though not without controversy.31 Finland’s pilot program received
negative attention early on when the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation, which
prepares the list of Web sites to be filtered, included lapisporno.info—a Web site dis-
cussing the issue of Internet censorship—on the list. A 2005 effort by German search
engines to delist harmful content providers came under criticism when the search
engines refused to say which Web sites were being removed.32
In December 2008, the Romanian Regulatory Authority for Communications and
Information Technology on the basis of Law No. 196/2003 ordered ISPs to block access
to 40 Web sites containing illegal material. If an ISP does not execute such a blocking
order within 48 hours, it may be fined between ROL 100,000 and ROL 500,000,000
(from USD 41,400 to USD 207 million).33 The block list34 contained mainly porno-
graphic Web sites, although reportedly a well-known user-generated video-sharing site
was also included.35 The Romanian Regulatory Authority can compel ISPs to block
access to any Web site that does not comply with the provisions of the law stating
that pornographic Web sites have to be officially authorized, password protected, and
charged for at a per-minute rate (determined by the site’s operator).36 The authority
is not required by the legislation to give an appropriate waiting period to Web site
owners to comply with these legal requirements; instead, it can immediately order
ISPs to block access.
Despite criticism, individual countries’ efforts at stopping child pornography
have met with remarkable success. In 2006, the U.K. Child Exploitation and Online
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Protection Center made 13 arrests in a pay-per-view pornography program.37 In Febru-
ary 2007, Austrian authorities were able to uncover a child-pornography ring involving
more than 2,300 people in 77 countries.38
As individual countries have moved to filter pornographic content online, they have
done so with increasing coordination. Citizens in 19 countries assist in identifying and
reporting illegal content—particularly in the area of child pornography—through a
network of hotlines established by the EU.39 Recent reports show that the Save the
Children Denmark hotline, financed in part by the European Commission’s Safer Inter-
net Plus Program, had nearly 9,000 reports of child abuse images in 2006 alone. In 2004,
Spanish police arrested 90 people in the country’s largest operation against the distribu-
tion of child pornography, also facilitated by the hotlines. At the same time, new regu-
lations at the regional level could force countries to impose stricter filtering regimes
within their own countries. The new AVMSD requires member states to take measures
to ensure that on-demand audiovisual services that might seriously impair the ‘‘physi-
cal, mental or moral development of minors’’ are made inaccessible to minors.40
While Europe has been very successful in mobilizing filtering technologies against
child pornography, it has been less successful at coordinating efforts against gambling.
In 2006, Italy enacted a law that requires ISPs to block the Web sites of gambling oper-
ators not licensed nationally. In 2007, however, the European Court of Justice ruled
Italy’s law in violation of EU standards.41 In 2002, Swiss politicians attempted a similar
block on online gambling. The effort was suspended in 2004, and no further action has
been taken since. A 2007 proposal in Norway blocked access to foreign gambling Web
sites; Web sites that ‘‘desecrate the Flag or Coat of Arms of a foreign nation’’; Web sites
that promote hatred toward public authorities, contain hate speech, or promote racism;
offensive pornography sites; and P2P networks that offer illegal downloads of music,
movies, or television shows.42 To date, no action has been taken on the bill.43
Individual countries have been very proactive in instituting filtering and monitoring
programs to control child pornography. This enthusiasm has extended to EU-wide reg-
ulation. However, no such enthusiasm exists for controlling gambling. Filtering, where
it has been instituted, has been done at the country, not the regional, level.
Nationalistic Filtering
European governments have not censored direct political opposition. However, they
have on occasion censored content that had the potential to ‘‘threaten national
identity.’’
In December 2002, a local Swiss magistrate, Françoise Dessaux, ordered several Swiss
ISPs to block access to three Web sites hosted in the United States that were strongly
critical of Swiss courts44 and to modify their DNS servers to block the domain www
.appel-au-peuple.org.45 The Swiss Internet User Group and the Swiss Network Opera-
tors Group protested that the blocks could easily be bypassed and that the move was
284 Europe Overview
contrary to the Swiss constitution, which guarantees ‘‘the right to receive information
freely, to gather it from generally accessible sources and to disseminate it’’ to every per-
son.46 Nevertheless, the order was enforced, and directors of noncompliant ISPs were
asked to appear personally in court, or they would risk facing charges.
On March 7, 2007, Turkey forced ISPs to block YouTube after several videos were
posted denigrating Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Turkish
flag. In blocking the Web site, Turkish officials invoked Article 301 of the Turkish Penal
Code, which criminalizes insults toward Atatürk as well as ‘‘Turkishness.’’ Turkey’s
leading ISP, TurkTelecom, complied with the order but petitioned the court to allow
access to the Web site to be restored. The court agreed on the condition that the par-
ticular videos be removed. The two-day blocking was heavily criticized both within
Turkey and abroad, and likened to ‘‘closing a library because of a single book that was
found to be improper.’’47 Yet YouTube and similar Web sites were again blocked in
March 2008 for hosting content insulting to Atatürk.48
Hate Speech
Within Europe there is a general consensus in favor of censoring anti-Semitic or
Holocaust-denying speech online. Where individual states have more expansive anti-
hate regimes, they have enforced those laws, with some success, at the national level.
In 2000, a French court ruled that U.S.-based Yahoo! Inc. was liable under French law
for allowing the people of France access to auction Web sites that included Nazi mem-
orabilia and demanded that Yahoo block this content in France or face fines.49 Yahoo
brought a suit in a U.S. District Court in San Francisco, claiming that the French court’s
ruling was unenforceable in the United States. The U.S. court ruled in Yahoo’s favor in
November 2001,50 but in 2004 the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned that
ruling on the grounds that it did not have sufficient jurisdiction over the French par-
ties.51 After rehearing the case en banc, the appeals court dismissed Yahoo’s case in
January 2006.52 Though split, the court reasoned that the fact that Yahoo had com-
plied voluntarily and removed the offending content precluded claims as to a possible
violation of the right to freedom of expression.53
Similarly, the German Federal Court of Justice ruled in December 2000 that material
glorifying the Nazis and denying the Holocaust must be censored as per German law,
regardless of where it is hosted.54 In 2002, the Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf (district gov-
ernment) obliged 56 ISPs to restrict access to four foreign Web sites.55 The attempts to
block access have attracted nationwide attention and met fierce opposition from users
and service providers.56 However, neither political demonstrations nor lawsuits have
been successful in stopping the blockade. By the end of 2005, 76 Internet service pro-
viders had been required to block the named Web sites.57
Germany has engaged in other efforts to combat hate speech. According to one study
published by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society in 2002, about 91 Web
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sites were completely or partly excluded by the German sections of the search engine
Google.58 In 2008, about 23 suspects were apprehended by German police in eight
German states, and a further 70 suspects had been identified in the investigation be-
cause of their illegal sale of right-wing extremist material over the Internet.59
Holocaust denial is also legislated at the country level. Fifteen European countries
also have laws against Holocaust denial,60 and others ban material that promotes racial
hatred. These have been harmonized in a protocol to the Council of Europe’s cyber-
crime treaty, which requires that ‘‘any written material, any image or any other
representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, dis-
crimination or violence, against any individual or group of individuals, based on race,
color, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as pretext for any
of these factors’’ and ‘‘material which denies, minimizes, approves of or justifies crimes
of genocide or crimes against humanity’’ must be made illegal by the signatories.61 As
with all illegal content, once it is brought to their attention, ISPs must either take
down or block the relevant Web sites (depending on whether they are hosted domesti-
cally or abroad).
One issue Europe has yet to resolve with regard to hate speech is whether merely
linking to offending content constitutes a crime. A 2000 case, in which French citizens
were barred from shopping on Web sites selling Nazi memorabilia,62 would suggest
that Europeans would think it is. Yet, in 2004, the political activist Alvar Freude was
accused of linking to right-wing extremist Web sites and was brought to court. A local
court found this to be a criminal offense. However, the Stuttgart higher regional court
overturned that decision in 2006 and absolved Freude.63
Defamation
Two forces are intersecting to shape defamation law in Europe. On the one hand, states
are relying on the ‘‘effects test’’ to determine legal jurisdiction; that is, so long as harm
is done within the country’s borders, the injured party can sue within that country.
On the other hand, individual countries are also exercising comparatively harsh anti-
defamation laws. Together, these forces mean that more people are being sued outside
their home countries, and for more money, than ever before.
Member states of the EU have sought a simplified electronic defamation framework.
The traditional principle in cases of defamation concerning the media—that the law of
the country where the defamed person lives is applicable—creates a strong incentive
for media to gain a potentially impractical degree of knowledge about the privacy and
defamation laws of each European country. In Italy, for example, a man in a cross-
border custodial battle claimed that his ex-wife, now a resident of Israel, was respon-
sible for posting statements and images on the Internet that were defamatory of him
and his ability to care for their two daughters. Italy’s highest appellate court, the
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Suprema Corte di Cassazione, overturned a prior verdict and held that Italy’s laws of
libel applied to content on foreign Web sites accessible by Internet users in the coun-
try.64 Italian doctrine thus supports an effects test for choice of law, similar to that used
in the United States for personal jurisdiction: if the offending statements, wherever
posted, created an effect within the country, they are subject to the Italian law. Other
countries are reaching similar conclusions. The German Federal Court of Justice de-
cided in 2000 that the Australian owner of an Australian Web site which denied the
Holocaust could be held liable in Germany.65
Simultaneously, anti-defamation laws at the domestic level, particularly in Britain,
have been criticized for leading to a ‘‘Web takedown’’ culture in which ISPs immedi-
ately remove content alleged to be defamatory for fear of lawsuits. A landmark precedent
in the United Kingdom led the way for the establishment of a ‘‘notice and takedown’’
system. In Laurence Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited,66 a defamatory statement was
made on a posting to a newsgroup, www.soc.culture.thai, available on a server of De-
mon Internet Limited. Despite Godfrey’s request to remove the post, Demon did not
comply. As a result, he claimed damages for libel under section 1 of the Defamation
Act of 199667 and settled with Demon out of court for over GBP 250,000.68
On rare occasions, some countries have attempted to achieve tight Internet regula-
tion by subjecting Web sites to mandatory registration under general media laws or
Internet-specific regulations. Such registration directly submits Web site owners and
users to civil and/or criminal law liability for content published online, which may
arise under provisions sanctioning defamation, dissemination of illegal content, and
pornography (among others). In some cases such publication may require preapproval
by a state agency. Poland, for instance, shows lack of clarity with regard to the
status of online media. A television broadcast segment that criticized the work of a
Polish debt collector prompted a series of threatening comments on a forum on the
GazetaBytowska.pl (Bytów Newspaper) Web site. Polish police asked the Web site’s
administrator to give them identifying information for the commentators in question,
but he refused. The police then charged the Web site under article 45 of the Press Law
Act (PLA) of 1984.69 A local court determined the Web site to be a daily publication
and therefore subject to the PLA, which provides for punishment for editors who
publish—even unintentionally—‘‘criminal content,’’ including threats like the ones
made in the online forum. The case was appealed to the Regional Court, which ruled
in February 2008 that Web sites such as GazetaBytowska.pl must be registered.70 A
ruling of the Polish Supreme Court a year earlier stated that ‘‘journals and periodicals
do not lose the character of a press release due solely to the fact that they appear in the
form of an Internet transmission’’ and that ‘‘the publishing of press in an electronic
form, available on the Internet, requires registration.’’ Subsequently, a Supreme Court
spokesman emphasized that the ruling was not intended to suggest that all regularly
updated Web sites needed to be registered.71
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Together, these two trends—the increasing use of the effects test and increasingly
harsh damages for defamation—have given an incentive for European countries to
coordinate anti-defamation laws at the European level.
A 2007 amendment to the Rome II convention attempted to set regional standards
for the application of anti-defamation laws. The amendment instructed European
courts to obey, with some exceptions, the anti-defamation laws of the country in
which the damage occurred.72
Surveillance
European countries have worked to coordinate security directives at the regional level,
yet these consensus directives have been criticized by outside groups as far too ex-
treme. The 2006 European Data Retention Directive73 prescribes surveillance on a re-
gional level in the public interest. Because the directive has been transposed into the
national legislation of most of the EU member states, ISPs at the local level are required
to retain specific data pertaining to electronic communications to assist in tracking
down crimes and for future prosecutions. Such data can be collected through users’
activities, in particular Internet access, e-mail, and telephony, and can be retained for
a minimum period of six months but not exceeding two years.74 The aim is to bring
about a common code of data retention in order to trace illegal content and the source
of attacks against information systems, and to identify those who use electronic com-
munications networks for terrorist activities and organized crime. The data to be
retained do not concern the content of communications. Yet the directive has inspired
controversy within member states and was challenged recently at the German Consti-
tutional Court.75
Yet some countries are far exceeding the scope of surveillance allowed by the EU. In
March 2007, the Swedish government granted its national defense intelligence agency
the power to monitor all cross-border telephone calls and e-mail traffic, even without a
warrant. Various critics have raised privacy concerns about the plan, positing that the
proposal violates privacy rights and breaches EU law. Notwithstanding the criticism, in
January 2009 amendments to the Swedish wiretapping law entered into force, allowing
the National Defense Radio Establishment sweeping surveillance powers over online
activities. The new law allows special state agencies to monitor telephone calls and
Internet traffic, including the content of the traffic itself, which is outside of the scope
of the EU Data Retention Directive. In addition, the state agency could develop a plan
to search for sensitive keywords in transmitted messages and could even require mon-
itoring content on servers outside the country’s borders.76 A nongovernmental organi-
zation has already brought a case against the new law in the European Court of Human
Rights.77 Sweden’s own national security police agency called the plan a violation of
‘‘personal integrity.’’ Such pervasive policies against online activities have triggered dis-
approval among big international ICT companies, some of which announced that they
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would cease making significant investments in the country if the controversial law was
not revisited.78
A different development of events occurred in Finland, where employers organi-
zations (reportedly including handset giant Nokia)79 lobbied strongly for introduc-
ing legislation that would allow employers to track employees’ e-mails to prevent
corporate espionage. In March 2009, the Finnish government adopted such a law
granting employers access to information about their workers’ messages, including
the recipients, senders, and the time when e-mails were sent or received, and whether
the e-mails contained attachments. The law does not allow the employers to read the
content of the messages outright. Nonetheless, employers’ otherwise broad rights over
employees’ electronic communications raise serious privacy concerns.
Germany, too, is taking active steps toward increasing government surveillance
online. A new amendment to the national telecommunication law requires that ISPs
retain personal data, such as e-mail senders’ IP addresses, recipients’ IP addresses, date
and time of all messages, IP address for each Internet subscriber, and a unique identifier
for each client to track online activity.
Germany’s federal crime police, the Bundeskriminalamt, have not only monitored
e-mails and chat rooms, but also begun performing so-called online raids.80 The idea
is to infect a suspect’s personal computer with Trojan horse software to secretly record
data entered into the computer. However, this technique remains highly controversial.
The federal constitutional court ruled in March 2008 that online raids could only be
used in exceptional circumstances.81
In 2005, the Italian government authorized increased surveillance of the Internet
and telephone networks.82 The bill requires Internet cafés to keep photocopies of
customers’ passports and to periodically submit logs of all Web sites visited to the
police.83 The law also increases licensing requirements for telecommunication service
operators, making licensing approval dependent upon the existence of satisfactory
data-monitoring and retention systems.84
In France, two laws have granted increased surveillance powers to the government.
The Daily Safety Law (LSQ) was approved almost unanimously by parliament on No-
vember 15, 2001, and the Internet Safety Law (LSI) was enacted on February 13, 2003.
Together, these laws require that ISPs keep a record of their customers’ Internet activity
and e-mail traffic for a year and that encryption firms assist authorities in decoding
messages involved in criminal trials. Additionally, in June 2008 the French govern-
ment established the High Authority for Copyright Protection and Dissemination of
Works on the Internet, which will monitor all network traffic for possible copyright
infringement.
Similar surveillance policies were introduced in Poland, with a February 2003
amendment to the Telecommunications Law. The law requires telecommunication
companies to provide the police and other state agencies with access to information
sent through telecommunications networks for the purpose of national defense, state
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security, and public order.85 The data that may be requested by the police include
caller identification, network terminals and/or telecommunication devices used in the
connection, data generated during the connection, the circumstances, and the type of
connection.86
The Polish government has been criticized for conducting a large number of wire-
tapping operations that may be seen as an invasion of privacy. In early March 2009,
the office of the Polish prime minister announced that it had plans to compile a ‘‘super
database’’ of information on all Polish citizens. The database would be compiled dur-
ing the 2011 census and would include information from the ministries of finance, jus-
tice, and home affairs, social insurance information, and information gathered from
telecommunications suppliers. The plan has met with outrage from Polish Internet
users, who claim the database would violate their constitutional rights. The prime min-
ister’s office has since released a statement explaining that the database will only in-
clude necessary information.87 It remains to be seen who would then determine what
information is necessary and how Internet users’ right to privacy would be guaranteed.
The prospect of revenue from online advertising has sometimes driven operators to
exercise surveillance over their customers’ preferences. Major British operators BT, Talk
Talk, and Virgin have all signed up to use Phorm,88 a Web tracking service, which uses
information gathered from a user’s browsing history to deliver targeted advertising on
members’ Web sites. An admission has been made by BT that it ran secret trials of a
new advertising platform among 18,000 of its broadband customers in 2006 in order
to determine the operational and technical performance of the service. The platform
targets advertisements at the operator’s customers using their browsing profiles. The
EU threatened in April 2009 to pursue legal action against the United Kingdom for
breaching Internet privacy laws by allowing operators to use the platform to track their
customers’ online activities for commercial gain (estimated at GBP 3 billion a year).
Conclusion
Today, Internet content in Europe is controlled by three groups of factors: region-wide
organizations (the EU), individual countries, and companies (e.g., ISPs, search engines).
While governments have been extremely active in promoting filtering technologies for
child pornography and surveillance technologies for copyright infringement, they are
increasingly finding that they can achieve their aims through indirect means. Rather
than passing explicit regulations, governments have pressured companies to volunta-
rily self-regulate content, be it pornography, hate speech, or content that infringes
upon copyrights. Such pressures show a creeping tendency toward the second- and
third-generation controls found elsewhere.
At the EU level, countries are increasingly working to harmonize Internet regulation,
especially with regard to defamatory and pornographic content. Given the significant
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cultural differences between countries and existing regulatory frameworks, creating a
common platform for legislation at the regional level is a slow and complex process.
Nonetheless, it is increasingly the arena where decisions about Internet filtering and
monitoring are made.
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France continues to promote freedom
of the press and speech online by
allowing access to most content.
France’s Internet penetration rate is
constantly increasing, and the French
government has undertaken numer-
ous measures to protect the rights of
Internet users, including the passage
of the Loi pour la Confiance dans
l’Économie Numérique (LCEN, Law for
Trust in the Digital Economy) in 2004. However, the passing of a new copyright
law threatening to ban users from the Internet upon their third violation has
drawn much criticism from privacy advocates as well as the European Union
(EU) parliament.
Background
As one of the founding nations of European economic and political integration, France
is seen as a key player on the European stage. However, the country sent shockwaves
through the EU when its voters rejected the proposed EU constitution in a May 2005
referendum.1 In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy won the presidential election with a 53
percent majority vote.2 The current government is a center-right administration that
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has sought to reform universities and special pension regimes and to modernize immi-
gration and economic policies.3
The French government operates under a traditionally highly centralized decision-
making process. Each of France’s departments is headed by a prefect appointed by the
central government. Although the process of decentralization began in the early 1980s,
with regional councils directly elected for the first time in 1986, it has continued at a
very slow pace.4
As established in the 1789 Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen), France adheres to the principle of laı̈cité, or
government secularism. Although approximately 85 percent of the French population
is Roman Catholic, Europe’s largest Muslim and Jewish populations reside in France,
comprising 10 and 1 percent of the population, respectively.5 Notably, as a result of
such staunch secularism, France has banned women and girls from wearing the Islamic
headscarf in schools, an act which has resulted in criticism from some civil rights
groups.6
France is a liberal democracy that guarantees freedom of the press and freedom of
speech.7 Article 11 of the 1789 Declaration stipulates that ‘‘the free communication
of thoughts and of opinions is one of the most precious rights of man: any citizen
thus may speak, write, print freely, save [unless it is necessary] to respond to the abuse
of this liberty, in the cases determined by the law.’’8 In addition, the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which France signed in 1950, promotes free speech in
Article 10.9
Freedom of speech is recognized as a constitutional right to be respected by citizens
as well as by the government during the process of passing new French legislation.
Indeed, a distinctive feature of the French judicial system is that the Constitutional
Council protects basic rights against potential violations by new laws, and the Council
of State protects basic rights when they might be violated by actions of the state. The
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 31,625
Life expectancy at birth (years) 81
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 11
Rule of law (out of 211) 22
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 18
Democracy index (out of 167) 24 (Full democracy)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 26
Internet users (percent of population) 51
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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Constitutional Council examines legislation and decides whether it conforms to the
constitution. It considers only legislation that is referred to it by parliament, the prime
minister, or the president.10
If upon examination basic rights are found to be in conflict with each other, the
Constitutional Council maintains a balance between freedom of speech and such prin-
ciples as maintaining law and order, proper administration of justice, and protection
of individuals. French law prohibits public speech and writings that incite racial and
religious hatred or hatred against people because of their sexual orientation.11 In addi-
tion, amendments have been made to France’s 1881 Press Law prohibiting denial of
the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide.12 Those who violate the law face imprison-
ment and/or a fine of up to EUR 45,000.13
Internet in France
The number of Internet users in France increased dramatically from 8.5 million users in
200014 to almost 32 million in 2007, with a 51.2 percent Internet penetration rate.15
Since 2000, France has adopted Internet technology at a furious pace and has had
some of the fastest growth rates for Internet usage, PC shipments, and overall infor-
mation technology spending by businesses, consumers, government, and education
throughout Europe.16 Although global Internet adoption and PC sales have shown
some signs of slowing in recent years, France still witnessed significant yearly gains
in Internet adoption: in 2005, over 60 percent of adults age 18 or older in France
used the Internet regularly, representing more than a 12-point increase from 2004
(when the figure was 48 percent).17 In addition, the usage of VoIP telephony has risen
steadily in recent years, and wireless Internet access by handset/cell phone is expected
to continue to grow.18
Although the French ISP market has begun to expand since privatization, the market
leader remains France Telecom, a publicly traded company that is the main communi-
cation access provider in France.19 Because of the well-developed information and
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure, home access is affordable to most of
the French population at competitive costs. Since high-speed Internet services were
implemented in France in 2001, access has increased significantly, with more than
one in five residents having access to high-speed Internet.20 Public libraries and Inter-
net cafés, prevalent throughout the country, also provide high-speed Internet access.
Studies have shown that, in comparison with other European Internet users, the
French spend a considerable amount of time online. A recent ComScore study revealed
that French Internet users spent 932 million hours online in February 2009, averaging
approximately 27 hours per person.21 According to one report, the most popular on-
line activities of French Internet users include social networking, watching television,
shopping, blogging, and checking the news.
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Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The French media are regulated under the supervision of the Conseil Supérieur de
l’Audiovisuel (CSA, Higher Audiovisual Council). This independent administrative au-
thority guarantees freedom of communication and checks whether television programs
comply with French laws. Special attention is paid to the protection of young audien-
ces, and equal air time is allocated to political candidates during election periods.22 In
response to market pressures on media pluralism, the government established La Direc-
tion du Développement des Médias (DDM, Department of Media Development) to en-
courage plurality of the press and to prevent excessive concentrations of ownership.23
Illegal content and activity on the Internet are mainly regulated by the LCEN 2004–
575 of June 21, 2004, which supersedes European Directive 2000/31/CE.24 Article 2 of
the LCEN relieves ISPs of civil and criminal responsibility if they had ‘‘no knowledge
of illegal activity or material’’ or if they ‘‘acted promptly to remove or block access to
it as soon as they discovered it.’’25 Providers are also exempt from civil responsibility
if they ‘‘have no knowledge of how the illegal activity or material arose.’’ However,
once a judicial order has been issued and proper notice given to the hosting Web site,
the site is liable for any further reposting of the illegal material. Moreover, a Web site
can be held liable for redirecting Internet users to another Web site containing unlaw-
ful information.26 This decision has recently been subject to controversy in France—
discussions mainly focus on the definition of ‘‘illegal activity or material’’ and on the
need for a clear distinction between editing and hosting activities.27
In 2000, a French judge ruled that U.S.-based Yahoo! Inc. had to prevent French
users from accessing Web sites auctioning racial hate memorabilia. Yahoo complied
by prohibiting users from accessing English-language Web sites selling Nazi memora-
bilia on its localized French site, yahoo.fr, but claimed that it was technically impossi-
ble to ban French users from accessing such content through its U.S. site.28 In 2001, a
U.S. district court ruled that the First Amendment of the Constitution protects content
generated in the United States by American companies from being regulated by author-
ities in countries that have more restrictive laws on freedom of expression.29
In 2008, France signed an agreement to block access to child pornography, as well as
Web sites promoting racial violence or terrorism.30
Surveillance
Although the French Constitution does not expressly include the right to privacy, the
French Constitutional Council held in 1995,31 and confirmed in 1999,32 that the right
to privacy is recognized as a constitutional right implicitly included in Article 2 of the
1789 Declaration.33 The civil and penal codes expressly recognize the tort of privacy
and a penal protection of the right to privacy, respectively.34 The 1978 Data Protection
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Act was amended in 2004 to create the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des
Libertés (CNIL, National Commission for Information and Liberties), an independent
administrative authority designed to ensure the protection of privacy and personal
data.35 With a mission of control and investigation, the CNIL can warn and impose
financial sanctions in case of Data Protection Act violations. It issues an annual report
based on its observations.36
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, privacy and data pro-
tection rights in France have been undermined by two laws: the Loi sur la Sécurité
Quotidienne (LSQ, Daily Safety Law) that was urgently approved, almost unanimously,
by parliament on November 15, 2001, and the Loi sur la Sécurité Intérieure (LSI, Internet
Safety Law) that was enacted on February 13, 2003.37 The laws extend to a year the
minimum period for which ISPs must keep a record of their customers’ Internet ac-
tivity and e-mail traffic. The LSI authorizes immediate access to the computer data of
telecommunications operators, as well as those of almost any public or private in-
stitution; it also allows judges to order that ‘‘secret methods that cannot be revealed
for reasons of national defense’’ be used to decode encrypted e-mail messages. In addi-
tion, authorities can require encryption firms to hand over their codes so that they can
read encrypted online messages.38 These provisions have been considered as a threat
to the principle of confidentiality of professional and private communications in
France.39
As a result of a campaign strongly focused on security issues, closed-circuit television
(CCTV) is used in France for surveillance in public places so as to prevent criminal
behavior. In 2007, the French Interior Minister announced that the number of CCTV
cameras in France would triple by 2009. This policy has been designed and pursued to
fight terrorism and street crime.40
On May 4, 2008, the French government ordered the creation of biometric passports
for its citizens, citing the need to comply with post-9/11 U.S. security demands. French
citizens will now be issued biometric passports that will include eight fingerprints and
a digital picture; the data are then collected in a national database.41 On December 11,
2007, the CNIL published an unfavorable opinion concerning this project, fearing
serious damage to private life and individual liberties.42
On April 9, 2009, the Projet de loi Favorisant la Diffusion et la Protection de la Création
sur Internet (Bill promoting the dissemination and protection of creation on the Inter-
net), intended to deny Internet access to users who repeatedly downloaded copy-
righted content without paying, was rejected by the French National Assembly.43
The proposed law (widely referred to as HADOPI, an acronym for Haute Autorité pour
la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des Droits sur Internet [High Authority for Copy-
right Protection and Dissemination of Works on the Internet], the agency the bill
would create), backed by President Sarkozy and by France’s film and record industries,
was brought to the National Assembly a second time on May 13, 2009, and approved,
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pending appeal.44 The European Parliament, however, voted overwhelmingly to add to
a telecoms reform bill a stipulation that agencies such as HADOPI must first obtain per-
mission from French courts before disconnecting violators.45
The HADOPI law has faced strong opposition throughout France by various groups,
and an employee of French television broadcaster TF1 was even fired for his opposition
to the law after a private e-mail sent to his member of parliament was forwarded back
to his employer.46
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative tested two ISPs (Orange and Neuf Cegetel) in France and found
no signs of filtering; however, manual testing found one Web site, www.aaargh.com
.mx, to be blocked. The Web site, which promotes Holocaust revisionism as well as a
boycott of Israel, was blocked by a French court; the court, in turn, has been brought
into question for not contacting the Web site’s hosts before ordering the filtering.47
Conclusion
In France, as in other Western countries, concerns over intellectual property guide on-
line regulatory efforts. However, access to the Internet remains relatively free, apart
from limited filtering of child pornography and Web sites that promote terrorism or
racial hatred.
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Germany is a country of high Internet
penetration, at approximately 76 per-
cent. Occasionally, takedown requests
and access restrictions are imposed on
ISPs, usually with the justification of
protecting minors or in compliance
with Germany’s objective to suppress
hate speech and extremism. In April
2009, the German government signed
a bill that would implement large-
scale filtering of child pornography Web sites, with the possibility for later expan-
sion. Additionally, the German government recently approved draft legislation to
implement data retention.
Background
After World War II, Germany was divided into American, British, French, and Russian
zones. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), a federal parliamentary
republic, was founded in 1949 out of the three Western zones. The German Demo-
cratic Republic (East Germany), an authoritarian socialist state, was established in
the Russian zone. In both states, continuing to uphold the obligations of Germany’s
history and preventing a repetition of extremism have been a priority ever since. In
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1990, East Germany joined the Federal Republic of Germany. Since that time, reconcil-
ing economic differences has shaped German policy.
In 1949, West Germany adopted its ‘‘Basic Law’’ (Grundgesetz)—similar to a constitu-
tion—which provides for freedom of expression; however, the Basic Law also restricts
expression that is ‘‘offensive, injurious, or indecent.’’1 Germany maintains a blacklist
of books, comic books, magazines, videotapes, and music, the so-called Index. The list,
originally intended to shield youth from pornographic material, has been expanded
to include other items; in particular, materials that make light of Germany’s history
and those which promote neo-Nazism or deny the Holocaust have been blacklisted.2
Volksverhetzung, defined in Germany as ‘‘incitement of hatred against a minority under
certain conditions,’’ is also strictly prohibited and punishable with up to five years’
imprisonment.3
Internet in Germany
The Internet is a central part of the German economy. Over the past ten years, fierce
competition has led to low prices and fueled Internet access. In 2008, Internet pene-
tration stood at approximately 76 percent.4 Germany’s primary ISPs are T-Online (47
percent market share), United Internet (15 percent), AOL (12 percent), and Arcor
(7 percent).5
T-Online is a spin-off of Deutsche Telekom. Deutsche Telekom is the former state-
run telecom, hence its high market share. Today, T-Online provides Internet services
and software, while Deutsche Telekom maintains the physical connection. Deutsche
Telekom still owns the majority of the physical network, including 90 percent of all
existing broadband connections.
Broadband access in Germany has increased in recent years, from 200,000 in 2000 to
14.7 million in 2006. Because the service is inexpensive, this number is expected to rise
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 33,181
Life expectancy at birth (years) 80
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 23
Rule of law (out of 211) 12
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 11
Democracy index (out of 167) 13 (Full democracy)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 19
Internet users (percent of population) 76
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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to 21.3 million in 2010.6 In 2008, T-Online’s DSL flat rate was EUR 10 (USD 15) per
month.7 Germany has 16 international Internet exchange points (IXP).8 The largest
one by far is the Deutsche Commercial Internet Exchange DE-CIX in Frankfurt, which
is the second-largest IXP in the world with an average throughput of 200 Gbps and a
maximum of more than 400 Gbps.9
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The regulator for the telecommunication sector of the economy is the Bundesnetza-
gentur (Federal Network Agency), which is also responsible for the postal service and
energy services.10 It has been endowed with authority by the Telekommunikationsgesetz
(TKG, Telecommunications Act) of 2004.11
The law that concerns the Internet as a medium is the Telemediengesetz (TMG, Tele-
communication Media Law) passed by the parliament in January 2007.12 Section 8 of
the TMG explicitly states that providers are not responsible for transmitted informa-
tion, provided they did not initiate the transmission or modify the transferred data.
The legal foundations for censorship are grounded in Germany’s laws prohibiting
public incitement of hatred against a minority (Volksverhetzung) and Holocaust denial.
For example, Section 130(3) of the German Criminal Code notes, ‘‘Whoever . . . denies
or renders harmless an act [of genocide] committed under the rule of National Social-
ism in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be punished with im-
prisonment for not more than five years or a fine.’’13 Additionally, media considered
harmful to minors are regulated by the Bundesprüfstelle für jugendgefährdende Medien
(BPjM, Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons), which traditionally
censored films, print media, and computer games, but has expanded its focus to the
Internet.14
Because of the federal structure of Germany’s political system, Internet censorship
can be initiated at the regional level. In 2002, the Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf (district
government) obliged 56 ISPs to restrict access to four foreign Web sites.15 Each of these
Web sites was based in the United States and contained right-wing extremist material.
The Bezirksregierung, which enforces the restrictions on Internet speech in the federal
state of North Rhine–Westphalia, offered the ISPs a choice of three ways to implement
the blockade: DNS-blockade, IP-blockade, or usage of a proxy server.16 An online peti-
tion condemning these attempts to block access has received more than 26,000 signa-
tures.17 However, neither political demonstrations nor lawsuits have been successful in
stopping the blockade. In the end, the administrative court of Düsseldorf endorsed the
blockade in 2005.18 By now, 76 Internet service providers have been required to block
right-wing extremist Web sites.19
Furthermore, according to a study published by the Berkman Center for Internet
and Society in 2002, a number of Web sites relating to neo-Nazi, white supremacist,
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or other objectionable materials were completely or partly excluded by the German
version of the search engine Google (google.de).20
While cases of blocking might occur infrequently, takedown requests, many of
which receive a positive response, occur far more often. For example, as a result of the
prohibition of Holocaust denial and public incitement of hatred against a minority
in Germany, complaints have been filed against companies that host such content.
The most prominent example is YouTube. In August 2007, German politicians and
the Central Council of Jews in Germany complained about the extremist content that
was being hosted on YouTube.21 A YouTube spokesman promptly promised to im-
prove the system of takedowns to comply with the demands of German law.22
A related issue is the political and judicial debate over whether linking to presumably
illicit content is illegal. Several instances of this issue have been recorded. For example,
in 2004 the political activist Alvar Freude was accused of linking to right-wing extrem-
ist Web sites and was brought to court. Freude had documented the censorship by the
Düsseldorf district government mentioned previously and had linked to blocked Web
sites. The district court found him guilty. However, Stuttgart Regional Court over-
turned that decision in 2006 and acquitted Freude.23
In another case involving prohibited online material, the Federal Court of Justice
decided in 2000 that the Australian owner of an Australian Web site denying the Holo-
caust could be held liable in Germany.24
Another reason provided for Internet blocking is the protection of minors. The legal
details are regulated in the Jugendschutzgesetz ( JuSchG, Youth Protection Act)25 and the
Jugendmedienschutz-Staatsvertrag ( JMStV, Youth Media Protection Treaty).26 The JuSchG
regulates Trägermedien (physical media) like books and videos. The JMStV regulates
broadcasts and Telemedien (transmitted media) like the Internet.
More generally, Section 184(1) of the German Criminal Code states, ‘‘Whoever, in
relation to pornographic writings . . . offers, gives or makes them accessible to a person
under eighteen years of age . . . shall be punished with imprisonment for not more
than one year or a fine.’’27 In addition, the dissemination of pornographic perfor-
mances through electronic media is prohibited if the provider does not ensure by tech-
nical or other means that the performance is not accessible to persons under 18 years
of age (Section 184d of the German Criminal Code). These laws are taken as a require-
ment for Web sites with adult content to implement a strict age verification system.
For example, Flickr has complied with this perceived requirement by prohibiting
German users from accessing photos marked ‘‘restricted.’’28
Since the amendment of the JuSchG and JMStV in 2003, the BPjM has maintained
a blacklist of Web sites. In order to avoid widespread publicity, this blacklist is not
published. One may inquire as to whether an item is on the blacklist by e-mailing
liste@bundespruefstelle.de.29 At the time of writing, the BPjM Web site stated that the
number of censored Web sites was 1,948.30
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In February 2005, Google Germany, Lycos Europe, MSN Germany, AOL Germany,
Yahoo, and T-Online agreed to self-regulate their search results under the head of the
Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter (FSM, Voluntary Self-Regulation of
Multimedia Service Providers).31 The FSM is a self-regulatory body for multimedia ser-
vice providers funded by several Internet companies in 1997. One of the FSM’s policies
is to exclude Web sites that have been blacklisted by the BPjM from the search indices
of its members. The current BPjM blacklist is regularly transferred to a hidden server;
the search engines then download the list and automatically remove the relevant
entries.
A number of cases have been brought to public attention. One in particular involves
bmezine.com, a Web site that ‘‘serves to document the activities of the body modifica-
tion community.’’32 In 2005, after BPjM judged the Web site to be a host of content
harmful to minors, it required Google.de to remove BMEzine from its search results.33
A second incident occurred in late 2007, when German adult content providers sued
several ISPs in various German states to block several Web sites that contained porno-
graphic content.34 The pages in question were hosted abroad and thus lacked a strict
age verification system. The district court of Frankfurt ordered the respective defendant
to block all relevant DNS addresses, while other courts dismissed the actions.35 In par-
ticular, a request to block Google was dismissed.36 Furthermore, the Oberlandesgericht
Frankfurt (Higher State Court) confirmed another dismissal of a court of first instance,
judging that ISPs could not be held liable for content that they only transmit.37
Surveillance
Although Internet access remains mostly unrestricted in Germany, Internet users have
recently been subject to state action. Germany’s Criminal Procedure Code specifies in
Section 100a that ‘‘the telecommunication of an individual may be monitored and
recorded if:
1. Specific facts substantiate the suspicion that somebody was the perpetrator or par-
ticipant in a serious crime as listed in paragraph 2 or, in cases where the attempt is
liable to persecution, has attempted to commit such crime, or has prepared such crime
by means of a criminal offense
2. The alleged crime would weigh heavily even taken individually
3. Investigating the act or determining the suspected person’s location by other means
would be significantly impeded or futile without surveillance’’
Since January 2008, ISPs and online service providers in Germany have been
required to retain certain data without initial suspicion of illegal activity (Vorratsdaten-
speicherung).38 The parliament passed the relevant law in November 2007,39 which
implements a European Union (EU) directive40; prior to its implementation, ISPs were
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allowed to retain only data required for billing customers. The new law amends the
Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG). Section 113a specifies that providers of e-mail services
must retain the following data:
1 If a message is sent: the sender’s e-mail and IP addresses, e-mail addresses of all
recipients;
1 If a message is received: e-mail address of the sender, e-mail address of the recipient,
IP address of the sending server;
1 If a client accesses his inbox: his e-mail address and IP address
1 For all of the preceding: date, time, and time zone.
Internet service providers, however, must retain the following:
1 IP address of the client;
1 A unique identifier of the client’s landline, allowing the identification of the client;
1 Date and time of the beginning and end of the user’s Internet access.
The data are then retained for six months. Section 113b establishes that the retained
data may be used solely for the following purposes:
1. Prosecuting criminal acts;
2. Preventing substantial dangers to public safety;
3. Fulfilling the lawful obligations of Germany’s intelligence offices.
An additional complaint has been filed at Germany’s Bundesverfasssungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court) in December 2007, claiming that data retention is unconstitu-
tional. In March 2008, the court issued an injunction to restrict data retention to ex-
ceptional cases. A final decision on data retention is still outstanding.
Whatever the final judgment may be, the last several years have displayed a clear
trend toward increasing Internet surveillance. Motivating factors behind this develop-
ment include the impetus to prevent terrorism, to prosecute crimes, and to enforce in-
tellectual property rights.
Finally, the fear of terrorism and right-wing extremism has led not only to the mon-
itoring of e-mails and chat rooms by the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police
Office), but also to the idea of ‘‘online raids.’’41 This involves infecting a suspect’s per-
sonal computer with Trojan software, which records data entered in order to extract
the relevant information clandestinely. However, online raids remain highly contro-
versial. The federal constitutional court ruled in March 2008 that online raids may be
used only in exceptional circumstances.42
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative conducted testing on T-Online, Arcor, and
1&1 and found no evidence of filtering, despite Germany’s laws prohibiting certain
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content. After ONI testing, however, the German government signed an agreement
with five leading ISPs for the filtering of child pornography using DNS tampering.43 Al-
though the filters will initially target a list of approximately 1,000 child pornography
sites, the Ministry of Family Affairs has stated that it could be expanded to include
other content in the future.
Conclusion
Currently, German users can access the Internet with only mild restrictions. However,
the April 2009 filtering bill and the recent legislation on data retention could have a
staggering effect on Web site access and Internet surveillance in the future. The deci-
sion to implement a large-scale filtering system follows in the footsteps of a number
of other European nations, including the United Kingdom and Scandinavian coun-
tries, and could prove to be influential for other members of the EU.
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Italy promotes freedom of speech
online by allowing access to most con-
tent. However, the Italian government
has been slow to address many online
privacy and freedom-of-information
concerns, and Italy lags behind much
of Europe in terms of Internet pene-
tration. Italy, like much of the Euro-
pean Union (EU), regulates certain
categories of Web sites, including
child pornography and gambling. Additionally, a recently proposed law, dubbed
the Levi-Prodi law, would impose registration and taxes on anyone creating ‘‘edi-
torial content,’’ including bloggers. The law, which has faced significant opposi-
tion, has thus far not passed.
Background
Italy has had a multiparty, democratic government since 1946. The 1948 constitution
was written to prevent a return to early 20th-century fascism, and powers were spread
among the different branches of government to limit the powers of the head of state.
During the cold war, the country feared a communist overthrow, and as a result power
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was consolidated among centrist parties. This concentration of power led to wide-
spread corruption, and after the fall of communism the judicial branch launched a
massive investigation that left no major parties untouched and involved more than
one-third of the members of parliament.1
Corruption continues to be an issue and has influenced control over the media,
particularly television. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who has held office for three
separate terms since 1994, has come under scrutiny multiple times for corruption,
including during the passage of a broadcasting law in 2004 that lifted ownership limits
for national broadcast channels. Berlusconi now owns three of Italy’s seven national
television networks and several national newspapers.2 In April 2006, he violated elec-
toral law three times by exceeding his allotted media time when he broadcast long
interviews on his own channels during the parliamentary election campaign.3
Internet in Italy
Internet penetration in Italy stood at approximately 49 percent in 2008.4 According
to the first national study of Internet and computer usage, published in 2007, about
33 percent of children under age eleven, 75 percent of adolescents and adult women,
and more than 80 percent of adult men access the Internet each month.5 As of 2006,
47 percent of households had a home computer, and 40 percent of households had
Internet access.6
The passage of Law No. 58, Disposizionia per la Riforma del Settore delle Telecomunica-
zioni (Rules for the Reform of the Telecommunications Industry), in January 1992 was
the beginning of the privatization of Italy’s telecommunications industry.7 Previously,
most telecom services had been provided by a collection of companies managed by the
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale/Societa Italiana L Esercizio Telecom (Institute for
Industrial Reconstruction/Italian Telecommunications Society, IRI-STET) group, part
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 28,682
Life expectancy at birth (years) 81
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 19
Rule of law (out of 211) 81
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 28
Democracy index (out of 167) 29 (Full democracy)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 28
Internet users (percent of population) 49
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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of Italy’s state holding company. In June 1994, in compliance with Law No. 58, five
of these companies merged to form Telecom Italia. Three years later, Telecom Italia
merged with Societa Italiana L Esercizio Telecom (STET), retaining the Telecom Italia
name, to form a privately owned company that is now the country’s largest telecom-
munications service provider.
Telecom Italia currently supplies around 7.7 million customers with broadband
connections, accounting for approximately 80 percent of the market.8 Other major
ISPs include Swiss-owned FastWeb, which serves 15 percent of the market,9 Tiscali,
and Wind, owned by Egypt’s Orascom.10 DSL and dial-up access are also available
from a number of smaller local and international providers.11 The country’s most
widely available type of broadband connection is ADSL, which costs between EUR
19.95 and EUR 40.00 (USD 29.58 to USD 61.78) per month, with speeds ranging from
640 Kbps to 12 Mbps.12
Telecom Italia and Tiscali are both tier 2 carriers.13 Within Italy, four main Internet
exchange points operate, in Florence, Milan, Rome, and Turin.14
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Compared with many of its European counterparts, the Italian government has been
slow to come to terms with the digital world, and its attempts to create and apply
legislation to the Internet often reflect this fact. In 2000, a group of Internet privacy
advocates claimed that while Internet censorship was nonexistent in Italy, the govern-
ment’s lack of understanding of privacy and freedom of information posed significant
problems for Internet and computer users.15 In October 2007, the government pro-
posed a bill, nicknamed the Levi-Prodi law for the lawmakers who proposed it, which
would require all ‘‘editorial product’’ owners to register with and pay taxes to the
Registro degli Operatori di Comunicazione, the regulatory authority that oversees media
and broadcasting. The intention of the bill was to simplify Italy’s publishing laws.
However, the bill was broadly worded enough to be interpreted as applying to bloggers,
Web site owners, and possibly even social network users, and drew widespread criti-
cism from these sectors, traditional media sources, and civil rights groups as an exam-
ple of the government’s failure to adapt to modernity.16 One writer noted that the bill
contradicted EU directives and, if enacted, could be challenged before the European
Commission and the European Court of Justice.17 The bill was eventually reworded to
apply only to commercial blogs; however, the debate continues, as noncommercial
bloggers with advertising would potentially still be included.18 As of November 2008,
the bill had not yet been decided upon.
The government has attempted to regulate the Internet with the same laws that
apply to print and broadcast media. These include a press law that holds publishers
responsible for the content of their publications. Applied to the Internet, the law holds
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Web sites responsible for all content they display, even user-posted content. Web sites
with user-generated content, however, are not well suited to this type of supervision.
The most visible incident related to this law occurred in November 2006, when prose-
cutors began an investigation of two representatives of Google after a violent video
of four Italian teenagers attacking a disabled student was posted on Google Video.19
Italian media law restricts the press from publishing anything that might be deemed
‘‘counter to morality,’’ a restriction Google allegedly violated by failing to check the
content of the video before it was posted.20
In 2006, blogger Roberto Mancini was fined EUR 13,500 for criticizing several jour-
nalists in northern Italy on his blog. The verdict of the case stated that while the state-
ments were not untrue (they were widely considered to be inappropriate), Mancini
was responsible for everything that was posted, including some vulgar reader com-
ments, and that it was his duty to act as an editor and remove any messages that were
offensive.21
The National Security Committee, established in 2002, handles all Internet-related
security concerns. The committee is composed of members from academia, the mili-
tary, and the legal sector. Some concern has been expressed that nongovernmental
civil rights organizations have not been consulted during public hearings held by the
committee.22
Internet filtering in Italy has come to public attention largely through the govern-
ment’s directives to ISPs. In 2006, Italy enacted a law that requires ISPs to block the
Web sites of gambling operators that are not licensed nationally. The law, which affects
more than 600 Web sites, isolates the country’s EUR 500 million gambling market
from all but local operators. Providers that continue to allow users to place bets with
banned Web sites after receiving a list of the offending sites from the Amministrazione
Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato (AAMS, Autonomous Administration of State Monop-
olies, a part of the Ministry of Economy and Finances) may be fined anywhere from
EUR 30,000 to EUR 180,000 per violation.23 Internet users who attempt to access the
Web sites of foreign bookmakers are shown a message explaining that bets must go
through the proper channels, and are directed to the AAMS.24
In January 2007, a law was passed requiring ISPs to block Web sites that display child
pornography within six hours of receiving a notice from the Ministry of Communica-
tions.25 The Centro Nazionale per il Contrasto della Pedopornografia (The National Center
against Child Pornography, part of the Ministry of Communications) is in charge of
maintaining a list of these Web sites. After receiving an initial list of banned Web sites
from the center, ISPs had 60 days to block them at the domain-name level and 120
days to block them at the IP-address level.26
The ‘‘.it’’ country code is regulated by the Registro del ccTLD.it Rules Committee,
which is made up of representatives of the Ministry of Communications and various
Italian Internet associations.27 Actual registration takes place through private ‘‘Main-
tainers’’ who register and maintain domain names on behalf of customers. Maintainers
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must be licensed businesses in Italy and are required to pay an initial fee of EUR 2,500
to the registry. This fee includes start-up costs for the first year and 60 domain names,
with invoices for additional domain names sent separately.28
Internet Surveillance
A July 2002 EU directive instructs ISPs and telephone companies to temporarily retain
all records of user activity and make these available to legal bodies, to the extent that
doing so ‘‘constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a
democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e., State security), defense, public
security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal
offences or of unauthorized use of the electronic communication system.’’29
As part of a set of antiterrorism measures passed in July 2005, the Italian government
authorized Internet and telephone network surveillance.30 The bill requires Internet
cafés to keep photocopies of customers’ passports and to submit periodically logs of
all Web sites visited to police headquarters.31 The law also raises licensing requirements
for telecommunication service operators, making licensing approval dependent upon
the existence of satisfactory data-monitoring and retention systems.32 In addition, the
bill calls for the compilation of a list of all of Italy’s cell telephone users.33
Public reaction to the bill has come mostly from business owners, who complain
that complying with the new regulations is expensive and cumbersome.34 Several
Internet café managers have seen drops in business, primarily from foreign customers
who have forgotten their passports or who are unaware of the identification require-
ment.35 Most Internet users seem to view the bill as innocuous, perhaps because Inter-
net cafés cater more to tourists than to Italian citizens. A bill requiring ISPs to monitor
Internet activity and to store user data for five years, which would have affected all
users, failed to pass in 2003 after protests by activists and opposition parties.36
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative completed testing on four Italian ISPs: iNet,37 Infostrada,38
Telecom Italia,39 and Tiscali,40 and was able to confirm that one gambling site,
partypoker.com, is blocked by Telecom Italia and Tiscali. The ONI was unable to con-
firm with certainty that the other ISPs have also blocked the Web site.
Conclusion
Although Italy has regulations in place to prohibit access to Web sites within certain
categories, access to the Internet remains relatively free apart from limited filtering,
particularly of gambling sites. However, the potential passage of the Levi-Prodi law is
a cause for concern, as are the government’s efforts to increase Internet surveillance.
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The five Nordic countries—Denmark,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Ice-
land—have become central players in
the European battle between file shar-
ers, rights holders, and ISPs. While
each country determines its own des-
tiny, the presence of the European
Union (EU) is felt in all legal contro-
versies and court cases. The Internet
industry extends across borders, and
so do filtering, military surveillance, and the monitoring of users. Privacy issues
were formerly a concern of the elite, but with the growth of the information soci-
ety, the right to privacy is now being discussed more widely in different political
contexts. A popular civil rights movement of file sharers and privacy advocates has
arisen out of Sweden in response to both national and international trends, and
digital rights activism is increasingly directed at the European Parliament. Single-
issue political parties concerned with privacy have now also begun to form in
countries outside Europe.
Regional ICT Penetration
The World Economic Forum1 ranks the Nordic countries at the very top of information
and communication technology (ICT) use in the world. All five countries were listed in
the top ten of a 2008–2009 survey prepared in partnership with the international busi-
ness school INSEAD.2
The Nordic countries each have broadband Internet penetration rates of more than
30 percent of the population. According to a survey by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) from June 2008, this figure places them in the
top eight in comparison with the organization’s 25 other member countries:3
1. Denmark 36.7 percent (1,996,408 subscriptions)
3. Norway 33.4 percent (1,554,993 subscriptions)
5. Iceland 32.3 percent (98,361 subscriptions)
6. Sweden 32.3 percent (2,933,014 subscriptions)
8. Finland 30.7 percent (1,616,200 subscriptions)
Regional Regulation
Norway and Iceland are the only Nordic countries that are not members of the EU.
However, they do form a part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and have officially
agreed to enact legislation similar to that passed in the EU in areas such as consumer
protection and business law. As a result, laws are integrated in Norway4 and Iceland5
differently than in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.6
Directives passed by the EU Commission and the European Parliament form a frame-
work for lawmakers in the 27 member states to implement their own national laws
before a certain deadline. Countries may decide to pass tougher laws than required by
a directive. A key to understanding the heated European struggle surrounding intellec-
tual property is an antipiracy directive called the International Property Rights Enforce-
ment Directive (IPRED)7. This directive gives rights holders wide-ranging freedoms to
investigate the identities of suspected file sharers and to obtain court orders to force
ISPs to share personal information about customers suspected of digital piracy. The
IPRED was introduced in 2004 and was repeatedly revised over the following years after
complaints that its criminal-sanctions provisions were too wide ranging. An amended
proposal (IPRED2) that may reintroduce some criminal sanctions was still being
debated in 2009.8 However, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) being
secretly negotiated9 between the EU, the United States, and other countries seems to
have taken over momentum from IPRED2.10
Sweden became the first EU country to put IPRED into effect on April 1, 2009. The
BBC reported that Internet traffic in Sweden fell by 33 percent when the law was
passed.11 To protect the privacy of their customers following the implementation of
IPRED, Swedish ISPs threatened to erase all their IP-number data.12 Broadband operator
AllTele offered their customers ‘‘dis-identification’’ services to hide file sharers from
investigators.13 Another ISP, ePhone, refused to hand over any data to the courts.14
In early 2009, such actions were not against Swedish law,15 but they may be when
another EU data-retention (logging) directive16 is implemented. Swedish lawmakers
are working on a proposal for a law that would force ISPs to store data for at least six
months.17
File sharing is extremely common in Nordic countries. The Swedish newspaper
Svenska Dagbladet reported that 79 percent of Swedish males aged 15 to 29 are against
the IPRED law.18 Open wireless local area networks (WLANs) have become an issue
under IPRED, as innocent subscribers may be liable for illegal downloads by others.
An IPRED-resistance movement started in Sweden encouraging people to open their
networks and rename them Ipredia to mask actions by individuals.19
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Copyright
The battles over copyright, private file sharing, and large-scale dissemination of links
in the Nordic region are primarily playing out in the courts under the close watch
of international organizations like the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI). One Swedish court case over a file-sharing site has earned the most
notoriety, but there have been several other cases in neighboring countries where
copyright disputes ended in Internet filtering.
The Pirate Bay is a Swedish Web site that tracks BitTorrent files.20 The Web site has
an estimated 22 million users and is one of the Internet’s largest sources for file shar-
ing. While it is predominantly known for illegal P2P file sharing of music and films, it
also handles links to content that can be legally shared. The fate of the Pirate Bay is the
subject of a court battle as well as a forceful grassroots Swedish political movement that
has resulted in the creation of a new political party called Piratpartiet (The Pirate
Party).21
In Denmark, any attempt to access the Pirate Bay using a Danish ISP leads to a block
page with links to a January 2008 ruling in a Danish civil court that all access to the
Web site should be blocked. Rights holders originally filed the case against the Danish
ISP Tele2, which today is owned by the Norwegian telecom Telenor. The Danish na-
tional court, Østre Landsret, confirmed the decision on November 26, 2008.22
In April 2009, the Pirate Bay case23 was submitted to the Danish Supreme Court. The
basic question for the court to consider is whether an ISP can be charged with blocking
access to a Web site, and whether the ISP, as the provider of the connection, can be
held responsible for any content transmitted. Thus, the case is about the Danish inter-
pretation of the EU Infosoc24 directive on copyright and related rights, often called the
Information Society Directive. Danish and Swedish parliaments and courts disagree on
the interpretation of this directive.
This is not the first case of its kind in Denmark. In March 2006, the country’s largest
ISP, TDC, was forced to block certain IP addresses used for the transmission of copy-
righted material by a Supreme Court decision.25 The court declared that the transmis-
sion of copyrighted files was equal to temporary unauthorized copying and thus illegal.
Court orders in 2007 forced Danish ISPs to block access to two Russian file-sharing
Web sites, Allofmp326 and MP3Sparks.
On April 17, 2009, the four founders of the Pirate Bay were sentenced to one year in
prison by a Swedish lower court and a combined fine of 30 million Swedish krona
(USD 4 million). The Stockholm District Court determined that the defendants worked
as a team in the operation and development of the Web site and that they had been
aware that copyrighted material was being shared.
The convicted individuals filed a complaint that the presiding judge was biased, as
a member of pro-copyright organizations. To the chagrin of the defendants, the court
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official charged with deciding whether the first judge was biased was also known to
have connections to pro-copyright organizations.27 Furthermore, the judge28 selected
for the appeal case was a member of a pro-copyright group until 2005.
The Norwegian private law firm Simonsen Advokatfirma DA in 2007 obtained per-
mission29 from the Data Inspectorate (Datatilsynet) to register the IP addresses of users
suspected of engaging in illegal file sharing. The firm represents rights holders. After
not receiving assistance from the Norwegian police, the law firm attempted to have
ISPs hand over the subscriber information associated with these addresses. Simonsen
also drafted a cease-and-desist letter, which they requested the ISPs forward to copy-
right infringing customers. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
asked Norwegian ISPs to block file-sharing sites, like the Pirate Bay. The ISPs refused to
cooperate.
In a May 2009 copyright case regarding the Norwegian movie Max Manus, Simonsen
sought a court order to get Norway’s largest ISP, Telenor, to release the subscriber infor-
mation of a person suspected of sharing the film illegally. The ruling was made in the
lowest court (Stavanger Tingrett) on May 5, 2009, but the verdict was kept secret at
the request of the film industry.30 In fear of Swedish-style IPRED conditions, attempts
are being made in Norway to initiate protests against secrecy.31 The case determined
whether private industry (ISPs) or public authorities are the ones responsible for inves-
tigating breaches of law on the Internet. Dealing with a basic principle, the case is
expected to be pushed into higher courts.
Norwegian telecommunications company and ISP Telenor has said that it is indiffer-
ent to preceding Swedish or Danish court decisions. A spokesperson for the ISP said the
company would conform exclusively to the rulings of Norwegian courts. At the same
time, a spokesperson for the Norwegian activist group FriBit rejected the idea that the
Max Manus case had any significance, and said, ‘‘The Pirate Bay will continue and there
are lots of other services like theirs . . . the ruling gives no cause to automatically use
other means, like censorship, to stop pirates.’’32 The fault lines in Norway are similar
to the conflicts in other Nordic countries, but the solutions may not be identical.
Filtering
Internet service providers in all Nordic countries deploy filtering to isolate Web sites
distributing child pornography. However, other infringements on freedom of expres-
sion and privacy have been controversial. Additionally, suspicions that the filters put
in place could eventually be used to filter other sites have resulted in protests from
many privacy and advocacy groups.
Nordic ISPs participate in the International Association of Internet Hotlines
(INHOPE) project with 35 member countries.33 Suspicious links are reported by organ-
izations and the general public and passed on to relevant authorities for verification.
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Partners in Denmark and Finland are Save the Children, and in Iceland, Heimili
& Skoli. Financing originates from the EU Safer Internet Plus Program fund.34 The
Swedish nongovernmental child protection organization ECPAT does a similar job. In
Norway, there is no official nongovernmental involvement.
Finland has a law to stop distribution of child pornography.35 According to Section
1, the law was created to protect children and to block access to child pornography
sites that are hosted outside of Finland. Finland also has laws against mocking God or
religion (Criminal Act, Ch. 17, Sec. 10), but so far no content of this nature has been
filtered.
The Finnish National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) compiles a secret list of Web sites
containing child pornography and distributes it to ISPs for filtering.36 In February
2008, the Electronic Frontier Finland (EFF) published an analysis of ‘‘Finnish Internet
censorship.’’37 According to the report, the NBI filtering list contained about 1,700
Web sites in 2008. The EFF stated that a number of nonpornographic Web sites were
found on the list.
In early 2009, the Web site Wikileaks,38 which collects evidence of corporate and
government misconduct, published a list of 797 Web sites censored by Finland. These
were originally harvested and published by a well-known Finnish ‘‘white hat’’ hacker
and activist Matti Nikki.39 The list included his own Web site lapsiporno.info, where
he criticizes secret censorship. Matti Nikki argued that there were several legal Web
sites on the blocked list. On February 17, 2008, he stated that ‘‘nearly none of the sites
on the child porn list seem to contain child porn.’’40 On March 23, 2009, all charges in
a criminal investigation against him were dropped.
The blacklist operated by the Danish child pornography filtering system (3,863
blocked URLs) was leaked41 on December 23, 2008, and made available online. Its pub-
lication was a protest42 against secret censorship systems43 and was supported by an
activist group, IT-Politisk Forening. All Danish ISPs filter content based on the list.
The head of the Telecommunication Industries Association of Denmark44 says the
list is of Web sites the authorities deem illegal, and that it should be expected to
contain not only child pornography, but also racist, offensive, and libelous material.
The Danish police IT investigation unit NITEC insists their list consists of illegal por-
nography sites only.45 The Danish ISP industry staunchly refuses to filter questionable
content (like gambling sites) unless they are contrary to statutory law or unless
required to do so by court order. Attempts by politicians have been made in Denmark
and other Nordic countries to protect government gambling monopolies from popular
online poker.
All Norwegian ISPs operate a voluntary Child Sexual Abuse Anti-Distribution Filter
(CSAADF). The filter is a blacklist of DNS addresses maintained and distributed by
Kripos, the Norwegian police agency that deals with organized, financial, and other
serious crimes. Each ISP implements this blacklist in its DNS servers by redirecting
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attempts to access blacklisted Web pages to a page with a warning message.46 The list is
generated without judicial or public oversight and is kept secret by the ISPs using it. A
list of supposedly blocked addresses was posted to Wikileaks in March 2009, contain-
ing 3,518 DNS addresses.47 According to Wikileaks, many of the sites on the (Norwe-
gian) list had no obvious connection to child pornography. The Norwegian and
Danish lists had 1,097 URLs in common. Police in Germany raided the owner of the
German Wikileaks domain name (a mirror site) in March 200948 because the Web site
published copies of Nordic filtering lists.
As a member of the EEA, Norway has enacted legislation in line with the EU directive
on electronic commerce,49 which among other things states that ISPs shall not moni-
tor their subscribers’ use of the Internet. However, the general interpretation in Nor-
way of the directive is that ISPs may be responsible for illegal content on their servers
(e.g., child pornography, copyrighted material) if the provider, upon obtaining knowl-
edge or awareness that such content is present, does not act expeditiously to remove or
disable access to the content.
As a result of this directive, some ISPs have devised user agreements that empower
the service provider to remove any controversial content, including content that is
not illegal, to protect themselves from being held liable in any controversy surround-
ing content.
For example, in February 2008 the Norwegian ISP Imbera removed images of the
Danish ‘‘Muhammad cartoons’’ from the Web pages of one of their customers, an or-
ganization called Human Rights Service, on the grounds that Imbera’s user agreement
prohibits users from uploading controversial content to Imbera’s servers.50
In Norway, the police can demand the subscriber information associated with a par-
ticular IP address from an ISP without a court order. This authority follows from a
Supreme Court decision in 1999, in a case involving an Internet subscriber suspected
of distributing child pornography.51 As a result of the ruling, the police can demand
personal information in all types of cases. According to press reports, the refusal of
the police to get involved in the Max Manus file-sharing case is the reason Simonsen
Advokatfirma DA had to go to civil court.
Surveillance
All Nordic countries hold freedom of expression in high regard. Having military intel-
ligence agencies monitor private citizens’ telecommunications in detail and without
controls has stimulated emotional debate and antisurveillance movements. The two
major forces behind the legal changes in the Nordic countries are fear of terrorism
and infringements on copyright. Government surveillance and censorship do not sit
well with the Nordic notion of being free and democratic societies, and the introduc-
tion of new measures has created an unusually emotional debate in the region.
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A survey of global surveillance activity by Privacy International in 2007 characterized
Denmark as the only Nordic country that is an ‘‘extensive surveillance society,’’ while
Finland, Sweden, and Norway were listed as exhibiting ‘‘systematic failure to uphold
safeguards.’’52 This classification included areas of privacy outside of digital life like
democratic safeguards, visual surveillance, and workplace monitoring. Iceland had
‘‘some safeguards but weakened protection.’’ Denmark was placed in the same category
as Bangladesh, France, India, Lithuania, the Philippines, and Romania, and was also
the only Nordic country facing a ‘‘deteriorating situation.’’ Privacy International also
publishes critical Country Reports Overviews53 of current developments (latest dated
December 14, 2007) in each country and wide-ranging in-depth analysis54 (latest De-
cember 12, 2007) of each country (except Iceland).
The Danish national police IT-Efterforskningscenteret (NITEC), the center for IT
investigations, is in charge of the blacklist for filtering child pornography sites. The
unit has reportedly been investigating techniques for monitoring and deciphering con-
versations on the free online telephony service Skype.55 The Danish police refuse to
discuss their investigation methods. At the EU level, the judicial cooperation unit,
EuroJust,56 has mentioned Skype’s desire to cooperate with EU authorities, dating
back to 2006.
On September 15, 2007, every Danish Internet user came under a comprehensive
surveillance system, covering their history of Web sites visited, incoming and outgoing
e-mails, and use of cell phones. The Danish implementation of the EU ‘‘data logging
directive’’57 forces telecommunications companies, ISPs, hotels, Internet cafés, wireless
hotspots, and apartment buildings with private Internet service to log and store infor-
mation on all personal communication data for at least one year. These logs must be
made available to police without a court order. The stated purpose is to fight terrorists.
Two former heads of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET)58 are on record
as opposing the expanded monitoring as unnecessary, worrisome, and damaging to
the public’s basic democratic rights.59
In Sweden, no logging law had yet been implemented in mid-2009, but surveillance
of cross-border Internet and telecommunications had. Wiretapping and surveillance
measures in Sweden have become a divisive issue in recent years. Those advocating
the need for increased surveillance point to the threat from international terrorism
and organized crime, and claim that additional measures are necessary to keep pace
with changing technology. Opponents claim the measures extending the scope of sur-
veillance pose a threat to civil liberties.
Following a prolonged political battle on privacy in the Swedish parliament, a law
known as the ‘‘FRA-law’’ narrowly passed in June 2008, giving the Swedish National
Defense Radio Establishment (FRA) the right to monitor all cross-border, cabled com-
munication traffic.60 In practice, all telephone calls, text messages, faxes, and e-mails
passing into and out of Sweden became subject to surveillance as of January 1, 2009.
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Public outrage over the law led to a significant revision in September 2008, and a
number of wide-ranging surveillance permits were repealed.61 Among the compro-
mises were requirements that court orders be issued before monitoring individuals,
that no communications inside Sweden would be logged, and that the FRA could only
work on behalf of the government and the military. The FRA thus monitors all ‘‘exter-
nal threats,’’ not just ‘‘foreign military threats.’’
Almost all telecommunication from Finland to the rest of the world passes through
Sweden, leading to fear of the FRA-law in Finland. Both Swedish and Norwegian legal
organizations have filed petitions at the European Court of Human Rights challenging
the Swedish wiretapping law.62 In neighboring Denmark, citizens scrambled to assess
whether they needed to change ISP and telephone companies in order to avoid being
monitored. The Danish Federation of Industries, the largest commercial organization
in the country, issued an elevated security warning, fearing commercial espionage by
Sweden, and published guidelines on how to avoid surveillance of data by foreign gov-
ernments at the end of 2008.63
The law regulating the Norwegian intelligence agency establishes the rules for mili-
tary Internet surveillance in Norway.64 It gives the Intelligence Services under the min-
istry of defense (Forsvarets Etterretningstjeneste, FO/E) a very broad mandate to collect
information that ‘‘serves the interests of Norway in relation to foreign states, organiza-
tions and individuals.’’ They must, however, refrain from collecting information about
Norwegian citizens or legal entities, but there seem to be no restrictions as far as for-
eigners are concerned.65
This broad mandate empowers the FO/E to perform electronic surveillance on com-
munications originating from foreign individuals and organizations at the border, in a
manner similar to the more explicit Swedish FRA-law. However, it is unknown how the
FO/E currently exercises its surveillance mandate.
The legal framework with regard to Internet surveillance by the Norwegian police
is the same as for all communications. The existing legal framework66 for tele-
phone wiretapping has simply been extended. To intercept e-mail or to tap an Inter-
net line requires a court order, and a person under surveillance must be suspected
of involvement in a serious crime punishable with ten years or more in prison (e.g.,
espionage).
Perspectives
All over Europe censorship and surveillance initiatives are promoted, like the French
‘‘three strikes’’ HADOPI law against piracy that introduced online snooping on sus-
pected file sharers.67 The law, which has already inspired clones in other EU countries,
will be challenged because of a recent declaration by the European Parliament that it is
illegal for an EU country to sever Internet access from anyone without the approval of
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a court.68 In May 2009, the European Parliament went through a new vote on details
in a revision of the telecom rules directive.69 Stemming from a Europewide mass mobi-
lization, the European Parliament, with a large majority, essentially declared Internet
access to be a fundamental right in the EU.70 At the time of writing, conciliation be-
tween the European Parliament and the Commission was in progress. Nonetheless, six
days later the French National Assembly passed the controversial law limiting these
rights, and the following day the French Senate voted and confirmed the HADOPI law.71
In April 2008, the Danish parliament’s Council on Technology published a report on
IT security that said Danish Internet users seem to prefer the government having direct
access to their computers in order to control and update their personal software prior
to allowing them onto public Web sites.72 The report stated that users wanted public
censorship of undesirable Web sites (e.g., those known for phishing) and preferred gov-
ernment security classification of selected software (like Web browsers). According to
the report, there also seemed to be public demand for the introduction of hardware-
based ‘‘digital identities,’’ somewhat different from the prevailing secure ‘‘digital signa-
tures.’’ At the same time, fear of surveillance and registration of individual activities
online was strong. The people surveyed also preferred that ISPs filter e-mail automati-
cally rather than having the current opt-in solution.
The independent Danish IT-Political Association argued strongly against this vision
of centralized control online. An extremely successful initiative of the association has
been Polippix,73 a Linux-based privacy protection software, distributed widely on CD
and online. The Danish IT-Political Association, like its sister organizations in other
Nordic countries, is a member of the European digital rights network EDRI, which
tracks EU and national attacks on privacy, introduction of surveillance, and limits on
Internet freedom. The work of EDRI is considered especially important because most
regulation regarding the Internet, copyright, and privacy originate from European
institutions or from international institutions with strong influence in Europe. How-
ever, the regulations do not prohibit individual countries from passing their own laws
in addition to European ones.
A Swedish public opinion poll74 published on May 18, 2009, showed that 43 percent
of the population had no interest in the FRA-law, and among those who were inter-
ested, 34 percent were against and 23 percent in favor. The most critical sector of the
population belonged to the 15–29 age group. The least worried group was conserva-
tives over 60. The issue of privacy for the online generation has gained significance as
a result of the FRA debate and the Pirate Bay file-sharing case. Indeed, a political party
by the name Piratpartiet,75 the Pirate Party, founded in 2006, was Sweden’s third-larg-
est party, with more than 48,000 members,76 immediately before the June 7, 2009,
elections. At the time of writing, public opinion polls indicated that Piratpartiet would
win representation in the European Parliament and in the national parliament, Riksda-
gen, in the next general elections (expected in 2010).
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Conclusion
Because they are at the forefront of ICT use in the world, the Nordic countries under-
standably have a lively public debate on copyright and privacy issues. New trends con-
cerning online reality will likely originate here. In these countries, rights holders and
the telecommunications industries are lobbying politicians in support of their different
interests. Recent developments in Sweden offer hints that the general public, apart
from indulging in massive pirating activities, is getting involved at the political level.
Following the FRA-law revision in Sweden, the governing right-wing alliance is
deeply shaken by the unexpected and forceful youth movement that draws its energy
from new age issues like privacy and file sharing. The Social Democratic Party, the
originator of the antiterror surveillance law proposal a few years ago, has with its
Green center-left partner announced that the issue of privacy (and the FRA) will be
hot during the next Swedish general elections (expected in 2010). They intend to
repeal the bill.
The battle over FRA in Sweden was fought with modern communication technology
(e.g., Facebook, Twitter, blogs, texting). The use of new methods for political mobiliza-
tion has reached critical levels, and activists are entering the political mainstream.
Issues are crossing borders.
Political scientists Ulf Bjereld and Henrik Oscarsson at the University of Gothenburg
in Sweden ask whether the security interests of the nation-state are colliding with the
right to free cross-border communication in international networks. In an article pub-
lished in the leading Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter on May 18, 2009, they question
whether the Swedish state is struggling to retake control of the globally networked
society’s most valued raw material, means of influence, and driving force: information.
These scholars see the Pirate Party as more than a single-issue platform, rather as a
movement of liberal values, individual freedom, and personal integrity, where culture
must be set free and patents and private monopolies opposed. Bjereld and Oscarsson
believe the party’s adherents favor citizen rights and freedoms, and demand clearer reg-
ulation and compliance with the social contract between government and citizens. It is
a new civil rights movement of the information society.77
It is obvious that very strong industrial interests are influencing politicians in the
Nordic countries and Europe. The controversial decision by the European Parliament
to make access to the Internet a ‘‘fundamental right’’ and the strong response, particu-
larly in Sweden, from the predominantly young digital grassroots may be a forewarn-
ing of things to come. The EU and increasingly its individual members are struggling to
regulate digital life, while activist users are trying to push back industrial dominance.
The Nordic countries are historically, legally, technically, and culturally very close to
one another, and are all in some way associated with the EU. As more countries
achieve the high Internet penetration rates of these five countries, we may see similar
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cultural and political phenomena spilling over to the region, and maybe globally too.
Already, ‘‘Pirate Parties’’ have formed or are in the process of being established in 22
other countries.78 Certainly, the outcome of the legal battles regarding copyright, sur-
veillance, and filtering in the Nordic countries should not be considered as without
bearing on the wider region in the near future.
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Nyheter, May 18 2009, http://www.dn.se/opinion/debatt/nastan-varannan-svensk-struntar-i-fra
-fragan-1.868277.
78. List of countries with Pirate Parties: http://www.pp-international.net/.
340 Nordic Countries
Turkey
Stretched between Asia and Europe,
Turkey amalgamates the cultural, his-
torical, and sociopolitical diversity of
two continents. The government has
implemented legal and institutional
reforms driven by the country’s ambi-
tions to become a European Union
member state, while at the same time
demonstrating its high sensitivity to
defamation and other ‘‘inappropri-
ate’’ online content, which has resulted in the closure of a number of local and
international Web sites.
Background
Turkey was established as a secular state in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The
‘‘Father of the Nation’’ transformed the government from Islamic rule to a secular
modern state, with laws based upon the Swiss civil code. The principle of secularity is
enshrined in the Constitution1 to ensure that religious matters do not interfere with
state affairs. The Turkish military powers consider themselves to be the guardians of
secular democracy and in the past have actively pursued this role, resulting in the
forced removal of elected governments on a number of occasions. The Turkish military
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has developed a long history of involvement in politics, and as a result the government
remains dependent upon it to maintain a balance between religious and secular insti-
tutions.
Since Turkey’s establishment as a secular republic, the nation has become increas-
ingly integrated with the West through membership in such organizations as the
Council of Europe, NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the G-20 major
economies. Free expression of opinion in Turkey is guaranteed by Article 10 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ratified by Turkey
in 1954, and by various provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, signed by Turkey in 2000.
Despite Turkey’s commitment to free expression and freedom of information, the
Penal Code broadly restricts such freedoms by criminalizing speech that insults the
Turkish nation, Turkish government institutions, and Turkish ethnicity. A number of
other legal acts shape the information available on the Internet by allowing state insti-
tutions to apply widely filtering and blocking mechanisms in order to prevent illegal
information online.
Internet in Turkey
Turkey’s Internet market is growing quickly. Internet penetration was at 7.5 percent in
2004, but increased to 33.1 percent by 2008. The Internet subscribers (i.e., the actual
number of dial-up, leased line, and fixed broadband Internet subscribers) were just
7.89 per 100 inhabitants for 2008.2 Overall, the market witnessed considerable growth
propelled by the increase in the number of broadband subscribers during 2006, with
ADSL being the predominant broadband access technology.3
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 11,825
Life expectancy at birth (years) 72
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 89
Human development index (out of 179) 76
Rule of law (out of 211) 98
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 121
Democracy index (out of 167) 87 (Hybrid regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 52
Internet users (percent of population) 33.1
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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The telecommunications market has seen a major structural change toward liberal-
ization, after the fixed-telephony network was opened to competition in 2005. Previ-
ously a monopoly, Turk Telecom (TT) is still the dominant telecom and broadband
Internet operator in the country, preserving a de facto monopoly of the fixed-line ser-
vices. Before liberalization, Turk Telekomünikasyon A.Ş. (Turk Telecom) was a state
company entirely owned by the Undersecretary of the Treasury. After years of national
debate and international pressure, the company’s privatization was carried out in
November 2005 when 55 percent of the shares were bought by private investors.4 Sub-
sequently, 15 percent of the remaining shares were sold and have recently begun to
be traded on the stock market.
There is a growing number of ISPs in the country.5 Through its wholly owned sub-
sidiary TTNet A.Ş., Turk Telecom focuses on development of broadband services to
compensate for the loss of revenue in the liberalized fixed-line voice market. According
to a report by the National Telecommunications Authority for the telecoms market in
2007, TTNet had a market share of 95.7 percent in retail ADSL Internet access services,
while other operators hold the remaining 4.3 percent.6 The company has announced
plans to invest nearly USD 800 million over the next few years in the sector and in-
crease Internet usage in both urban and rural areas.7
Turk Telecom owns international channels for Internet traffic. It operates the Inter-
net backbone network (through TTNet) and leases lines to other providers. Thus, the
prices for external and sometimes internal lease of TT’s infrastructure affect most of
the ISPs.
In July 2008, Turk Telecom began offering VDSL2 (very high speed digital subscriber
line 2) service across 73 of 81 provinces. Turk Telecom wholesales this service to ISPs.
The VDSL2 service is transmitted over phone lines and increases the Internet connec-
tivity in Turkey eightfold, bringing it into the top third of 23 European countries in
terms of fastest connectivity using DSL technology.
The main commercial ISPs in Turkey are TTNet, Superonline, Sabanci Telecom, Koc-
net, Smile, Doruknet, DoganOnline, and IsNet. Superonline is owned by the Çukurova
Group, which is one of the leading Turkish business conglomerates.8 Superonline’s
lines, just like those of other providers, pass through Turk Telecom. Superonline is
awaiting approval of a WiMAX license, which would allow it to provide ‘‘triple-play’’
services without being dependent on Turk Telecom’s infrastructure.9
Some of the other main ISPs are affiliated with banking and media groups, including
the Sabanaci Group’s turk.net, Is Bank’s is.net, and Koc’s koc.net. Sabanci Telecom was
created through the merger of TTNet, Sabanci Telecom, and AK Internet. The provider
offers a range of services (data communications, Internet access, VoIP, and mobile data
services in partnership with the mobile operator Telsim).10 In 2006, Sabanci’s invest-
ment in the ISP market reached 63 million liras.
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Turkey has one official Internet exchange point (IXP), the Turkish Information Ex-
change, or TIX.11 Established in 1997 as a private initiative with a large number of
members in its first years, TIX languished after it was restructured into a company in
2002.12 Subsequently, a second IXP was established in June 2003 with the collabora-
tion of a number of leading ISPs. Although this second platform was used extensively
for a couple of months, the traffic on this exchange point has also declined, starting at
the end of December 2003, as a result of the severe price competition ISPs faced from
Turk Telecom.13
Following liberalization, Turk Telecom had to transfer its cable assets to a govern-
mental entity (Turksat) responsible for communications satellites as proposed by the
Turkish Competition Authority. The largest share of investments in the original cable
telecoms company was made by private operators. Government control over the tele-
com pipelines is expected to be only a temporary solution, but it has caused serious
concerns among private operators regarding the certainty of their investments.14 Of
24 satellite platform operators in the country, Turksat is the main one. The company
is also responsible for designing the government portal offering e-government services.
The main mobile operator is the private Turkcell with more than 28.7 million sub-
scribers as of March 31, 2006.15 The largely private mobile company Telsim is second
with 8 million subscribers, followed by Aria with 4 million.16 Both Turkcell and Telsim
have been issued 25-year licenses to operate in the mobile phone sector.
Before initiating operation, VoIP operators need to obtain a license. The ‘‘Authoriza-
tion Regulation on the Telecommunications Services and Infrastructures’’ of August 26,
2004, states that the general authorization granted to ISPs for performing activities
does not include provision of VoIP services (Article 5.1 of Annex A6). Pursuant to Arti-
cle 4.1. of Annex A9 of the same regulation, the ISPs willing to provide VoIP services
would need to obtain a license for long-distance telephony services from the Tele-
communications Authority. However, compared to the environment before the market
liberalization, VoIP services are more accessible now. There are a number of local VoIP
clients providing an alternative to Skype that targets Turkish and even international
markets.17
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Regulatory Framework
The Telecommunications Authority (TA) was established under Law No. 4502 in
2000.18 Prior to that time, the Ministry of Transportation handled regulatory issues in
the field of telecommunications. This ministry still approves the changes in license fees
proposed by the telecoms agency. The so-called independent regulatory authorities,
including the TA, were recently established in Turkey to regulate and monitor sectors
of strategic importance for the state.19 While these authorities are part of the adminis-
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trative system and are therefore state agencies, they are organized in a manner that per-
mits a certain level of independence from the executive body (i.e., they do not operate
under the traditional administrative hierarchy; their decisions and acts are not subject
to the approval or permission of the central administration, nor can their decisions or
acts be revoked or amended by the central administration). However, certain legal pro-
visions imply that the central administration, and in particular the government, still
maintains considerable control over the Telecommunications Authority. Most notably,
pursuant to Article 8 of Law No. 2813, members of the Telecommunications Board (the
highest decision-making body of the TA) are appointed by the Council of Ministers.
Even the amendments to the law discussed in the following paragraphs do not succeed
in safeguarding the independence of the TA from political interference.
The Authorization Regulation of the Telecommunications Services and Infrastruc-
tures of 2004 envisions a permissive regime to the ISPs for entering the local market.
Providers are required to apply for and obtain a general authorization from the Tele-
communications Authority to provide telecommunications services. Internet Law No.
5651, established in 2007, expands the group of regulated providers to include all ac-
cess and hosting providers.
The Telecommunications Authority Regulation of October 24, 2007, specifies the
prerequisites that hosting and access providers need to comply with when applying
for an issuance, transfer, renewal, or cancellation of licenses and imposes a number of
responsibilities on providers. One of these charges both the access and hosting pro-
viders with the duty to remove illegal content from their system upon notification
from the Communications Presidency, to the extent that it is technically possible.
However, the regulation reaffirms the principle laid out in the Law No. 5651 that nei-
ther the access providers nor the hosting providers are under an obligation to ensure
the legality of the content they provide.
The licenses granted to hosting providers are valid for five years and are renewable.
The licenses issued to access providers are valid for the period during which the rele-
vant provider has been authorized by the Telecommunications Authority to provide
telecommunications services.
Legal Framework
Turkey’s aspiration to join the EU has been a major influence in driving reform and
liberalizing its telecommunications sector.20 As a candidate to the EU, Turkey is under
an obligation to align its national legislation with that of the EU in all 31 areas of the
acquis communautaire, which includes telecommunications and IT. The EU’s telecom-
munications policies call for liberalization of the sector with a view to making the EU
one of the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economies by 2010.21
In recent years, Turkey has taken substantial steps to reform its telecommunications
laws. In this regard, the adoption of Law No. 4502 in 2000, which provides a legal
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framework for liberalization of the sector and establishes the telecommunications reg-
ulatory authority, is particularly noteworthy. Furthermore, the opening of the market
to competition by removal of Turk Telecom’s monopoly in the sector is another posi-
tive development.
Nevertheless, as stated in the ‘‘Turkey 2007 Progress Report,’’ prepared by the Euro-
pean Commission, a number of issues still remain to be addressed regarding Turkish
harmonization of telecommunications laws. In this regard, the licensing regime and
the high communications taxes imposed on operators are considered particularly prob-
lematic.22 The restrictive licensing scheme imposed on access providers by the Tele-
communications Authority is out of line with the EU directives. Turkey will need to
abolish its licensing regime for electronic communications services and replace it with
a clear, predictable, and transparent general authorization process, as proposed by
the EU.
A further concern is that Turk Telecom’s owners possess a 21-year concession agree-
ment over all equipment, which has to revert to the government at the end of the
concession. This provision by itself is inconsistent with the overall character of EU tele-
communications law.
Turkey Mass Media Laws Regulating Freedom of Expression
The legal framework that regulates the freedom of expression and freedom of press
in Turkey consists of the Press Law23 and the Law on the Establishment of Radio and
Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts (the RTUK Law).24 The current Press Law
applies only to the print media, while the RTUK Law covers TV and radio broadcasts.
Turkey’s 2004 Press Law No. 5187 annuls the former Press Law No. 5680 and its
amendments, which was heavily criticized for bringing Internet broadcasting within
the ambit of press legislation, thereby subjecting Web sites and ISPs to monitoring
standards entirely incompatible with the characteristics of the Internet.25 After reaf-
firming the constitutional principle that the press is free, Article 3 of the Press Law
goes on to state that ‘‘this freedom may be restricted in accordance with the require-
ments of a democratic society to protect the reputation and rights of others as well as
public health and public morality, national security, and public order and public
safety; to safeguard the indivisible integrity of its territory; to prevent crime; to with-
hold information duly classified as state secrets; and to ensure the authority and impar-
tial functioning of the judiciary.’’ In addition, the Press Law sets certain limits on the
freedom of press on the following points:
1 Compromising the judicial process (Art. 19)
1 Encouraging sexual assault, murder, or suicide (Art. 20)
1 Illicit disclosure of identities (Art. 21)
1 Failure to publish reply and correction (Art. 18)
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The RTUK Law’s objective is ‘‘to prescribe the principles and procedures relating to the
regulation of radio and television broadcasts and to the establishment, duties, compe-
tence and responsibilities of the Radio and Television Supreme Council.’’ Article 4 of
this law provides an extensive list of broadcasting standards that need to be complied
with in TV, radio, and data broadcasts, thereby setting the limits on how the TV and
radio broadcasting enterprises can exercise their freedom of expression and freedom
of press. The list risks burdening the media, as it includes vaguely framed phrases
such as ‘‘national and moral values of the community,’’ ‘‘give rise to feelings of hatred
in the community,’’ and ‘‘raise the feeling of fear.’’ The Radio and TV Supreme Council
is responsible for overseeing the TV and radio stations’ adherence to these broadcasting
standards and imposing the prescribed sanctions in case a violation occurs. Pursuant
to Article 33 of the RTUK Law, the available sanctions are issuance of a warning, fine,
suspension, and revocation of broadcasting license permit.
Turkey Internet Laws Regulating Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information
Until 2005, the Internet in Turkey was a largely free medium. However, in 2005 this
situation quickly changed when laws were introduced to restrict Internet content.
Widespread use of the Internet and growing concerns about the uncontrolled amount
of sensitive content available online pushed authorities to adopt a special law on the
Internet. The Law on the Internet (or the Regulation of Broadcasts via Internet and Pre-
vention of Crimes Committed Through such Broadcasts) No. 5651 was passed by the
parliament on May 4, 2007, and signed by president Ahmet Necdet Sezer on May 22.
This law introduces criminal liability for people who post certain categories of illegal
content online. According to this law, if such content is posted it should be taken
down immediately either by authorities or by the ISPs themselves.
The law establishes a model that allows a large group of actors, including the govern-
ment, to petition the court or the Telecommunications Authority to filter certain Inter-
net content. ‘‘Sufficient suspicion’’ that an offense is committed is a sufficient test to
meet under the Internet Law to allow block of access. As a result of this law and related
legislation, a number of Web sites have been blocked over the past few years in Turkey.
This censorship has led to an uproar from large communities within Turkey and
abroad, and has placed concerns about filtering of Internet content high on the na-
tional agenda.
The most common crime is posting obscene content—that is, content in violation of
Article 8, paragraph A (5) of the Internet Law. Statistics provided by a Communications
Presidency representative reveal that the posting of obscene content accounts for more
than half of the total number of court rulings for blocking Internet access so far—5,629
since November 2007.26 The remaining rulings banned access to the following types of
proscribed content (from most to least common):
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1. Crimes against Atatürk (Article 8/b)
2. Prostitution
3. Providing place and opportunity for gambling
4. Sexual abuse of children
5. Encouraging people to commit suicide
6. Supplying drugs that are dangerous for health
7. Facilitation of the abuse of drugs
The second most common reason for shutting down a Web site is posting content
insulting Atatürk. A number of such incidents occurred in 2007, as this was the first
year in which sites were blocked under direct application of the Internet Law. For the
definition of ‘‘crimes against Atatürk,’’ the law refers to Turkish Law No. 5816 on
Crimes against Atatürk, which criminalizes certain activities against the founder of
modern Turkey. As Atatürk is the founder of the secular Turkish state, an insult to
him is considered an insult to Turkey’s governing system in general and an act of state
treason. A closer look at the internal division between secularists and people of faith
demonstrates that by insulting Atatürk, one is thought to be insulting the Turkish
interpretation of secularism.27
The recent Law No. 5728, dated February 2008, introduces a ninth category of crimes
in addition to the ones provided in Article 8 of the Law on the Internet. Based on this
recent amendment, access to content related to unauthorized online gambling and
betting can be banned. These activities were initially prohibited under Law No. 7258
and sanctioned with a fine. Law No. 5728, however, penalizes such conduct as a crime
when carried out online. As evident from these laws, activities in Turkey can be crimi-
nalized not only in the Criminal Code but in special laws enacted by the Parliament as
well.
In addition to the Internet Law, Turkish courts base their access-blocking decisions
on violations of other crimes and even some private law rules. Based on statistics from
Turk Telecom,28 banned sites based on norms other than the controversial Article 8 of
Internet Law No. 5651 numbered 153 in 2005, 886 in 2006, and 549 in 2007. Turkish
authors29 referring to Turk Telecom’s statistics state that access-blocking decisions ren-
dered in violation of norms other than the ones enlisted under Article 8 have been
based primarily on the following grounds:
1 Downloading of MP3 and movies in violation of copyright laws
1 Insults against state organs and private persons
1 Crimes related to terrorism
1 Violation of trademark regulations
1 Unfair trade regulated under the Turkish Commercial Code
1 Violation of Articles 24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution (freedoms of religion,
expression, thought, and freedom of press)
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Under the Internet Law, ISPs become responsible for blocking access to illegal Web
content even before the judge rules so. The Telecommunications Authority is tasked
with identifying the actor responsible for the offensive content.
The recently created Information Denouncement Center accepts complaints sub-
mitted by e-mail or phone that report Web sites that allegedly carry content subsumed
in any of the crimes typified in Article 8 of Law No. 5651. A complaint against online
content may be submitted to a prosecuting attorney who then must lodge it with the
court within 24 hours. In event of an emergency request, the prosecuting attorney may
impose a ban on the Web site himself and submit it to a judge within 24 hours. The
Internet Law provides for quick procedures and stipulates that once a judge decrees a
blocking order, it should be delivered to the relevant ISP for implementation within
another 24 hours. Sanctions envisioned for the ISPs or hosts who refuse to block access
to offensive content include imprisoning owners or managers for six months to two
years.
The law provides that the Telecommunication and Transmission Authority can im-
pose bans on Internet sites without a prior judicial approval if
1 the offending Web site hosts the previously mentioned crimes and is hosted outside
Turkey, or
1 a Web site contains sexual abuse of children or obscenity and its host resides in
Turkey.
In this case, the prosecuting attorney may start a criminal action against those respon-
sible for posting the offensive content once they are identified.
In addition to the preceding procedures, anyone may file a formal complaint against
posted online content with the Communication Presidency, an entity established
under the Internet Act. An individual claim may be sufficient to ban an entire site
when the personal rights of the claimant have been violated. The individual can di-
rectly request that the content or hosting provider remove the offensive content.
Following the request, the content or hosting provider has to post a response to it
within seven days on the Web site where the content is hosted. The provider should
begin processing the request within two days. If prolonged, the request is considered
rejected. The next recourse to the aggrieved party is to file a complaint with the local
Criminal Peace Court within 15 days. The court will then make a decision within three
days without a trial, and this decision can be appealed at a higher court. After the court
decision, the content or hosting provider must remove or block the content and pub-
lish a reply to the claimant within two days. Noncompliance with the court decision
is sanctioned with imprisonment. For example, a Google Groups ban was enforced
following an individual claim against a blogger who posted a defamatory comment
about the claimant on the server.30
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The Turkish Internet Law provides the opportunity for Web site owners to exercise
their right of reply against a content ban. However, this right is usually given after the
site has been already blocked. There is no guaranteed right of reply to Web site owners
whose content has been banned for a reason other than the ones listed in the Internet
Law.
One of the main concerns with court decisions on Internet cases is the lack of pro-
portionality. When the court considers certain content illegal, it orders a complete ban
on the Web site hosting the content, instead of only blocking the particular material.
Typically, the rulings of the Criminal Peace Court only cite the relevant legal provi-
sions on which they are grounded and the final court order. This procedure does not
provide the accused with the rationale behind the decisions, nor does it provide the
right to defend against the charges. In addition, the time for submitting the appeal is
very short, being only seven days.
Generally, court rulings in Turkey remain hidden from the public eye. The Turkish
Attorneys Law does not provide guarantees for publicity of court decisions without
regard to the particular type of dispute. Instead, this law restricts the right to make
a copy of a court decision, which for privacy concerns remains available only to the
party’s attorney. Technically, the Attorneys Law allows all attorneys regardless of
whether they are representing parties in a particular case to examine court decisions.
However, reports from ONI field researchers indicate that attorneys who have made
requests to review particular decisions issued in the application of the Internet Law
have been denied access by court clerks, because of privacy concerns. This lack of
access makes it difficult for Web site owners and their representatives to know how
they can fully comply with the law.
Authorities often apply the Internet Law to ban access to online content, as the law
provides quick enforcement mechanisms. Since the law does not provide the defini-
tions of the criminalized activities, the court frequently refers to a number of other
laws in its rulings, including the Penal Code and the Law on Crimes against Atatürk.
Article 301 was enacted into the Turkish penal code on June 1, 2005, as part of a
package of penal-law reform enacted prior to Turkey’s proposal for membership into
the EU. Between 2005 and 2008, it was used to bring charges in more than 60 cases,
many of which were high profile, such as that against internationally renowned novel-
ist Orhan Pamuk.31 From its inception, Article 301 received significant opposition. Fol-
lowing the 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink,32 such opposition
increased significantly, resulting in former deputy prime minister and foreign minister
Abdullah Gül declaring that the law was in need of revision.33 On April 30, 2008, the
law was only slightly modified to include lighter sentencing,34 replacement of ‘‘Turk-
ishness’’ with ‘‘Turkish nation’’ (even though public denigration of the Turks’ culture
and identity is a crime), and a requirement that the justice minister approve all cases in
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which Article 301 is to be used.35 Article 301 has been widely applied by the Criminal
Courts of Peace to regulate online activities.
Any proscribed content under Article 301 is immediately removed without first
requesting the content provider to remove it. This was the case against YouTube in
2007 and 2008. The media-sharing site was blocked a number of times, primarily be-
cause of content that allegedly offended Kemal Atatürk or the so-called ‘‘Turkishness.’’
YouTube made an express agreement to take down offensive videos if advised.36 De-
spite this agreement, Turkish courts ordered Turkish Telecom to block access to the
entire site rather than requesting YouTube to take action.
In addition to Article 301, two other articles broadly limit free speech in Turkey:
Article 312 of the Penal Law imposes three-year prison sentences for incitement to
commit an offense and incitement to religious or racial hatred,37 and Article 81 of
the Political Parties Law forbids political parties from using languages other than
Turkish in written material or at public meetings. The latter affects Turkish Kurds in
particular.38
Defamation
Defamation is sanctioned under the Turkish criminal law as well as under the civil law.
The Penal Code considers defamation an offense against honor. Article 125, entitled
‘‘Defamation,’’ contains the following provisions:
1. Any person who acts with the intention to harm the honor, reputation or dignity of
another person through concrete performance or giving impression of intent, is sen-
tenced to imprisonment from three months to two years or imposed punitive fine.
2. The offender is subject to above stipulated punishment in case of commission of of-
fense in writing or by use of audio or visual means directed to the aggrieved party.
3. In case of commission of offense with defamatory intent:
a) Against a public officer,
b) Due to disclosure, change or attempt to spread religious, social, philosophical belief,
opinion and convictions and to obey the orders and restriction of the one’s religion,
c) By mentioning sacred values in view of the religion with which a person is con-
nected, the minimum limit of punishment may not be less than one year.
4. The punishment is increased by one sixth in case of performance of defamation act
openly; if the offense is committed through press and use of any one of publication
organs, then the punishment is increased up to one third.
By providing that defamation can be committed by use of audio or other visual means,
the second paragraph of Article 125 brings defamatory acts committed on the Internet
within the ambit of criminal law, with the consequence that the persons who commit
this offense may face imprisonment or fines.39
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Numerous civil law defamation claims have been brought before courts in the recent
years. The legal basis for civil law defamation claims in Turkish law is Article 41 and
Article 49 of the Code of Obligations.
Article 41 contains the following stipulations:
A person who wrongfully harms another either intentionally, negligently or imprudently, is under
an obligation to compensate the other party for this harm.
A person who knowingly harms another through an immoral act is also under an obligation to
compensate the other party for this harm.
Article 49, entitled ‘‘Harm to Personal Interests,’’ states the following:
A person whose personal rights have been unlawfully violated is entitled to bring a claim for
monetary compensation for the nonpecuniary damages he has incurred.
The Turkish Code of Obligations provides for a civil law claim for defamation where-
by the claimant can ask for monetary compensation instead of blocking access to con-
tent. However, most claimants prefer to turn to the Internet Law’s protection when
such is provided. One of the reasons for this preference is that the Turkish Code of
Obligations bans excessive enrichment through compensation while the Internet Law
provisions allow claimants to apply for a direct access ban.
Reports indicate that the Telecommunications Authority has announced plans to
bring defamation carried out online and hacking under the scope of Article 8 of Law
No. 5651, thereby providing people whose personal rights have been violated by on-
line content with an alternative mechanism that would allow them to seek an access-
banning remedy instead of monetary damages under the Law of Obligations or fines
under criminal law.40 As the procedure for obtaining a remedy under Internet Law is
more expedient than in civil and criminal law cases, this amendment equips the
aggrieved party with a much easier and quicker mechanism against online defamatory
content.
Surveillance
The National Security Bill, or the ‘‘Draft Act on National Information Security Agency
and Its Tasks,’’ does not include a provision on the Internet. The bill envisages the
establishment of a national information security agency as a public body. It requires
the public bodies and agencies as well as private entities (companies, etc.) to provide
‘‘national information’’ necessary to ensure national information security to the secu-
rity agency when requested to do so. ‘‘National information,’’ however, is vaguely
defined in the bill’s present version. The bill, if enacted, may be used by the govern-
ment to compel ISPs to supply the state with information on users’ communications
and activities at any time.
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At present, the Telecommunications Authority Regulation of 2007 introduces state
monitoring over access and hosting providers and their activities. Article 15-c of the
regulation stipulates that access providers that cease their operations are obliged to
submit all records of traffic logs pertaining to their last year of operation, as well as
their user IDs, to the Telecommunications Authority.
ONI Testing Results
Turkey has one main commercial backbone connection, owned and controlled by Turk
Telecom and the educational network, UlakNet. Most of the filtering of international
traffic takes place on the Turk Telecom network, which links to other commercial ISPs
within the country. Testing by the OpenNet Initiative shows that the academic
network does not currently engage in filtering. UlakNet primarily provides Internet
access to academic centers and some government institutions, including the military.
The ONI testing found a number of sites blocked on Turk Telecom in a variety of
categories. Sites containing information on Turkish Kurds, including www.pajk-online
.com, hpg-online.com, and the official Web site of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or
PKK were blocked. Interestingly, two sites belonging to well-known Muslim creationist
Adnan Oktar (adnanoktar.wordpress.com and yahyaharun.com) were blocked, as was
19.org, the site of Oktar’s rival Edip Yuksel. According to some reports, Oktar is respon-
sible for the bans on Yuksel’s sites and Wordpress, as well as the 2008 blocking of evo-
lutionist Richard Dawkins’ site in Turkey.41 Other blocked sites included P2P sites such
as the Pirate Bay (thepiratebay.org) and myp2p.eu. Gambling sites were also blocked.
Since the Internet Law came into effect, the number of blocked sites has drastically
increased. The most high-profile filtering has been of the popular video-sharing site
YouTube.com. YouTube access has been blocked a number of times in 2007 and 2008,
in response to complaints about specific videos, most of which were considered to
‘‘insult Turkishness.’’ Access has been restored following the takedown of each video.
Wordpress and all blogs on the Wordpress domain, as well as popular blogging plat-
form Blogspot, have been blocked and unblocked a number of times as well.
Conclusion
Turkey has implemented a series of reforms in its telecommunications and Internet
sectors, showing its firm determination to stay on the membership path to the Euro-
pean Union. Nonetheless, further reforms are needed to terminate the de facto monop-
oly of the main telecoms and Internet service provider Turk Telecom. All Internet
traffic passes through Turk Telecom’s infrastructure, thereby allowing centralized con-
trol over online content and facilitating the implementation of shutdown decisions.
Unless the government rethinks its current Internet policy and abandons blocking
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Web sites as a method for combating illegal content, freedom of expression in Turkey
will remain compromised.
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United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (U.K.) has a no-
table libertarian tradition, manifested
by, among other things, solid guaran-
tees of freedom of expression, freedom
of information, and protection of pri-
vacy. Nonetheless, over the last few
years the country has witnessed a
quick shift toward increased surveil-
lance and police measures in both
online and physical space. Combating
terrorism and preventing child abuse have been widely used by state agencies and
private commercial actors (e.g., Internet service providers) to justify the imple-
mentation of interception of communications and direct filtering measures in the
country, which have drawn growing criticism.
Background
The U.K., consisting of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, is a constitu-
tional monarchy currently headed by Queen Elizabeth II.1 Previously a colonial power,
the U.K. emerged from the World Wars as a leading global financial center and West-
ern democracy.2 As the country is a member of the European Union (EU), the bloc’s
law takes precedence over national law, with U.K. courts required to recognize the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in matters of EU law.
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The U.K. has a vast media network, led by the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), a publicly funded institution,3 with a mandate to remain independent.4 Other
media institutions in the U.K. also enjoy journalistic freedom and represent a broad
spectrum of political ideas.5 Despite the officially recognized journalistic freedom,
there have been reports of journalists being jailed or detained for divulging state
secrets.6 The U.K. is a strong supporter of fundamental human rights and freedoms,
including freedom of expression.7 However, recent developments in U.K. antiterrorism
laws, in particular the Terrorism Act (2000) and subsequent legislation in 2005 and
2006, have drawn harsh criticism. Advocacy groups claim that new provisions focused
on expanding police powers and allowing communication providers to retain personal
data for the purpose of ‘‘protecting national security or preventing or detecting crime
that relates to national security’’8 are contrary to basic human rights principles.9
Internet in the United Kingdom
Residents of the U.K. currently form the fifth-largest broadband subscriber population
in the world.10 In the U.K., 61 percent of households had Internet access in 2007, with
84 percent of those having a broadband connection.11 The sector regulator reports that
broadband technology is available for practically every U.K. citizen to connect to the
Internet.12 In 2006, 63 percent of adults in the U.K. were estimated to have accessed
the Internet within a three-month period.13 Internet usage is more widespread among
the younger generations, with over 90 percent of people aged 16 to 24 accessing the
Internet in a three-month period, and only 24 percent of those aged over 65 accessing
it during the same period.14 Most of the users access the Internet from their home
location (87 percent).15 As a result of affordability and enhanced market competition,
mobile penetration is very high.16 However, the percentage of people accessing the
Internet with their handsets is surprisingly small (only 3 percent in 2007).17
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 33,717
Life expectancy at birth (years) 79
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 21
Rule of law (out of 211) 15
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 13
Democracy index (out of 167) 21 (Full democracy)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 10
Internet users (percent of population) 79.6
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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In 2007, there were around 700 Internet service providers (ISPs) in the U.K.18 Of the
broadband providers, however, Virgin Media and BT (formerly British Telecom) pro-
vided services for half of the market;19 along with the three next largest providers,
they comprise 84 percent of the market.20 Broadband service has expanded so signi-
ficantly in the last four years that it is now more affordable than dial-up service.21 Cur-
rently, no restrictions exist on the amount of information a user can send and receive
when subscribing to broadband service, but it is recognized that network management
might be required in the future.22
In December 2008, the majority of ISPs in the U.K. agreed to better inform their cus-
tomers about Internet connection speeds. This scheme, which would benefit approxi-
mately 95 percent of the U.K.’s Internet users, was adopted in response to consumer
confusion about advertisements that promised broadband speeds that were largely
unattainable.23
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The telecommunications industries are regulated by the Office of Communications
(Ofcom).24 Ofcom’s mandate includes, among other duties, the protection of audi-
ences against harmful material, unfairness, and infringements of privacy.25 Broadcast-
ing in the U.K. is regulated by the Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS).26
As a member state of the European Union, the U.K. has integrated the bloc’s commu-
nication directives into its national law. The European Parliament has recently voted
on the new proposals by the European Commission (EC) to reform the telecommuni-
cations regulations with the idea of promoting competition on a pan-European level
and taking further steps to preserve information security, including controlling spam,
spyware, and other malicious software.27 Updated regulations are expected to be inte-
grated into national legislation starting in 2010.
In 2000, the EU adopted a proposal concerning, inter alia, the dissemination of child
pornography on the Internet.28 The notes to the proposal explicitly state that service
providers normally will not be held liable for any dissemination, caching, or hosting
of child pornography, though they are held liable if they commit illegal acts that ben-
efit the service provider.29 This is consistent with broader EU law which states that ISPs
acting as ‘‘mere conduits’’ of information are not liable for any illegal information
transmitted.30 European Union law specifically provides that ISPs are under no obliga-
tion to monitor the information they transmit, but they must be able to provide infor-
mation on its transmission given an appropriate request from the government.31
Though U.K. authorities do not oblige ISPs to monitor the information being trans-
mitted, at least one major ISP, BT, filters child pornography materials.32 However, BT
stresses that they do not affirmatively search for sites to block, but rather act only
upon reports by users and information provided by the Internet Watch Foundation
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(IWF).33 The implementation of this filtering practice is known as ‘‘CleanFeed.’’34 The
IWF, a nonprofit organization based in the U.K. that works with the U.K. government,
compiles a list of Web sites it deems illegal and transmits this information to BT and
other ISPs.35 The list compiled by the IWF usually contains 800–1,200 unique and
live URLs.36 In addition to filtering content for child sexual abuse, the IWF also detects
and attempts to take down Web sites hosted in the U.K. that promote racial hatred,37
which are illegal under the Public Order Act 1986.38
In 2006, Home Office Minister Vernon Croaker announced that from 2008 onward
he expected that all ISPs would block access to child pornography using a ‘‘CleanFeed’’
style system.39 The announcement also suggested that if the filtering was not done by
ISPs on a voluntary basis, Parliament would consider legislative enforcement.40 At that
time, the largest ISPs in Britain, which together provided over 90 percent of all broad-
band access, all used some sort of filtering system.41
The U.K. commissioned a report on child safety on the Internet that was released in
March 2008 (the Byron Report).42 This report recognized that it would not be possible
to remove fully all obscene material from the Internet and that any effective control
would have to be adopted voluntarily by ISPs.43 It stated that there was a strong
case to block illegal material such as child pornography, though it also recommended
that no attempts be made to filter illegal material at the network level.44 The U.K. gov-
ernment has agreed to implement all the recommendations contained in the Byron
Report.45
In December 2008, a number of British ISPs blocked a Wikipedia page displaying an
image of an album cover from 1976 that portrayed a naked teenage girl. The ISPs made
the decision after receiving a warning from the IWF claiming the image may be illegal.
Wikipedia users complained that the ISPs blocked not only the image but the entire
article; they also noted that the ISPs did not apply the block systematically, as access
to commercial sites, such as Amazon.com, that sold the album and displayed its cover
image, was still available.46 Furthermore, the block temporarily prevented users on the
affected ISPs from editing Wikipedia.47 Several days after the block was imposed,
the IWF reviewed the case and decided to remove the article from their list of offensive
sites, citing the negative effects of the block and the wide availability of the image on
other sites.48
United Kingdom law requires that information that glorifies or incites terrorism be
censored.49 According to section 3 of the Terrorism Act (2006), once provided with a
notice that a Web site may contain terrorism-related content, an ISP may be liable for
the content if it does not take every reasonably expected step to block access to the
content.50
Filtering technologies such as the ‘‘CleanFeed’’ system are criticized for not publi-
cizing the list of filtered Web sites, which could lead to abuses.51 In addition, because
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ISPs and the IWF are not public institutions, they are not subject to judicial review.52
Instead, the IWF offers an internal appeal procedure.53
Internet Surveillance
The U.K., together with the United States, was ranked as one of the worst offenders
against individual privacy rights in the democratic world by Privacy International for
2007.54
Among areas of great concern are the estimated 4 million CCTV cameras installed
in practically every corner of Britons’ social life.55 Based on the EU Data Retention
Directive but at times exceeding its scope, the data retention scheme in the U.K. took
a significant step forward. There are ‘‘hundreds of thousands’’ of requests from state
agencies to communications providers for traffic data.56
In the U.K., the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is an independent author-
ity with the goal of promoting access to official information and protecting personal
information. It is also responsible for enforcing the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).57
The commissioner has a broad mandate but only minimal enforcement powers.58 A
new act has been proposed to amend the DPA and give the ICO the authority to
impose fines for deliberate data protection breaches.59 The ICO reports to Parliament
and is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice.60 Recently, concerns have arisen over ISPs
tracking user activity to customize viewed ads.61 The commissioner himself warned in
2004 that the U.K. was in danger of becoming a ‘‘surveillance society.’’ This concern
was reiterated in the House of Lords’ February 2009 report entitled ‘‘Surveillance: Citi-
zens and the State.’’62 However, after a review of the situation the ICO noted that as
long as users are ‘‘informed when a cookie is placed on their computer, given clear
and comprehensive information about the purpose of the storage and given the ability
to refuse it being placed on the system . . . there does not appear to be any detriment to
users,’’ and that the developing companies are not in violation of the Data Protection
Act 1998.63
The U.K. government’s power to collect communications data is primarily addressed
in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).64 Warrants to approve the
collection of communication content are issued by the Secretary of State upon proof
that the intrusion is necessary and proportionate when balanced with individuals’ pri-
vacy interests.65 The Secretary of State has broad powers that are loosely regulated.66
The collection of noncontent data, including subscriber information, traffic, and loca-
tion data, can be authorized without a warrant by various public officials.67
As for other electronic surveillance, the Foundation for Information Policy Research
notes that even before the events of September 11, 2001, the U.K. was utilizing sophis-
ticated systems for electronic surveillance against crime. The foundation warns that
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further ‘‘safeguards and democratic oversight’’ are needed.68 On May 21, 2008, The
Guardian warned of the possibility of a database that records every telephone call,
e-mail, and Web site visit made in Britain.69 On June 9, 2008, the ICO released a state-
ment recognizing the necessity to consider the impact of the development of such
tools on individuals’ privacy and the need to minimize unnecessary intrusion. It fur-
ther recommends that ‘‘every possible step . . . be taken to ensure public trust in the
way that personal information is collected and stored.’’70 Although plans for the data-
base to collect all user information were canceled, the Home Secretary has requested
that communications firms record contact between customers, including e-mails,
phone calls, and Internet use, as well as visits to social networking sites.71
In a different area, expectations of commercial gain due to online advertising have
led some of the most important operators in the country (BT, Talk Talk, and Virgin)
to use different applications to track the browsing history of their customers. In April
2009, the EU expressed its intent to commence legal actions against the U.K. for allow-
ing this Web-tracking practice, which, according to the EU, would violate privacy laws.
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative comprehensively tested three ISPs in the United Kingdom:
Easynet,72 Be,73 and BT,74 and did not find any evidence of filtering; however, the
U.K. openly blocks child pornography Web sites (which ONI does not test) and has
allegedly blocked other sites containing ‘‘illegal material.’’75
Conclusion
Protecting freedom of expression and encouraging tolerance to diverse viewpoints, the
U.K. is one of the pioneers in nurturing politically sensitive debates and promoting
the use of new technology. Freedom of expression and protection of privacy over the
Internet is guaranteed in the law. Nevertheless, motivated by national security con-
cerns, the state has provided for vast surveillance measures over online communica-
tions. Moreover, certain filtering and tracking practices do take place. Such practices
are sometimes encouraged by the state but most often voluntarily implemented by pri-
vate operators. The U.K. government, however, has to ensure that blocking practices
do not lead to abuse in the absence of external and independent control.
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United States and Canada Overview
The Internet in the United States and Canada is highly regulated, supported by a com-
plex set of legally binding and privately mediated mechanisms. Technical filtering
plays a minor role in this regulation. The first wave of regulatory actions in the 1990s
in the United States came about in response to the profusion of sexually explicit mate-
rial on the Internet within easy reach of minors. Since that time, several legislative
attempts at creating a mandatory system of content controls in the United States have
failed to produce a comprehensive solution for those pushing for tighter controls. At
the same time, the legislative attempts to control the distribution of socially objection-
able material on the Internet in the United States have given rise to a robust system
that limits liability over content for Internet intermediaries such as Internet service
providers (ISPs) and content hosting companies. Proponents of protecting intellectual
property online in the United States have been much more successful, producing a sys-
tem to remove infringing materials that many feel errs on the side of inhibiting legally
protected speech. National security concerns have spurred on efforts to expand surveil-
lance of digital communications and fueled proposals for making Internet communica-
tion more traceable.
After a decade and half of ongoing contentious debate over content regulation in the
United States, the country is still very far from reaching political consensus on the ac-
ceptable limits of free speech and the best means of protecting minors and policing
illegal activity on the Internet. Gambling, cyber security, and dangers to children who
frequent social networking sites—real and perceived—are important ongoing debates.
Canadian legislators have been less aggressive than their U.S. counterparts in propos-
ing specific legislative remedies for problems arising from Internet use. Canadians have
been more inclined to employ existing regimes developed for regulating offline speech
and less apt to propose broad solutions. Canadians do not currently pursue copyright
infringement online with the same zeal as their U.S. counterparts. Neither does Cana-
dian law provide the same formal protection for intermediaries. Unlike the United
States, publishing of hate speech is restricted in Canada. Under section 320.1 of the
Canadian Criminal Code, a judge can issue a warrant authorizing the deletion of (pub-
licly available) online hate propaganda from computer systems located within the ju-
risdiction of the court.
Public dialogue, legislative debate, and judicial review have produced filtering strat-
egies in the United States and Canada that are different from those described elsewhere
in this volume. In the United States, many government-mandated attempts to regulate
content have been barred on First Amendment grounds, often after lengthy legal
battles.1 However, the United States government has been able to exert pressure indi-
rectly where it cannot directly censor. In Canada, the focus has been on government-
facilitated industry self-regulation. With the exception of child pornography, Cana-
dian and U.S. content restrictions tend to rely more on the removal of content than
blocking; most often these controls rely upon the involvement of private parties,
backed by state encouragement or the threat of legal action.2 In contrast to much of
the world, where ISPs are subject to state mandates, most content regulation in the
United States and Canada occurs at the private level.
The United States and Canada both have relatively high Internet penetration rates.
In each country, nearly three-quarters of the population has access to the Internet.3
Despite such high Internet penetration rates, the two countries have relatively low
broadband subscription rates, with the United States at 23 percent and Canada at 28
percent. Internet subscription rates on the whole are only slightly higher: the United
States has a 24 percent subscription rate, while Canada’s rests at 31 percent.4 The
broadband stimulus push of President Barack Obama’s administration in early 2009
may improve these rates in the United States.
These high rates of Internet usage increase the ability of citizens to publish and
widely distribute dissenting points of view. At the same time, Internet users engage in
a large number of other online activities, such as accessing pornography, that test a
society’s dedication to free expression and privacy.
Regulating Obscene and Explicit Content
The United States Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) as part
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Signed into law by President Bill Clinton in
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February 1996, the CDA was designed to criminalize the transmission of ‘‘indecent’’
material to persons under 18 and the display to minors of ‘‘patently offensive’’ content
and communications.5 The CDA took aim not only at the authors of ‘‘indecent’’ mate-
rial but also at their Internet service providers, although it offered them each safe har-
bor if they imposed technical barriers to minors’ access.6
Prior to taking effect, the CDA was challenged in federal court by a group of civil lib-
erties and public interest organizations and publishers who argued their speech would
be chilled by fear of the CDA’s enforcement. The three-judge district court panel con-
cluded that the terms ‘‘indecent’’ and ‘‘patently offensive’’ were sufficiently vague such
that enforcement of either prohibition would violate the First Amendment.7 ‘‘As the
most participatory form of mass speech yet developed,’’ Judge Stewart Dalzell wrote in
a concurring opinion, ‘‘the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmen-
tal intrusion.’’8 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this holding in 1997, invalidating the
CDA’s ‘‘indecency’’ and ‘‘patently offensive’’ content prohibitions.9 In the landmark
case Reno v. ACLU, the Court held that CDA was not the ‘‘least restrictive alternative’’
by which to protect children from harm. Rather, parent-imposed filtering could effec-
tively block children’s access to indecent material without preventing adults from
speaking and receiving this lawful speech.10 Other sections of the CDA continue to re-
main in force, including Section 230, which provides immunity to ISPs for content
that third-party users place online.11 Section 230 has had an undeniably powerful
impact in promoting free speech in the United States. A growing body of case law sug-
gests that it is being used by ISPs to settle or quickly dismiss claims that are brought
against them.12 Many question whether the sweeping protections offered by Section
230 offer in fact too much protection for online speech and excessively limit the ability
of victims and the state to suppress harmful speech.13
Lawmakers responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU by enacting
the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)—a second attempt at speaker-based content
regulation. In COPA, the U.S. Congress directed its regulation at commercial distribu-
tors of materials ‘‘harmful to minors.’’14 The slightly narrower focus of COPA did not
solve the constitutional problems that doomed the CDA. The district court enjoined
COPA on First Amendment grounds.15 After a few trips to the Supreme Court and
back for fact-finding, the district court issued its ruling in March 2007, finding COPA
void for vagueness and not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in protect-
ing minors. Once again, the court held that criminal liability for speakers and service
providers was not the ‘‘least restrictive means’’ to accomplish the government’s pur-
pose because the private use of filtering technologies could more effectively keep harm-
ful materials from children. The Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals later affirmed this
decision, and, in January 2009, the Supreme Court put the legislation to rest—at least
for now—by refusing to hear the case.
Plaintiffs successfully argued that CDA and COPA would chill the provision and
transmission of lawful Internet content in the United States. Faced with the impossible
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task of accurately identifying ‘‘indecent’’ material and preemptively blocking its diffu-
sion, ISPs would have been prompted to filter arbitrarily and extensively in order to
avoid the threat of criminal liability, while writers and publishers would feel compelled
to self-censor.
Stymied at restricting the publication of explicit material, congressional leaders
changed their focus to regulating what someone might hear, rather than what they
say. The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) of 2000 forced public schools and
libraries to use Internet filtering technology as a condition of receiving federal E-Rate
funding. A school or library seeking to receive or retain federal funds for Internet access
must certify to the FCC that it has installed or will install technology that filters or
blocks material deemed to be obscene, child pornography, or material ‘‘harmful to
minors.’’16 The Supreme Court rejected First Amendment challenges to CIPA, holding
that speakers had no right of access to libraries and that patrons could request unblock-
ing.17 In response, some libraries and schools have rejected E-Rate funding,18 but most
have felt financially compelled to install the filters.
In the aftermath of CDA, COPA, and CIPA, Internet filtering in the United States is
carried out largely by private manufacturers. These companies compete for market
share in a lucrative business area. Schools, businesses, parents, and other parties wish-
ing to block access to certain content have a broad range of software packages available
to them.19 While some programs filter heavily, permitting access only to a ‘‘white list’’
of preapproved sites (for example, those appropriate for young children), others gener-
ate blacklists of blocked sites through a combination of automated screenings of the
Web, staff members who ‘‘rate’’ sites on appropriateness, and user complaints.
Although CIPA mandates the presence of filtering technology in schools and libraries
receiving subsidized Internet access, it effectively delegates blocking discretion to the
developers and operators of that technology. The criteria ‘‘obscene,’’ ‘‘child pornogra-
phy,’’ and ‘‘harmful to minors’’ are defined by CIPA and other existing legislation, but
strict adherence to these rather vague legal definitions is beyond the capacity of filters
and inherently subject to the normative and technological choices made during the
software design process. Moreover, while CIPA permits the disabling of filters for adults
and, in some instances, minors ‘‘for bona fide research or other lawful purposes,’’20
it entrusts school and library administrators with deactivating the filters, giving them
considerable power over access to online content. Once FCC certification requirements
have been met, it is these individuals who shoulder the burden of ensuring access to
constitutionally protected material.21
Attempts to filter Internet content in the United States have also reached the state
level. In 2004, Pennsylvania authorized the state attorney general’s office to force
ISPs to block Pennsylvania residents’ access to sites that the attorney general’s office
identified as child pornography.22 A district court struck down this regulation as
unconstitutional where this state law in effect was regulating activity occurring
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wholly outside the state’s borders, but did not strike down the act due to over-
breadth.23 The court noted that ‘‘there is an abundance of evidence that implementa-
tion of the Act has resulted in massive suppression of speech protected by the First
Amendment.’’24
The complexities of government-led efforts to restrict online speech have given rise
to quasi-voluntary initiatives supported by the force of law. Since possession and distri-
bution of child pornography are criminal acts in the United States, service providers re-
spond to removal requests and report any requests to the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children. In June 2008, the New York state attorney general signed
an agreement with Comcast, AT&T, Inc., AOL, Verizon Communications, Inc., Time
Warner Cable, and Sprint to purge their servers of child pornography identified by
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.25 The agreement attempts
to curtail access to child pornography by implementing a new system to rapidly
identify child pornography images as well as responding to user complaints about
child pornography. In addition, several ISPs agreed to stop supporting access to
Usenet newsgroups, identified by the attorney general’s office as a source of child
pornography.
The desire to protect children from harm online continues to drive efforts at content-
based restrictions on the Internet. Law enforcement agencies use pressure to convince
private companies to take on voluntary Internet regulatory initiatives. Concerns over
child safety online have focused attention on the potential risks associated with time
spent on social network sites such as Facebook and MySpace, where children may
come into contact with sexual predators and be subject to cyberbullying by their peers.
Law enforcement officials in the United States have been vocal in promoting age and
identity verification systems in order to better police online sites frequented by
minors.26 The Internet Safety Technical Task Force, a group of technology companies,
Internet businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and academics, was brought
together by agreement with 49 U.S. state attorneys general to study the use of technol-
ogies by industry and end users to promote Internet safety for minors. The task force
report of January 2009 recommended a model of collaboration among industry groups,
law enforcement, and others rather than implementation of a series of mandatory
technical controls to protect children online.
Another U.S. legislative attempt to control online speech, the Megan Meier Cyber-
bullying Prevention Act, would criminalize ‘‘severe, repeated and hostile’’ speech on-
line.27 This proposed legislation, named after a girl who committed suicide thought to
be induced by online harassment, has been harshly criticized as unnecessary, given the
existing off-line remedies for harassment, and for its potential impact on protected on-
line speech, as it could be applied to many incidents of online speech far beyond the
cyberbullying targeted by the legislation.28 Seventeen of the 50 states have passed laws
against cyberbullying.29
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While legislators in the United States have pursued broader definitions of offenses
and mandates on Internet filtering, Canada has tended to act conservatively in re-
sponse to online obscenity. In its response to online sexually explicit material, Canada
has made only de minimis amendments to preexisting law.30 Legislators have simply
revised existing obscenity provisions to encompass online offenses. For example, the
passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2001 established online acts of distrib-
uting and accessing child pornography and luring a child as crimes.31 The Criminal
Code mandates a system for judicial review of material (including online material)
alleged to be child pornography. It does not, however, require ISPs to judge the legality
of content posted on their servers or to take corrective action prior to a judicial deter-
mination.32 If a judge determines that the material in question is illegal, ISPs may
be required to take it down and help the court identify and locate the person who
posted it.33
There have been instances in Canada of ISPs attempting to filter content hosted out-
side of Canada despite regulatory uncertainty in the area. For three days in July 2005,
the Canadian ISP Telus blocked access to a Web site run by members of the Telecom-
munication Workers Union during a labor dispute containing what Telus argued was
proprietary information and photographs that threatened the security and privacy of
its employees.34 This unilateral action by Telus deviated from the general practice
of Canadian ISPs to pass on any and all information without regard for content in
exchange for immunity from liability over content.35 This action also conflicted with
Section 36 of the Canadian Telecommunications Act, which states that, without the
approval of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC), a ‘‘Canadian carrier shall not control the content or influence the meaning or
purpose of telecommunications carried by it for the public.’’36 Telus’s blocking also
affected the customers of other ISPs that connect via Telus.37 The matter was resolved
when Telus was able to obtain court orders from Alberta and British Columbia requir-
ing the Web site operator, who lives and works in Canada, to remove the offending
materials (the site was hosted in the United States).38
In August 2006, Canadian human rights lawyer Richard Warman filed an application
with the CRTC to authorize Canadian ISPs to block access to two hate speech sites
hosted outside of Canada.39 The CRTC denied the application, but the decision recog-
nized that although the CRTC cannot require Canadian ISPs to block content, it could
authorize them to do so. However, the CRTC noted that the ‘‘scope of this power has
yet to be explored.’’40 In a 2009 decision by an Ontario court, Richard Warman was
successful at getting an order for a Web site to disclose the identities of eight of its
anonymous contributors.41 The decision has been appealed by the defendants.42 The
rules that the court relied on were general duty of disclosure rules in Ontario civil pro-
cedure that were not written with the intent of applying to this situation. The state of
court involvement in online speech therefore remains uncertain.
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In November 2006, Canada’s largest ISPs launched Project Cleanfeed Canada in part-
nership with Cybertip.ca, the nation’s child sexual exploitation tipline. The project,
modeled after a similar initiative in the United Kingdom, is intended to protect ISP cus-
tomers ‘‘from inadvertently visiting foreign Web sites that contain images of children
being sexually abused and that are beyond the jurisdiction of Canadian legal author-
ities.’’43 Acting on complaints from Canadians about images found online, Cybertip.ca
analysts assess the reported information and forward potentially illegal material to the
appropriate foreign jurisdiction. If a URL is approved for blocking by two analysts, it
may be added to the Cleanfeed distribution list. Each of the participating ISPs volunta-
rily blocks this list without knowledge of the sites it contains, precluding ISP involve-
ment in the evaluation of URLs. Blocked sites fail to load, but attempts to access them
are not monitored and users are not tracked.44
Since Project Cleanfeed Canada is a voluntary program, the blocking mechanism is
up to the discretion of the ISPs. Sasktel, Bell Canada, and Telus all claim to block only
specific URLs, not IP addresses, in an attempt to avoid overblocking.45 Beside the sig-
nificant public outcry that would most likely occur, overblocking itself may be illegal
under the Telecommunications Act mentioned previously.
Under Section 163 of the Canadian Criminal Code, accessing child pornography—as
well as making it accessible—is unlawful.46 Therefore, the filtering of such content
does not infringe on rights of access or speech afforded by the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms within Canada’s constitution. Moreover, because ISP participa-
tion in Project Cleanfeed is voluntary, the blocking of sites through the project cannot
be said to be state sponsored. However, the project remains controversial for other rea-
sons. First, Project Cleanfeed has not yet sought or received authorization from the
CRTC. Second, the blacklist maintained by Cybertip.ca remains secret, as publishing a
‘‘directory’’ of child pornography would itself be illegal. This lack of transparency inevi-
tably generates distrust of the list and the process by which it is compiled. Third, the
procedure for appealing the blocking of a site may have implications for anonymity.47
A content owner or ISP customer may complain to the ISP or directly to Cybertip.ca,
which will reassess the site and, if necessary, obtain an independent and binding judg-
ment from the National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre. It is unclear whether
this process might expose the complainant’s identity and create a potential for abuse
of that individual’s rights by the ISP or perhaps even by authorities.
Canada’s response to online obscenity and its voluntary filtering initiative are mini-
mal in contrast to the more vigorous regulatory efforts of the United States.
Regulation of Online Gambling
In 2006, the United States House of Representatives passed legislation designed to limit
online gambling by prohibiting the transfer of funds to gambling sites. The Unlawful
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Internet Gambling and Enforcement Act (UIGEA), which was slipped into the SAFE
Port Act,48 banned gambling, prohibited online poker sites and other betting compa-
nies from ‘‘knowingly accepting’’ money from United States–based customers, and
encouraged financial institutions to deny Internet gambling transactions. Since the
act’s inception, its legality has been in question.49
Two states in the United States have attempted to further limit gambling online. In
October 2008, a circuit court judge in the state of Kentucky granted a request by the
governor to have 141 Web sites used by online gaming operations transferred to state
control.50 In January 2009, following a petition filed by members of the Center for
Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the American
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky,51 a Kentucky appeals court overturned the judge’s
request.52 In May 2009, John Willems, director of the Alcohol and Gambling Enforce-
ment Division (AGED) of Minnesota’s Department of Public Safety (DPS), filed an order
requiring that 11 ISPs, including Comcast, Charter, and Verizon Wireless, prevent state
residents from reaching approximately 200 gambling sites.53 iMEGA (Interactive
Media, Entertainment, and Gaming Association) had filed a lawsuit against Willems
seeking an injunction to block implementation of the AGED order,54 which was later
dropped when the Minnesota DPS reached a settlement with iMEGA. ISPs are no
longer required to block state residents’ access to gambling sites.55
In 2008, Representative Barney Frank (Democrat, Massachusetts) again announced
plans to introduce legislation aimed at overturning the UIGEA.56 He had failed a previ-
ous attempt in 2007 in the form of an act entitled the Internet Gambling Regulation
and Enforcement Act.57
The legality of online gambling in Canada is unclear, as few gaming cases exist to
provide guidelines, although persons running online gaming operations can be subject
to criminal liability.58 As a result, offshore gambling sites are currently legal to use in
Canada.59 Advertising of such services is generally held to be illegal in Canada.
Defamation
As in other countries, the potential for legal liability for civil violations, including def-
amation and copyright, constrains the publishers of Internet content and certain ser-
vice providers in the United States and Canada. These pressures can have a ‘‘chilling
effect’’ on lawful online content and conduct, and can threaten the anonymity of
users. The content and court adjudication of such laws constitute state action, even
when the lawsuits and threats are brought by private individuals or entities.
One crucial factor in determining liability for defamation is the provider’s relation to
the content—whether the provider functioned as a carrier, distributor, or publisher of
the defamatory content. In the United States the common law has been overridden by
a federal statute, a holdover portion of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. 230. A key part of the CDA
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survived judicial scrutiny. Section 230 immunizes ISPs for many of their users’ actions
including defamation (copyright and criminal activity is excluded): ‘‘No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.’’60 Moreover,
the First Amendment shields speakers from liability for much speech about public
figures.61
Canada has no statutory equivalent to the statutory protection for ISPs under CDA
230. However, Canadian case law suggests that ISPs are entitled to a certain degree of
immunity: in June 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that ISPs
cannot be held liable for violations of Canadian copyright law committed by their sub-
scribers.62 The decision ruled that the act of caching content by an ISP would not make
it liable and that an ISP’s knowledge of potential infringements by subscribers is not
necessarily sufficient to create liability either.63 In Canada, ISPs are therefore able to es-
cape liability if they prove that they are merely acting as ‘‘conduits.’’64 They may, how-
ever, face liability as publishers if they exercise editorial control over material. This
situation stands in contrast to the United States, where CDA 230 provides publisher
immunity to ISPs, limited only where the provider or host has acted as an ‘‘informa-
tion content provider’’ and actually created some or all of the content.65 An important
caveat to the U.S. immunity is that it does not apply to intellectual property law—
while the Canadian situation exemplified in the case described earlier does provide im-
munity to ISPs regarding intellectual property matters such as copyright.66 Overall,
both Canadian and U.S. service providers receive legal protections that favor the pro-
tection of free speech online. Canadian ISPs, however, lack the clearly set out statutory
protection that exists in the United States and may feel compelled to take down alleg-
edly defamatory content (e.g., postings to message boards) when threatened with the
possibility of costly lawsuits.
Copyright
U.S. copyright law has evolved more quickly than Canadian law both in addressing the
issue of ISP liability and in encouraging removal of infringing material. The Online
Copyright Limitations of Liability Act, a part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) of 1998,67 gives service providers a ‘‘safe harbor’’ from liability for their users’
copyright infringement provided they implement copyright policies and provides the
legal basis for a notice-and-takedown regime. Where a service provider unknowingly
transmits, caches, retains, or furnishes a link to infringing material by means of an au-
tomatic technical process, it is protected from liability so long as it promptly removes
or blocks access to the material upon notice of a claimed infringement.68 Section 512
(c) of the DMCA69 provides that ‘‘a service provider shall not be liable for monetary re-
lief, . . . , for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason
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of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
. . . if the service provider
1 does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on
the system or network is infringing;
1 in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent; or
1 upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or dis-
able access to, the material;
1 does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and
1 upon notification, . . . responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the ma-
terial that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.’’
The notice-and-takedown provisions of the DMCA have been put to broad use and
have proven to be an effective instrument for combating copyright infringement on-
line. This has also been seen as giving copyright owners—potentially anyone who has
fixed an ‘‘original work of authorship’’—unwarranted leverage over service providers
and their subscribers. When a provider is notified of an alleged infringement, risk aver-
sion encourages it to remove or disable access to the specified material, probably with-
out first informing the subscriber. The subscriber may file a counternotice and have the
content restored if the copyright owner does not file a claim in court, but such chal-
lenges are rare.70 Subscribers, like the providers hosting their Web sites, are more likely
to concede to takedown pressures, even when an infringement may not actually be
occurring. If a subscriber is sued, his or her identity may be subpoenaed, as in cases of
defamation, and with similarly little judicial scrutiny.71 Major search engines such as
Google comply with hundreds of removal requests a month, even though it is not
even clear that provision of a hyperlink would incur copyright liability.72
When Canada began to consider amending its copyright laws, it appeared to be fol-
lowing in the footsteps of the United States. In 2004, the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Canadian Heritage retabled its Interim Report on Copyright Reform,
which proposed a ‘‘notice and takedown’’ policy similar to that of the DMCA, under
which Canadian service providers would be compelled to remove content immediately
upon receiving notice of an alleged infringement from a professed copyright holder.
The report came under fire from the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest
Clinic (CIPPIC), Digital Copyright Canada, and the Public Interest Advocacy Centre
(PIAC); numerous petitions and critiques followed, calling for balance between the
rights of content creators and fair public use.73 The ‘‘Canadian DMCA’’ has since been
proposed, in the form of Bill C-61 in 2008, which appears to be even more restrictive
that the U.S. DMCA.74 The consensus on this bill is that it is unlikely to pass, although
it continues to be a priority of the Conservative government.75
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With no legislation yet enacted, Canadian ISPs have implemented a ‘‘notice and
notice’’ policy for handling copyright infringement. This policy would be continued
under Bill C-61.76 ‘‘Notice and notice’’ was a concept originally proposed in the now-
defunct Bill C-60, which was dropped from the legislative agenda in 2005 with the
collapse of the Liberal government.77 Under this policy, copyright owners send notices
to ISPs regarding possible copyright infringement by subscribers. Providers then for-
ward these notices to their subscribers—instead of being obligated themselves to re-
move the content.78 Even though the notices do not mean that immediate legal
action will follow if infringing activities do not cease, they have been successful in get-
ting significant portions of infringing subscribers to remove their materials.79
Legal protections against defamation and copyright infringement afforded under
U.S. and Canadian law are in tension with the rights of service providers and Internet
users. This often gives rise to the censoring and self-censoring of material. Canadian
service providers erring on the side of caution may remove content from subscribers’
sites, as U.S. providers do when informed of alleged copyright violations. User material
is therefore subject to censorship based on unsubstantiated claims. Moreover, because
subpoenas offer plaintiffs an avenue for ascertaining subscribers’ identities without
scrutiny, the potential for misuse of these subpoenas can instill a fear of improper
discovery in subscribers that leads to self-censorship. These chilling effects have been
well documented,80 and while they are indirect rather than direct state-mandated fil-
tering, they constitute real censorship of online speech.81
Computer Security
Security concerns drive many of the state-mandated limitations on the speech and pri-
vacy interests of citizens. These security concerns in the United States and Canada take
two forms: national security and computer security.
Computer security has led to certain content restrictions in the United States and
Canada. Concerns about unwanted messages reaching computers, in various flavors of
spam, have prompted content-based restrictions such as the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 in
the United States. In Canada, a National Task Force on Spam was convened in 2005 to
study the spam problem.82 While some laws, such as the Personal Information Protec-
tion and Electronic Documents Act, were found to at least tangentially apply to spam,
the task force found a need for legislation directly limiting spam that originates in Can-
ada.83 The ‘‘Anti-Spam Bill’’ was finally tabled by the Canadian Government on April
24, 2009, as the Electronic Commerce Protection Act (Bill C-27) and is headed for com-
mittee review.84 Government materials accompanying the release of Canada’s ECPA
point to plans to establish a Spam Reporting Centre similar to the U.S. FTC reporting
mechanism.85 The U.S. Congress has considered a range of options for limiting the free
flow of bits across the Internet to address the problem of malicious software infecting
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computers, though most of the efforts to filter information based upon content
deemed to be computing security risks are carried out by private firms or individuals
on a voluntary basis.86 Calls are also being made to promote greater responsibility
among ISPs for malicious software spread over their networks in order to contain the
worst of ‘‘zombie’’ computers sending spam and distributing malware, in the interest
of preserving network safety for other connected PCs. In sum, there is still an active,
ongoing discussion about how and why regulation of the flow of obviously malicious
code over the Internet might take place.87
Network Neutrality
As a new Federal Communications Commission begins its work in the Obama Admin-
istration, network neutrality and the problem of bandwidth throttling are near the top
of the list of issues it must tackle. One common mode of filtering Internet traffic is for
ISPs to discriminate based upon the type or amount of data sent or requested through
the network. Many people have had the experience of seeking to send an e-mail to a
colleague with a large attachment, such as a photo or a video, only to have the e-mail
bounce back with a note stating that an e-mail server along the way had rejected the
message because of its size. Writ large, this same issue arises for ISPs and their users.
Providers practice various forms of network management, where they decide to favor
some data packets over others, often to combat network scourges like spam and mal-
ware. Some ISPs, for instance, allow users only a certain amount of bandwidth for
certain activities. In August 2008, the FCC ruled that Comcast, a large ISP, had vio-
lated federal network neutrality rules when it practiced bandwidth throttling to pre-
vent usage of the BitTorrent service.88 The Comcast decision—a vote of 3–2 by the
commission—marked the first such intervention by the FCC, but by no means
resolved the issue of what kind of reasonable network management ISPs are permitted
to practice. The new Obama administration FCC will likely be called upon to consider
new legislation by Congress, new regulatory systems, and new allegations of infrac-
tions of the sort carried out by Comcast.
Surveillance
Concerns related to national security in the United States have contributed to the
development of an extensive and technologically sophisticated online surveillance
system. The U.S. surveillance system was expanded significantly under the Bush
administration following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Government wiretaps
are reported to have included taps on major Internet interconnect points and data
mining of Internet communications.89 Tapping these interconnect points would give
the government the ability to intercept every overseas communication and many
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domestic ones. The U.S. government has moved to dismiss lawsuits filed against
it and against AT&T by asserting the state secrets privilege; district courts in California
and Michigan have refused to dismiss the lawsuits. If the allegations prove to be true,
they show that the United States maintains the world’s most sophisticated Internet
surveillance regime. The Bush administration also pushed to expand the Communi-
cations Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) to force providers to give law
enforcement wiretap access to electronic communications networks. The attorney
general under the Bush administration, Alberto Gonzales, called for data retention
laws to force ISPs to keep and potentially produce data that could link Internet
subscribers to their otherwise anonymous communications.90 During Barack
Obama’s election campaign, he criticized both the Bush administration’s use of
warrantless surveillance and its reliance on the state secrets privilege, yet in January
2009 defended congressional legislation immunizing telecommunications companies
from lawsuits regarding their participation in the Bush administration’s surveillance
programs.91
The U.S. government is required to produce annual reports on the number of wire-
taps it conducts under Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of
1968 (the ‘‘Wiretap Act’’), as well as communication interceptions conducted under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Pen Register and Trap and
Trace statute (Pen/Trap statute).92 No reports have been provided under the Pen/Trap
statute since 1998.93
In Canada, Part VI of the Criminal Code governs the powers of law enforcement to
engage in electronic surveillance of private communications when conducting crimi-
nal investigations. The Criminal Code requires the production of annual reports on
the details of the interceptions that occur.94 Canadian electronic surveillance for for-
eign intelligence is primarily undertaken by the National Defense’s secretive Commu-
nications Security Establishment (CSE), which operates in close cooperation with its
U.S. counterpart and other allied intelligence networks. A commissioner is appointed
to review the actions of the CSE and produce annual reports commenting on the ad-
herence of the agency to its legislative mandate in the National Defense Act.95 The
commissioner’s annual reports, while providing some oversight, provide little addi-
tional transparency, as no statistics on the number of communications interceptions
are reported.
Conclusion
While there is little technical filtering in either country, the Internet is subject to sub-
stantial state regulation in the United States and Canada. With respect to surveillance,
the United States is believed to be among the most aggressive countries in the world in
terms of listening to online conversations.
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Legislators in both countries have imposed Internet-specific regulation that limits
their citizens’ access to Internet content. In addition, lawmakers have empowered pri-
vate entities to press Internet intermediaries, including ISPs, for content removal or to
carry out filtering. Although the laws are subject to legislative and judicial debate, these
private actions may be less transparent. Governments in both countries, however, have
experienced significant resistance to their content restriction policies, and, as a result,
the extreme measures carried out in some of the more repressive countries of the world
have not taken hold in North America.
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Australia and New Zealand Overview
Australia maintains some of the most restrictive Internet policies of any Western coun-
try and over the past two years has taken steps toward a nationwide mandatory Inter-
net filtering scheme. Its neighbor, New Zealand, regulates the Internet considerably
less rigorously. Australia’s constitution does not explicitly give the right to free
speech,1 and in fact contains a clause giving the Australian government ‘‘communi-
cations power,’’ allowing it to regulate ‘‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other
like services,’’ including the Internet.2 A number of state and territorial governments
in Australia have passed legislation making the distribution of offensive material a
criminal offense, as the constitution does not afford that power to the national
government.3
The Australian government has for some time promoted and financed an ‘‘opt-in’’
filtering program, in which users voluntarily accept filtering software that blocks offen-
sive content hosted outside the country. In 2008, the government announced plans
for a layered filtering scheme, proposing a mandatory filter to block pornographic and
illegal content, as well as an opt-out filter that would block even more content. The
filter, which faces considerable opposition from Australian and international anti-
censorship groups and, in some cases, the ISPs themselves, will first be tested by six
ISPs before going live.4
In contrast, New Zealand has less strict Internet regulations. The government main-
tains a more limited definition of offensive content that can be investigated by a desig-
nated government entity, although—unlike in Australia—the definition includes hate
speech (despite its being illegal in both countries). Furthermore, the government of
New Zealand has not passed legislation to allow issuance of takedown notices for such
content, and its enforcement of Internet content regulation by prosecution almost
solely focuses on child pornography. New Zealand has not yet formalized its copyright
laws and has rejected multiple proposals to do so, most recently scrapping proposed
Section 92A of the Copyright Amendment (New Technologies) Act.5 The country’s def-
amation and surveillance laws are similar to those of Australia. Overall, Australian
Internet regulations are significantly stricter than those of New Zealand and much of
the Western world.
Offensive Content
Australia’s and New Zealand’s approaches to offensive content on the Internet both
rely on government-run content-classification systems. However, their approaches
differ in terms of what is considered offensive and what is done about the offending
content.
Australian laws relating to the censorship of offensive content are based on the
powers delineated in and protections omitted from the Australian constitution. Section
51(v) of the document gives Parliament power to ‘‘make laws for the peace, order, and
good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: (v) postal, telegraphic, tele-
phonic, and other like services.’’6 With no explicit protection of free speech in the
constitution, the Australian government has invoked its ‘‘communications power’’ to
institute a restrictive regime of Internet content regulation.
The Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Bill 1999, an amendment to
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, establishes the authority of the Australian Commu-
nications and Media Authority (ACMA)7 to regulate Internet content. The ACMA is
empowered to look into complaints from Australians about offensive content on the
Internet and issue takedown notices. The ACMA is not mandated to scour the Internet
for potentially prohibited content, but it is allowed to begin investigations without an
outside complaint.8
Web content that is hosted in Australia may be subject to a takedown request from
the ACMA if the Office of Film and Literature Classification finds that it falls within
certain categories as defined by the Commonwealth Classification (Publications, Films
and Computer Games) Act 1995, a cooperative classification system agreed to by the
national, state, and territorial governments.
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The levels and definitions of prohibited content are as follows:
1. R18: Contains material that is likely to be disturbing to those under 18. This content
is not prohibited on domestic hosting sites if there is an age-verification system certi-
fied by the ACMA in place.
2. X18: Contains nonviolent sexually explicit content between consenting adults. This
content may be subject to ACMA takedown provisions if hosted on domestic servers.
3. RC: Contains content that is Refused Classification (child pornography, fetish,
detailed instruction on crime, etc.) and is prohibited on Australian-hosted Web sites.9
The classification system chosen for Internet content is the more restrictive standard
used for films, rather than the publications classification. As a result, some content
allowable offline is banned when brought online.10
Once the determination has been made that content hosted within Australia is pro-
hibited, the ACMA issues a takedown notice to the Internet content provider (ICP). It
is not illegal for the ICP to host prohibited content, but legal action could be taken
against it by the government if it does not comply with the takedown notice.
For offensive content hosted outside of Australia, the ACMA itself determines
whether content is prohibited and notifies a list of certified Web-filter manufacturers
to include the prohibited Web sites in their filters.11 To obtain certification, these certi-
fied ‘‘Family Friendly Filters’’ must agree to keep lists of prohibited sites confidential.12
Providers are then required to offer a Family Friendly Filter to all their customers,
though customers are not required to accept them.13 As a result, content taken down
in Australia could be posted outside the country and still be accessible to the majority
of Australian Internet users. Electronic Frontiers Australia, a nonprofit group dedicated
to protecting online freedoms, reports that at least one Web site taken down has
moved to the United States, even keeping its URL under the ‘‘.au’’ domain. It is not
known how many Web sites have moved overseas in this fashion.14
States and territories in Australia have instituted a variety of laws that criminalize the
downloading of illegal content and the distribution of content that is ‘‘objectionable’’
or ‘‘unsuitable for minors.’’15 The state of Victoria, for example, in Section 57 of its
Classification (Publication, Films and Computer Games) (Enforcement) Act 1995,
makes it illegal to ‘‘use an on-line information service to publish or transmit, or make
available for transmission, objectionable material.’’16 There is no uniformity between
the states, however. In Western Australia, for example, it is not illegal to distribute
R18 and X18 to adults online (though the ACMA can still issue takedown notices),
but the possession of any RC content (not just child pornography, as is the case in
other states) is illegal.17
In March 2007, all mainland states in Australia banned access to YouTube over
school networks because of an uploaded video depicting a 17-year-old Australian girl
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being abused, beaten, and humiliated by a group of young people. Eight youths have
been charged in connection with the assault.18 School blocking of YouTube has faced
opposition, notably from Google executive Vint Cerf, who noted his belief that ‘‘many
young people have those skills that may be well beyond those of their parents and
their teachers and will find ways of accessing information.’’19
The Commonwealth is also implementing new Internet filtering initiatives. In June
2006, the Australian government announced an AUD 116.6 million initiative, ‘‘Pro-
tecting Australian Families Online.’’ The initiative included AUD 93.3 million to be
spent over three years to provide all families with free Web filters. The government
also announced that it would test an ISP-level blocking system in Tasmania. At the
time, Helen Coonan, the minister for communications, information technology, and
the arts, opposed implementing this system on a countrywide basis.20
However, in December 2007, Telecommunications Minister Stephen Conroy
announced a strengthened ‘‘clean feed’’ policy, under which all Australian ISPs are
required to provide Internet filtering services that prevent child pornography and other
‘‘inappropriate’’ material from reaching schools and houses.21 Those who link to
banned sites from their own sites will be fined AUD 11,000 per day.22 Instead of opting
in to the program, as users did under the 2006 initiative, users who wish to see adult
material must opt out (there is no opt-out for illegal content). In conjunction with
the new policy, the ACMA released a set of updated regulations entitled the Restricted
Access System Declaration of 2007,23 requiring content service providers to implement
age-verification systems on all Web sites containing mature or adult content.24 As of
April 2009, ACMA was still conducting trials for ISP-level content filtering; eight ISPs
had agreed to participate.25
The plan was initially kept under wraps. In October 2008, a policy advisor in Con-
roy’s office sent an e-mail to the Internet Industry Association (IIA) instructing the IIA
to inform ISPs that they must keep quiet about the country’s filtering scheme.26 The
incident was widely reported by the Australian press, and several heads of ISPs spoke
out against what they considered to be an attempt at censorship.27
One concern of those opposed to the scheme is the potential for nonillegal Web sites
to be banned, a fear that has turned out not to be unfounded. In March 2009, ACMA
added pages from the whistle-blowing site Wikileaks to its blacklist of banned URLs
after the site published a secret Internet censorship list for Denmark.28 In doing so,
Australia became one of only three countries in the world to censor the site—the other
two are China and the United Arab Emirates. In retaliation, a group of anonymous acti-
vists published ACMA’s confidential blacklist on Wikileaks.29
Although New Zealand has not yet instituted a filtering scheme like that which Aus-
tralia is working to implement, a vaguely worded page on the Department of Internal
Affairs’ (DIA) special censorship page entitled ‘‘Censorship and the Internet’’ states that
the department ‘‘takes a proactive role in prosecuting New Zealanders who trade
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objectionable material via the Internet. If a publication is categorised as ‘objectionable’
it is automatically banned by the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act
1993.’’30 Electronic Frontiers Australia has stated that this act likely covers Internet
materials as well.31 Under the act, any material that ‘‘describes, depicts, expresses, or
otherwise deals with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a
manner that the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public
good’’ is considered objectionable and is illegal to distribute or possess.32 Specifically,
any material that promotes or supports ‘‘the exploitation of children, or young per-
sons, or both, for sexual purposes; or the use of violence or coercion to compel any
person to participate in, or submit to, sexual conduct; or sexual conduct with or upon
the body of a dead person; or the use of urine or excrement in association with degrad-
ing or dehumanizing conduct or sexual conduct; or Bestiality; or acts of torture or the
infliction of extreme violence or extreme cruelty’’ is banned.33 There is also a decision
procedure described in the act for any content that might be objectionable but does not
fall within this specific list, including discriminatory and hateful material.34 This law
has formed the basis of the DIA’s enforcement of Internet censorship in the country.
Like Australia’s ACMA, the DIA ‘‘proactively’’ investigates potentially banned mate-
rial35 and submits any such material not already classified to the Office of Film and
Literature Classification for a ruling.36 This office then classifies the material as ‘‘un-
restricted’’ or ‘‘objectionable,’’ except in certain circumstances of restricted access or
for ‘‘educational, professional, scientific, literary, artistic, or technical purposes.’’37
There is, however, no explicit legal mechanism for the takedown of objection-
able material. Instead, the nonprofit InternetNZ is in the process of establishing an
industry-wide code of conduct that would require its signatories to agree not to host
illegal content.38 As a result, the government focuses its efforts on prosecuting the dis-
tributors or possessors. The Films, Videos, and Publications Classifications Amendment
Act 2005 sets the penalty for distributing objectionable material at a maximum of ten
years in prison (up from a maximum of one year) and for knowingly possessing objec-
tionable materials at a maximum of five years in prison or a NZD 50,000 fine.39 Accord-
ing to various sources, the DIA has almost completely focused its enforcement of
Internet censorship on child pornography.40
Hate Speech
Both Australia and New Zealand have legislation addressing hate speech generally, and
both have applied this legislation to the Internet through different means. New Zea-
land, however, has an institutionalized investigation system, while Australia does not.
Australia addresses hate speech through the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which
makes it ‘‘unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if: the act is
reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate
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another person or a group of people; and the act is done because of the race, colour or
national or ethnic origin of the other person, or of some or all of the people in the
group.’’41
Australian courts applied this law to the Internet for the first time in October 2002
in the Jones v. Töben case. Jeremy Jones and the Executive Council of Australian Jewry
brought a lawsuit against Frederick Töben, the director of the Adelaide Institute, be-
cause of material on Töben’s Web site (www.adelaideinstitute.org) that denied the
Holocaust. The Federal Court, ruling that publication on the Internet without pass-
word protection is a ‘‘public act,’’ found that posting this material online was in direct
violation of Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (quoted earlier) and
called for the material to be removed from the Internet.42
Australia does not, however, give the ACMA authority to investigate complaints or
issue takedown notices for hateful or racist materials online, even if they would be ille-
gal under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.43 Schedule 5 of the Broadcast Services
Act 1992 gives the ACMA authority only over materials deemed ‘‘offensive’’ within
the classification scheme described earlier. As a result, there appears to be no venue
other than the courts in which to pursue complaints about hateful or racist materials
online. However, Chilling Effects reports that Google received notice on May 5, 2006,
of a site in its search results that ‘‘allegedly violates section 18C of the Racial Discrimina-
tion Act 1975’’ and removed it from the Google Australia site (www.google.com.au).44
This action may be indicative of a new notice-based system taking form.
New Zealand, in contrast, has both explicit prohibition of discrimination based on
race, religion, age, disability, and sexual orientation in Section 21(1) of the Human
Rights Act 199345 and explicit prohibition of the publication of material that ‘‘repre-
sents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any particular class of the
public are inherently inferior to other members of the public by reason of any charac-
teristic of members of that class, being a characteristic that is a prohibited ground of
discrimination specified in Section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993’’46 in Section
3e of the Films, Videos, and Publication Classifications Act 1993. The DIA uses these
statutes to pursue investigations into potentially discriminatory material.
Copyright
Australia’s copyright laws underwent a significant overhaul following the acceptance
of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement in 2004. Pursuant to that agree-
ment, Australia was required to bring its copyright laws closer in line with those of
the United States.47 Some of the relevant requirements included the following:
1. Agreeing to World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet treaties.
2. Implementing an ‘‘expeditious’’ takedown system of copyright-infringing materials.
396 Australia and New Zealand Overview
3. Strengthening control over copyright protection technology circumvention.
4. Agreeing to copyright protection standards.
5. Increasing the length of copyright to life plus seventy years from its previous level
of life plus fifty years.48
Most of these provisions were implemented in the U.S. Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act 2004, though new regulations in response to requirement 3 were
recently implemented in the Copyrights Amendment Act 2006.49
After implementing a system of copyright more consistent with that of the United
States, the Australian government decided to pursue another overhaul of its copyright
laws in 2006, as ABC Science Online reports, to ‘‘keep up with the rapidly changing dig-
ital landscape.’’50 The proposed amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 were worri-
some to many. Google argued that certain provisions would allow copyright owners
to pursue legal action against it and other search engines for caching material without
obtaining express permission from each Web site. These provisions would ‘‘condemn
the Australian public to the pre-Internet era,’’ Google argued.51 Other critics contended
that the proposed amendments would make possession of an iPod or other music-
listening device designed to play MP3 files illegal, and uploading a video of oneself
singing along to a pop song a crime.52
Although these two final concerns have been remedied in the resulting Copyrights
Amendment Act 2006 (it is still legal to own an iPod and it is allowable to post a lip-
synching video),53 the caching issue still appears to be unresolved. There is an excep-
tion in the act that allows computer networks of educational institutions to cache
copyright-protected online material ‘‘to facilitate efficient later access to the works and
other subject-matter by users of the system.’’54 However, this provision does not ap-
pear to offer the exception that Google sought.
Overall, though, the amendments allow for a greater number of exceptions to the
copyright laws to establish more realistic fair use of copyrighted material, such as
‘‘time-shifting, format-shifting and space-shifting’’ (recording a television show to
watch later, scanning a book to view it electronically, and transferring material from
CDs to iPods, respectively), and greater protection of parody and satire.55
The Australian judiciary has been active in copyright enforcement online as well. In
a landmark decision in December 2006, the Federal Court upheld a lower court ruling
that found the Web site operator of mp3s4free.net, Stephen Cooper, and the hosting
ISP, E-Talk, liable for copyright infringement. Cooper’s site did not itself host any copy-
right-protected material, but rather served as a search engine through which users
could find and download copyright-protected music for free. In its ruling, the court
found that merely linking to copyright-protected material was grounds for infringe-
ment. In addition, the court found that ISP E-Talk was also liable for copyright in-
fringement because it posted advertisements on the site and was unwilling to take the
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site down.56 Interestingly, Dale Clapperton, of Electronic Frontiers Australia, has
argued that this decision could be used against search engines such as Google. In an
article in the Sydney Morning Herald, he stated that ‘‘what Cooper was doing is basically
the exact same thing that Google does, except Google acts as a search engine for every
type of file, while this site only acts as a search engine for MP3 files.’’57
In New Zealand, recent attempts to regulate copyright law to include digital provi-
sions have been rejected by the national government.58 Therefore, New Zealand’s cur-
rent law is contained within the Copyright Act 1994. The term of a copyright is set at
life plus fifty years.59
The Copyright (New Technologies and Performers’ Rights) Amendment Bill cur-
rently being considered in New Zealand, however, would dramatically change the dig-
ital copyright landscape into one that more closely mirrors the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) of the United States. If passed, the bill would allow for format
shifting and space shifting of music,60 criminalize the distribution of the means to sub-
vert technological protection measures protecting copyrighted content, and establish a
system in which ISPs are required to remove copyright-infringing content and notify
the poster if the ISP ‘‘obtains knowledge or becomes aware that the material is infring-
ing.’’61 This removal system is somewhat different from the U.S. system of notice and
takedown in that it requires knowledge of infringement and not simply notification.62
Defamation
Through a variety of court cases, both Australia and New Zealand have applied their
respective defamation laws to the Internet, and both countries, with New Zealand
courts following the Australian courts’ example, have controversially expanded their
jurisdiction in defamation suits to online materials hosted outside their borders.
Defamation in Australia, except for a small range of cases, is handled through state
and territorial law;63 until December 2005, states and territories maintained largely
nonuniform codes of defamation.64 After what amounted to a threat that the Com-
monwealth would act if states and territories did not, the states and territories finally
decided to enact uniform laws in December 2005.65 Since defamation laws are applied
where material is seen, read, or experienced, nonuniform laws meant that writers and
publishers had to be wary of different sets of laws all over the country under which
they might be sued under various definitions of defamation.66 Now the laws are uni-
form, so this liability risk has been mitigated. No legislation specifically targets defama-
tion on the Internet, and, therefore, its regulation is essentially the same as that for all
other publications.67
The judiciary has played an important role in setting online defamation policy be-
cause of jurisdictional issues. In a major decision in December 2002, the Australian
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High Court ruled that a party within Australia can sue a foreign party in Australian
court for defamation resulting from an online article hosted on a foreign server. The
specific case involved a lawsuit pitting Joseph Gutnick, an Australian businessman,
against Dow Jones over a defamatory article written about him in Barron’s Online in
October 2000. Dow Jones argued that since its servers (and therefore the article) were
in the United States, the defamation case should have been tried in the United States.
A decision allowing the case to be tried in Australia, they argued, would restrict free
speech around the world because it would require authors and publishers to take into
account the laws of foreign countries under which they could be sued when publishing
material online.68
The court countered, however, that the ‘‘spectre of ‘global liability’ should not be
exaggerated. Apart from anything else, the costs and practicalities of bringing proceed-
ings against a foreign publisher will usually be a sufficient impediment to discourage
even the most intrepid of litigants. Further, in many cases of this kind, where the pub-
lisher is said to have no presence or assets in the jurisdiction, it may choose simply to
ignore the proceedings. It may save its contest to the courts of its own jurisdiction
until an attempt is later made to enforce there the judgment obtained in the foreign
trial. It may do this especially if that judgment was secured by the application of laws,
the enforcement of which would be regarded as unconstitutional or otherwise offen-
sive to a different legal culture.’’69 The parties eventually settled for AUD 180,000 in
damages and AUD 400,000 in legal fees.’’70
New Zealand defamation law was first found to apply to online material in a district
court decision, O’Brien v. Brown, in late 2001. In the case, Patrick O’Brien, chief ex-
ecutive officer of the New Zealand domain manager Domainz, sued Alan Brown, the
head of a Manawatu ISP, for Brown’s posting of harsh criticisms and calls for fraud
investigation into Domainz on a publicly available Internet Society of New Zealand
bulletin board.71 The judge in the case found that the Internet afforded no additional
freedom of expression to the defendant than any other medium and, further, that pub-
lication on the Internet required a greater award of damages than through another
medium because of the ease with which Domainz’s potential customers and clients
could access the defamatory material.72
In addition, the New Zealand courts have followed Australia’s example in determin-
ing the jurisdiction for defamation suits over online content hosted in a foreign coun-
try. Ironically, the relevant suit involved an Australian defendant. In 2004, the
Wellington High Court found that the University of Newlands (based in New Zealand)
could sue Nationwide News, Ltd. (based in Australia) in New Zealand court for Nation-
wide’s inclusion of the plaintiff in a list of ‘‘Wannabe Unis’’ and ‘‘degree mills’’ in its
online newspaper, The Australian. This ruling more closely aligned New Zealand defa-
mation policy with Australia.73
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Surveillance
Both Australia and New Zealand have taken steps toward greater Internet security, pass-
ing laws to give government agencies greater authority to investigate illegal activities
online.
Australia’s Internet surveillance regime is primarily based on two laws. The first is the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. This act, amended in June
2006, prohibits intercepting telecommunications or accessing, without first notifying
both the sender and the receiver, stored telecommunications by any person or entity,
except in cases such as the installation or maintenance of telecommunications equip-
ment.74 It also establishes two warrant systems, controlled by the attorney general, by
which law enforcement may gain access to these communications: ‘‘telecommuni-
cations service warrants’’ (for real-time interception) and ‘‘stored communications
warrants’’ (for access to stored communications without a requirement to notify the
communicants).75
The second relevant law is the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, which significantly
increases the authority of law enforcement to install surveillance devices such as
keystroke recorders under newly created ‘‘surveillance device warrants.’’76 Electronic
Frontiers Australia has expressed worry that these warrants will be used by law enforce-
ment to avoid applying for a telecommunications service warrant, essentially allowing
them to intercept communications where a telecommunications service warrant would
not have been authorized.77
Further, in 2003, the Australian Internet Industry Association (IIA) attempted to
establish a code of practice requiring ISP signatories to retain user information for six
or twelve months and provide it to law enforcement upon official request. Specifically,
personal data—such as name, address, and credit card details—were to be retained by
ISPs for six months after a customer ends service with that ISP or twelve months after
the record is created, whichever is longer. Operational data, such as proxy logs and
e-mail information, were to be kept for six months after creation of the data.78 Law
enforcement could request this information using the certificate system set up in the
Telecommunications Act 1997,79 which allows private information to be disclosed if
‘‘an authorized officer of a criminal law-enforcement agency has certified that the dis-
closure is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law.’’80
In New Zealand, the most relevant piece of legislation to Internet security is Sup-
plemental Order Paper 85 to the Crimes Amendment Bill No. 6, passed in 2003. The
act essentially makes it illegal to hack or intercept electronic communications, but
exempts the police, the Security Intelligence Service, and the Government Communi-
cations Security Bureau acting under interception warrants as described by the Crimes
Act 1961. As noted on the Web site of the Green Party, however, these warrants could
be ‘‘quite broad in their application and cover a class of people.’’81
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Conclusion
Australian laws and policies toward the Internet are aligned with those of many
Western countries, while New Zealand’s are less stringent. The Australian government
has instituted a strict takedown regime for offensive content, and various states and
territories have made distribution of such content a criminal offense. The government
is pursuing voluntary programs to increase home filtration of the Internet, and Aus-
tralia’s evolving hate speech, copyright, defamation, and security policies offer further
justification for restricting Internet content. A countrywide ISP-level filtering scheme is
currently being tested.
New Zealand, in contrast, has instituted a more limited classification system—
though it does include hate speech—with no takedown notices and has not yet for-
mally adopted copyright legislation that applies to the Internet. Its broad defamation
and security policies, however, are more reminiscent of Australia.
Overall, however, Australia’s Internet censorship regime is strikingly severe relative
to both its neighbor and similar Western states, and it is helping to push the normative
boundaries of filtering for an industrialized democratic state. It is not, however, at the
level of the most repressive regimes that the OpenNet Initiative has studied.
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The dynamism and creativity driving the development of networked spheres in Asia
showed no signs of abating through the early months of 2009. As more citizens began
to utilize Internet tools for disseminating and producing information, online expres-
sion, activism, and networking have begun to permeate the national political and cul-
tural fabric across the spectrum of Asian countries.
In 2007–2008, the OpenNet Initiative conducted in-country testing in Bangladesh,
China, India, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, Malaysia, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, the Phil-
ippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand. Testing results found filtering practices to
be largely consistent with 2006 results.
China, Burma, and Vietnam continued to rely on pervasive filtering practices to
shape public knowledge and expression by targeting primarily content specific to polit-
ically sensitive topics in their own countries, especially Web sites in local languages.
China, Burma, and Vietnam also continued to block with the greatest breadth and
depth, spanning human rights issues, reform and opposition activities, independent
media and news, and discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities. On the
opposite end of the spectrum, Singapore continued to block a nominal amount of
adult content and pornographic Web sites.
South Korea increased its filtering across content categories to include a selective
number of the Korean-language pornography Web sites, but otherwise remained con-
sistent with its 2006 filtering practices, specifically targeting Web sites containing
North Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North and South Korea,
as well as a handful of gambling Web sites. In contrast to 2006, ONI in 2007–2008
found no evidence of filtering of pornography and religious conversion sites in Paki-
stan. Otherwise, Pakistan continued to engage in security and conflict filtering as well
as social filtering of Web sites containing ‘‘blasphemous’’ content.
The ONI found no evidence of national filtering in Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, or the
Philippines. During ONI testing periods, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia were
not filtering the Internet, but media reported that these countries also began blocking
selectively for brief periods in 2007–2008.
Internet in Asia
Asia continues to be home to some of the most and least connected countries in the
world, while a large middle tier of countries are witnessing rapid and steady growth.
In 2008, Thailand and Vietnam each reached penetration rates of a quarter of their
populations.1 China trailed at 22.6 percent,2 though in 2008 it became the country
with the most Internet users in the world, at 298 million.3 China, where the number
of Internet users increased 42 percent from 2007,4 also saw remarkable growth in
broadband usage. Over 90 percent of Internet users in China had broadband access by
the end of 2008, a spike of over 100 million.5 In contrast, concerns about a saturated
market were prominent in South Korea, which by early 2008 had become the most
penetrated broadband market in the world at 90 percent of households.6 While Malay-
sia, with a penetration rate of 61 percent, trailed behind only Singapore in Southeast
Asia and has strongly encouraged adoption of broadband Internet throughout the
country,7 broadband penetration only surpassed 17 percent in the third quarter of
2008, from 7 percent in 2005.8
On the opposite end of the spectrum, countries with less than a 10 percent Internet
penetration rate including India, Nepal, and the Philippines have been actively pro-
moting and investing in infrastructure and access, particularly in rural areas that have
been affected most profoundly by the digital divide. About 80 percent of Bangladesh’s
fixed-line connections are installed in or around its four largest cities, yet about 80 per-
cent of all Bangladeshis live outside these cities.9 In Nepal, with an Internet penetra-
tion rate of only 1.4 percent,10 the Nepal Wireless Project wirelessly connected 22
remote mountain villages to the Internet in five years, allowing villagers to exchange
information about commodity prices, local goods, and markets, and implemented tele-
medicine facilities.11
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The exception to the general embrace of information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) development has consistently been Burma. The country’s largest ICT devel-
opment at Yadanabon City, supported by foreign investment and set to serve as the
national backbone connecting to China, India, and Thailand, is currently under con-
struction near Mandalay.12 However, the military government under the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) was responsible for one of the most severe crack-
downs on the Internet documented. On September 29, 2007, in order to cut off the
stream of footage and images of its violent response to stopping protests led by monks
and civilians, the SPDC made use of its comprehensive control over the country’s
Internet gateways to completely shut down Internet access (with intermittent periods
of connectivity) for approximately two weeks.13 The government also restricts upload
speeds to half the download speeds for Internet subscribers and frequently implements
slowdowns in Internet access speeds, which many critics claim are attempts to restrict
Internet usage and enhance monitoring capabilities.14
The increasing popularity of interactive Web sites and social media platforms such as
video-sharing sites, Web portals, discussion forums, and blogs has enabled them to
have a resounding impact in Asia. By facilitating the easy production and sharing of
user-generated content, online social media have served as important vehicles for
news dissemination and independent expression, especially in countries where main-
stream media are state controlled or closely aligned with ruling interests. For example,
bloggers have been named the ‘‘fifth estate’’ in Asian countries such as Vietnam, Thai-
land, and China, whose governments maintain strict control over most news and
media outlets. In Malaysia, independent news sites and blogs were credited with pro-
viding opposition parties with a platform to mobilize during the March 2008 general
elections, in which the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition had its worst showing
ever and five bloggers were elected to seats for opposition parties.15 Though Internet
penetration lags in rural areas (representing 15 percent of households with Internet
access),16 alternative messages and information available only online reached beyond
young, middle class, and urban voters through short-message-service (SMS) messages,
video compact discs (VCDs) of online television programming, and printed fliers.17 The
only media organization to provide live coverage of election results, Malaysiakini.com,
has reportedly become the country’s most popular alternative news source and was
one of about ten of the first online news sites granted media accreditation in July
2008.18
In November 2007, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan declared a state of emer-
gency and shut down the country’s independent broadcast media, including news,
sports, and entertainment television stations.19 In response, these stations went online
and offered free broadcasts on their Web sites, while YouTube became the vehicle for
lawyers, journalists, and activists to post footage of protests and other news.20
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Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of citizens utilizing online tools to cir-
cumvent their governments’ control over information occurred during the so-called
Saffron Revolution in Burma. On August 19, 2007, leaders of the 88 Generation stu-
dent movement organized a rally to protest a sudden sharp increase in fuel prices in
Rangoon,21 and over the next month, leadership of the protests passed to Buddhist
monks, with participation swelling to an estimated crowd of 150,000 protesters on Sep-
tember 23.22 Throughout these extraordinary demonstrations and the first days of the
junta’s violent crackdown on monks, students, and others, citizen video journalists
and bloggers fed raw, graphic footage and eyewitness accounts to the outside world
over the Internet and through trusted networks. This vital information was posted by
overseas Burmese news organizations and international media, and fed back into the
country by satellite television and radio, thus achieving a bidirectional flow of informa-
tion only fully cut off when the government implemented a complete shutdown of the
Internet beginning on September 29.23 Despite the Burmese government’s continuous
efforts to restrict Internet access and online expression, the use of blogs and social
media sites for the independent gathering and dissemination of information appears
to have taken hold: in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which devastated
much of the Irrawaddy river delta and left more than 138,000 dead or missing and mil-
lions in need of food, water, shelter, and medical care,24 citizens nevertheless set out to
record the damage as well as the government’s response.25
In Asia, citizens’ application of the array of Internet tools available to them has often
tested societal and cultural boundaries for acceptable behavior. In 2005, a girl in South
Korea who allowed her dog to defecate on the subway was filmed, tracked down, pub-
licly exposed, and ultimately quit her university in humiliation.26 As ‘‘dog poop girl,’’
she became emblematic of an online vigilantism that would drive the implementation
of real-name registration requirements in South Korea. Known in China as ‘‘human
flesh search engines,’’ this phenomenon can thrive across borders. For example, in
April 2008, as groups around the world organized actions around the crackdown on
unrest in Tibet, a Chinese student was filmed attempting to referee between two
opposing groups of protesters at Duke University.27 After the video was posted on
YouTube and other Web sites, the online reaction was swift: she was lambasted in
Chinese-language discussion forums and portals, and her parents living in China
went into hiding after threats were painted on their apartment.28
Since 2006, many Asian governments have quickly realized the potential benefits of
exploiting opportunities for conducting propaganda or public relations strategies over
the Internet, even while cracking down on independent and critical voices thriving in
these online spaces—an example of the evolution toward third-generation controls.
The Chinese government has carefully orchestrated symbolic engagements with its
online citizens as well as mass strategies to boost public relations. On June 20, 2008,
President Hu Jintao participated in his first online chat on the People’s Daily Online’s
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‘‘Strong China’’ (qiangguo) discussion forum,29 while the so-called Fifty Cent Party, in
reference to an estimated 280,000 Web commentators nationwide who zealously sup-
port the Chinese Communist Party and were initially rumored to net 50 cents per post,
are directly organized by the government to ‘‘guide’’ online public opinion.30 In South
Korea, with its credibility badly damaged by protests over the decision to end the ban
on imports of American beef that were largely fueled by Internet debate, President Lee
Myung-bak’s administration ordered government ministries and organizations to begin
blogging in order to inform the public of news and events.31 It took these steps amid
attempts to legislate further restrictions on what it saw to be a proliferation of slanderous
and malicious commentary online. After Malaysia’s general election in March 2008,32
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said that his Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition’s
‘‘biggest mistake’’ in the elections was in believing that the ‘‘cyberwar’’ was unimpor-
tant.33 Even the Burmese government, which has taken the most draconian measures to
keep its citizens off-line, reportedly launched its Web portal www.khitlunge.org.mm, run
by the government-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Association, to ‘‘spread
government propaganda and counter media attacks by exiled Burmese media groups.’’34
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
In 2007–2008, the leadership of many Asian governments facing political threats or
crises took measures to further restrict certain forms of expression on the Internet.
These measures, which especially targeted acts of cyber defamation and independent
news reporting and criticism on social media platforms such as YouTube, reflected the
growing relevance and impact of the Internet as a source of information from indepen-
dent and diverse sources.
In Thailand, ongoing political turmoil between ‘‘red-shirt’’ and ‘‘yellow-shirt’’ fac-
tions, organized around their support of or opposition to former Prime Minister Thak-
sin Shinawatra and the constituencies he championed, led Thai Prime Minister Samak
Sundaravej to declare a state of emergency on September 2, 2008. Upon his declara-
tion, the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology ordered ISPs to
immediately shut down around 400 Web sites and block 1,200 more, all alleged to dis-
turb social order or endanger national security.35 Although these Web sites were report-
edly detected between March and August 2008, the blocking order and simultaneous
requests for court orders required by law were instituted as the Thai government faced
challenges by protesters occupying government buildings and accusations that it com-
mitted electoral fraud by buying votes in the December 2007 election.36
Providing an indication of the types of activities that will be targeted under the
Computer Crimes Act, in March 2009 police arrested the director and moderator of the
political news site www.prachatai.com for reportedly allowing a comment referencing
the royal family to remain on the site for 20 days.37 Chiranuch Premchaiporn was
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arrested under Section 15 of the Computer Crimes Act, which extends the liability for
illegal activities to service providers that intentionally support or consent to them.38
Illegal activities defined in the framework for regulating Internet content include
inputting obscene data; forged or false data likely to cause injury to another person,
the public, or national security; and data that constitute a criminal offense relating to
national security or terrorism.39 Individuals who either input these illegal data, which
include online messages and information, into computer systems or publish or forward
them with the knowledge of these offenses, are subject to a maximum sentence of five
years imprisonment and a THB 100,000 fine.40
In the race to curb the ‘‘harmful’’ effects of social media, user-generated content, and
the unabated growth of online commentary, Asian governments have enacted cyber
crimes laws that purport to deter acts of online defamation and vigilantism, but could
also potentially be applied to stifle citizen journalism. The Thai cyber crimes law
creates civil and criminal liability for individuals who publicly post photographs of
others that are ‘‘likely to’’ impair their reputation or expose them to shame, public
hatred, or contempt.41 In Pakistan, a cyber crimes ordinance taking effect September
2008 made ‘‘cyber stalking’’—which requires ‘‘intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass
any person’’ using computers or networks—a crime punishable by up to seven years’
imprisonment.42
In April 2008, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s administration agreed to re-
sume imports of American beef after a five-year ban,43 sparking about a hundred days
of candlelight vigils and some of the largest street protests in 20 years.44 A television
program that aired on April 29 claiming that ‘‘Koreans are 94 percent more likely to
contract a human form of mad cow disease’’ also contributed to stoking online debate,
especially on the Agora forum of Korea’s second-largest portal Daum (which saw its
daily page view count spike from 40 million to 200 million).45 These demonstrations
also went interactive: protesters uploaded images to the Internet, sent messages on
protest meet-ups and warnings on arrests via SMS, and threw themselves into online
debate.46 Ultimately, his entire cabinet resigned and President Lee was forced to call
for a ‘‘new beginning’’ for his government.47
In the following months, President Lee’s administration introduced legislation that
would attempt to address the increase in reported online defamation, ‘‘false rumors,’’
and ‘‘malicious postings.’’ The regulatory body for policing online content, the Korean
Communications Standards Commission, would be authorized to force Internet portals
and P2P Web sites to delete content or suspend publishing for a minimum of 30 days
upon receiving a complaint of articles accused of being ‘‘fraudulent’’ or ‘‘slanderous,’’
during which the commission would determine whether disputed articles should be
removed permanently.48 Internet portals that fail to temporarily block online postings
containing defamatory information would be subject to a fine of up to KRW 30 million
or could be forced to shut down,49 while portals or individuals involved in improperly
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manipulating Internet search results should be subject to imprisonment of up to one
year and a fine up to KRW 10 million.50 The proposed addition of the crime of ‘‘cyber
defamation’’ would punish those who openly insult others through the Internet with
up to two years’ imprisonment or a KRW 10 million fine.51
The South Korean government also pursued an approach similar to its regulation of
other emergent forms of harmful or illegal content—by deputizing private actors such
as portals, bulletin boards, and other Internet content providers (ICPs) to actively
police slanderous content. While legislation would compel them to set up constant
in-house monitoring functions,52 many of Korea’s Internet portals also implemented
their own measures to curb postings considered to violate privacy. For example, Naver
created a simplified process for users to immediately block ‘‘groundless rumors or
postings.’’53
In China, where it is common for dissidents and activists to be charged with subver-
sion and other crimes involving national security for criticizing government officials
online,54 authorities have also begun levying criminal defamation charges against
those who accuse them of corruption. A few cases of alleged online defamation publi-
cized in Spring 2009 implicated not only the freedom of expression, but also people’s
right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ, rights both guaranteed in the
constitution.55 After petitions and other attempts to protect concerned farmers’ legal
rights had failed, Wu Baoquan and Wang Shuai were detained for their online criticism
of land seizures for commercial development pushed through by local government offi-
cials, in which farmers were inadequately compensated after being forced off their
land.56 Wu Baoquan was tried twice for criminal defamation and ultimately had his
sentence increased to two years, although the same court that affirmed his conviction
decided to review his case in April 2009.57 Wang Shuai was detained on March 6, 2009,
and released on bail only after signing a written confession.58
Since 2007, when its bloggers (now over a million strong) reportedly began discus-
sing sensitive topics ranging from government corruption and foreign relations to
HIV/AIDS,59 Vietnam has steadily been refining its legal framework for online activity
to bring social media firmly under control.
Article 12 of the Law on Information Technology defines illegal content by proxy,
by prohibiting the use of digital information for the purposes of opposing the state
or undermining the ‘‘all-peoples unity bloc’’; inciting violence, propagating wars of
aggression, sowing hatred among nations and peoples or obscenity, depravation,
crime, social evils or superstition; undermining the nation’s fine traditions and cus-
toms; revealing state secrets or other secrets provided for by law; distorting, slandering,
or offending the prestige of organizations or the honor, dignity, or prestige of citizens;
and advertising for or propagating goods or services banned by law.60 Implementing
regulations added ‘‘sowing hatred and conflict between ethnic groups and nations’’ to
the list of prohibited acts.61
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Internet users and organizations involved in Internet activity in Vietnam are legally
responsible for the content they create, upload, store, and transmit on the Internet.62
Bloggers are additionally responsible for ensuring that even hyperlinks do not contain
illegal content.63 However, Vietnam does offer a ‘‘safe harbor’’ of sorts for organiza-
tions and individuals who transmit or temporarily or automatically store information
created by others. Third-party hosts and providers are generally not responsible for this
content unless they initiate the transmission, choose recipients for the information, or
select or modify the contents of transmitted information.64 However, they are
expressly responsible for taking ‘‘necessary measures’’ to stop the illegal access to or
illegal deletion of information upon government request.65 All online social services
providers, including blog service providers, must be prepared to give ad hoc as well as
formal, biannual reports on their services, including data on blogs that violate terms-
of-service rules.66
Singapore, whose political elite have a long history of pursuing their opponents and
critics with costly and frequent defamation suits, strengthened its penal code with
amendments (effective in 2008) to include crimes committed by electronic means.67
For example, abetting a crime now includes acts done outside of Singapore, as long as
the crime was committed in Singapore.68 In May 2008, blogger Gopalan Nair, a U.S.
citizen living in Fremont, California, had returned to Singapore to support Dr. Chee
Soon Juan in defamation proceedings.69 On May 29, Nair posted his observations of
the trial and called High Court judge Belinda Ang a ‘‘stooge’’ who was ‘‘prostituting
herself’’ as an employee of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and his father, Mentor
Minister Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.70 Nair was also accused of insulting another
judge in an e-mail from 2006, and ultimately convicted of ‘‘intentional insult or inter-
ruption to a public servant sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding’’71 and sen-
tenced to three months’ imprisonment on September 17, 2008.72
Critics of Malaysia’s ruling party also continued to be targeted through the use of
existing punitive legal mechanisms, as reflected in the bevy of sedition, defamation,
and even national security charges levied against blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin for his
online writings. On April 25, 2008, Kamarudin had published an article on his influen-
tial political Web site, Malaysia Today, linking Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak
(sworn in as Prime Minister in April 2009) and his wife to the October 2006 murder of
a Mongolian translator.73 Kamarudin was charged with sedition in May 200874 and
faces three criminal defamation charges in a related case.75 From September 12 to
November 7, 2008, Kamarudin, who had been released on bail in May, was detained
under Malaysia’s notorious Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA), which authorizes the
preventive detention of individuals for up to two years (renewable indefinitely) with-
out trial or any judicial review.76 Kamarudin was accused of creating a national security
threat by causing potential tension in Malaysia’s multiracial and multifaith society
through his online activities.77
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In Pakistan, President Musharraf’s crackdown on the broadcast media after declaring
a state of emergency in November 2007 resulted in an actual increase in online dis-
semination of news and synchronicity between online and off-line citizen activism.
The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was established when
Musharraf allowed for the creation of privately owned, independent broadcast media
in 2002. As conditions for obtaining a broadcast license, media outlets were required
to prevent content containing violence, terrorism, discrimination, extremism, sectari-
anism, pornography, and obscenity from receiving coverage in programming and ad-
vertising.78 Media were also directly prohibited from broadcasting any content that is
obscene, disturbs public order, endangers national security, or is ‘‘against the ideology
of Pakistan.’’79
Upon declaring the state of emergency in 2007, Musharraf further amended PEMRA’s
charter to prohibit programming that ‘‘defames or brings into ridicule the head of
state, or members of the armed forces, or executive, legislative or judicial organ of the
state.’’80 Video footage of suicide bombers, other terrorists, and their victims was
banned,81 and PEMRA was empowered to close any broadcast service in a ‘‘situation
of emergency’’ and seize equipment or seal the premises of licensees ‘‘in the public
interest.’’82 All privately owned radio and television stations were shut down, some by
force,83 and cable operators were banned from broadcasting any national or interna-
tional news channels.84 Because Musharraf did not take such an assiduous approach
toward restricting online content during the emergency, privately owned television
stations taken off the air took advantage of the relative openness of the Internet and
sent text messages announcing the live streaming of their programming online.85
Since 2007, offended citizens and groups in India have demanded that social net-
working Web sites be scrubbed of what they believe to be defamatory or obscene con-
tent online. Google’s Orkut is the most popular social networking Web site in India
and the second-most-visited portal nationally. As a result of citizens filing complaints
with the police, several individuals have been arrested for violating Article 67 of the
IT Act, which punishes the online publication or transmission of obscene content.86
In February, Chandigarh IT professional Jatinder Singh Marok was alleged to have cre-
ated an obscene profile on Orkut of a girl, including her personal identification and
photos.87 In another high-profile case, Rahul Krishnakumar Vaid, a 22-year-old IT con-
sultant, was accused of posting obscene and derogatory comments about Sonia Gandhi
on an Orkut forum. According to an official account, police obtained Vaid’s identity by
asking Google to disclose his IP address, as well as the identification information in his
Gmail account.88
With the enactment of its cyber crimes law in June 2007, Thailand became one of
the few countries in Asia to require its government to obtain court authorization to
block Internet content.89 Vietnam and South Korea are also notable in Asia for
expressly mandating filtering as a preventive mechanism against ‘‘harmful’’ content.
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Vietnam imposes a positive responsibility upon the state, society, and schools to pro-
tect children from the negative impacts of information that is either obscene or incites
violence, which includes authorizing state agencies to build and disseminate content
filters.90 All providers must refuse or suspend services to individuals engaged in prohib-
ited online activities, implement a reporting regime, and submit to inspection and ex-
amination by competent state agencies. However, online social service providers must
also ‘‘block and remove illegal content upon detection or at the request of competent
state agencies.’’91
South Korea authorizes regulation of Internet content through the Korea Communi-
cations Standards Commission (KCSC), whose authority extends to ordering the block-
ing of Web sites, the deletion of a particular message identified as an improper
communication, a Web site’s closure, or the suspension of the particular user ID of
the individual who posted the improper writing.92 The KCSC was originally empow-
ered to develop general principles or codes of telecommunications ethics, conduct
deliberation of and request the ‘‘correction’’ of information declared illegal by presi-
dential decree, and operate reporting centers against unhealthy telecom activities.93
Thus, its filtering mandate is part of its power to make determinations on information
‘‘harmful’’ to youth,94 as well as recommend action against Web sites containing
illegal content, including pornography, information for cyber criminals, gambling
services, and Web sites that express support for communism or for the government of
North Korea.95
Filtering
Asia, with its diversity, is home to several organically grown models for Internet filter-
ing. Singapore, along with China, began experimenting with Internet filtering as early
as 1996. Beginning September 15, 1996, users were forced to access the Internet
through proxy servers that filtered sites banned by the Media Development Authority
or MDA (then called the Singapore Broadcasting Authority, or SBA).96 These servers
reportedly contained a database of frequently accessed ‘‘approved’’ material, and also
refused access according to an SBA list of banned Web sites.97 At the time, the SBA
targeted primarily pornography, with plans to also restrict ‘‘unacceptable political and
religious discussion, defamation, and racist writings.’’98 However, by 2002, these ambi-
tions had been scaled back to the ‘‘ceremonial’’ filtering of a modest number of Web
sites, a policy the government reaffirmed in March 2007.99
Singapore has refined a ‘‘dual regulation approach’’ to content regulation,100 where
mainstream media are state controlled or heavily regulated while alternative media
such as independent Web sites and blogs are relatively free to publish. At the core of
this ‘‘light touch’’ regulatory framework for online content is a class license scheme
that requires all ISPs and those ICPs determined to be political parties or persons
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‘‘engaged in the propagation, promotion or discussion of political or religious issues
relating to Singapore’’ to register with the Media Development Authority.101 Thus,
individuals, groups, and other organizations engaged solely in the discussion of these
issues online must register for a license.102 However, the class license scheme has been
rarely enforced, achieving greater efficacy in cultivating what its critics call a ‘‘culture
of silence’’ through self-censorship.103 In April 2007, the Singaporean government cre-
ated an advisory council to study and make recommendations on its regulatory regime
for ‘‘interactive digital media.’’104 The Advisory Council on the Impact of New Media
(AIMS) report, issued on December 8, 2008, praised the long-standing ‘‘light touch’’
approach to regulation of new media, while proposing some incremental changes. For
example, AIMS recommended that the registration requirement for political parties be
eliminated, but also argued for the class license scheme to be preserved.105
Like Singapore, China promoted the development of Internet infrastructure and
services while strictly regulating media outlets and other forms of speech. While China
has never formalized its filtering policy, it diverged from Singapore in developing ag-
gressive filtering practices in concert with a robust internal market for Internet services
and content, resulting in the emergence of public-private localized filtering.106 In addi-
tion to the broad range of content filtered at the international gateways and through
the blocking of keywords, domestic providers wishing to remain in regulatory compli-
ance are required to install internal filtering mechanisms and devote staff resources to
monitor content on their Web sites or face civil and criminal liability. For example, in
April 2009 an employee of China’s leading search engine, Baidu.com, leaked a folder
containing the tools of internal censorship.107 These included lists of topics, keywords,
and URLs to be blocked, lists of banned forums, employee guidelines for monitoring
work, censorship guidelines for the popular Baidu discussion forums called post bars,
and guidelines for how to search for information that needs to be banned.108 As a
result, China has cultivated a model that buttresses a broad filtering regime with strict
regulation of its own content providers, allowing it to maintain more optimal levels of
control over its expansive domestic market.
For governments, the surge in user-generated content and multimedia files through
online social media sites has made the implementation of filtering policies more com-
plex.109 In February 2008, Pakistan provided one of the most severe examples of a
clumsy technical approach to restricting social media, when the government’s attempt
to block YouTube in Pakistan made the entire Web site inaccessible to most Internet
users around the world for up to two hours.110 On February 22, the Pakistan Tele-
communication Authority (PTA) issued an order to block access to a single video on
YouTube—the film Fitna by the Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders that purportedly
mocked the Prophet Muhammad—while listing three IP addresses.111 In response, the
Pakistan Telecommunications Company, Ltd., the telecom that implements blocking
orders, redirected requests for YouTube videos to its own network. This rerouting
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was advertised to the Internet at large and was picked up by the Hong Kong–based ISP
PCCW, which then broadcast the redirect to ISPs around the world.112 YouTube staff
worked with PCCW to restore access within two hours.113 Access to YouTube was
restored in Pakistan after the video listed in the PTA blocking order was removed. Indo-
nesia followed suit, ordering ISPs to block YouTube in April 2008 over the same film
after Google reportedly did not respond to the government’s request to remove the
video from the Web site.114
Authorities in Bangladesh, a country with an Internet penetration rate of less than
1 percent,115 nevertheless chose to block YouTube for a few days in March 2009 in
order to protect the ‘‘national interest.’’ The disputed video covered a partial audio
recording of a meeting between the prime minister and military officials, who were
angry at the government’s handling of a mutiny by border guards in Dhaka that left
more than 70 people dead.116 The Bengali language blogging platform Sachalayatan
was also reported to be inaccessible beginning on July 15, 2008, and was forced to
migrate to a new IP address.117 Although its blocking was not officially confirmed,
Sachalayatan was likely Bangladesh’s inaugural filtering event.
Even China, which has developed domestic content-control mechanisms for its
Internet market that help to shield it from the difficult choices facing other countries,
can be vulnerable to the reverberations of social media. Google confirmed that
YouTube was blocked in China beginning on March 23, 2009,118 which media
reported could have been prompted by a graphic video released by Tibetan exiles in
which Chinese troops beat a group of Tibetans.119 Multiple users also reported that
YouTube was blocked in China around March 4, 2009, coinciding with the one-year
anniversary of the crackdown on protests in Tibetan regions as well as the 50th anni-
versary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959.120
As the proliferation of borderless social media reduces the effectiveness of the
blacklist-and-block model, governments are increasingly looking to technology compa-
nies to act as gatekeepers for facilitating transnational public-private filtering.121 In
Asia, Thailand may present an example of an alternative to the approaches taken by
China and Singapore. Thailand also blocked YouTube in April 2007 for hosting a num-
ber of videos that insulted King Bhumibol Adulyadej or his family, which constitutes a
crime of lèse majesté under Thai law punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment.122 By
May 2007, YouTube agreed to remove a number of the specified videos for violating its
terms of service, and the block on the YouTube domain was lifted in August 2007 upon
Google’s creation of a program of geolocational filtering for blocking access to specified
videos for users in Thailand.123 In 2008, investigations by a project of the MIT Free
Culture group appeared to have uncovered the code for a technical mechanism that
YouTube uses to allow certain videos to be seen everywhere except in those locations
specified in a media restriction tag.124 Although Thailand’s filtering of the Internet has
been ramped up in recent years, Thai law also requires court authorization to block a
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Web site. Thus, Thailand has secured the cooperation of the world’s dominant video
aggregator site in implementing selective geolocational filtering on its behalf, without
having to resort to a formal or transparent legal process. Its experience could also signal
further public-private transnational cooperation between governments and private
technology companies that result in selective filtering: a Vietnamese information min-
istry official stated in 2008 that the government would ask transnational gatekeepers
such as Google and Yahoo to help regulate the Vietnamese blogosphere.125
Ultimately, there continues to be no single or uniform approach to filtering in Asia.
In August 2008, in contravention of its own policy, Malaysia joined the growing collec-
tion of countries that filter the Internet. On August 27, media reported Malaysia Today
blocked by order of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission
(MCMC) for violating Articles 211 and 233(1) of the Communications and Multimedia
Act of 1998 (CMA).126 Malaysia Today was alleged to have published offensive, false,
and indecent content, especially ‘‘comments relating to Islam and how Muslims prac-
tice it.’’127 The blocking order was labeled a preventative action under Section 263 of
the CMA, requiring the cooperation of licensees such as ISPs to cooperate in enforcing
the laws of Malaysia.128 Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad criticized this
‘‘reneging of a promise’’ not to censor the Internet as loss of credibility and the public’s
respect.129 Although a government official later clarified that MCMC did not receive a
direct order to block Malaysia Today but had exercised its discretion under the CMA,
Communications Minister Datuk Shaziman Abu Mansor disclosed that over 100 Web
sites and blogs, including Malaysia Today, were blocked for violating various sections
of the CMA.130 On September 11, the Malaysian cabinet ordered the MCMC to
unblock all Web sites, stating that existing laws would be used to prosecute blogs and
Web sites in violation of the CMA, which would be monitored by an MCMC commit-
tee comprising police officials, officials from the Attorney General’s Chambers, and the
Home Ministry.131
Conclusion
Filtering conducted by Asian governments followed the same broad trajectories in
2007–2008 as it had previously with some incremental changes, and continues to be
most clearly demarcated along national lines and by local language and content rather
than according to any regional or categorical formula. Increased scrutiny of filtering
practices worldwide has contributed to greater awareness about escalated filtering tak-
ing place during political events like elections and political emergencies, with at least
six Asian countries reported to have blocked YouTube between 2007 and early 2009.
Most of the governments in Asia where the OpenNet Initiative conducted in-country
testing are expanding their legal mandate and authority to filter and regulate content,
especially in targeting online defamation. As social media platforms such as video
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aggregator Web sites, Web portals, and online discussion forums gain in size and rele-
vance, legal regulation of the Internet is also converging on data-retention require-
ments, delegated liability for ISPs and ICPs, increased criminal penalties for content
producers, and other mechanisms that could create a dragnet around the individuals
operating in these increasingly networked public spheres. These measures fall in line
with emerging second-generation controls.
Notes
1. Paul Budde Communication Pty., Ltd., ‘‘Thailand—Key Statistics, Telecom Market Overview
and Forecasts,’’ February 11, 2009; Paul Budde Communication Pty., Ltd., ‘‘Vietnam—Key Statis-
tics, Telecom Market Overview and Forecasts,’’ April 11, 2009.
2. China Internet Network Information Center, ‘‘Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Devel-





6. Paul Budde Communications Pty., Ltd., ‘‘South Korea Broadband Market—Overview and Statis-
tics,’’ September 6, 2008, p. 1.
7. Lee Min Keong, ‘‘Malaysia Lowers Broadband Targets,’’ ZDNet Asia, September 11, 2007, http://
www.zdnetasia.com/news/communications/0,39044192,62032069,00.htm.
8. Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, ‘‘Communications and Multimedia:
Selected Facts and Figures,’’ Q3 2008, p. 28, http://www.skmm.gov.my/facts_figures/stats/index
.asp; Lee Min Keong, ‘‘Malaysia Lowers Broadband Targets,’’ ZDNet Asia, September 11, 2007,
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/communications/0,39044192,62032069,00.htm; Paul Budde Com-
munication Pty., Ltd., ‘‘Malaysia—Internet Services,’’ February 7, 2009.
9. Paul Budde Communication Pty., Ltd., ‘‘Bangladesh—Key Statistics, Telecom Market Overview
and Forecasts,’’ December 28, 2008.
10. Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘‘Asia Internet Usage Stats and Population Statistics,’’ 2009,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm.
11. Nepali Times, ‘‘Web Pioneer—Mahabir Pun Put Nepal on the Information Technology Map
Not by Complaining about How the Poor Didn’t Have Access to Computers, but Actually Doing
Something about It,’’ August 3, 2007, http://www.nepalitimes.com.np/issue/360/Nation/13821.
12. Yadanabon Cyber City, http://www.yadanaboncybercity.com/.
13. OpenNet Initiative Bulletin, ‘‘Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown
in Burma,’’ November 2007, http://opennet.net/research/bulletins/013/.
422 Asia Overview
14. Interview with public access center operator; OpenNet Initiative Blog, ‘‘Doubts Surface over
Announced Internet Maintenance in Burma,’’ March 24, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/03/
doubts-surface-over-announced-internet-maintenance-burma; Lawi Weng, ‘‘Internet Slowdown to
Continue at Least One More Day,’’ The Irrawaddy, April 2, 2009, http://irrawaddy.org/article.php
?art_id=15429; Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Growing Restrictions on Free Flow of Information,’’
May 15, 2009, http://www.rsf.org/Growing-restrictions-on-free-flow.html.
15. Kalinga Seneviratne, ‘‘Bloggers Sit on Opposition Benches,’’ Inter Press Service, March 13,
2008.
16. Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, ‘‘Communications and Multi-
media’’.
17. Jeremy Au Yong, ‘‘The Next Frontier; Media Experts and Top Malaysian Bloggers Attracted
Attention for the Role They Played in Malaysia’s Recent General Election,’’ The Straits Times, April
12, 2008.
18. Carolyn Hong, ‘‘KL Hands Out Press Passes for Online Media; Coming of Age for Internet
Journalists, Who Now Can Cover Gov’t Events,’’ The Straits Times, July 9, 2008.
19. Financial Express, ‘‘Blacked Out Pakistani TV Channels Turn to Internet,’’ November 7,
2007, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/blacked-out-pakistani-tv-channels-turn-to-internet/
237012/.
20. Huma Yusuf, ‘‘Old and New Media: Converging During the Pakistan Emergency (March
2007–February 2008),’’ Center for Future Civic Media (MIT), January 12, 2009, http://civic
.mit.edu/watchlistenlearn/old-and-new-media-converging-during-the-pakistan-emergency-march
-2007-february-2008?page=0%2C0.
21. Seth Mydans, ‘‘Steep Rise in Fuel Costs Prompts Rare Public Protest in Myanmar,’’ New York
Times, August 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/world/asia/23myanmar.html.
22. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma,’’ De-
cember 2007, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma1207web.pdf.
23. OpenNet Initiative Bulletin, ‘‘Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown
in Burma,’’ November 2007, http://opennet.net/research/bulletins/013/.
24. Seth Mydans, ‘‘Myanmar Rulers Still Impeding Access,’’ New York Times, June 3, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/asia/03myanmar.html.
25. Juliana Rincón Parra, ‘‘Myanmar: Citizen Videos in Cyclone Nargis’ Aftermath,’’ Global
Voices Online, May 16, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/05/16/video-burmamyanmar-in
-cyclone-nargis-aftermath/.
26. Jonathan Krim, ‘‘Subway Fracas Escalates into Test of the Internet’s Power to Shame,’’ Wash-
ington Post, July 7, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/06/
AR2005070601953.html.
27. The video footage is available on YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
zomgZuZoDoM.
Asia Overview 423
28. Grace Wang, ‘‘Caught in the Middle, Called a Traitor,’’ Washington Post, April 20, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/18/AR2008041802635.html;
National Public Radio, ‘‘Duke Student Targeted for Mediating Tibet Protest,’’ April 21, 2008, http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89803198.
29. People’s Daily Online, ‘‘Hu Jintao Talks to Netizens via People’s Daily Online,’’ June 20, 2008,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6433952.html.
30. David Bandurski, ‘‘China’s Guerrilla War for the Web,’’ Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2008,
http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web.
31. Brian Lee, ‘‘Blue House Tries to Plug the Holes in PR Machine,’’ JoongAng Daily, May 6, 2009,
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2904455.
32. Kalinga Seneviratne, ‘‘Bloggers Sit on Opposition Benches,’’ Inter Press Service, March 13,
2008.
33. Agence France Presse, ‘‘Malaysia PM Says ‘Big Mistake’ to Ignore Cyber-Campaign,’’ March 25,
2008.
34. Min Lwin, ‘‘Junta Approves Investment in Cyber City,’’ The Irrawaddy, July 30, 2008, http://
www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=13614&Submit=Submit; Brian McCartan, ‘‘Myanmar on
the Cyber-Offensive,’’ Asia Times Online, October 1, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Southeast_Asia/JJ01Ae01.html.
35. Oliver Luft, ‘‘Thai Government Tries to Shut Down 400 Websites,’’ Guardian, September 3,
2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/sep/03/digitalmedia.thailand.
36. CNN.com, ‘‘Constitution Protests Continue in Thailand,’’ June 2, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/02/thailand.protests/index.html.
37. Marwaan Macan-Markar, ‘‘MEDIA-THAILAND: Police Target Websites Unflattering to
Royalty,’’ IPS, March 8, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46023; Jonathan Head,
‘‘Police Arrest Thai Website Editor,’’ BBC News, March 6, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/i/
bbc_news/asia_pacific/792/79281/story7928159.shtl.
38. Marwaan Macan-Markar, ‘‘MEDIA-THAILAND: Police Target Websites Unflattering to
Royalty,’’ IPS, March 8, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46023.
39. Act on Computer Crime B.E. 2550 (2007), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/wp
-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=2.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., Section 16.
42. Article 13, Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance, 2008 (Ordinance No. IV of 2008).
43. Choe Sang-hun, ‘‘Korean Leader Considers Ways to Rework Government,’’ New York Times,
June 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/world/asia/11korea.html.
424 Asia Overview
44. The Dong-a Ilbo, ‘‘Anti-US Beef Protests: One Year Later,’’ April 29, 2009, http://english.donga
.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2009042903068.
45. Ibid.; Jon Herskovitz and Rhee So-eui, ‘‘South Korean Internet Catches ‘Mad Cow Madness,’ ’’
Reuters, June 13, 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idINSEO30506420080613?sp=
true.
46. Jon Herskovitz and Rhee So-eui, ‘‘South Korean Internet Catches ‘Mad Cow Madness,’ ’’ Reu-
ters, June 13, 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idINSEO30506420080613?sp=true.
47. Choe Sang-hun, ‘‘Korean Leader Considers Ways to Rework Government,’’ New York Times,
June 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/world/asia/11korea.html.
48. Michael Fitzpatrick, ‘‘South Korea Wants to Gag the Noisy Internet Rabble,’’ Guardian,
October 8, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/oct/09/news.internet; Kim Tong-
hyung, ‘‘Cabinet Backs Crackdown on Cyber-Bullying,’’ Korea Times, July 22, 2008, http://www
.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/07/123_28003.html.
49. Kim Hyung-eun, ‘‘Do New Internet Regulations Curb Free Speech?’’ JoongAng Daily, August
13, 2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893577.
50. Lee Sang-bok, ‘‘New Regulations Proposed for Internet Postings,’’ JoongAng Daily, August 21,
2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893939.
51. Ser Myo-ja, ‘‘GNP Files Bills To Alter The Nation’s Media Landscape,’’ JoongAng Daily, Decem-
ber 4, 2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2898166.
52. Kim Hyung-eun, ‘‘Do New Internet Regulations Curb Free Speech?’’ JoongAng Daily, August
13, 2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893577.
53. Sung So-young, ‘‘Portals Beef Up Measures against Malicious Postings,’’ JoongAng Daily, Octo-
ber 23, 2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2896433.
54. See, for example, the case of Hu Jia, Amnesty International, ‘‘Hua Jia Jailed for Three and a
Half Years,’’ April 4, 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/chinese-activist
-gets-jail-sentence-20080403.
55. Article 41, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
constitution/constitution.html.
56. Joshua Rosenzweig, ‘‘China’s Battle over the Right to Criticize,’’ Far Eastern Economic Review,
May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-criticize.
57. Siweiluozi’s Blog, ‘‘Update: Review Underway in Wu Baoquan’s Case,’’ April 22, 2009, http://
siweiluozi.blogspot.com/2009/04/update-review-underway-in-wu-baoquans.html; Siweiluozi’s Blog,
‘‘Updated Update: Ordos Law Enforcement Officials ‘Clearing Their Thoughts’ Regarding Wu Bao-
quan,’’ April 27, 2009, http://siweiluozi.blogspot.com/search/label/Wang%20Shuai.
58. Joshua Rosenzweig, ‘‘China’s Battle over the Right to Criticize,’’ Far Eastern Economic Review,
May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-criticize.
Asia Overview 425
59. Geoffrey Cain, ‘‘Bloggers the New Rebels in Vietnam,’’ San Francisco Chronicle, December
14, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/14/MNJ814GR9H.DTL&type=
printable.
60. Law on Information Technology (No.67/2006/QH11), http://vbqppl4.moj.gov.vn/law/en/
2001_to_2010/2006/200606/200606290015_en/lawdocument_view.
61. Article 6(1), Decree No. 97/2008/ND-CP of August 28, 2008, on the Management, Provision
and Use of Internet Services and Electronic Information on the Internet, http://www.mic.gov.vn/
lawfiles/31236373.PDF (accessed May 25, 2009).
62. Article 9, Law on Information Technology; Article 12(2)(c), Decree on the Management, Pro-
vision and Use of Internet Services.
63. Articles 3.1, 4, Circular No. 07/2008/TT-BTTTT of December 2008, guiding a number of con-
tents of the Government’s Decree No. 97/2008/ ND-CF of August 28, 2008, on the Management,
Provision and Use of Internet Services and Information on the Internet regarding the supply of
information on blogs, http://www.mic.gov.vn/lawfiles/23434370.pdf (accessed May 25, 2009).
64. Article 16(4), Law on Information Technology.
65. Article 16(3), Law on Information Technology.
66. Article 6, Circular No. 07/2008/TT-BTTTT of December 2008.
67. For example, on October 13, 2008, Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) leader Chee Soon Juan
and his sister were ordered to pay more than SGD 600,000 in damages for defaming Mentor Min-
ister Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in a 2006 SDP
newsletter likening the conduct of government officials to another corruption scandal involving
the National Kidney Foundation. Zakir Hussain, ‘‘PM, MM Get $950k Damages; Amount Deter-
mined in Part by ‘Egregious’ Conduct of the Chees,’’ The Straits Times, October 14, 2008.
68. Article 108B, Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2007, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/
html/homepage.html.
69. Inter Press Service, ‘‘Singapore: State Sues Blogger for Criticizing High Court Judge,’’ June 7,
2008.
70. Urban Rant Blog, ‘‘Singapore Courts Grant Arrest Warrant Without Bail For Insulting a
Judge,’’ June 2, 2008, http://singaporedissident.blogspot.com/2008/05/singapore-judge-belinda
-angs-kangaroo.html.
71. Article 228, Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2007, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/html/
homepage.html.
72. Zakir Hussain, ‘‘Gopalan Nair Jailed 3 Mths,’’ The Straits Times, September 17, 2008, http://
www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-southeastasia.asp?parentid=97420.
73. Lee Glendinning, ‘‘Malaysian Blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin Goes on Trial over Sedition
Charges,’’ Guardian, October 6, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/06/malaysia
.pressandpublishing.
426 Asia Overview
74. New York Times, ‘‘Malaysian Blogger Charged with Sedition,’’ May 6, 2008, http://www
.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/world/asia/06iht-malay.1.12610343.html.
75. Kamarudin allegedly defamed Razak’s wife, Datin Rosmah Mansor, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul
Aziz Buyong, and Lieutenant Colonel Norhayati Hassan in a public court declaration in June
2008. Sushma Veera, ‘‘Second Arrest Warrant Out for Raja Petra,’’ New Straits Times, May
26, 2009, http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/NST/Wednesday/National/2567087/Article/index
_html.
76. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Detained Without Trial: Abuse of Internal Security Act Detainees
in Malaysia,’’ September 26, 2005, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/09/26/detained-without
-trial-0.
77. Pertubuhan Berita Nasional Malaysia, ‘‘Detained Raja Petra’s Actions Threat to National
Security—Deputy IGP,’’ September 12, 2008.
78. Article 20, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance 2002, http://www.pemra.gov.pk/
pdf/ordinance1.pdf.
79. Article 27, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance 2002, http://www.pemra.gov.pk/
pdf/ordinance1.pdf.
80. Article 20(m), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance, 2007 (LXV of 2007), http://
www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ord031107.pdf.
81. Article 20(j), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance, 2007 (LXV of 2007), http://
www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ord031107.pdf.
82. Article 30(4), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance, 2007 (LXV of 2007), http://
www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ord031107.pdf.
83. CNN.com, ‘‘Pakistani Police Storm Television Station,’’ November 3, 2007, http://www
.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/11/03/pakistan.media/.
84. Muhammad Najeeb, ‘‘Pakistani Media Gagged, Even Internet Not Spared,’’ Hindustan Times,
November 4, 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=460572ab-dea2
-4703-93e4-280a1763bbf4&&Headline=Pakistani+media+gagged%2c+even+Internet+not+spared.
85. Financial Express, ‘‘Blacked Out Pakistani TV Channels Turn to Internet,’’ November 7, 2007,
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/blacked-out-pakistani-tv-channels-turn-to-internet/237012/.
86. Information Technology Act, Article 67, 2000. Under the act, anyone who publishes ‘‘any
material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to
deprave and corrupt . . .’’ is subject to a fine and up to five years in prison. See http://www.sarai
.net/journal/pdf/133-135%20(bill).pdf (accessed May 25, 2009).




88. Times of India, ‘‘One Held for Posting Obscene Orkut Message on Sonia,’’ May 18, 2008, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Pune/One_held_for_posting_obscene_Orkut_message_on_Sonia/
articleshow/3049971.cms.
89. Article 20, Act on Computer Crime B.E. 2550 (2007), English translation at http://advocacy
.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=2.
90. Article 73, Law on Information Technology (No.67/2006/QH11), http://vbqppl4.moj.gov.vn/
law/en/2001_to_2010/2006/200606/200606290015_en/lawdocument_view.
91. Article 11(c), Decree No. 97/2008/ND-CP of August 28, 2008, on the Management, Provision
and Use of Internet Services and Electronic Information on the Internet, http://www.mic.gov.vn/
lawfiles/31236373.PDF (accessed May 25, 2009).
92. See Decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court, Opinion 14–1 KCCR 616, 99Hun-Ma480,
June 27, 2002, http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/decision_etc/decision2003.htm.
93. Article 53–2, Telecommunications Business Act (1995), Law 4903, January 5, 1995, http://
www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Legislation/Korea/BusinessAct.htm.
94. KCSC, ‘‘Operation Committees,’’ http://www.icec.or.kr/eng/02_Operation/Committees.php.
95. KCSC, ‘‘Subject of Report,’’ http://www.singo.or.kr/eng/02_report/Subject_Report.php; Re-
porters Without Borders, ‘‘South Korea—2004 Annual Report,’’ http://www.rsf.org/en-rapport59
-id_rubrique416-South_Korea.html.
96. The Economist, ‘‘NetNanny States China and Singapore Restrict Citizens’ Access to World
Wide Web,’’ September 14, 1996, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-18675318.html.
97. Robert Uhlig, ‘‘Singapore to Censor Net Porn, Violence,’’ Daily Telegraph, September 3, 1996.
98. United Press International, ‘‘Singapore Begins to Block Internet,’’ September 14, 1996.
99. Ministry of Information, Communications, and the Arts, ‘‘Censorship Review Committee
Report of 2003,’’ http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.316.Censorship_Review_2003.pdf;
Agence France Presse, ‘‘Singapore Vigilant on Sedition, ‘Ceremonial’ on Porn Censorship,’’ March
22 2007.
100. Cherian George, ‘‘One Country, Two Systems: For How Long?’’ Singapore: New Media, Poli-
tics & the Law, March 10, 2007, http://singaporemedia.blogspot.com/2007_03_01_archive.html;
Tor Ching Li, ‘‘The Dangers of Dual Media Regulation,’’ Channel News Asia, January 12, 2007,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/252084/1/.html.
101. Broadcasting (Class License) Notification 2001, July 15, 1996, http://www.mda.gov.sg/
wms.file/mobj/mobj.487.ClassLicense.pdf ( accessed January 1, 2007).
102. See Media Development Authority (MDA), ‘‘Internet,’’ http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/
devnpolicies.aspx?sid=161.
103. ‘‘Proposals for Internet Freedom in Singapore,’’ April 21, 2008, http://www.yawningbread
.org/ybsamplerfiles/bloggerssub.pdf.
428 Asia Overview
104. The Online Citizen, ‘‘AIMS Seeks Feedback On New Media,’’ September 17, 2008, http://
theonlinecitizen.com/2008/09/aims-seeks-feedback-on-new-media/.
105. IFACCA, ‘‘Engaging New Media, Challenging Old Assumptions, A Report by the Advisory
Council on the Impact of New Media on Society,’’ pp. 74–76, December 2008, http://www.ifacca
.org/national_agency_news/2009/01/09/engaging-new-media-challenging-old-assumptions/.
106. Robert Faris, Stephanie Wang, and John Palfrey, ‘‘Censorship 2.0,’’ Innovations: Technology/
Governance/Globalization (MIT Press), Winter 2008.
107. Xiao Qiang, ‘‘Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked,’’ China Digi-
tal Times, April 30, 2009, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and
-censorship-document-leaked/.
108. Ibid.
109. Robert Faris, Stephanie Wang, and John Palfrey, ‘‘Censorship 2.0,’’ Innovations: Technology/
Governance/Globalization (MIT Press), Winter 2008.
110. OpenNet Initiative Blog, ‘‘Pakistan’s Internet Has a Bad Weekend,’’ February 25, 2008, http://
opennet.net/blog/2008/02/pakistan%E2%80%99s-internet-has-a-bad-weekend; Martin A. Brown,
‘‘Pakistan Hijacks YouTube,’’ Renesys Blog, February 24, 2008, http://www.renesys.com/blog/
2008/02/pakistan_hijacks_youtube_1.shtml.
111. ‘‘Corrigendum—Most Urgent: Subject: Blocking of Offensive Website,’’ Pakistan Telecom-
munication Authority, February 22, 2008, http://www.renesys.com/blog/pakistan_blocking_order
.pdf.
112. Declan McCullagh, ‘‘How Pakistan Knocked YouTube Offline (and How to Make Sure It
Never Happens Again),’’ CNet News, February 25, 2008, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3
-9878655-7.html.
113. Martin A. Brown, ‘‘Pakistan Hijacks YouTube,’’ Renesys Blog, February 24, 2008, http://www
.renesys.com/blog/2008/02/pakistan_hijacks_youtube_1.shtml.
114. CNN.com, ‘‘Indonesia Blocks YouTube to Protest Islam Film,’’ April 8, 2008, http://www
.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/04/08/indonesia.youtube/index.html.
115. Paul Budde Communication Pty., Ltd., ‘‘Bangladesh, Key Statistics, Telecom Market Over-
view and Forecasts,’’ December 28, 2008.
116. BBC News, ‘‘Bangladesh Imposes YouTube Block,’’ March 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/south_asia/7932659.stm.
117. Aparna Ray, ‘‘Bangladesh Gets a ‘Blog-Ban’ Scare,’’ Global Voices Online, July 28, 2008,
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/28/bangladesh-gets-a-blog-ban-scare/.
118. OpenNet Initiative Blog, ‘‘Google Confirms YouTube Blocked in China,’’ March 24, 2009,
http://opennet.net/blog/2009/03/google-confirms-youtube-blocked-china.
Asia Overview 429
119. Jane Macartney, ‘‘Film of Tibet Violence May Have Prompted China to Block YouTube,’’ The
Times, March 26, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5975252.ece.
120. See Herdict, http://www.herdict.org.
121. Robert Faris, Stephanie Wang, and John Palfrey, ‘‘Censorship 2.0,’’ Innovations: Technology/
Governance/Globalization (MIT Press), Winter 2008, p. 175.
122. The Nation, ‘‘Ban on YouTube Lifted after Deal: Website to Block Clips Offensive to Thais
or That Break Thai Law,’’ August 31, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/08/31/
headlines/headlines_30047192.php.
123. Ibid.; Sydney Morning Herald, ‘‘YouTube Removes Clips Mocking Thai King,’’ May 12, 2007,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/YouTube-removes-clips-mocking-Thai-king/2007/05/12/
1178899145725.html.
124. OpenNet Initiative Blog, ‘‘YouTube and the Rise of Geolocational Filtering,’’ March 13, 2008,
http://opennet.net/blog/2008/03/youtube-and-rise-geolocational-filtering.
125. Geoffrey Cain, ‘‘Bloggers the New Rebels in Vietnam,’’ San Francisco Chronicle, December
14, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/14/MNJ814GR9H.DTL&type=
printable.
126. See Malaysia Today, ‘‘Move to Block Blog ‘Not Govt Directive,’ ’’ August 30, 2008, https://
mt.m2day.org/2008/content/view/11968/84/. Article 211(1) makes it illegal to provide content
which is indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person. According to Article 233, it is illegal for any person to make any
comment, request, suggestion, or other communication transmitting the same types of illegal
content over networks. Articles 211(1), 233, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Act of
1998, http://www.skmm.gov.my/the_law/NewAct/Act%20588/Act%20588/a0588s0211.htm.
127. The Edge Malaysia, ‘‘Net Value: CMA Provides for Prohibition of Offensive Content,’’ Septem-
ber 8, 2008.
128. Ibid.
129. The Straits Times, ‘‘Mahathir Slams Blocking of Malaysia Today Portal,’’ August 30, 2008.
130. The Star Online, ‘‘SKMM Not Ordered to Block Access to Website,’’ August 30, 2008, http://
thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/8/30/nation/22210685&sec=nation.
131. Sim Leoi Leoi and Florence A. Sam, ‘‘MCMC Told to Unblock Malaysia Today (Update 2),’’




Despite very low connectivity, Inter-
net users in Burma have managed to
communicate valuable information
to the outside world during explosive
political events. The Burmese military
government continues to enforce
stringent overall access restrictions,
the most extreme of which occurred
during the complete shutdown of the
Internet in Burma in September and
October 2007. On top of these barriers to access, the government also polices Inter-
net content through one of the most severe regimes of information control in the
world.
Background
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military government that rules
the Union of Myanmar, maintained its stranglehold on economic and political devel-
opments in Burma through several major crises in 2007 and 2008.
On August 19, 2007, precipitating what would become known as the Saffron Revo-
lution, leaders of the 88 Generation student movement organized a rally to protest
a sudden sharp increase in fuel prices in Rangoon (Yangon).1 Burmese spend up to
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70 percent of their monthly income on food alone,2 making the fuel price hikes amid
chronic inflation—which reached 30 percent in 2006 and 2007—untenable.3 Over the
next month, leadership of the protests passed from the former student leaders and a
number of female activists to Buddhist monks, with participation swelling to an esti-
mated crowd of 150,000 protesters on September 23.4 Throughout the crisis, citizen
journalists and bloggers continued to feed raw, graphic footage and eyewitness
accounts to the outside world over the Internet. The violent crackdown that began on
September 26 ultimately left up to 200 dead,5 including a Japanese journalist whose
shooting was caught on video.6 Burmese security forces raided monasteries, detaining
and disrobing thousands of monks, and despite claims in official state media that only
91 people remained in detention as of December 2007, Human Rights Watch claimed
the number to be in the hundreds.7
On May 2 and 3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit lower Burma and devastated Rangoon and
much of the Irrawaddy River delta, with more than 138,000 dead or missing and mil-
lions in need of food, water, shelter, and medical care.8 After initially blocking aid for
two critical weeks, the junta accepted relief efforts coordinated through the Tripartite
Core Group—the military junta, the United Nations (UN), and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—and has been cautiously credited with exhibiting
greater openness since.9 However, a year later, half a million people were still living in
temporary shelters, over 200,000 lacked local supplies of drinking water, and villagers
were still coping with chronic food shortages and the slow resumption of farming and
fishing.10 A recovery program requiring USD 690 million through 2011 had raised only
USD 466 million in commitments at the end of 2008.11
On the heels of the release of Burma’s longest-serving political prisoner, Win Tin, a
79-year-old journalist freed as part of an amnesty granted to 9,000 inmates,12 around
300 individuals were sentenced to harsh prison terms for political crimes between
October and December 2008.13 Most were tried by police prosecutors and convicted by
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 854
Life expectancy at birth (years) 62
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 90
Human development index (out of 179) 135
Rule of law (out of 211) 199
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 208
Democracy index (out of 167) 163 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 179
Internet users (percent of population) 0.1
Source by indicator: World Bank 2005, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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judges operating from prison courts, including the notorious Insein prison.14 During
the week of November 10, 2008, alone, more than 80 individuals were convicted,
including 14 democracy activists who were sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment for
leading protests in the summer of 2007, Buddhist monks, poets, musicians, and stu-
dent leaders.15 According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Myanmar, 16 journalists and bloggers were in prison in March 2009.16 Not
surprisingly, given the crackdown that followed, the Committee to Protect Journalists
has labeled Burma the worst place in the world to be a blogger.17
On May 14, 2009, Nobel laureate and democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi was taken
from her home to Insein prison to stand charges of violating the terms of her house
arrest by affording temporary shelter to an American man who had swum across a
lake to her residence.18 Aung San Suu Kyi, facing five years’ imprisonment under these
charges, had lived under house arrest for 13 of the past 19 years, and she was arrested
only weeks before her current six-year term was set to expire.19
Internet in Burma
Unlike the rest of Asia, a combination of government restrictions, connection speeds,
and prohibitive costs has kept Internet access rates relatively stagnant in Burma. The
International Telecommunications Union estimates the number of Internet users at a
low 45,000 for 2008,20 representing a steep drop from recent figures of up to 300,000
users.21 Burma’s fixed-line, cell phone, and Internet penetration rates remain below
1 percent.22 Connection speeds are slow, and steep costs significantly limit access. For
example, initial costs for broadband range from USD 900 on Myanmar Teleport (MMT)
to USD 2,300 on Myanmar Post and Telecommunication (MPT), with wireless access
on MMT starting at USD 1,500.23 As a result, broadband is available only to an esti-
mated 2,000 subscribers, primarily government and businesses and used mostly for
Internet telephony by VoIP.24 Assuming that there are about ten to 15 users per
subscription, media have calculated that there are more than 300,000 users of MMT
(formerly Bagan Cybertech) and MPT, the two state-owned ISPs. Costs limit access
significantly: even households that can afford a personal computer and long-distance
connection fees outside the capital Rangoon and Mandalay cannot pay USD 20 per
month and upward for a dial-up or broadband account.25
According to news reports, an entity called Information Technology Central Services
(ITCS) was launched in 2007, to be run by the government-aligned Union Solidarity
and Development Association.26 Though ITCS is not an ISP, it provides telecommuni-
cation services such as voice mail, mail to SMS (short message service, or text message),
and an information portal (www.khitlunge.org.mm).
However, the arrival of a new ISP, predicted to become the largest in Burma, pre-
sented the most convincing evidence that the government intended to expand
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Internet access while maintaining strict control over online activity. The new ISP,
Hanthawaddy National Gateway, which was reportedly launched in July 2008, will
serve the entire country with the exception of Rangoon.27 In the case of Hanthawaddy,
which officials state will operate to ‘‘international standards,’’ Internet security will be
achieved largely through filtering. According to an MPT official, ‘‘The main advantages
of having this ISP is that the Internet connection will be fast-moving, and good secu-
rity will be available because of the website filtering system.’’28 The Irrawaddy, an over-
seas news site, reported that Hanthawaddy ‘‘received technical assistance from China’s
Alcatel Shanghai Bell Company.’’29
As a signatory to the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement initiated in 2000, Burma has
formed the e-National Task Force to support IT development.30 Yadanabon Cyber City
(in Pyin Oo Lwin), set to become Burma’s largest IT development, is also part of an
information and communications technology (ICT) development master plan under
the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI).31
Although the government initially cited a preference for investment from local com-
panies or foreign companies that are cooperating with local companies, rather than
solely foreign-owned enterprise, three foreign companies—Russian-owned CBOSS,
Maxinet of Australia, and Global Technology (believed to be based in either Thailand
or the U.K.)—were among the 12 technology companies approved to invest USD 22
million in the site, which is somewhat isolated by being 30 miles from Mandalay.32
However, Shin Satellite of Thailand, Alcatel Shanghai Bell of China, and Malaysia’s IP
Tel Sdn Bh were reportedly rejected as investment partners.33 The Irrawaddy quoted
sources from computer universities as stating that Yadanabon’s objective was to tighten
control over Internet connections as well as prevent users from gaining access to or
distributing information critical of the regime.34
Both MPT and MMT are currently connected to the Hanthawaddy Gateway back-
bone (a move announced in September 2008 but only recently executed),35 but
Yadanabon will ultimately serve as the national backbone (with a bandwidth of 600þ
Mbps according to some sources), connected to China and eventually India and
Thailand through overhead optical fiber (STM 1 or higher), underground optical fiber
(STM 1 or higher), satellite communication systems, and the SMW-3 undersea cable
system.36
To counterbalance price and access controls, most users access the Internet in Inter-
net cafés (between USD 0.30 and USD 0.50 per hour).37 Officially, there are 433 public
access centers (PACs) nationwide, and the government plans to achieve full coverage
of PACs in every township in the country.38 In reality, the number of PACs and Inter-
net cafés has increased rapidly in Rangoon, Mandalay, and other major towns and
cities across the country, with more than 1,000 PACs operating without licenses in
Rangoon alone.39 Some PACs are owned by Union Solidarity and Development Associ-
ation (USDA) and run Internet café services in their local offices in townships. Some
434 Burma
PACs provide VoIP services such as Skype, Pfingo, MediaRingTalk, and others. Centers
are prevented from installing bypass software on their computers, but generally allow
customers to use laptops. According to one PAC operator, 60 percent of users use dial-
up connections or prepaid access kits while the rest use broadband connections such as
ADSL or WiMAX, as well as satellite connections provided by the state-controlled MMT
and MPT.
Despite the limitations imposed on connectivity in Burma, throughout the days of
escalating protests in September 2007 and the first glimpses of a violent crackdown, a
small band of citizen bloggers and journalists fed graphic footage and eyewitness
accounts to the outside world through the Internet and their personal networks.40
Vital information, including photographs and videos taken with cell phones and digi-
tal cameras and not obtainable through traditional means, was uploaded to the Inter-
net, broadcast over television and radio, and spread in communities throughout the
country. Although described invariably as tech-savvy university students and youth,
these citizen journalists helped multiple generations of Burmese to find linkages to
each other through blogs and other social media.41
On September 29, 2007, the SPDC made use of its comprehensive control over the
country’s Internet gateways to completely shut down Internet access, with intermit-
tent periods of connectivity, for approximately two weeks.42 A small group of netizens
had vividly demonstrated that the tools of information technology can have a strong
impact on the global coverage of events as they are unfolding. The Internet shutdown
was the government’s most direct and drastic option to cut off this bidirectional flow
of information, so that the picture of reality for people on both sides of the Burmese
border would remain distorted.
In April 2008, the overseas news organization Mizzima News reported that the
government had formulated a sector-based Internet shutdown strategy to deal with
the constitutional referendum scheduled for May 10.43 As soon as information leaks
began, Internet cafés and PACs would be cut off, followed by the commercial sector
if information continued to flow out, and presumably by the hospitality and tour-
ism sector. Authorities planned both shutdowns of access and significant slowdowns
in connection speeds,44 a strategy that was made moot in the wake of Cyclone
Nargis.
Slowdowns in Internet access speeds are not infrequent in Burma. For example,
a prolonged slowdown on MMT began on March 22, 2009, and continued until
April 21.45 MMT had announced that the submarine cable SE-ME-WE 3 (South East
Asia Middle West Europe 3) would be undergoing maintenance from March 21 to
March 25, but both MMT and MPT shut down their service for several hours on the
afternoon of March 22. For end users, the announced network maintenance resulted
in frustration with delays (in addition to those caused by the use of circumvention
tools) in accessing popular online services, including Gmail, Google Talk, Skype,
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Pfingo, and VZOChat, while many Internet cafés were closed while waiting for the
resumption of normal Internet access speeds.
Slow upload speeds are an indication not just of capacity in Burma, but also of inten-
tional design. Even after connectivity was largely resumed after the Internet shutdown,
Internet speeds controlled with proxy caching servers were slowed to 256 Kbps in a
likely attempt to prevent or diminish the uploading of videos and photos.46 Although
broadband subscribers can choose to pay according to access speeds (512 kbps, 256
kbps, or 128 kbps), they must also accept upload speeds that are half the download
speeds in each subscription.47
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Despite ongoing and grave human rights violations committed by the SPDC, equal
protection under the law (Art. 347), freedom of expression and peaceful assembly
(Art. 354), the right to education (Art. 366), freedom of religion (Art. 36), and other
fundamental rights are guaranteed in the amended constitution adopted in May
2008.48 Although the SPDC has stated that 380 domestic laws are being reviewed for
compliance with constitutional human rights provisions,49 it continues to apply broad
laws and regulations to punish citizens harshly for any activity deemed detrimental to
national interests or its continued grip on power.
All domestic radio and television stations, as well as daily newspapers, are state
owned and controlled.50 While more than 100 print publications are now privately
owned,51 the Ministry of Information limits licensing to media outlets that agree to
print only approved material and to submit to vigorous advanced censorship by its
Press Scrutiny and Registration Division.52 For example, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis,
media were prohibited from publishing stories depicting the devastation and human
suffering.53 Publishing license regulations issued by the Ministry of Information in
2005 are prodigious in scope, banning negative news and commentary about ASEAN,
any ‘‘nonconstructive’’ criticism of government departments, coverage of national dis-
asters and poverty that affect the public interest, and the citation of foreign news
sources that are detrimental to the state.54 In effect since 1962, the Printers and Pub-
lishers Registration Law applies to all ‘‘printed published matter’’ and requires the reg-
istration of all printing presses, printers, and publishers, as well as the submission of all
books and newspapers as they are published.55 Similar restrictions apply in the Video
and Television Law, which provides for three years’ imprisonment for ‘‘copying, dis-
tributing, hiring or exhibiting videotape’’ that has not received the prior approval of
the Video Censor Board.56
Online access and content are stringently controlled through legal, regulatory, and
economic constraints. As in other areas, however, the state’s policies are difficult to
assess because they are rarely published or explained.
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According to the 1996 Computer Science Development Law (CSDL), network-ready
computers must be registered (for a fee) with the MPT; failure to do so can result in
fines and prison sentences of seven to 15 years.57 In the Electronic Transactions Law
(2004), anyone who uses ‘‘electronic transactions’’ technology to receive or send in-
formation relating to state secrets or state security or to commit any act harming state
security, community peace and tranquility, or national solidarity, economy, or culture
can be sentenced to between seven and 15 years’ imprisonment.58 Terms-of-service
rules for MPT users issued in 2000 provide a warning that online content will be sub-
ject to the same kind of strict filtering that the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division
carries out: users must obtain MPT permission before creating Web pages, and they
cannot post anything ‘‘detrimental’’ to the government or simply related to politics.59
Furthermore, sharing registered Internet connections is also punishable by revocation
of access and the threat of ‘‘legal action,’’60 the equivalent to which can be found
in the CSDL, which punishes unauthorized computer networks or links with seven to
15 years’ imprisonment.61 The MPT can also ‘‘amend and change regulations on the
use of the Internet without prior notice.’’62
The threat to the junta posed by Burmese activists and other dissenting voices using
online tools to communicate with and transmit information to the outside world be-
came evident in the rash of draconian sentences handed down in November 2008
against 88 Generation’s leaders, bloggers, and others. Closed courts, mostly operating
out of Insein prison, applied the Electronic Transactions Law and the Television and
Video Law to deliver sentences of up to 65 years. On November 11, fourteen 88 Gener-
ation activists were sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment, a staggering term consisting
of 15 years for each of four counts of illegally using electronic media63; formation of an
illegal organization added five years to that sentence.64 Nay Phone Latt, a blogger and
owner of several Internet cafés, was arrested in January 2008 and sentenced in Novem-
ber to 20 years’ imprisonment by a special court in Insein prison, 15 of those years for
violating Articles 33(a) and 38 of the Electronic Transactions Law and over three years
of the sentence for violating Article 32(b) and 36 of the Television and Video Law.65
The Electronic Transactions Law also constituted part of the 59-year sentence
handed down to comedian, film director, and blogger Maung Thura (who uses the
stage name Zarganar), convicted for circulating his footage of relief work after Cyclone
Nargis on DVD and the Internet, as well as for giving interviews critical of government
aid efforts to overseas media.66 Both Nay Phone Latt and Zarganar had their sentences
reduced, to 12 and 35 years, respectively, in February 2009.67
As for Internet cafés, the government has been urging business owners to become
licensed as PACs under the management of Myanmar Info-Tech, a state-owned com-
pany.68 The general manager of Myanmar Info-Tech claimed that more than 1,000
Internet cafés were operating in Rangoon without PAC licenses, and café owners
reportedly have informal bribe-paying arrangements with government employees that
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allow them to operate and offer proxy tools and other services that are technically
forbidden.69 In addition to requirements that screenshots be taken every five minutes
and that records of Internet usage be sent to Myanmar Info-Tech every two weeks, café
owners are told to arrange computer monitors for easy public viewing and to ensure
that only state-run e-mail providers are used.70 Operators of PACs must also record
the names, identification numbers, and addresses of their customers.71 However, it is
widely reported that, despite regular crackdowns, most PAC owners largely ignore
these regulations and provide customers with proxy servers and alternative means of
accessing blocked Web sites.72
Surveillance
In Burma, the fear of surveillance is pervasive and embedded in daily life.73 Offline,
the state can effectively monitor its citizens through a dragnet that functions with the
assistance of various civilian organizations it directly controls. These overlapping
organizations include mass organizations such as the USDA, which imposes mandatory
membership on citizens in specific professions and is being cultivated as a ‘‘future
military-controlled civilian government in Burma,’’ with President Gen Than Shwe as
a primary patron.74 State and local Peace and Development Councils (PDCs) are also
effective tools of social control. For example, all households must provide their local
ward PDCs with a list and photographs of all persons residing in the household and
register any overnight guests before dark, a policy that is reinforced by regular mid-
night checks of homes.75 Another mass-based organization, known as the Swan Arr
Shin, pays its members to conduct routine neighborhood surveillance and police as-
sistance, delegating others to engage in violence against opposition figures for higher
remuneration.76 During the Fall 2007 protests, intelligence officials videotaped and
photographed protesters, and security forces relied on the information to enlist PDCs,
the USDA, and local law enforcement authorities in identifying individuals in order to
immediately begin making arrests in the ensuing crackdown.77
Until it was disbanded in 2004, the Defense Services Computer Directorate (DSCD)
had become focused on information warfare operations such as monitoring telephone
calls, faxes, and e-mails focused onmilitary communications, while the computer center
of the intelligence agency Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) under the
Ministry of Defensemonitored opposition groups.78 After the DSCDwas reformed as the
Military Affairs Security (MAS), it presumably took over information warfare duties.79
While the government’s aptitude at conducting online surveillance is not entirely
clear, it certainly appears to be pursuing a combination of methods to monitor the
small proportion of its citizens that access the Internet. Despite the reported wide-
spread lack of compliance, at the most popular Internet access point—Internet
cafés—owners and operators, as mentioned earlier, are required to record users’ per-
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sonal identification, take screenshots every five minutes, arrange computer monitors
for easy public viewing, allow the use of only state-run e-mail providers, and forbid
the use of circumvention tools.80 A new service in 2009, Mtalk, offers an instant mes-
saging application and private e-mail and is a rare joint venture between MPT and a
private company, Myanmar Technology Gateway.81 Mtalk’s MPT-hosted server can
access GTalk with a single login, causing Internet users to worry about potential sur-
veillance and the exposure of their contact lists.82
The military government’s stringent filtering regime fosters fear and self-censorship.
For example, according to ONI sources the banning of certain political blogs in mid-
2007 sparked rumors that more would be banned if this trend continued, spurring
many local bloggers to self-monitor their postings in the hope that their blogs would
not be added to the blacklist.83 Government e-mail services, theoretically boosted by
the blocking of many free Web-based e-mail services, are widely believed to be under
surveillance, with delays of up to several days between the sending and receipt of
e-mails, or with messages appearing with attachments deleted.84 Blogger Nay Phone
Latt was allegedly convicted in part for storing a cartoon of General Than Shwe in his
e-mail account.85 Internet slowdowns fuel speculation of enhanced online monitoring,
especially where users are required to click through pages equipped with network visi-
bility applications (such as Bluecoat) that allow for monitoring of network activity and
behavior in order to access the Internet.86
Surveillance methods are more effective when there are fewer targets, and a possible
strategy of the Burmese regime may be to keep more people offline. During the October
2007 Internet shutdown, surveillance, or at least perceived surveillance, was attributed
as a rationale for various government responses, including the government’s policy
of originally limiting Internet access to the curfew hours between 9:00 p.m. and
5:00 a.m.87 Not only would the late hours significantly reduce the number of users
(as most Burmese users do not have access to the Internet at home), but it would
also make the task of identifying targeted users easier for a government without much
experience in tracking and investigating Internet usage.
In 2008, persistent and severe distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks hit the
Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and Mizzima News in July, the community forums
Mystery Zillion and Planet Myanmar in August, and The Irrawaddy, DVB, and the New
Era Journal in September.88 In all these attacks, these Web sites, mostly overseas news
organizations, were effectively inaccessible after being flooded with data in short
amounts of time and thus becoming overloaded with information requests.89
ONI Testing Results
In verifying the parameters of the Internet shutdown in September 2007, researchers
from the OpenNet Initiative were able to determine the outage periods using router
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paths advertised by the Autonomous Systems (AS) corresponding to these ISPs,
recorded by Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) monitors of the RIPE project.90 The outage
on MPT, the main government ISP, can be divided in two phases. Phase One of the
outage was a complete shutdown from September 29 to October 4.91 The sole ex-
ception was one brief period of connectivity on October 1 for six hours starting at
6:35 p.m. Phase Two consisted of a regulated outage lasting all day except during the
period between approximately 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. each night from October 4
through October 12. On October 7, MPT had one extra period of connectivity from
9:40 a.m. to 3:37 p.m. In addition to Internet connectivity coinciding approximately
with the curfew period,92 there is evidence that the Internet was also available from
around noon (starting anywhere between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.) until approxi-
mately 4:00 p.m. from October 9 to October 12. As of noon on October 13, MPT
appears to have resumed operation as a stable network with few changes in routing
paths.
The outage on BaganNet follows a similar pattern, with Phase One comprising a
complete shutdown from 7:00 p.m. on September 29 until 10:24 p.m. on the evening
of October 4, also with one exception. Phase Two comprises a regulated shutdown all
day from October 4 until October 9, except during the curfew period from 10:00 p.m.
to 4:00 a.m. As BaganNet’s Internet connectivity is established through MPT, it was
also up from October 9 through October 12 during the approximate curfew period as
well as for a period starting between 12:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. for a few hours daily.
Two long periods of connectivity thereafter, the first from 10:00 p.m. on October 12
to 4:04 a.m. on October 13 and the second from 12:05 p.m. on October 13 to 10:40
p.m. on October 15, were followed by one long outage, from 10:40 p.m. on October
15 to 9:00 a.m. on October 16. Throughout the outage, a small collection of pre-
approved Web sites on the country’s Intranet, known as the Myanmar Wide Web,
was unaffected.
Testing was conducted on MMT and MPT at various periods in 2008 and early 2009.
Both MMT and MPT continued to filter extensively and focused overwhelmingly on
independent media, political reform, human rights, and pornography sites relating
to Myanmar, as well as free Web-based e-mail services and circumvention tools. While
MMT blocks entire root domains, MPT is slightly more selective and only blocks spe-
cific pages of sensitive Web sites—MPT treated Blogspot and the Asia Observer this
way, blocking a number of URLs but not the root domain.
Both ISPs blocked approximately the same number of circumvention tools, includ-
ing Proxify, Proxyweb, Guardster, and Proxyweb.net. Psiphon was inconsistently
blocked: it was filtered at one time during testing but was accessible at others.
In June 2006, Gmail and Google Talk were made inaccessible and Skype was
banned93—reportedly an attempt not only to censor communications but also to
preserve the government’s monopoly over telephone and e-mail services as MPT’s rev-
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enues dipped.94 Testing by ONI confirmed filtering practices consistent with 2007 find-
ings: search engines as well as the suite of additional services (e.g., Google Groups,
Picasa, Google Docs, Google News, and Google Translate) offered by Google, Yahoo,
and MSN were all accessible, with the exception of Google Video and google.at
(Austrian Google), which were blocked by MPT. However, free e-mail services con-
tinued to be filtered, with Yahoo! Mail, Gmail, Hushmail, and mail2web blocked by
both ISPs. In addition, MPT took the precaution of blocking additional e-mail sites
including hotmail.msn.com (though not www.hotmail.com). While MMT and MPT
blocked the Web site www.skype.com, once Skype is accessed and downloaded using
circumvention tools, it is possible to use the Skype VoIP service on both ISPs.
Testing in 2008–2009 revealed that MMT targeted social media sites more than MPT.
Only MMT blocked Flickr, YouTube (although MPT blocked Google Video), Geocities,
and Blogspot. Blocking of the entire Blogspot/Blogger domain by MMT rendered many
of the blogs that were the most active in disseminating images and information relat-
ing to the Saffron Revolution inaccessible. However, while MPT kept the Blogspot
domain open, it blocked the individual blogs of at least four prominent bloggers fea-
tured by international media during the Saffron Revolution: ko-htike.blogspot.com
and niknayman.blogspot.com, two blogs reported blocked in September 2007,95 as
well as moemaka.blogspot.com and myochitmyanmar.blogspot.com. To avoid being
casualties of the blocking of popular domains such as Blogspot and Wordpress, blog-
gers sought their own personal domain, such as blog.mghla.com, with its content
hosted by Blogspot.
International news agencies filtered by both ISPs included Radio Free Asia (www
.rfa.org), the Voice of America Burmese and English Web sites, and the BBC Burmese
service. Only MPT blocked the main BBC Web site and BBC News, while MMT filtered
CNN and the Financial Times. Both MMT and MPT blocked many major independent
news sites reporting on Myanmar, including overseas regional publications such as
The Irawaddy, Mizzima News, Democratic Voice of Burma (www.dvb.no), and BurmaNet
News, as well as Web sites exclusively in the national language (www.burmatoday.net).
While both ISPs blocked some regional publications, such as Thailand’s The Nation
newspaper, the Asia Times (www.atimes.com), and the Asian Tribune, MMT targeted
regional news sites slightly more than MPT.
Web sites containing content on human rights advocacy and democratic reform
continued to be a priority for blocking. A substantial number of nongovernmental
organization Web sites with different levels of involvement in Myanmar human rights
issues were blocked on both ISPs, from international rights organizations such as
Human Rights Watch, the Open Society Institute, and Amnesty International, to a
wide range of Burma-focused groups (e.g., Burma Watch; www.burmacampaign
.org.uk). Within this group were Web sites documenting the persecution of ethnic
minorities and the personal Web site of Aung San Suu Kyi. Other continuities in
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blocking between 2006 and 2007 and 2008–2009 included coalitions for democratic
change in Myanmar, such as the Web site of the coalition government of the Union
of Burma (www.ncgub.net), opposition movements (www.chinforum.org), and rights
groups (www.womenofburma.org).
There continue to be indications that the military government does not take an
entirely systematic approach to filtering. For example, MPT appeared to have reduced
filtering of certain content from previous testing periods, particularly of pornographic
or adult content sites. Based on testing conducted in 2008 and 2009, it now appears
that MMT has overtaken MPT in blocking pornography.
In addition, as was the case in 2006–2007, testing done in 2008–2009 found signifi-
cant differences in filtering between the two ISPs. Of the sites blocked, less than a third
were filtered on both ISPs. The remaining blocked Web sites were blocked on one ISP
or the other, but not both. MMT blocked a greater number of Web sites dealing with
domestic issues, where the term ‘‘Burma’’ or ‘‘Myanmar’’ in the URL was one of the
common threads among the filtered list. Thus, groups critical of the government
(the Burma Lawyer’s Council) as well as peripheral personal Web sites (such as those
with photographs of Myanmar) were blocked. On the other hand, MPT chose to filter
some additional Web sites of international organizations, including the UN’s Human
Rights page (www.un.org/rights) and the Center for Constitutional Rights, and partic-
ularly those with projects related to Burma listed on their home pages, including Earth-
Rights International (www.earthrights.org) and the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions.
Conclusion
The Burmese military government has demonstrated that it is willing to take extreme
steps to maintain its control over the flow of information within and outside its
borders, including shutting down Internet access entirely. Despite the ability of a small
group of Internet users to continue to disseminate information online, access to con-
nectivity as well as actual content are severely hampered by extensive filtering, strin-
gent laws and regulations, and heightened surveillance, all factors contributing to a
pervasive climate of fear.
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China has devoted extensive resources
to building one of the largest and
most sophisticated filtering systems
in the world. As the Internet records
extraordinary growth in services as
well as numbers of users, the Chinese
government has undertaken to limit
access to any content that might po-
tentially undermine the state’s control
or social stability by pursuing strict
supervision of domestic media, delegated liability for online content providers,
and, increasingly, a propaganda approach to online debate and discussion.
Background
The convening of the Seventeenth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in Octo-
ber 2007, at which China’s top echelon of government leaders chose their eventual
successors, was the beginning of a momentous year for China, and consequently for
domestic and international news media. On March 10, 2008, hundreds of monks in
the Tibetan autonomous region led a series of protests to demand loosening of restric-
tions on religious practices and even independence for Tibet.1 Chinese authorities
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rapidly responded with arrests and a violent crackdown against thousands of monks
and rioting Tibetans.2 A corresponding clampdown on reporting from the region and
other Tibetan-populated areas in western China left media with a dearth of reliable in-
formation; official accounts and dispatches released by Tibetan exile organizations put
issues like the actual death toll in question. The crackdown in Tibet galvanized protests
both in support of and opposed to China’s policies toward its religious and ethnic
minorities, especially as symbolized in the Olympic torch making its way in an elabo-
rate tour around the world. The conflicts that erupted in cities as distant as Paris3 and
Seoul in March and April contributed to a so-called transnational Chinese backlash
against Western media portrayals of China, culminating in an ‘‘anti-CNN’’ movement
and a call for a boycott against the French supermarket chain Carrefour.4
On May 12, 2008, a 7.9-magnitude earthquake, with its epicenter in Wenchuan
county, Sichuan province, killed around 90,000 people and injured hundreds of thou-
sands, leveling more than 5 million buildings and leaving millions homeless.5 During
the massive relief efforts and national mobilization of volunteers and monetary contri-
butions immediately following the quake, media were allowed to operate with unprec-
edented openness, with official state outlets such as China Central Television winning
notice and praise for presenting timely and uncanned news. However, within a few
weeks authorities began to encircle and regulate the story—for example, by issuing
more bans on coverage of certain topics and requiring registration of reporters. It took
authorities repeated efforts to quash coverage of one of the most potent and enduring
controversies: the tragic deaths of thousands of schoolchildren and teachers attributed
to shoddy school construction, along with the implication that government officials
were responsible.6 Authorities did not release an official statistic of the number of
schoolchildren who died until almost a year after the quake, and some claimed that
the official figure of 5,335 was too low, compared to Reuters’ estimate of 9,000 deaths,
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 5,084
Life expectancy at birth (years) 73
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 93
Human development index (out of 179) 94
Rule of law (out of 211) 121
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 196
Democracy index (out of 167) 136 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 77
Internet users (percent of population) 22.6
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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calculated from reports by the state news agency and local media.7 This accusation led
one commentator to state, ‘‘Chinese news reports on this major story unfolded in a
complicated environment, and it is impossible to render a simple verdict about media
coverage.’’8
With more than USD 40 billion spent on hosting the 2008 Olympic Games in Bei-
jing, the Chinese government acted to assert control over this global event while pre-
senting an open and welcoming environment for athletes, media, foreign dignitaries,
and visitors.9 As part of these overtures, the government issued regulations in January
2007 allowing journalists to travel across the country without registering with local
authorities and to interview subjects without official consent.10 While the unblocking
of Web sites and improved access to officials at Olympics venues marked some im-
provement in openness and transparency, the government also stepped up surveil-
lance around Beijing and prevented activists from petitioning to use legally sanctioned
protest zones.
After a news conference held by the U.S. men’s volleyball team, in which several
Chinese reporters had their notebooks (and at least one tape recorder) confiscated, Bei-
jing Olympics spokesman Sun Weide denied knowledge of this differential treatment
of Chinese reporters: ‘‘I am not very clear about the situation you raised,’’ he said.
‘‘For Chinese journalists, they very much enjoy the rights to cover the Beijing Olympic
Games. . . . the rights are protected by the constitution in China.’’11 Yet China’s ‘‘open-
door’’ policy for journalists as a result of the Olympics had a marginal impact on Olym-
pics coverage by domestic media. The government persisted in its clampdown on local
Chinese media,12 and the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China confirmed 63 cases
of reporting interference during the Olympics, out of a total of 178 in 2008, including
ten incidents of police roughing up reporters and breaking their cameras.13 While the
relaxed rules for foreign journalists were made permanent in October 2008,14 new rules
issued in February 2009 required reporters based in Hong Kong and Macao to apply for
a permit prior to every reporting trip to mainland China.15
A month after the Olympics concluded, a scandal erupted over tainted milk products
that killed six infants and sickened nearly 300,000 others.16 Information soon emerged
indicating that provincial governments and central government agencies, as well as
officials from the Sanlu group, China’s leading seller of milk powder, had either sup-
pressed earlier reports or failed to act, likely at the cost of human lives.17 Although
it had been receiving complaints about its infant milk powder since December 2007,
the Sanlu group only informed its board in August 2008, prompting its joint ven-
ture partner Fonterra to inform the New Zealand government.18 A reporter for the
newspaper Southern Weekend, known for its investigative reports, wrote in a blog post
that he and several other journalists were prevented in July from publishing findings
about how milk powder was making children sick because of pressure from Sanlu
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officials as well as an overall Olympics-related clampdown on negative news cover-
age.19 In January 2009, 21 defendants were convicted for their roles in the production
and sale of melamine-tainted products, including two melamine producers, who
received death sentences, and the former Sanlu chairwoman, who was sentenced to
life imprisonment.20
As 2008 progressed, the Chinese government demonstrated a perceptible shift in its
media-control policies in order to better manage the handling of negative news
reports, which continued to spread with incredible speed and intensity on the Inter-
net. This approach involves the government responding more actively and rapidly to
fast-breaking news events, primarily by attempting to set the agenda for coverage
rather than suppress it.21 With lessons learned about the upsides of transparency and
timeliness from the early Sichuan earthquake coverage and other emergencies, the
central government reportedly began allowing local governments to disclose infor-
mation about unrest and protests in an apparent attempt to ‘‘control the news by
publicizing the news.’’22 However, despite gestures toward broader openness with the
media, the government clearly did not intend to relinquish control.23 This tactic often
resulted in the same delivery of ‘‘authoritative’’ facts, with state news agencies such as
Xinhua and the People’s Daily benefiting over commercial media from this selectively
enhanced coverage.24 In February 2009, the official China News Service announced
that it would create a blacklist of journalists engaged in ‘‘unhealthy professional con-
duct,’’ and those found breaking rules would be prohibited from engaging in news
reporting and editing work.25
Coming off of these perceived triumphs and devastating crises, the Chinese govern-
ment warned that extra vigilance was needed in 2009. The potential for increased
social instability triggered by the global financial crisis increased anxieties in a year
already punctuated by powerful anniversaries of events tainting the legacy of the
CCP, which will also commemorate 60 years since the founding of the People’s Repub-
lic of China: 20 years since the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square crackdown; 50 years
since the Tibetan uprising that led to the Dalai Lama’s exile; and ten years since the
Falun Gong spiritual movement was banned quickly after their 10,000-strong flash
protest in front of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese central leadership.
Thus, officials repeatedly issued reminders that ‘‘stability preservation work’’26 would
be a top priority. At a media forum in January, an official in China’s Internet affairs
bureau said, ‘‘You have to check the channels one by one, the programs one by one,
the pages one by one. . . . You must not miss any step. You must not leave any
unchecked corners.’’27 Efforts to enforce stability preservation have resulted in predict-
able crackdowns on media reporting; for example, in March 2009, reporters were
detained, turned back, or had their recordings confiscated when trying to visit Tibetan
areas in three provinces ahead of the first anniversary of the unrest in Tibet.28
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Internet in China
China leads the world with 298 million Internet users, an increase of 42 percent from
2007 to the end of 2008.29 More astoundingly, in this same time period more than 90
percent of these users had broadband access, a spike of over 100 million.30 China also
has the world’s biggest cell phone market, with some 583.5 million subscribers.31 The
rural-urban divide that influences many gaps in the informatization of the national
economy is closing, but it remains substantial. Rural areas and the poorer western
provinces are beginning to gain ground, against a national Internet penetration rate
of 22.6 percent.32 At the end of 2008, rural Internet users made up almost a third of
the entire online population, a jump of over 60 percent.33 While many of the poorer
and western provinces such as Yunnan, Gansu, and Guizhou continue to have pene-
tration rates of less than 10 percent, they also have considerable growth rates, upward
of 50 percent.34 Driven by the policy goal that ‘‘every village has access to the tele-
phone and every township has access to the Internet’’ by 2010, infrastructure develop-
ment has expanded broadband Internet access to 92 percent of townships.35 Gender
is also an important demographic factor in the urban-rural divide, with rural male
users outnumbering women by 15 percent. Internet users between the ages of 10
and 19 gained ground in 2008, increasing to 35 percent of all users and overtaking
the 20–29 age group to become the leading demographic using the Internet.36
Web sites registered in China are another exponential growth area, increasing by
91.4 percent since 2007.37 Social media platforms continue to take hold: 210 million
Internet users in China have visited video-sharing sites, 54 percent have blogs (al-
though only 35 percent of those update them at least once every six months), almost
a third participate in online discussion forums, and 19 percent belong to social net-
working sites.38 Chinese netizens have access to a wide variety of well-developed Inter-
net platforms for the domestic market, which have typically outpaced foreign services,
such as search engines (Baidu’s market share is at 63 percent compared to Google’s
28 percent), online portals (the top four portals—Sohu, Sina, Tencent, and Netease—
claim 73 percent of sector revenue), bulletin board services (BBS) and discussion
forums, online video sites, blogs, social networking (the service Kaixin has an esti-
mated 30 million daily users), and booming business-to-customer e-commerce.39 Since
2006, when only China Netcom and China Telecom were permitted to offer pilot
commercial VoIP services in selected cities,40 the number of VoIP service providers has
reached 3,000, mainly in Beijing and Shanghai, with the number of users reaching
80 million.41
In 2008, China’s telecom regulator, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII),
was dissolved and its functions absorbed into the new Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology (MIIT).42 In addition to the MII mandate to regulate
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telecommunications, Internet, broadband, electronics, computing, and software, the
MIIT’s enhanced authority includes supervision of IT development, formerly held by
the National Development and Reform Commission.43 Physical access to the Internet
is controlled by the MIIT and is provided by eight state-licensed Internet access pro-
viders (ISPs), each of which has at least one connection to a foreign Internet back-
bone.44 China’s international outlet bandwidth reached 640 Gbps in 2008, an
increase of 73.6 percent, but China Telecom (ChinaNET) maintained more than 50
percent of that bandwidth.45 China Netcom (now China Unicom) joined China’s sec-
ond-largest ISP, China169, after China Telecom split off in 2003.46
In an effort to boost the fixed-line phone industry’s competitiveness in the mobile
market, in 2008 numerous ministries jointly decided to merge the assets of the nation’s
six state-owned telecommunication companies and form three groups, announcing a
plan to issue licenses for high-speed 3G cell phone services after the restructuring.47
As part of the reorganization, China Netcom was fully incorporated into China Unicom
in October 2008, reportedly completing the biggest merger in Chinese history.48 In
January 2009, the MIIT issued three 3G licenses, with China Unicom and China Tele-
com receiving licenses for established 3G services and China Mobile authorized to carry
a Chinese TD-SCDMA service, so far unproven, that has been a priority of research and
development for the government.49
By sheer scope and range of topics—from online novels to video satires50—the Inter-
net ‘‘cannot be ignored as a battleground for spreading public opinion’’ and senti-
ment.51 Frequently, incidents that go viral (gaining widespread popularity by virtue
of being shared on the Internet) are then catapulted into national prominence, fre-
quently leading to calls for government action and response. According to Hu Yong,
a journalism professor, dedicated coverage by online portals, extensive commentary
on discussion forms, and the potency of Internet rumors that reverberate back into
traditional media are driving convergence in the communications industry—especially
in spawning ‘‘new media events’’ that often result in consequences for the officials,
businesspeople, or celebrities involved.52 In an unpublished investigative report
obtained by David Bandurski of the China Media Project, the vice president of People’s
Daily Online said that of the numerous secret internal reports sent up to the Central
Party Committee each year, two-thirds of the few hundred reports given priority and
action by top leaders are from the Internet Office of the State Council Information
Office.53
The rising prominence of collective efforts over the Internet to target and expose per-
sonal data,54 known as ‘‘human flesh search engines,’’ appear to serve a voracious
appetite within the Chinese online community for personal accountability. According
to Xinhua, the phenomenon had its origins in 2001, when a man posted a picture of
a woman he claimed to be his girlfriend on the portal Mop.com, and other Internet
users identified her as a model for Microsoft, proving him a liar.55 They can initiate
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investigations as straightforward as looking for missing relatives, but sometimes stray
into questionable acts of vigilantism involving threats and harassment. In the years
since, the human flesh search engines have scored a series of successes in identifying
corrupt officials who have acted shamefully or abused their office (and are often sub-
sequently punished), as well as attacking private individuals engaging in perceived
distasteful behavior.56 These loosely networked efforts are capable of launching cam-
paigns against people like Grace Wang, a Chinese student at Duke University who
was filmed in April 2008 attempting to referee between two opposing groups of pro-
testers at a ‘‘Free Tibet’’ action on campus.57 After the video was posted on YouTube
and other Web sites, the online reaction was swift: she was lambasted in Chinese-
language discussion forums and portals for being ‘‘brainwashed’’ and a ‘‘race traitor,’’
among other things, and her parents living in China went into hiding after threats
were painted on their apartment.58
At times, online activity has tested this relationship between citizens and gov-
ernment on a range of sensitive issues. Signed by more than 300 Chinese activists,
scholars, lawyers, and others, Charter 08 was issued online on December 9, 2008, as
a manifesto inspired by the founding of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in 1977.59
It called for the protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, a republican
system of ‘‘one person, one vote,’’ and other comprehensive reforms.60 Charter 08
provoked a clear response from authorities, who questioned or detained more
than 100 of the original signatories, including Liu Xiaobo, a well-known dissident
who was detained without process on December 8 and continued (as of May 13,
2009) to be held at an unknown location.61 However, through circulation by
e-mail and other means, Charter 08 had garnered more than 7,000 signatures by early
2009.62
Beyond the hot-button incidents that carry news cycles,63 the interaction between
top-down media supervisory structures and a more porous and unpredictable online
sphere have also contributed to the rise of a number of phenomena unique to the
Chinese cybersphere. The so-called Fifty Cent Party, a term referring to an estimated
280,000 Web commentators nationwide who zealously support the CCP and were ini-
tially rumored to net 50 cents per post, are directly organized by the government to
‘‘guide’’ online public opinion.64 It had its origins at Nanjing University in 2005,
where students were recruited with work-study funds to advocate the party line on an
online student forum, and it has been institutionalized to the extent that the Ministry
of Culture developed Web commentator trainings (complete with exams and job certi-
fication) and major Web sites are required to have in-house teams of these govern-
ment-trained commentators.65 Thus, while the government continues to aggressively
intervene in news media coverage, these Fifty Cent Party members are proliferating
because the CCP also has come to recognize the potential benefits of a public relations
approach to online discourse.
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Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Although China’s constitution formally guarantees freedom of expression and pub-
lication66 and the protection of human rights,67 legal and administrative regulations
ensure that the Chinese Communist Party will be supported in its attempt at strict su-
pervision of all forms of online content. The Internet has been targeted for monitoring
since before it was even commercially available,68 and the government seems intent on
keeping regulatory pace with its growth and development.
Underlying all regulation of the Internet is a pantheon of proscribed content.
Citizens are prohibited from disseminating between nine and eleven categories of
content that appear consistently in most regulations69; all can be considered sub-
versive and trigger fines, content removal, and criminal liability.70 Illegal content,
although broadly and vaguely defined, provides a blueprint of topics the government
considers sensitive, including endangering national security and contradicting offi-
cially accepted political theory, conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil
organization, and inciting illegal assemblies or gatherings that disturb social order.71
Campaigns directed at cracking down on the perceived harmful societal effects of
Internet development have been both publicly mobilized and opaquely implemented,
but the latter are no less of a reality. The severity of Internet content control also fluc-
tuates during different time periods, especially those buffering politically sensitive
events. For example, an official announcement from the General Administration of
Press and Publications stating that ‘‘a healthy and harmonious environment for a
successful Seventeenth Party Congress’’ would be encouraged by stamping out ‘‘illegal
news coverage’’ and ‘‘false news’’ precipitated a crackdown on political news reporting,
commentary, and Internet discussion through the close of the Party Congress in Octo-
ber.72 In those sensitive months, authorities closed 18,401 ‘‘illegal’’ Web sites and tar-
geted Internet data centers, the physical computers that private firms rent to offer
online interactive features.73
On January 5, 2009, seven ministries (including the Ministry of Public Security and
the Ministry of Culture) were convened by the State Council Information Office (SCIO)
to discuss selected activities for repairing the flood of ‘‘vulgar’’ (disu) content on the
Internet that harms the minds and bodies of youth.74 The crackdown was soon
extended to include cell phone messages, online games and novels, videos, and radio
programs; by January 23, the China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Center
(CIIRC) had received nearly 19,000 reports of harmful content, leading authorities to
shut down 1,250 illegal Web sites and to delete more than 3 million items.75 The tar-
geting of vulgar and pornographic content also netted some political casualties, nota-
bly the blog service provider Bullog.cn (Niubo), founded in 2006 by blogger Luo
Yonghao. Bullog, which had become an important platform for liberal-leaning intel-
lectuals and political bloggers, was shut down on January 9, 2009, for ‘‘picking up
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harmful information on political and current affairs.’’76 Its closure was linked to its
status as the leading domestic circulator of Charter 08,77 as it had already survived a
suspension in October 2007 during the Seventeenth Communist Party Congress and
the purging of multiple high-profile blogs.78 By April 2009, Luo had migrated the site
as Bulloger.com to a server overseas, which was accessible only by proxy server and
‘‘unlikely ever to be allowed to exist in China.’’79
In addition to campaigns dedicated to ‘‘strict supervision’’ of online providers in
order to curb various types of ‘‘harmful’’ information,80 the government has managed
to develop a relatively comprehensive strategy for managing online media. Since 2004,
when essays and articles posted online began to be restricted more systematically,
government supervision has evolved to rely largely on informal controls within official
structures and stringent formal regulation. Nevertheless, it has been a challenge for the
Chinese government to establish the same level of control over the Internet and online
media as it has over the traditional media, because of factors including the relative de-
centralization of government supervision, the scale and viral possibilities of content
available online, and the greater number of nonstate actors.
A major development in Chinese cyberspace since 2005 has been the flourishing
of online news media, which now rank among the top online activities and reached
234 million Internet users in 2008.81 Not only do Chinese users cite the Internet as
their most important source for information, more important than television and
newspapers, but also the national information clearinghouse on information tech-
nology, the China Internet Network Information Center, acknowledges that ‘‘the
report[ing] of major events, such as the Olympics, has enabled network[ed] media to
stand on a par with mainstream media.’’82 Supervision of the media, previously exe-
cuted primarily by the Propaganda Department of the CCP, has been split with the
SCIO, whose local branches have supervisory responsibility over Internet content.83
As a result, most major online content providers and portals are registered in Beijing
and are managed by the Beijing Internet Information Administration Bureau under
the Beijing Information Office. Web sites and content providers have been reported
to operate with greater or lesser levels of freedom depending on where they are
registered.84
Any organization transmitting content electronically about current politics, eco-
nomic issues, and other public affairs must abide by the 2005 Provisions on the Admin-
istration of Internet News Information Services (‘‘Internet News Regulations’’).85 These
regulations introduced a complex regulatory scheme with the result that only news
originating from state-supervised news outlets could be posted online. Government-
licensed and authorized news agencies are limited to covering specific subjects
approved by the state,86 but at least are allowed to conduct original reporting on ‘‘cur-
rent events news information,’’ defined as ‘‘reporting and commentary relating to
politics, economics, military affairs, foreign affairs, and social and public affairs, as
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well as reporting and commentary relating to fast-breaking social events.’’87 All Web
sites that are nongovernmental entities, or otherwise not licensed news agencies, are
restricted from performing any journalistic function, limiting them to reprinting
content from central news outlets or media under the direct control of provincial
governments.88 In practice, major portals are not permitted to repost many articles
published by print media online.
To discipline media, government ministries and Communist Party organs use both
formal controls, such as policies and instructions and defamation liability, and infor-
mal mechanisms, including editorial responsibility for content, economic incentives,
intimidation, and other forms of pressure.89 Generally, authorities prefer to issue
instructions advising on topics to be censored informally by means of short message
service (SMS), chat, or e-mail, or at regular meetings with editors. Coverage of politi-
cally sensitive events is zealously managed at every stage in order to reduce the risk of
exposure to the smallest possible degree.90 This management includes prior bans on
publication and time limits for obeying instructions, as well as ‘‘guidance’’ that serves
a more propagandistic function, including instructions on whether to place news,
when to place news, where to place it, and in what form it should be publicized.
When ‘‘mass incidents’’ or major events such as the 2008 Olympic Games reach their
conclusion, the grasp loosens over time, but it remains an unrelenting presence.
Despite the challenges and intense resources required to effectively police online
media, many of these formal and informal controls have nevertheless been extended
to Chinese cyberspace. China’s legal framework for Internet access and usage is
achieved by the participation of state and nonstate actors at all institutional levels.91
Control over Internet expression and content is multilayered and achieved by dis-
tributing criminal and financial liability, licensing and registration requirements,
and self-monitoring instructions to nonstate actors at every stage of access, from the
ISP to the content provider and the end user. Some of these blunt and frequently
applied methods include job dismissals; the closure of Web sites, often by their Web
hosting service, for a broad array of infractions92; and the detention of journalists,
writers, and activists. In 2008, 49 individuals were known to be imprisoned for online
activities,93 including several (such as Huang Qi and Du Daobin) serving their second
period of detention for Internet-related crimes.94 Internet users have also been targeted
for posting photographs and other multimedia online.95 For example, journalist
Qi Chonghuai was questioned by police about an article he cowrote about a corrupt
local official and photographs of a luxurious government office building on the anti-
corruption online forum of the Xinhua News Agency, before being sentenced to
four years imprisonment on fraud and extortion charges.96 Schoolteacher Liu
Shaokun was detained on June 25, 2008, and sentenced to one year of ‘‘reeducation
through labor’’ for posting pictures of school buildings that collapsed in the Sichuan
earthquake.97
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Internet content providers, such as BBS and other user-generated sites, are directly
responsible for what is published on their services.98 All services providing Internet
users with information that fail sufficiently to monitor their Web sites and report vio-
lations, or that produce, publish, or distribute harmful information, face fines and
other serious consequences, including shutdown, criminal liability, and license revoca-
tion.99 The government has used this approach to bring social media like video-sharing
sites in line with the larger governing framework for Internet content regulation. The
Provisions on the Management of Internet Audio and Video Programming Services
(‘‘Video Regulations’’), effective January 1, 2008, were a further refinement of the
government’s attempt to create a sustainable ‘‘walled garden’’ of self-policed local-
language content for the Chinese cybersphere.100 Jointly issued by the broadcast media
regulator the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) and the MII,
the regulations require video service providers that produce their own content to
obtain both a broadcast production license and rarely issued Internet news infor-
mation services licenses, which are regulated by the MII,101 thus carrying forward the
model introduced in the Internet News Regulations. Just as unlicensed service pro-
viders may not upload or transmit content for anyone, they are also prohibited from
allowing any individuals to upload content pertaining to ‘‘current events’’ news.102
In addition to the types of illegal content routinely proscribed in Internet regula-
tions, SARFT issued a notice on March 30, 2009, detailing 21 unusually specific and
wide-ranging additional content categories that online video providers should edit or
delete.103 These include distortions of Chinese culture and history; disparaging depic-
tions of revolutionary leaders, heroes, police, army, or judiciary; depictions of torture;
mocking depictions of catastrophe, including major natural disasters; excessively
frightening images and sound effects; and ‘‘sexually suggestive or provocative content
that leads to sexual thoughts.’’104 The notice also mandates providers to improve their
content administration systems by hiring personnel to review and filter content, espe-
cially online music videos and other video entertainment, original content, and even
netizen reporters (paike).105
For the first time, individuals are singled out in the Video Regulations, so that ‘‘pri-
mary investors’’ and ‘‘managers’’ can be fined up to RMB 20,000 or barred from engag-
ing in similar services for five years for violations such as not sufficiently policing
content or changing shareholders without going through specified procedures.106
Implementation of these regulations has been uneven, a trademark of many laws in
China. A significant degree of uncertainty was also created by the inaugural require-
ment that online video service providers be either wholly state owned (as defined in
Article 65 of the 2005 Company Law) or entities where the state holds the controlling
interest, until the government clarified in February 2008 that this provision did not
apply to already established Web sites.107 Initially, 25 video-sharing portals were
shut down (including 56.com), and another 32 video-sharing Web sites including
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Tudou.com—China’s largest video-sharing portal—were warned for hosting improper
material in March 2008.108 The third-largest Chinese video-sharing site, 56.com, went
off-line mysteriously in June 2008 for more than a month,109 and Youku.com received
a license from SARFT in July 2008.110
Technical filtering associated with the so-called Great Firewall of China is only one
tool of informal control applied in China. For example, to manage the explosion of
the Chinese blogosphere, which reached 162 million blogs at the end of 2008,111 blog
service providers must not only install filters that do not allow the posting of po-
tentially thousands of keyword combinations, but also flag certain posts for review.
Comment sections, forums, and other interactive features that pose a higher risk of
containing sensitive content can be shut off, while posts can be deleted or concealed
by the provider so that only the author can see them.112 Bloggers who are considered
to have written too many troublesome posts can have their accounts canceled at will.
The unfolding of one mass incident presents a crucial case study on the range of
online and media strategies to gather and communicate information, as well as govern-
ment attempts to manage them. On June 22, 2008, the body of middle school student
Li Shufen was found in the Ximen River in Weng’an county, Guizhou province.113 Al-
though authorities declared her death to be caused by accidental drowning, her family
believed that she was a victim of a crime and pressed for an investigation. Rumors cir-
culated that relatives of the country party secretary and police chief were among the
people Li was with on the night of her death, one of whom said she jumped suddenly
while he was doing push-ups.114 In less than a week, the furor had grown so much that
a group of hundreds of marchers heading toward government offices morphed into a
crowd of up to 30,000 rioters, who surrounded a police headquarters and set fire to
buildings and police vehicles.115 For a week, local officials were silent, and only one
piece of news was released by the official Xinhua News Agency, describing protesters
as ‘‘some people who did not know about the exact context of what had hap-
pened.’’116 In contrast to the silence of state-run media, numerous photos and video
clips of the rioting appeared immediately on blogs and various online forums such as
Tianya and the People’s Daily Strong China forum, while unconfirmed and conflicting
stories about the girl’s death were circulated on the Internet.117 Angry netizens and
Web site moderators dueled vigorously, with users posting in increasingly oblique
and creative ways and Web sites aggressively deleting and blocking information about
the incident.118 Furthermore, although hundreds of video clips appeared on YouTube,
Chinese users could not access certain videos about the incident, and none appeared
on two of biggest China’s domestic video-sharing sites, Tudou.com and Uume.com.119
Soon after, state-run media began increasingly to report news and official announce-
ments regarding the Weng’an riot on Chinese news sites, but without allowing
Internet users to leave comments. Other media attempting to cover the story were
compelled to apply for special press passes in order to secure interviews, which were
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then attended by local officials.120 By early July, state media were providing updates
on the girl’s cause of death and confirming that four officials had been fired as a result
of the incident.121
At the same time, because these compulsory control mechanisms are actually imple-
mented through informal processes, provider-based content control is neither narrow
nor entirely predictable. A study of Chinese blog service providers demonstrated that
there is substantial variation in censorship methods, the amount of content censored,
and providers’ transparency about deleting or depublishing content.122 Similar find-
ings were reached in a Citizen Lab study of four popular search engines in China,
which found significant variations in the level of transparency about filtering, actual
content censored, and methods used, suggesting that there is not a comprehensive sys-
tem for determining censored content.123 While Google and Microsoft, which are
hosted outside China, actually delisted certain search results, the two search engines
hosted inside China, Yahoo and Baidu, ran their Web crawlers behind China’s filtering
system, and therefore did not index Web sites already blocked by the Chinese govern-
ment. Although Google censored considerably less than the other search engines, it
also has a practice of prioritizing authorized local content, which researcher Nart Ville-
neuve found amplified the significance of the censored Web sites, as they were the
only ones to offer differing viewpoints.124 Indeed, the complexity of these informal
control mechanisms was further revealed in April 2009, when an employee of China’s
leading search engine, Baidu, leaked a folder containing the substance and flow of in-
ternal censorship.125 These included lists of topics, keywords, and URLs to be blocked,
lists of banned forums, employee guidelines for monitoring work, censorship guide-
lines for the popular Baidu post bars, and guidelines of how to search for information
that needed to be banned.126
The government’s filtering practices can cause considerable anger among China’s
Internet users, especially when entire platforms or tools such as RSS feed sites or
Twitter are blocked.127 The uses of social media form the building blocks for what
blogger Isaac Mao calls sharism, where the ‘‘co-computing of people, networks, and
machines’’ forms a networked pipeline system to spread information in the face of
Internet crackdowns.128
Because of a wide range of factors—from economic incentives and demographic
factors of the online community to the dragnet of legal liability—the impact of self-
censorship is likely enormous and increasingly public, if difficult to measure. Further-
more, the efforts of industry organizations at self-discipline are not entirely removed
from government oversight. In promoting ‘‘Internet cooperation,’’ officials place self-
discipline hand-in-hand with admonitions to abide by Chinese laws.129 The CIIRC
encourages the reporting of ‘‘illegal’’ or ‘‘harmful’’ information and is sponsored by
the Internet Society of China, formally registered as a civil society organization.130 Yet
the CIIRC cited Baidu and Google’s Web and image search engines for returning a large
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number of obscene and pornographic links as part of an announced official crackdown
on obscene and pornographic content in January 2009. Google and Baidu were among
a total of 19 Web sites singled out for harmful, vulgar content available to minors,
including Sina.com, Sohu.com, Wangyi, and Tianya.131
The Chinese constitution protects people’s right to criticize and make suggestions
to any state organ.132 However, a few cases of alleged online defamation publicized
in Spring 2009 exemplify how the Internet is illuminating some of the complexities
of influence and power in the relationships between media, different levels of govern-
ment, and citizens seeking justice.
Land requisitions for commercial development by local governments in China,
where farmers are often inadequately compensated for land and suffer significant losses
in income, are a common problem of poor governance and an inadequate legal sys-
tem.133 After petitions and other attempts to protect concerned farmers’ legal rights
had failed, Wu Baoquan and Wang Shuai were detained for their online criticism of
local government land seizures.134 In 2007, Wu Baoquan had posted information and
conducted his own investigation about a land requisition in Ordos, Inner Mongolia,
where officials forced residents off their land in order to sell it to developers, earning
exorbitant profits while paying compensation well below market rates to the farm-
ers.135 Wu was tried twice for criminal defamation and ultimately his sentence was
increased to two years, although the same court that affirmed his conviction decided
to review his case in April 2009.136
Wang Shuai was the author of a satirical blog post suggesting officials from his
hometown, Lingbao city in Henan province, had misappropriated funds for combating
drought by carrying out policies that actually encouraged drought in order to drive
down land values and justify paying farmers less compensation for requisitioning their
land.137 He was detained in Shanghai by Lingbao officials on March 6, 2009, and
released on bail only after he signed a written confession and his family agreed to cut
down their fruit trees, reducing the compensation they would receive for their land.138
As is often the case, it took media attention, this time through a story in a national
newspaper, the China Youth Daily, to spark the online public scrutiny that would influ-
ence the outcome of Wu’s case. In this instance, higher party officials issued an apol-
ogy (from the Henan province chief of public security), compensated Wang for his
eight days in detention, and fired the local party secretary and punished three others
responsible for the unauthorized land requisition as well as demolishing crops and
buildings before compensation was paid.139
Neither Wang nor Wu was a journalist using a professional platform to disseminate
information, but media were in large part responsible for exponentially expanding
public awareness and discourse on their detention and the problems underpinning
their cases.
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The first litigation to be launched over human flesh search engines also tested how
Internet libel would be dealt with under Chinese law. A Beijing woman named Jiang
Yan had committed suicide in December 2007, months after learning about her hus-
band Wang Fei’s infidelity.140 According to her instructions, posts from the blog diary
she left recounting her ordeal were published posthumously by major Web portals, and
Wang’s anonymous human flesh search engine critics went to work publishing her
husband’s name, address, and other personal details.141 In March 2008, after he was
publicly condemned, harassed, and fired from his job, Wang sued the classmate of his
wife who had posted her blog on his Web site and the portals Daqi.com and Tianya. In
December, after convening a rare panel of 54 judges, a Beijing court ruled in Wang’s
favor, finding that the classmate and Daqi violated Wang’s rights of privacy and repu-
tation, ordering them to pay a total of almost USD 1,200 in damages for emotional dis-
tress, remove the posts, and apologize.142 However, since Wang admitted to his
infidelity, the court did not find that Wang had been slandered. It also exonerated
Tianya, which had acted ‘‘appropriately’’ by deleting a user post containing Wang’s
personal information upon his request.143 Interestingly, after issuing its judgment the
Beijing district court held a press conference to recommend that the MIIT use technol-
ogy to monitor Internet speech and prevent similar infringements.144
While one legal scholar argued that the Chinese legal system ‘‘weighs privacy pretty
heavily against free speech, even when the speech is truthful,’’145 the relatively low
fine may not act as quite as strong a deterrent as plaintiffs like Wang may desire. How-
ever, the legal system has become increasingly responsive to those who feel victimized
by the human flesh search engines, especially corrupt officials. In March 2009, the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved an amendment to
the Criminal Law that would punish government and corporate employees with access
to personal data who illegally obtain, sell, or leak such information, while Xuzhou city
in Jiangsu province became the first jurisdiction to prohibit the dissemination of
others’ personal information on the Internet.146
Surveillance
The government has continued to refine Internet surveillance mechanisms to closely
track individuals’ online activities.147 In November 2006, the Ministry of Public Secu-
rity announced the completion of the essential tasks of constructing the first stage of its
‘‘Golden Shield’’ project, which is a digital national surveillance network with almost
complete coverage across public security units nationwide.148 Despite the vagueness
of public pronouncements on the implementation of the Golden Shield, the surveil-
lance efforts of local governments, as well as organizations delegated responsibility for
surveillance such as schools and ICPs, are clearly becoming more sophisticated. Since
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2006, local governments have been developing ‘‘Safe City’’ surveillance and communi-
cations networks that connect police stations, through IP video surveillance, security
cameras, and back-end data management facilities, to specific locations including
Internet cafés, financial centers, and entertainment areas.149 Private firms known as
‘‘censorship entrepreneurs’’ have also jumped into the fray, providing advanced text-
mining solutions to enable censors to monitor, forecast, and ‘‘manage’’ online public
opinion, thereby avoiding scandalous and damaging revelations such as the Internet
post in June 2007 that exposed how children were kidnapped and forced into
slave labor at illegal brick kilns in Shanxi province.150 One company featured by
international media, TRS Information Technology, claims to be the ‘‘leading search
and content management technology and software provider in China,’’ serving over
90 percent of the State Council ministries, 50 percent of newspaper press groups, and
300 universities and colleges.151 Although TRS disclosed that its high-end surveillance
systems had been generally adopted by police—specifically that the company had
installed data-mining systems at eight Shanghai police stations so that one Internet
police officer could now do the work of ten—TRS does not list the Ministry of Public
Security as one of its customers.152
Chinese law offers few viable protections for individual privacy, although clauses in
most Internet laws and regulations technically provide for the confidentiality of user
information. The exceptions, however, are more important. For example, regulations
on the management of e-mail services provide that e-mail service providers are duty-
bound to keep personal information and e-mail addresses of users confidential, and
may not disclose them except with user consent or when authorized for national secu-
rity reasons or criminal investigations according to procedures stipulated by law.153
Most Internet regulations allow for disclosure of user information when required by
law, for reasons involving national security, and for criminal investigations, but do
not specify what formal procedures are required or what evidentiary standards must
be met for the disclosure of information. In practice, as has been demonstrated in a
number of cases,154 all ISPs and ICPs not only must capitulate to Chinese government
demands for censoring content, but also are required to assist the government in mon-
itoring Internet users and recording their online activities. Requests to turn over per-
sonal data are often informal or provide little detail, and providers have no discretion
to refuse turning over information to public security officials.155
Real-Name Registration
Registration requirements are often the first step to monitoring citizens’ online activ-
ities. Although this rule is not enforced, new subscribers to ISPs have been expected to
register with their local police bureaus since 1996.156 In March 2005, as part of a CCP
campaign to exercise tighter control over culture, education, and media, all university
BBSs were ordered to block off-campus users and require users to reregister with their
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personal identifying information when going online, eliminating online anonym-
ity.157 The city of Hangzhou was slated to become the first in China to require real-
name Web registration for users to participate in local chat rooms or online forums,
but these regulations were put on hold in May 2009.158 The momentum for real-
name systems might be stronger with cell phones, however. In January 2009, Beijing
Mobile announced that it would begin requiring customers to show identification
when purchasing its Easyown prepaid SIM cards (which amount to 70 percent of the
customers on China Mobile, the nation’s largest carrier) and limit purchases to three
per person.159
Data Retention
In China, ISPs and ICPs must fulfill data retention obligations. Internet service pro-
viders are required to record important data (such as identification, URLs visited,
length of visit, and activities) about all of their users for at least 60 days and to ensure
that no illegal content is being hosted on their servers.160 While 78 percent of users in
China connect from home, 42 percent of users also use Internet cafés as a main access
location.161 However, since 2002, Internet cafés have been heavily regulated: all cafés
are required to install filtering software, ban minors from entering, monitor the activ-
ities of their users, and record every user’s identity and complete session logs for up to
60 days.162 In many cities, they are also connected by live video feed to local police
stations. The providers of electronic bulletin services, including bulletin board services,
online discussion forums, chat rooms, and so on, are required to monitor the contents
of information released in their service system, time of release, and URL or domain
name, and to keep it for 60 days.163
Owned by Tencent, QQ is China’s most popular instant messenger. This service was
found to have installed a keyword-blocking program in its client software to monitor
and record users’ online communication, offering it to the police if required.164
Filtering and surveillance are often complementary processes, especially when ISPs
and ICPs that are liable for the activities of their users delegate human monitors to
monitor and flag content for further review or deletion. Online communications by
e-mail and instant messaging (such as QQ and Skype) are also examined and moni-
tored by the government.165 In October 2008, a joint report by the Information War-
fare Monitor and ONI Asia provided a chilling example of the possibilities for
surveillance conducted by nonstate actors on a massive scale.166 The Chinese-marketed
TOM-Skype, a version of the VoIP and chatting software Skype, kept more than a
million user records in seven types of log files, including IP addresses, user names, and
time and date stamps in all the log files that could be decrypted. All these log files,
along with the information required to decrypt them, were kept on publicly accessible
servers. For call information logs dating from August 2007, the user name and phone
number of the recipient were also logged, while content filter logs dating from August
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2008 also contained full texts of chat messages (which themselves contained sensi-
tive information such as e-mail addresses, passwords, and bank card numbers). Of
the eight TOM-Skype surveillance servers traced by Nart Villeneuve, one server hosted
a special version designed for use in Internet cafés and contained log files and the
censored keyword list, while another contained logs for TOM Online’s wireless
services.
The TOM-Skype surveillance system was triggered when a TOM-Skype user sent or
received messages containing a banned keyword listed in a key file, and those messages
were then stored in log files on a TOM-Skype server. Within the content of these
messages stored in the file logs, when filtered out to eliminate English language
obscenities, almost 16 percent contained the word ‘‘communist,’’ 7 percent the word
‘‘Falun,’’ and 2.5 percent ‘‘Taiwan independence.’’ However, the logged messages also
made reference to other content outside the range of these long-sensitive topics, such
as earthquakes and milk powder.167
Furthermore, the data also contained personal information of Skype users that inter-
acted with TOM-Skype users. Users who attempt to access www.skype.com from China
are redirected to skype.tom.com. While Skype claimed that TOM fixed the security
breaches within 24 hours of the report’s publication,168 the report issued a warning
for ‘‘groups engaging in political activism or promoting the use of censorship circum-
vention technology accessed through services provided by companies that have com-
promised on human rights.’’ From the information contained in the log files, it would
be possible to conduct politically motivated surveillance by using simple social net-
working tools to identify the relationships between users.
Like all other ICPs, most bulletin boards and chat rooms assign personnel to monitor
the content of messages.169 Messages submitted by users are censored by human cen-
sors and filtering systems before appearing online.170 In order to enhance the surveil-
lance on bulletin board systems, since 2005 the users of campus bulletin boards have
been mandated to reregister with their real identifying information before posting mes-
sages online.171
In recent years, serious concerns have been raised about the ability of the Chinese
government to spy on the country’s 624 million cell phone subscribers: in 2008, one
Chinese state-run cell phone company revealed that it had unlimited access to the
personal data of their customers and hands the data over to Chinese security officials
upon request.172 Since 2004, the Chinese government has been drafting legislation to
regulate personal mobile phone communication, which would require all cell phone
subscribers to register for mobile phone service with their real name and identification
card.173 In addition, Chinese police have installed filtering and surveillance systems for
mobile and SMS providers to block and monitor ‘‘harmful’’ short-message communica-
tions.174 Anyone who distributes ‘‘harmful’’ messages or rumors using SMS on mobile
phones can be arrested and convicted.175
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Cyber Attacks
In 2008, organizations advocating for human rights in Tibet and China experienced
escalated cyber attacks during politically explosive events, such as the crackdown on
Tibetan protesters in March, and in the lead-up to the Olympic Games in August. The
preferred method of these attackers was reportedly e-mail viruses, which are more
likely to be undetected by commercial antivirus software because they are hand-
crafted.176 From field research conducted at the offices of the Tibetan Government in
exile in Dharamsala and several Tibetan missions abroad, researchers at the SecDev
Group and the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto discovered an extensive
malware-based cyber-espionage network that also used ‘‘contextually relevant e-mails’’
to gain ‘‘complete, real-time’’ control of at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 coun-
tries.177 This network, which they called GhostNet, sent e-mails to specific targets con-
taining a Trojan called Gh0st RAT, which in taking full control of infected computers
allowed GhostNet to search and download specific files and covertly operate attached
devices such as microphones and Web cameras. Among the high-value infections,
comprising close to 30 percent of the computers affected, were many foreign affairs
ministries, embassies, regional organizations (such as the ASEAN Secretariat), and
news organizations. Although the complicity or awareness of Chinese authorities could
not be conclusively established, researchers tracked the instances of Gh0st RAT to com-
mercial Internet access accounts located on the island of Hainan in China.
ONI Testing Results
The ‘‘Great Firewall of China’’ uses a variety of overlapping techniques for blocking
content containing a wide range of material considered politically sensitive by the
Chinese government. While China employs filtering techniques used by many other
countries, including domain name system (DNS) tampering and Internet protocol (IP)
blocking, it is unique in the world for its system of filtration, targeting Internet connec-
tions when triggered by a list of banned keywords. Known as a TCP reset, this content
filtering by keyword targets content regardless of where it is hosted.
Reset filtering using TCP is based on inspecting the content of IP packets for key-
words that would trigger blocking, either in the header or the content of the mes-
sage. When a router in the Great Firewall identifies a bad keyword, it sends reset
packets to both the source and destination IP addresses in the packet, breaking the
connection.
China employs targeted yet extensive filtering of information that could have a
potential impact on the Communist Party’s control over social stability, and is there-
fore predominantly focused on Chinese-language content relating to China-specific
issues. For the government, information constituting a threat to public order extends
well beyond well-publicized sensitive topics, such as the June 1989 military crackdown,
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the Tibetan rights movement, and the Falun Gong spiritual organization (all of which
are methodically blocked), and includes independent media and dissenting voices, as
well as content on human rights, political reform, sovereignty issues, and circumven-
tion tools.
Filtering during the 2008 Olympic Games
The OpenNet Initiative monitored a short list of prominent blogs, Chinese-language
and international news sites, advocacy organizations, and social media platforms con-
tinuously from late July to mid-September 2008. This period generally marked one of
the most significant openings in access to information since ONI began monitoring
Internet filtering in China in 2004, but the foundations of censorship based on control
over domestic media and civil society remained.
In 2001, China issued this decree in its official bid for the 2008 Olympic Games:
‘‘There will be no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games.’’178
This promise was significantly compromised, not only in China’s purported long-term
attempt to build a more open and transparent media system,179 but also in the lack of
transparency over its policy on access to online information.
At a press conference on July 28, the media director of the Beijing Olympic Commit-
tee responded to a Wall Street Journal reporter who physically displayed the filtering of
certain Web sites on his laptop by denying anything was amiss.180 This time, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson laid part of the blame with the Web sites themselves,
claiming they have problems making them ‘‘not easy to view in China.’’181 Yet, three
days later, on July 31, the IOC admitted to accepting a deal with the Chinese govern-
ment in which sensitive Web sites that were ‘‘not considered Games-related’’ would be
blocked.182
During the Olympics, access was partitioned between the Olympics Main Press Cen-
ter (MPC) in the Olympic Green and the Beijing International Media Center, the main
press venue for non-IOC-accredited journalists.183 The ONI compared data from the
Olympics MPC to that from other locations in Beijing, compiling a snapshot of Inter-
net filtering in China leading up to the Olympics. Testing conducted by the ONI at the
Olympics MPC confirmed that filtering of Internet content continued even for mem-
bers of the foreign press through TCP reset keyword blocking and IP address blocking,
the latter accounting for the vast majority of filtering at the MPC. For each test at the
MPC, the ONI tested at other locations in Beijing with broadband Internet access pro-
vided by China Netcom. Throughout this time period, filtering was nearly identical
between the MPC and consumer-level access on China Netcom and China Telecom,
indicating that the incrementally increased openness was implemented nationally.
Many sites that are routinely blocked by the Chinese government for containing po-
litically sensitive content remained accessible from August 1 to at least mid-September
2008, including the Web sites of human rights organizations and foreign-hosted
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Chinese-language news sites. Overseas news organizations such as the World Journal
and the BBC News Chinese Web site were the main beneficiaries of China’s Olympic
guarantees.
Even though the IOC acknowledged on July 31 that filtering would continue to take
place, a number of Web sites blocked at the MPC on July 25 were accessible a week
later, including Amnesty International, Chinese-language Wikipedia (zh.wikipedia.org),
and an increased swath of independent media including Taiwan’s Liberty Times, the
Hong Kong–based Apple Daily newspaper, Voice of America news, and Radio Free Asia
(www.rfa.org) and its Chinese Web site.
However, RFA’s Tibetan- and Uyghur-language Web sites became inaccessible again
around August 20. Although Flickr remained accessible throughout the testing period,
two of its photo servers were filtered until mid-August. Most of the sites unblocked for
the Olympics remained accessible until at least mid-September 2008 on China Netcom,
although a few (including Amnesty International) were again blocked on China Tele-
com by September 15.
At the same time, the ONI found that the sites being filtered frequently address
tumultuous and controversial changes wrought in preparation for the games, from
crackdowns on civil society to the transformation of a capital city and other social
upheavals. Thus, the majority of advocacy sites and politically ‘‘sensitive’’ organizations
remained blocked, sweeping across a broad range of issues from citizen journalism
(www.zuola.com) to the Three Gorges Probe, as well as nearly all of the Tibetan exile
advocacy groups. Groups staunchly critical of Chinese government policy, including
the press freedom groups Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House, continued
to be blocked. The status of certain news sites, including the China Digital Times Inter-
net news and information clearinghouse and Boxun.com, a dissident news Web site
that Chinese government officials reportedly look to as a source of internal news,
remained unchanged. Furthermore, the accessibility of any Web site does not guaran-
tee that content on that site will be available, as China’s practice of filtering keywords
through a TCP reset appears as robust as ever.
On December 19, 2008, the Web site of the New York Times was reported blocked
even as restrictions were lifted on the Chinese-language Web sites of the BBC, Voice
of America, and Asiaweek, which had been blocked earlier that week.184
In addition to testing during the Olympics period, the ONI also conducted testing in
late 2008 on two backbone providers, the state-owned telecoms China Unicom (CU),
formerly China Netcom, and China Telecom (CT), which between them provide cover-
age nationwide. Because both control access to an international gateway, URL filtering
and domain name system (DNS) tampering implemented by CU and CT affect all users
of the network regardless of ISP.
Nearly all the DNS tampering was executed by CU, while CT blocked a number of
human rights organizations, pornographic sites, and one Hong Kong–based publisher
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(mirrorbooks.com) using this method. China Unicom also used IP blocking to filter
nearly 400 IP addresses. These correlated closely with sites blocked on CT through a
method obscured to analysis, in which users were presented with an error page inform-
ing the user that a network error occurred while accessing the Web site. While the error
page can appear in the case of legitimate network errors, the repeated appearance of
the error page indicates blocking is taking place. China Telecom also used a squid
proxy to block a handful of Web sites, including several Flickr photo servers. While
the two backbone providers showed less overlap in filtering methods when compared
with 2006–2007, there continued to be almost complete correlation in blocking be-
tween CU and CT.
At time of testing, most international social media platforms were accessible, includ-
ing Flickr, Blogspot, Wordpress, Facebook, and Twitter. In contrast to 2006–2007,
when all individual Blogspot blogs tested were accessible on China Netcom and
blocked or inaccessible on China Telecom, in 2008 CU and CT blocked nearly all of
the same individual Blogspot blogs tested. Technorati continued to be blocked.
In late 2008, China had resumed blocking many Web sites that were blocked in
2006–2007 and made accessible during at least part of the Olympics period. These
included the independent overseas news sites (The Liberty Times) and Radio Free Asia’s
main Web site and its Mandarin-, Uyghur-, and Tibetan-language sites. However, in
contrast to 2006–2007, some of these Web sites were unreliably or intermittently
accessible during December 2008 testing, possibly as a result of the TCP reset filtering
method used. Sites blocked using the TCP reset included YouTube, Chinese-language
Wikipedia, and BBC News.
A few sites that were accessible in 2006–2007 had been blocked by 2008 testing,
most notably Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org). The site Wikileaks (www.wikileaks.org)
was also blocked by both ISPs in 2008 testing.
The greatest variations in filtering patterns between 2006–2007 and 2008 occurred
with Chinese-language news media Web sites, likely in continuity from the Olympics.
As in 2006–2007, few international news organizations were filtered, and some for-
merly blocked (e.g., Voice of America news) were accessible. Notably, some prominent
Chinese-language media blocked in 2006–2007 were accessible in 2008, including the
World Journal, www.singtao.com, and the Apple Daily. However, a significant number
of independent media representing different points on the political spectrum con-
tinued to be filtered.
In 2006–2007 and 2008, China filtered a significant portion of content specific to its
own human rights record and practices. As such, only a few global human rights sites
with a global scope continued to be filtered, including Human Rights and Freedom
House. Article 19 and Human Rights First were no longer blocked in 2008, and filtering
on Amnesty International was renewed after a hiatus during the Olympics period. A
typical example of this targeting of China-related content is the differential treatment
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of two related organizations: while the Web site for the writers’ association PEN Amer-
ican Center hosted content on the jailed dissident and Charter 08 coauthor Liu
Xiaobo, it was accessible (www.pen.org) at the same time that the Chinese PEN Center
(www.chinesepen.org), a site with both English and Chinese content, was blocked
by both ISPs. The sites of watchdogs on Chinese rights defenders and labor rights con-
tinued to be blocked, as did a substantial number of rights organizations based in Hong
Kong.
Certain targets for blocking continued to cut across political and social lines of con-
flict in 2008. The consistent filtering of Web sites supporting greater autonomy and
rights protection for the Uyghur (www.uyghurcongress.org), Tibetan, and Mongolian
(www.innermongolia.org) ethnic minorities is not surprising, as these issues have al-
ready been excluded from official discourse inside China. Nearly all the overseas Tibe-
tan organizations, which conduct activities ranging from news broadcasting for the
Tibetan community to the Tibetan Youth Congress, which lobbies for full indepen-
dence for Tibet, have been blocked. China also continued to block a substantial num-
ber of sites on religion, including the International Coalition for Religious Freedom,
Catholic organizations, and sites on Islam in Arabic, including those presenting ex-
tremist viewpoints (www.alumah.com).
In 2008, China continued to filter a significant number of sites presenting alternative
or additional perspectives on its policies toward Taiwan and North Korea. For example,
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan (www.dpp.org.tw) is continually fil-
tered. However, a number of sites with no political content but ending with the do-
main ‘‘.tw’’ were blocked, and Greenpeace Taiwan was the only country Web site of
the organization blocked by both ISPs.
As in 2006–2007, the major exceptions to the focus on politically sensitive topics
specific to China in 2008 were circumvention tools and pornography. A portion,
though not a majority, of proxy tools and anonymizers in both the Chinese (garden-
networks.com) and English (www.peacefire.org) languages were blocked. The circum-
vention tool Psiphon was also blocked, along with the Web sites of the Citizen Lab at
the University of Toronto and the Information Warfare Monitor, sister institutions
engaging in research on circumvention and surveillance. Both ISPs also blocked a sub-
stantial amount of pornographic content.
Although the scope of Internet filtering in China extends far beyond the highly
sensitive issues known as the ‘‘three Ts: Tibet, Tiananmen, and Taiwan,’’ the continued
potency of these subjects evidently prompted the Chinese government to step up
filtering of leading international Web sites and social media platforms in 2009. On
March 24, 2009, Google officially confirmed that YouTube was blocked in China; traffic
dropped steeply on the evening of March 23 to ‘‘near zero’’ by March 24.185 The Web
site www.herdict.org also captured accounts providing evidence of a previous reported
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block of YouTube beginning on March 4, coinciding with the one-year anniversary
of the crackdown on protests in Tibetan regions (during which YouTube was also
reported blocked in March 2008) as well as the 50th anniversary of the Tibetan upris-
ing of 1959. Blogspot became inaccessible around May 9,186 and on June 2, two days
before the 20th anniversary of the June 4 military crackdown, Flickr, Twitter, live.com,
and Hotmail were blocked in rapid succession.187
In May 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in China sent a
notification to computer manufacturers of its intention to require all new PCs sold in
China after July 1 to have filtering software preinstalled.188 The notice, jointly issued
by the MIIT, the Civilization Office of the Central Communist Party Committee, and
the Ministry of Finance, according to the PRC Government Procurement Law, man-
dates the procurement of all rights and services related to a designated software called
‘‘Green Dam Youth Escort’’ to be made available for free public use. Green Dam is a
product of the Jinhui Computer System Engineering Company, which reportedly
received RMB 40 million from the government for a year-long contract.189
The purported intent of the Green Dam software is to filter harmful online text and
image content in order to prevent this information from affecting youth and promote
a healthy and harmonious Internet environment.190 However, researchers at the
OpenNet Initiative and the Stop Badware Project conducting an initial technical assess-
ment of the software found that Green Dam’s filtering not only is ineffective at block-
ing pornographic content as a whole, but also includes unpredictable and disruptive
blocking of political and religious content normally associated with the Great Firewall
of China.191
As a computing tool, Green Dam is far more powerful than the centralized filtering
system China currently implements, as it actively monitors individual computer be-
havior to the extent that its ‘‘language processing’’ tool can institute extremely intru-
sive ‘‘kill’’ action on sites if the content algorithm detects ‘‘inappropriate’’ sensitive
political or religious speech.192 These actions include the sudden termination of Web
browser tabs, whole browsers, and a wide range of programs including word processing
and e-mail. The program installs components deep into the kernel of the computer
operating system in order to enable this application layer monitoring. Researchers
also found that the killing of sites upon inappropriate keywords or URLs like http://
falundafa.org extends to killing single letters that autocomplete in location boxes and
autocomplete lists in browsers. For example, if a user enters ‘‘epochtimes.com’’ into the
location, the user will see the page briefly, see the warning box briefly, and then have
the whole browser terminated. But after the user restarts the browser, epochtimes.com
will be in the browser history and therefore in the autocomplete list, so that the
user may only have to type ‘‘e’’ into the location box to trigger the appearance of
epochtimes.com in the autocomplete list and cause Green Dam to terminate the whole
browser.193
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The monopoly status granted to Jinhui is unprecedented, representing the first
instance where a government mandated a specific filtering software product for use at
a national level instead of performance standards that encourage consumer choice,
security, and product quality. The mandated procurement and preinstallation of Green
Dam also adds a new and powerful control mechanism to the existing filtering system,
in addition to blocking already done at the international backbones and by individual
online content providers. Distributing control mechanisms to end users at the periph-
ery allows the government to partially offload the burden of monitoring and blocking
content to individual machines on the network, amounting to a ‘‘huge distributed
super computer dedicated to controlling online content.’’194
In addition to interfering with the performance of personal computers in an unpre-
dictable way, the poor design of Green Dam also presents security risks that allow any
Web site the user visits to take control of the user’s computer, with the potential for
malicious sites to steal private data and commit other illegal acts, or even turn every
Chinese computer running Green Dam into a member of a botnet.195 The Stop Bad-
ware Project at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society confirmed that the appli-
cation violates its Badware guidelines for software, as it does not disclose the filtering of
political speech or the unexpected behavior of completely killing processes that con-
tain such speech.196
Conclusion
The Chinese government has maintained a strict and vigorous approach toward Inter-
net censorship, interfering with public knowledge and discourse through pervasive fil-
tering practices and a multitude of nontechnical methods. In 2008, China led the
world with 300 million Internet users, and the sheer scale and expanding scope of on-
line content presented a significant challenge for a government intent on maintaining
social stability and order in China’s networked spheres. China continues to fine-tune
its system of information control, including attempts to promote a public relations
approach to online commentary and news reporting. The foundation of China’s infor-
mation-control framework continues to be built on ensuring that domestic providers
are responsible for filtering and monitoring hosted content. The government has also
taken measures to distribute control mechanisms to end users through the procure-
ment of filtering software on home computers. The 2008 Olympic Games held in Bei-
jing had a net positive impact on access to information, but this has abated without
continued international pressure for greater openness and transparency.
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In 2007–2008, political turmoil and
campaigns to curb media coverage in
Pakistan took place against a rela-
tively stable backdrop of Internet fil-
tering directed at content determined
to be blasphemous, secessionist, anti-
state, or anti-military. One of the
most widely reported instances of fil-
tering occurred in February 2008,
when a government order to prevent
access to a YouTube video mocking the Prophet Muhammad resulted in a near-
global block of the entire YouTube Web site for around two hours.
Background
During General Pervez Musharraf’s first term as president, military control was applied
over the judiciary and the ruling party in Parliament, and print and electronic media
were censored where the content was deemed to be anti-government or anti-Islam.
Government repression of media has been particularly acute with regard to Balochi
and Sindhi political autonomy, content considered blasphemous, and other anti-state
or anti-religious content.
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In October 2007, Musharraf won an indirect, widely boycotted presidential election
held while his two major political opponents were in exile. Leading the court challenge
over Musharraf’s eligibility to run while still serving as army chief was Chief Justice
Ifthikar Muhammad Chaudhry, who had himself been suspended by Musharraf in
March 2007 and reinstated in July 2007, after a ‘‘Lawyer’s Movement’’ instigated court
boycotts and massive rallies around the country.1 Musharraf responded by suspending
the constitution and placing the country under a state of emergency on November 3,
the second since his bloodless coup in 1999.2 While waiting for the court’s decision,
Musharraf’s government shut down all privately owned television stations and other
independent media outlets, arrested lawyers and about 60 senior judges, and jammed
cell phone and Internet connections.3
Under growing international pressure, Musharraf resigned from his army position
in late November and was sworn in for his second term as president, finally lifting
the emergency on December 15. However, in August 2008 the two main governing
parties agreed to launch impeachment proceedings, and Musharraf resigned under
pressure.4 In September 2008, Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of assassinated Pakistan
Peoples Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto, was elected Pakistan’s new president by
legislators.5
A vibrant civil society movement working against Internet censorship continues to
operate in Pakistan and monitors developments in filtering.6 International human
rights groups have reported on the persecution of journalists at the hands of the Paki-
stani military intelligence agency and extremist groups, while advocacy groups such as
the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists continue to call for investigations into attacks
against journalists, which are often unresolved.7 According to the Committee to Pro-
tect Journalists, at least five journalists were killed in connection with their work in
2008, several of them in the conflict-torn regions of Northwest Frontier Province and
Swat.8 Six journalists and media workers were killed in 2007.9
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 2,357
Life expectancy at birth (years) 65
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 54
Human development index (out of 179) 139
Rule of law (out of 211) 169
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 169
Democracy index (out of 167) 108 (Hybrid regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 127
Internet users (percent of population) 10
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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Internet in Pakistan
With 3.7 million Internet subscribers, an estimated 22 million Pakistanis were online
in 2008, constituting a penetration rate of around 10 percent.10 Pakistan has experi-
enced considerable growth in its information and communication technology (ICT)
sector; in 2003, the government deregulated its telecom market, opening itself up to
corporate competition in telephone, cellular, and Internet services.11 Internet access is
widely available at Internet cafés, which accommodate many lower-income and casual
users. Rates for usage range between PKR 15 and PKR 40 per hour (USD 0.25–0.60 per
hour), depending on location and amenities. Internet café managers are expected to
monitor the activities in their establishments, but based on user experience these cafés
appear to be mostly unregulated by the regular police.
Since deregulation, the market has become highly competitive, and there are
currently approximately 50 ISPs in Pakistan of varying size and quality of service.12
The largest ISPs in the country include Cybernet, Comsats, Brainnet, Gonet, and
Paknet (a subsidiary of the Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited, or
PTCL). Although the estimated penetration rate for broadband Internet is just over 1
percent and demand has historically been low, Pakistan is ranked fourth globally in
broadband Internet growth, with a growth rate of over 180 percent in metropolitan
areas.13
All Internet traffic in and out of Pakistan is routed by the PTCL, which controls the
IT infrastructure of the country through its subsidiary, the Pakistan Internet Exchange
(PIE), with three international gateways at Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi,
and small/medium points of presence (POPs) in six other cities.14 Domestic Internet
traffic is peered at the PIE gateways within the country. In 2007, the PTCL’s Karachi
exchange reportedly processed at least 95 percent of Pakistan’s Internet traffic.15 In
February 2008, the construction of a fifth undersea cable system that would link India
and France (I-ME-WE) was announced, to be available for service by the end of 2009
and serving nine telecoms, including the PTCL.16 The company invested USD 50 mil-
lion into I-ME-WE, expected to have a capacity of 3.84 terabits per second.17
The Internet, as a tool for dissemination of information and mobilization of civil so-
ciety, has been increasingly integrated into the political life of Pakistan. Bloggers across
Pakistan objected to the intermittent block on the Blogspot platform and the tempo-
rary blocking of Wikipedia in 2006, and initiated a virtual civil society movement to
repeal the orders.18 In the movement against Musharraf’s declaration of emergency in
November 2007, with lawyers leading mass protests and acts of civil disobedience
against the suspension of judges and the constitution,19 a convergence between new
and old media became evident.20 According to one contributor to the Emergency
Times blog (pakistanmartiallaw.blogspot.com), created to keep people informed about
news and protests, ‘‘the real resistance to the emergency was built on the Internet.’’21
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In the face of stringent media regulation, individual journalists, lawyers, and viewers
uploaded news broadcasts from banned television stations to YouTube, while stations
offered free streaming on their own Web sites.22 Millions signed online petitions, while
students, youth, and others created blogs (such as the Emergency Times) and dynami-
cally utilized an array of tools, including SMS2Blog, Facebook, and video and photos
uploaded to social media sites such as Flickr, to plan flash protests and document their
resistance in the face of a media blackout.23
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Internet filtering in Pakistan is regulated by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority
(PTA),24 under the directive of the government, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and
the Ministry of Information Technology (MoIT), formerly the Ministry of Information
Technology and Telecommunications (MITT). The PTA implements its censorship reg-
ulations through directives handed down to the PTCL,25 of which the Emirates Tele-
communications Corporation (Etisalat) took majority control in 2006.26
In December 2007, the government passed a cyber crimes ordinance, followed by the
Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance (PECO) enacted less than a year later and
taking effect on September 29, 2008.27 Cyber crimes are investigated under the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA),28 with the support of the National Re-
sponse Centre for Cyber Crime (NRCCC), which provides technical assistance and a
reporting center, and leads awareness campaigns.29 In addition to laying out offenses
for electronic forgery, fraud, criminal data access, and the use of malicious code, the or-
dinance made ‘‘cyber stalking’’—which requires ‘‘intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass
any person’’ using computers or networks—a crime punishable by up to seven years’
imprisonment.30 Media rights advocates expressed concern that the prohibition
against taking or distributing photographs of a person without consent made one of
the major components of citizen journalism illegal.31 The ordinance also makes
‘‘cyberterrorism,’’ defined as the access or utilization of a computer network or elec-
tronic system or device by a person or group with ‘‘terroristic intent,’’ an offense pun-
ishable by life imprisonment or death.32
In the absence of a specific legal framework, Pakistan’s filtering practices have
evolved largely out of executive action taken by various government organs. Blocking
orders have been issued through an opaque process that invites speculation as to the
political motivations behind them, with authorizing agencies alternating between the
MoIT, the PTA, the courts, and law enforcement. For example, in August 2008 the civil
society organization Pakistan ICT Policy Monitors Network announced that six URLs
were blocked upon the request of retired Admiral Afzal Tahir, accused in a number of
YouTube videos of abusing his office in a personal land dispute.33 In October 2008, the
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government announced that the terrorism wing of the country’s FIA would be tasked
with hunting down the ‘‘antidemocratic’’ forces that were circulating YouTube videos
and text messages aimed at discrediting the ruling party’s politicians.34
On September 2, 2006, the MoIT announced the creation of a committee to monitor
the content of offensive Web sites. Composed of representatives from the MoIT, the
PTA, the Ministry of the Interior, and the cabinet, as well as members of security
agencies, and presided over by the Secretary of the MoIT, the Inter-Ministerial Com-
mittee for the Evaluation of Websites (IMC) was tasked with examining and blocking
Web sites containing blasphemous, pornographic, or anti-state material.35 To address
the grievances of Internet users with this censorship body, the government set up the
Deregulation Facilitation Unit to deal with users’ complaints.36
Much of the episodic filtering in Pakistan has been ordered in reaction to ‘‘blasphe-
mous’’ content. On February 28, 2006, the PTCL issued a blocking directive banning a
dozen URLs posting controversial Danish cartoons depicting images of the Prophet
Muhammad.37 Within two weeks in March, in a series of escalating instructions, the
Supreme Court directed the government to block all Web sites displaying the cartoons,
to explain why they had not been blocked earlier, to block all blasphemous content,
and to determine how access to such content could be denied on the Internet world-
wide.38 The Supreme Court also ordered police to register cases of publishing or post-
ing the blasphemous images under Article 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, where
blasphemy or defamation of the Prophet Muhammad is punishable by death.39
President Musharraf’s crackdowns on the media included content prohibitions and
enhanced government discretion as to licensing requirements in order to cultivate
self-censorship. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was
established when Musharraf allowed for the creation of privately owned, independent
broadcast media in 2002. One of its first acts was to lay out the regulatory framework
that would ultimately support Musharraf’s drive to control and restrict independent
journalism. This framework instructed that in order to obtain a broadcast license,
media outlets were required to preserve the sovereignty, security, integrity, values, and
constitutional principles of public policy of Pakistan.40 Article 27 of the 2002 ordi-
nance also directly prohibited the broadcast or distribution of any content ‘‘against
the ideology of Pakistan,’’ as well as programming that ‘‘is likely to create hatred
among the people, is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order, is likely to
disturb public peace and tranquility, endangers national security or is pornographic,
obscene or vulgar or is offensive to the commonly accepted standards of decency.’’41
Upon declaring a state of emergency in 2007, Musharraf further amended PEMRA’s
charter to prohibit programming that ‘‘defames or brings into ridicule the head of
state, or members of the armed forces, or executive, legislative or judicial organ of the
state,’’42 as well as content ‘‘against the ideology, sovereignty, integrity or security of
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Pakistan.’’43 Video footage of suicide bombers, terrorists, and their victims was
banned.44 PEMRA was now empowered to close any broadcast service in a ‘‘situation
of emergency’’ and to seize equipment or seal the premises of licensees ‘‘in the public
interest,’’45 with penalties expanded to include three years’ imprisonment and the
maximum fine increased from PKR 1 million to PKR 10 million.46 For print media, the
Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance, 2002 (XCIII of
2002) was amended to reflect the same content prohibitions and grant the government
the same emergency authority to shutter any publication for up to 30 days.47 In April
2008, the MoIT introduced a bill to repeal these amended provisions, reduce the maxi-
mum fine to PKR 1 million, and abolish the provision banning broadcasts ‘‘against the
ideology of Pakistan.’’48
Musharraf did not take such an assiduous approach toward restricting online con-
tent during the emergency, although telephone and Internet access were intermit-
tently cut. However, all privately owned radio and television stations were shut down,
some by force,49 and cable operators were banned from broadcasting any national or
international news channels.50 The Code of Conduct created after the emergency was
characterized as voluntary,51 but most of these stations were allowed to resume broad-
casting in December only after agreeing to abide by the Code of Conduct.52 In Decem-
ber 2008, the Pakistan Broadcasters Association (PBA) announced that it would
formulate its code of conduct and self-regulate among its members.53
Internet Surveillance
The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance requires ISPs to retain all traffic data for
at least 90 days and to provide it to the government upon request, or face fines and up
to six months’ imprisonment.54 Providers may also be required to cooperate in the col-
lection of real-time data (including traffic data) and to keep their involvement confi-
dential.55 The bill ostensibly focuses on the use of the Internet to commit acts of
terrorism, but its scope is broad enough that Pakistani bloggers and Reporters Without
Borders expressed concern over the impact on Internet freedom.56
Pakistani media have reported that the PIE, which controls the international gate-
ways, monitors all incoming and outgoing Internet traffic in Pakistan. This capability,
in addition to filtering, allows it to monitor and store all e-mails for a certain period of
time.57 There are no reported cases of people imprisoned for their online activities, and
most Pakistani bloggers view government surveillance as more clumsy than frighten-
ing. At the same time, political events that generate unusual amounts of online chatter
and debate, including the suspension of Chief Justice Chaudry in March 2007, cause
bloggers and other users to worry about being censored or targeted.58 After the imposi-
tion of de facto martial law in November 2007, several bloggers made arrangements to
have their blogs published outside of Pakistan.59
494 Pakistan
ONI Testing Results
Episodic filtering, in addition to routine blocking of Web sites considered blasphemous
or threatening Pakistan’s internal security, continued through the end of Musharraf’s
term as president and into the tenure of the new civilian government. In December
2007, the enactment of the cyber crimes ordinance was followed shortly by the
reported blocking of several hundred anti-government blogs.60 In late December
2008, upon the recommendation of the IMC, the PTA issued an order to block six
URLs: three from dictatorshipwatch.com, a Web site created after Musharraf declared
a state of emergency; one from makepakistanbetter.com, a social and political discus-
sion forum; one from friendskorner.com, another discussion forum; and one from
buzzvines.com.61 The common thread among the Web pages appeared to be informa-
tion about Punjab Governor Salman Taseer,62 rather than any type of content under
the authorized purview of the IMC.
OpenNet Initiative testing was conducted on Cybernet, LINKdotNET, the PTCL, and
Micronet in May through July 2008. There is no uniform method of blocking among
the four ISPs tested. Cybernet blocks by setting a DNS lookup failure; both LINKdotNET
and Micronet employ block pages—LINKdotNET by means of Squid Proxy and Micro-
net using both proxy server and Squid Proxy. The PTCL had appeared to rely on DNS
poisoning by redirecting to an IP address they own containing no content, but during
later rounds of testing switched to a block page using a proxy server.
A comparison of ONI testing results from 2006–2007 and 2008 indicates that despite
high-profile filtering incidents, ISPs may actually be blocking less content. For exam-
ple, in contrast to testing results from 2006 to 2007, where the PTCL implemented a
limited block on pornography and religious conversion sites, 2008 testing found no
evidence of filtering in these categories.
A form of collateral filtering, the blocking of additional content that is unintended
and caused by imprecise filtering methods,63 has long been a feature of Internet cen-
sorship in Pakistan. For example, in March 2007, in an attempt to comply with a
Supreme Court order to filter blasphemous content ‘‘at all costs,’’ the PTCL im-
plemented a blanket IP address block at their Karachi PIE exchange that lasted for
four days and impacted the Akamai servers, leading to disruptions in accessing Google,
Yahoo, BBC, CNN, ESPN, and several other major Web sites.64 In January 2008,
several bloggers reported the blocking of the Blogspot.com and Wordpress.com
domains.65
One of the most severe examples of collateral filtering took place in February 2008,
when a government attempt to block YouTube in Pakistan made the entire Web site
inaccessible to most Internet users around the world for up to two hours.66 On Febru-
ary 22, the PTA issued an order to block access to a single video, while listing three
IP addresses.67 The film Fitna by the Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders, which
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contained ‘‘blasphemous’’ content considered offensive to Islam, was the official cause
of the block, but others claim that the government could have been trying to suppress
a video depicting a woman engaging in election fraud in Karachi.68 In response, the
PTCL redirected requests for YouTube videos to its own network. This rerouting was
advertised to the Internet at large and was picked up by the Hong Kong–based ISP
PCCW, which then broadcast the redirect to ISPs around the world.69 YouTube staff
worked with PCCW to restore access within two hours.70 Access to YouTube was
restored in Pakistan after the video listed in the PTA blocking order was removed.
The Web sites blocked by all four ISPs provide a representative snapshot of 2008
filtering practices, consisting entirely of Balochi news, independence, and culture Web
sites, with the exception of two: the anti-Islamist jihadwatch.org and themoviefitna
.com, a Web site dedicated to coverage of Geert Wilders and his film Fitna.
The filtering of material considered blasphemous or anti-Islamic has long been a pur-
ported objective in Pakistan. In 2006–2007, most material relating to the Danish car-
toon incident that led to a block on the entire Blogspot.com domain was blocked by
ISPs; 2008 testing showed that many of these have since been hacked or unblocked.
Cybernet, LINKdotNET, and the PTCL blocked a right-wing American Web site con-
taining the cartoons (zombietime.com), while leaving only Cybernet to block one
other relevant Web site, mohammeddrawings.com.
By April 2006, the PTA extended their blocking to anti-state Web sites as well as those
promoting Balochi human rights and political autonomy.71 Testing done by the ONI
in 2006–2007 confirmed that internal security conflicts had become a strong focus for
filtering, including Web sites relating to Balochi independence movements, Sindhi
human rights, and political autonomy movements. Among these categories, Web sites
addressing Balochi political independence were the most comprehensively blocked.
Filtering of content in 2008 continued to target these categories of Web sites, albeit a
smaller number and with even greater inconsistency. All four ISPs blocked Web sites
tested relating to human rights, news, and justice (e.g., www.balochistaninfo.com)
in the province of Balochistan. However, a number of Balochistan-related Web sites
blocked by all four ISPs have been closed, including www.balochfront.com and
baloch2000.org. Other Web sites were blocked by a combination, but not all, of
the ISPs, including the Balochistan Legal Fund (www.bso-na.org) by Cybernet,
LINKdotNET, and the PTCL; the Balochi independence Web site balochestan.com by
Cybernet and LINKdotNET; and www.balochtawar.net by Cybernet and Micronet. A
limited selection of Balochi-related blogs were also blocked, with all four ISPs filtering
www.rahimjaandehvari.blogfa.com.
A selected number of the Sindhi sites tested continued to be blocked in 2008, such
as www.worldsindhi.org, which was blocked by the PTCL, Micronet, and LINKdotNET.
Unlike in 2006–2007, none were blocked by all four ISPs. However, in contrast to
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2006–2007, when the few existing Web sites pertaining to Pashtun secessionism were
fully accessible, Micronet blocked the Pashtun discussion board www.kitabtoon.com.
The blocking of a selective number of blogs and Web sites containing purported anti-
Islamic and anti-Pakistani content was one continuity between 2006–2007 and 2008
testing, such as the Indian militant extremist sites www.hinduunity.com that was
blocked by Cybernet and LINKdotNET and anti-Islamic Web sites (www.plusultrablog
.com by Cybernet; www.nordish.net blocked by Cybernet, LINKdotNET, and the
PTCL). However, there was also less filtering of blogs in 2008. A limited number of
Web sites not directed at Pakistani issues were filtered by some, but not all, ISPs. For
example, the blog of Michelle Malkin, a popular conservative American blogger, was
inaccessible on all ISPs in 2006–2007; in 2008, only Cybernet filtered michellemalkin
.com. A free online radio site, Live365.com, was filtered by Cybernet, LINKdotNET, and
the PTCL.
Since the last round of testing, it appears that more responsibility for implement-
ing filtering is being shifted down to the ISP level. The most recent round of testing
also showed that filtering across ISPs is less consistent than in 2006–2007, when all
but a handful of filtered Web sites were blocked by all the ISPs. In 2008, Cybernet
blocked the greatest number of Web sites tested, filtering twice as much as the nearest
ISP; Cybernet was followed by LINKdotNET, PakNet, and Micronet (in descending
order). Between ISPs, the greatest overlap in filtering occurred between Cybernet and
LINKdotNET.
The ONI testing in 2008 showed that in continuity with 2006–2007 results, the vast
majority of newspapers and independent media, social media such as YouTube and
Blogspot.com, circumvention tools, international human rights groups, VoIP services,
civil society groups, minority religious Web sites, Indian and Hindu human rights
groups, Pakistani political parties, and sexual content (including pornography and gay
and lesbian content) were accessible on all four ISPs.
Conclusion
Pakistanis currently have unimpeded access to most sexual, political, social, and reli-
gious content on the Internet. Although the Pakistani government does not currently
employ a sophisticated blocking system, a limitation which has led to collateral blocks
on entire domains such as Blogspot.com and YouTube.com, it continues to block Web
sites containing content it considers to be blasphemous, anti-Islamic, or threatening to
internal security.
Online civil society activism that began in order to protect free expression and blog-
ging rights has expanded as citizens utilize new media to disseminate information and
organize in the face of media blackouts and other political crises.
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Over the years, the growing sophisti-
cation and dynamism of the Internet
in South Korea have also raised con-
cerns of its power to spread harmful
slander and information. In response,
the South Korean government is
authorized through an expansive reg-
ulatory framework to exercise signifi-
cant discretion over ‘‘illegal’’ Internet
content and ‘‘harmful’’ material for
youth. In addition to rigorously regulating providers, government agencies also
enforce real-name registration requirements for participation in Internet services
and closely monitor election-related online activities.
Background
The Republic of Korea (also known as South Korea) was established in 1948 and spent
most of its first four decades under authoritarian rule. In 1987, after a massive protest
movement, the government enacted a democratic constitution that has endured to
this day. Overall, South Korea’s human rights record has steadily and markedly
improved since the 1990s. Since that time, South Korea has become one of the most
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vibrant democracies in Asia. Its citizens enjoy universal suffrage and broad constitu-
tional freedoms, and they choose their leaders in free and fair multiparty elections.
South Korean foreign relations remain dominated by the state’s relationship with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea), with which South Korea has
technically been at war since the two sides fought to a stalemate in 1953. Since that
time, the South Korean government has often been intolerant of dissident views and
those espousing communism or supporting North Korea; publicly praising North Korea
has been, and remains, illegal. Human rights groups charge that, since its enactment in
1948, thousands of South Koreans have been arrested under the state’s anticommunist
National Security Law (NSL). Those arrested over the years have included students,
publishers, trade unionists, political activists, professors, and Internet users, many
peacefully expressing their political views.1 While prosecutions under the NSL have
decreased significantly since the transition to democracy, there have been a few recent
high-profile investigations using the NSL.2 As of 2004, Amnesty International reported
that 14 people were in prison under the law.3
Internet in South Korea
South Korea is one of the most connected countries in the world, with over 77 percent
of South Koreans age six and older using the Internet.4 South Korea has also become
the most penetrated broadband market in the world: by early 2008, 90 percent of
households used broadband.5 Following heavy investment in broadband infrastructure
after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, South Korea now provides its citizens
with a national network that carries data at speeds for the average broadband user of
50–100 Mbps.6 Over three-quarters of South Korean Internet users use the Internet
more than once per day.7
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 23,399
Life expectancy at birth (years) 79
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 99
Human development index (out of 179) 25
Rule of law (out of 211) 53
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 69
Democracy index (out of 167) 28 (Full democracy)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 1
Internet users (percent of population) 77.8
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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By 2008, Korea’s 114 Internet service providers (ISPs) were connecting at six Internet
exchanges (IX) providing a total of 1,450 Gbps capacity to South Korean Internet
users.8 However, three South Korean ISPs (KT, formerly known as Korea Telecom,
Hanaro Telecom, and Korea Thrunet) control nearly 85 percent of the broadband mar-
ket. The largest broadband supplier, KorNet, provides about half the ADSL lines in the
country, making it the largest ADSL supplier in the world.9
Dedicated blog service providers, video sites, and online news sites saw the biggest
growth in 2008.10 Over 50 percent of Korean Internet users have created user-
generated content (UGC), with over 30 percent producing content at least once a
month.11 Most UGC is centered around Web portals and is text based, though over
50 percent is in video and flash-generated formats.12 The government has acknowl-
edged that UGC has powered social and political transformation: whereas political dia-
logue tends to be limited to that between politicians and major media, high-speed
Internet infrastructure and social media tools have allowed users anywhere to engage
in real-time dialogue.13 Of the 67 percent of Korean Internet users who read news
online, almost 90 percent rely on news services provided by portals, followed by 60
percent viewership of Web sites of print publications.14
Thus, it is not surprising that citizens of South Korea, one of the world’s most net-
worked countries, have come to influence and in some cases transform the political
and social fabric through their online participation. In April 2008, as part of trade
negotiations with the United States, President Lee Myung-bak’s administration agreed
to resume imports of American beef after a five-year ban.15 On April 29, 2008, a televi-
sion program called PD Notebook on the network MBC claimed that ‘‘Koreans are 94
percent more likely to contract a human form of mad cow disease,’’ sparking a flood
of online debate, especially on the Agora forum of Korea’s second-largest portal,
Daum (which saw a daily page-view count spike from 40 million to 200 million).16 A
group called the People’s Association for Measures against Mad Cow Disease, led by
organizations such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and the Korean
Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union, led about 100 days of protests and
demanded the resignation of the Lee Myung-bak administration.17 These protests
were coupled with online action, as protesters uploaded images to the Internet, sent
messages on protest meet-ups and warnings on arrests via text messaging, and engaged
in online debate.18 Ultimately, his entire cabinet resigned and Lee was forced to call for
a ‘‘new beginning’’ for his government.19
The power of the Korean cyberspace was also chillingly demonstrated in the suicides
of at least four celebrities in 2007 and 2008.20 Korea’s online community was blamed
for spreading malicious rumors and attacks on actress Choi Jin Sil’s character that were
alleged to have driven her to commit suicide in October 2008.21 In hundreds of thou-
sands of posts, Internet users circulated rumors that Choi was a loan shark who had
pressured the actor Ahn Jae Hwan to repay a USD 2 million loan, and ultimately kill
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himself.22 After Choi’s suicide, the Cyber Terror Response Center of the National Police
Agency launched a one-month probe into ‘‘false rumors and malicious postings’’ on
the Internet, mobilizing its 900 investigators to crack down on ‘‘malpractice’’ con-
ducted over the Internet as well as cell phones.23 The police reported more than
10,000 cases of online libel in 2007.24
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Despite Korea’s democratic credentials, its free speech protections are weak relative to
many other democracies. Article 21 of the Korean constitution guarantees that ‘‘all citi-
zens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press,’’ but also contains the qualification
that ‘‘neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor
undermine public morals or social ethics.’’25 This caveat empowers the government to
impose restrictions on a broad range of expression.
Laying the foundation for all digital and analog content regulation, Article 53(1) of
the Telecommunications Business Act (1991) states ‘‘a person in use of telecommunica-
tions shall not make communications with contents that harm the public peace and
order or social morals and good customs.’’26 Harmful communications were to be de-
termined by presidential decree,27 and under the original formulation constituted con-
tents that ‘‘aim at or abet a criminal act, aim at committing antistate activities, and
impede good customs and other social orders.’’28 Further, harmful communications
could be refused, suspended, or restricted by order of the minister of the Ministry of
Information and Communication (MIC), which delegated this authority to the Infor-
mation and Communication Ethics Committee (ICEC).29 The ICEC was established
under an amended Telecommunications Business Act (1995) to regulate the content
of communications and inform state policy aimed at suppressing subversive communi-
cations and ‘‘promoting active and healthy information.’’30
In June 2002, the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Business Act defining ‘‘harmful’’ content and granting the government unlimited
authority to regulate it.31 It held Article 53(1) to be insufficiently specific and clear, and
Article 53(2) to violate the rule against blanket delegation.32 A student at Hankook
Aviation University had posted a message in June 1999 entitled, ‘‘Exchange of Gunfire
in the West Sea, Sloppy Kim Dae-jung!’’ on the ‘‘urgent message board’’ of the online
community Chanwoomul, which a systems administrator deleted before suspending
the student’s use of the service for one month in accordance with an order from the
MIC.33 In August 1999, the student filed a constitutional complaint, arguing that
the provisions infringed on his freedoms of expression, science, and arts, and violated
due process and the principle against excessive restriction. However, the Supreme
Court found that MIC orders to refuse, suspend, or restrict communications violated
neither the principle of proportionality nor due process of law, and did not infringe
506 South Korea
on the freedom of expression. It cautioned that under the Administrative Procedures
Act, users are to be given advance notice of administrative agency decisions, should
be given opportunities to submit opinions, and have the right to participate at formal
or public hearings.34
In December 2002, the National Assembly amended Article 53 to prohibit content
that is ‘‘illegal’’ rather than ‘‘harmful,’’ while upholding the executive powers of the
MIC and the delegated regulatory authority of the ICEC.35 This provision was ulti-
mately repealed with the 2007 amendment of the Act on Promotion of Information
and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection (Information
Act),36 although this definition remains in place at least functionally.37 Illegal informa-
tion included in types of information to be reported continues to be described as that
which infringes upon public interests and social order, specifically obscenity, defama-
tion, violence or cruelty, incitement to gambling, and public order.38
Specific laws to protect youth, national security, and other national priorities have
informed the scope of content regulated by the government-delegated bodies responsi-
ble for filtering. For example, the NSL provides ‘‘up to seven years in prison for those
who praise, encourage, disseminate or cooperate with antistate groups, members or
those under their control.’’39 The NSL has been used to criminalize advocacy of com-
munism40 and groups suspected of alignment with North Korea,41 although arrests
under the NSL have become much less frequent in recent years. Nevertheless, the law
continues to have a chilling effect on public discussion of North Korea42 and provides a
justification for censorship of Web sites related to North Korea and communism.
Similarly, the directive to protect the country’s youth from ‘‘harmful’’ Internet con-
tent, broadly described as ‘‘immoral, violent, obscene, speculative and antisocial infor-
mation,’’43 has been one of the central planks in the development of South Korea’s
filtering policy. The standard of harm in the Enforcement Decree of the Juvenile Pro-
tection Act ( JPA) was developed from criteria for deliberation of media materials harm-
ful to juveniles, which include provocative, obscene, antisocial, violent, or unethical
materials that may harmfully affect their mental and physical health.44 In accordance
with the JPA, ISPs are responsible, as ‘‘protectors of juveniles,’’ for making inappropri-
ate content inaccessible on their networks.45 Web sites carrying adult content must
warn visitors and require identification verification for access, measures meant to pre-
vent minors under 19 from accessing pornographic material.46
In February 2008, the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) was created to
consolidate the MIC and the Korean Broadcasting Commission (KBC). Under South
Korea’s current legal framework, regulation of Internet content is conducted primarily
by two government agencies: the Korean Communications Standards Commission
(KCSC)47 (formerly KISCOM) and the National Election Commission (NEC).
The KCSC integrated the functions of the KBC and KISCOM in February 2008.48
KISCOM’s mandate was originally established through the creation of the ICEC in
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1995.49 Accordingly, the two KCSC subcommissions deal separately with broadcasting
and telecommunications standards.50
At its inception, the ICEC was empowered to develop general principles or codes
of telecommunications ethics, conduct deliberation on and request the ‘‘correction’’ of
information declared ‘‘harmful’’ by presidential decree, and operate reporting centers
against unhealthy telecommunications activities.51 The KCSC telecom subcommission
continues to make determinations on ‘‘requests for correction’’ with respect to ISPs and
Internet content providers (ICPs).52 Thus, the KCSC is empowered to make determina-
tions on information ‘‘harmful’’ to youth under the Juvenile Protection Act,53 as well
as recommend action against Web sites containing ‘‘illegal’’ content, including por-
nography, information for cyber criminals, gambling services, and Web sites that ex-
press support for communism or for the government of North Korea.54 The scope of
its authority extends to ordering the blocking of Web sites, the deletion of a particular
message identified as an improper communication, a Web site’s closure, or the suspen-
sion of the particular user identification of the individual who posted the improper
writing.55 In addition to special advisory committees, the KCSC also mediates disputes
over online defamation. The KCSC said it received 156,000 complaints in 2006 about
Internet postings considered inaccurate, and 216,000 in 2007.56
With President Lee’s full support, government ministries proposed a battery of legis-
lation beginning in July 2008 that would create a framework for addressing defama-
tion, ‘‘false rumors,’’ and ‘‘malicious postings.’’ In July 2008, the KCC introduced the
Comprehensive Measures on Internet Information Protection, which would institute
50 changes to communications and Internet regulation.57 In amendments to the Infor-
mation Act, the South Korean government further expanded the already significant
regulatory authority of the KCC by adding to online providers’ liability for the acts of
their users. The KCSC would be authorized to force Internet portals and peer-to-peer
Web sites to delete content or suspend publishing for a minimum of 30 days upon
receiving a complaint of articles accused of being ‘‘fraudulent’’ or ‘‘slanderous,’’ during
which the commission would determine whether disputed articles should be removed
permanently.58 Internet portals that failed to temporarily block online postings con-
taining defamatory information would be subject to a fine of up to KRW 30 million
or could be forced to shut down,59 while portals or individuals involved in improp-
erly manipulating Internet search results could be subject to imprisonment for up
to one year and a fine up to KRW 10 million.60 Upon a leak of personal information,
the portal must inform the victim of the privacy breach and report the matter to the
KCC.
Following an approach taken with other emergent forms of harmful or illegal con-
tent, portals, bulletin boards, and other Internet content providers have increasingly
taken on responsibility for policing slanderous content. While they would be legally
compelled to set up constant in-house monitoring functions,61 Korea’s two largest
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Internet portals also implemented their own measures to curb postings considered to
violate privacy; for example, Naver created a simplified process for users to quickly
block ‘‘groundless rumors or postings’’ and Daum required users to click on a different
box if they want to read other users’ comments.62
In July 2008, Minister of Justice Kim Kyung-hwan announced the introduction of
the crime of ‘‘cyber defamation,’’ which would punish those who openly insult others
through the Internet with up to two years imprisonment or a KRW 10 million fine.63
Under this rubric, criminal law would apply to defamation and threats, while penalties
for cyber defamation and ‘‘cyberstalking’’ would be pursued under information and
communication laws.64
Although the Lee administration denied that it had orchestrated the crackdown,
government prosecutors also pursued blogger Park Dae-sung on charges of ‘‘spreading
false data in public with harmful intent,’’ punishable by as many as five years in prison
or fines of up to KRW 50 million.65 Using the pen name Minerva, blogger Park Dae-
sung had posted nearly 300 entries on Daum’s Agora Internet forum between March
2008 and January 2009.66 His accurate predictions of financial events such as the fall
of Lehman Brothers and the crash of the won gained him prophetic status, but also
drew allegations that he cost the government billions of dollars by undermining finan-
cial markets.67 Park was arrested in January 2009 but acquitted in April; prosecutors
announced that they would appeal the ruling.68
On April 1, 2009, the National Assembly adopted a ‘‘three-strikes’’ approach to copy-
right infringement, particularly file sharing and downloading movie content.69 In an
amendment to Article 133 of the Copyright Law dealing with the ‘‘Collection, Aban-
donment, and Deletion of Illegal Reproductions,’’ the Minister of Culture, Sports, and
Tourism would be authorized to shut down message boards that refuse to comply with
more than three warnings to remove copyrighted content,70 while users who upload
such content may also have their accounts canceled.71 These punitive measures could
be taken regardless of whether a takedown request by a copyright holder has been
issued.72
Social media sites whose ‘‘main purpose is to enable different people to interactively
transmit works, etc., among themselves’’ are treated as ‘‘special types of online service
providers’’ under Article 104 of the Copyright Law.73 Article 104 providers are obliged
to take ‘‘necessary measures’’ to intercept the illegal interactive transmission of copy-
righted works upon the request of rights holders. Article 142(1) lays out fines for these
special providers who fail to take necessary measures at a maximum of KRW 30 mil-
lion, while other providers who ‘‘seriously damage’’ the enforcement of copyright as a
result of their failure to take down reproductions or ‘‘interactive transmissions’’ are also
subject to fines of up to KRW 10 million.74 Under the amended legislation, Article 104
providers who have been fined under Article 142(1) twice and have failed to take nec-
essary measures can be blocked upon the issuance of a third fine.75
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South Korea’s elections framework allows significant limits to be placed on po-
litical speech prior to and during elections, in order to prevent corruption, promote
equal opportunity, and minimize the social economic losses and ‘‘side effect[s]’’ that
‘‘unlimited free campaigns’’ might cause.76 Elections are restricted by numerous
detailed prohibitions on campaign-related activities that would be standard practice
in many other democracies, including endorsing a candidate if you are an elected
official,77 conducting a public opinion poll within the six days before an election,78
and setting limits on campaign locations, the posting of campaign paraphernalia, and
so on.
The Election Law also extends these restrictions to campaign activities conducted on
information and communication networks. As the prohibition with the greatest im-
pact on Internet speech, Article 93 of the Public Official Election Law (‘‘Election Law’’)
makes it illegal for noncandidates to distribute information supporting, recommend-
ing, or opposing any political party or candidate.79 Election commissions that discover
information posted online that violates the Election Law may demand that the Web
site or hosting service delete, restrict, or suspend the relevant information; the service
provider must promptly comply or raise an objection.80
The NEC is responsible for controlling all aspects of Korean elections, from counting
votes to monitoring the media and tracing campaign contributions.81 The NEC moni-
tors and censors domestic online media platforms in order to maintain the country’s
restrictions on election-related political speech,82 especially its ban on public advocacy
of candidates prior to an election period. It has used this power to remove more
than 100,000 election-related articles, comments, and blog entries from the Internet,83
as well as more than 65,000 movies posted to video-sharing Web sites.84 The NEC
began censoring the Internet in the early 2000s, partly in reaction to the significant
role the Internet played in the 2002 presidential election. It currently has two divisions
that are devoted to Internet regulation and censorship: the Internet Election News
Deliberation Commission (IENDC), which handles newspaper Web sites and other
online media sources (or ‘‘Internet press’’),85 and the Cyber Censorship Team (CCT),
which monitors personal blogs, videos, message board comments, and other Web
sites.86
The IENDC’s mission is to ensure that newspaper Web sites, online news agencies,
and other semiofficial online news sources are impartial in their campaign coverage
and do not violate election laws.87 The IENDC has a great deal of discretion to decide
what constitutes a violation of these rules and to censor the Internet press accordingly.
Generally, it does so by contacting the relevant Internet press organizations and telling
them to change their content or to issue a correction.
Started in 2002, the CCT has the formidable task of policing everything else on the
Internet, including blogs, personal Web sites, video postings, and message boards.88
The CCT has three main tasks: first, to prevent people from making damaging and
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untrue statements about the candidates in an election; second, to maintain the prohi-
bition against campaigning at any time other than the officially sanctioned two- to
three-week election period; third, to ensure that all message board users only make
comments during the election using their full, real names. All three tasks are usually
executed by requesting the Web site’s hosting service to delete or change offending
content, and if the hosting service refuses to delete it, the CCT will open an investiga-
tion and press charges. Monitoring is carried out by about 1,000 part-time workers,
who are hired nationwide 120 days before every election to run a search program to
find and flag suspicious content.89
Violation of the law against advocating a candidate prior to the election period can
be punished with a fine of up to KRW 4 million or two years in prison.90 Offending
acts include posting long opinions on Web portals and Web sites of political parties,
posting comments on online news articles, or any similar acts on personal Web sites
or blogs.91 However, the NEC has stated that ‘‘there is small chance that citizens will
face legal charges for posting their opinion as they will be viewed flexibly in actual
crackdowns.’’92
The line between campaigning and normal discussion is extremely vague, and the
decision to censor is made at the discretion of the CCT’s officers. This vagueness has
had a chilling effect on online political discourse, especially at video-sharing sites,
whose election-related content has been reduced to little more than videos produced
by the campaigns themselves.93 Between the 2004 and 2007 presidential elections,
the total number of deletion requests for early campaigning skyrocketed, from 2,425
to 76,277. Media have also reported that from June 2006 to May 2007, up to 19,000
online election-related messages were deleted, while legal punishment was pursued
against 13 messages containing false rumors about candidates.94
Surveillance
The South Korean constitution guarantees that the privacy (Article 17) and the privacy
of correspondence (Article 18) of citizens shall not be violated.95 While most scholars
believe that Article 17 forms the basis of a right to privacy,96 the Supreme Court has
also held that together with Article 10, guaranteeing human dignity and the right to
pursue happiness, ‘‘these constitutional provisions not only guarantee the right to be
let alone, which protects personal activity from invasion by others and public expo-
sure, but also an active right to self-control over his or her personal information in a
highly informatized modern society.’’97
Internet service providers are generally directed to gather the minimum amount of
information necessary and are restricted from disclosing personal information beyond
the scope of notification or from collecting certain personal information, such as
‘‘political ideology, religion, and medical records,’’ that would likely infringe the user’s
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privacy without consent.98 However, these protections do not apply where special pro-
visions apply or other laws specify otherwise.
Real-name registration requirements have been a part of the South Korean Internet
landscape since 2003, when the MIC sought the cooperation of four major Web portals
(Yahoo Korea, Daum Communications, NHN, and NeoWiz) in developing real-name
systems for their users.99 While implicating deeper privacy concerns, the purported
goal of these real-name measures is to reduce abusive behavior on the Internet, and a
number of prominent cases (such as the suicides of a number of actresses) have made
this a major issue for the Korean public.100
In 2004, election laws began requiring individuals who post comments on Web sites
and message boards in support of, or opposition to, a candidate to disclose their real
names.101 In 2005, the government implemented a rule that requires anyone who cre-
ates an account with an e-mail or online chat service to provide detailed information
that includes name, address, profession, and identification number.102 This policy was
tightened further by the MIC on July 27, 2007, when users were required to register
their real names and resident identification numbers with Web sites before posting
comments or uploading video or audio clips on bulletin boards.103 In December 2008,
the KCC extended its reach to require all forum and chat room users to make verifiable
real-name registrations.104 Furthermore, in April 2009 an amendment to the Informa-
tion Act took effect, requiring Korea-domain Web sites with at least 100,000 visitors
daily to confirm personal identities through real names and resident registration num-
bers.105 Previously, real-name registration was required for news Web sites with more
than 200,000 visitors a day or portals and user-generated content sites with over
300,000 daily visitors.106 On April 9, reportedly citing freedom of expression as ‘‘the
most important value to uphold on the Internet’’ as justification, Google disabled
the features on its Korean language YouTube site (kr.youtube.com) for uploading
videos and comments.107
Amendments to the Protection of Communications Secrets Act put forward in 2007
would establish extensive data retention requirements and also expand the govern-
ment’s surveillance capabilities. First, it would require telecommunications companies
and ISPs to retain access records and log files (online transactions conducted; Web sites
visited; time of access; and files downloaded, edited, read, and uploaded) for at least
three months, along with date and time stamps, telephone numbers of callers and
receivers, and GPS location information for 12 months.108
The National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) recommended that a
number of proposed amendments be removed, including the inclusion of GPS infor-
mation to locate users.109 It also questioned the need for additional penalties for tele-
communication service providers that refuse to comply with requests to provide
communications records, despite existing provisions allowing investigators to obtain
evidence by search and seizure in ordinary investigations.110 In 2008, three years after
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a scandal over the illegal wiretapping of the cell phones of influential political figures
forced them to destroy their equipment, the National Intelligence Service asked for per-
mission to resume the practice.111 E-mails (after submission and receipt) are already
considered by law enforcement authorities to be ‘‘objects,’’ subject to ordinary search
and seizure requirements, rather than ‘‘means of communications’’ requiring wiretap-
ping warrants and notification to parties within 30 days.112
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative testing conducted in 2007 and 2008 confirmed that South Korea
filters political and social content, specifically targeting Web sites containing North
Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North and South Korea, as well
as a handful of Web sites devoted to gambling. These findings are consistent with
2006–2007 analysis, with one exception: in 2007 and 2008, Korean ISPs were also
shown to selectively filter the Korean-language pornography Web sites tested.
Testing was conducted on three of the largest South Korean ISPs—KT’s KorNet, LG
Dacom, and Hanaro Telecom’s Hananet—from May to August 2008 and in November
2008. On each ISP, ONI detected DNS tampering, which prevents Internet domain
names from resolving to their proper IP addresses. All Web sites blocked resolved to a
block page jointly hosted by the police and the KCSC.
The ONI determined that a significant number of pro–North Korea or pro-unification
Web sites on ONI’s testing list were blocked, along with a selected number of gam-
bling-related Web sites. The blocking was extremely consistent across the three ISPs
tested, although KorNet and LG Dacom blocked more of the same Web sites as com-
pared to Hananet.
The ONI testing suggests that the extent of filtering in South Korea is still not com-
mensurate with other measures the government has taken to cleanse the Korean Web
of illegal or harmful social content. At the same time, the relatively low rate of filtering
is consistent with the government’s approach to regulating content, which is far more
reliant on ordering content and Web-hosting providers to police their own content
directly through deletions, suspensions, and takedowns.
Conclusion
Although South Korea is a world leader in Internet and broadband penetration, its
citizens do not have access to a free and unfiltered Internet. South Korea’s govern-
ment maintains a wide-ranging approach toward the regulation of specific online
content and imposes a substantial level of censorship on elections-related discourse
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Countries in the Middle East and North Africa continue to invest in information tech-
nology infrastructure and media projects as part of their strategies to develop local
economies and create employment. Among the major examples is Jordan’s plan to
establish a free IT zone in Amman, which will give sales and income tax breaks to the
software companies and business development firms based in the zone. The zone is
part of a strategy designed to increase the number of Internet users from 26 percent to
50 percent of the population. It aims to increase employment in the IT sector and to
boost the sector’s revenues from USD 2.2 billion in 2009 to USD 3 billion by the end
of 2011.1
In addition to existing regional hubs Dubai Media City and Dubai Internet City, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched a new content-creation zone to support media
content creators in the Middle East and North Africa. The new Abu Dhabi–based zone
aims to employ Arab media professionals in film, broadcast, digital, and publishing.
Among the partners of the zone are CNN, the BBC, the Financial Times, the Thomson
Reuters Foundation, and the Thomson Foundation.2
At the same time, some countries have initiated efforts to develop Arabic Web con-
tent. In this regard, Microsoft is working on translation technology that would make
the Arabic language more accessible to Internet users, as part of Qatar’s Supreme Coun-
cil for Information and Communication Technology’s initiative to develop more Web
sites with Arabic content.3
The number of Internet users is likely to continue to rise, especially with the
introduction of technologies that overcome poor information and communication
technology (ICT) infrastructure that hinders Internet access in the region. WiMAX,
for example, was commercially available by the end of March 2009 in Algeria, Bahrain,
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia, while operators in other parts of the region
have started testing the service.4 Additionally, broadband markets are growing fast in
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, and commercial 3G mobile services have been
launched in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia.5
Demographic factors are also expected to contribute to the growth of the Internet
population. Arab Media Outlook, 2008–2012 states, ‘‘Digital media will thrive in the
Arab market because the market has a large, technologically accomplished demo-
graphic group—its youth—who are comfortable with it and will customize it to their
own requirements.’’ The report also revealed that ‘‘over 50% of the population in
Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and Egypt are estimated to be currently
less than 25 years old, while in the rest of the countries the under-25, ‘net generation’
makes up around 35% to 47% of total population.’’6
Liberalization of telecommunications markets has already taken place in several Arab
countries. Most of the incumbent telecom companies in North Africa are already in
private hands, with the exception of Algérie Télécom, the privatization of which has
been postponed because of the global economic crisis.7 However, experts say telecom
liberalization in the Middle East and North Africa still lags behind the rest of the world
in terms of cost and efficiency, a matter which does not encourage direct foreign
investment.8
The Media Environment
The Middle East and North Africa is one of the most heavily censored regions in the
world. Human rights watchdogs and free speech advocacy groups continue to criticize
the media restrictions and repressive legal regimes, and over the past few years, a great
number of bloggers and cyber dissidents have been jailed.
In April 2009, the International Federation of Journalists called for a radical overhaul
of media laws in the Middle East, stating that the laws in most of the region’s countries
still permit the jailing of journalists for undermining the reputation of the state, the
president, the monarch, or religion. Such laws have often been used to suppress report-
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ing of corruption or scrutiny of government actions.9 This media environment created
by authorities has been hostile to bloggers and online activism, resulting in a number
of arrests across the region. In a list created by the Committee to Protect Journalists of
the ten worst countries to be a blogger, five countries (Egypt, Syria, Iran, Tunisia, and
Saudi Arabia) were from the region.10
Internet and Media Regulations: The Debate
The last few years have witnessed an increase in debates over media and Internet
censorship in the region. Rifts between censors and local and regional advocates of
freedom of speech have intensified, and more voices continue to express concern
about media regulations in the region.
Interestingly, while advocates in the region criticize the regimes for repressive regu-
lations, which limit freedom of speech online, some governments claim they arrest
bloggers and online activists because they exploit what the regimes call ‘‘media free-
dom.’’ In Egypt, for example, the authorities arrested a blogger in May 2009 under the
accusation of ‘‘exploitation of the democratic climate prevailing in the country to over-
throw the regime.’’ The Cairo-based Arab Network for Human Rights Information
deplored the charges and described them as a black comedy.11
Another example of such a rift is from the Gulf countries, where the head of the
Doha Center for Media Freedom criticized Dubai Police for allegedly asking Google to
censor YouTube. The head of the center was later criticized by Qatar officials as well
as some journalists and was accused of endorsing pornography,12 which is a sensitive
topic in many Middle East and North African societies.
While it is common for Internet groups and online activists in the region to organize
online campaigns to condemn online censorship and arrests of bloggers and online
writers, other online campaigns that call for and support social censorship—mostly
online pornography—have emerged in the past few years. For instance, an Arabic
Web site called Ehjeb (Arabic for the verb ‘‘to block’’) is becoming increasingly popular,
particularly among users of Web forums. The Web site offers to facilitate the blocking
of Web sites by sending user-submitted URLs of questionable content to censors in
some of the region’s countries. Also, some Internet users in North African countries
where there is no social filtering have organized online campaigns to demand filtering
of sexually explicit content.13
Pro-censorship advocates and anti-censorship activists have also used the court
system in their attempts to implement or remove censorship. For example, a judge in
Egypt filed a lawsuit requesting the banning of 51 Web sites considered offensive. The
court rejected the lawsuit in December 2007 and emphasized support for freedom of
expression as long as the Web sites do not harm religious beliefs or public order.14
MENA Overview 525
However, in May 2009 a Cairo court ruled in favor of an Egyptian lawyer and ordered
the Egyptian government to ban access to pornographic Web sites because they are
deemed offensive to the values of religion and society.15
In Tunisia, however, a blogger challenged the Web-filtering regime in the country by
filing a legal suit against the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) for censoring the social
networking site Facebook after it was briefly blocked in August 2008. The court dis-
missed the case in November 2008 without providing any explanation.16 These exam-
ples and cases illustrate how the fight over access controls is taking different and often
more subtle shapes and forms, and also indicate that different players will continue the
debate and challenge each other.
Access Control
Access controls in the Middle East and North Africa are multilayered; governments and
authorities use first- and second-generation measures to regulate Internet access and
online activities. These measures include laws and regulations, technical filtering,
physical restrictions, surveillance and monitoring, and harassment and arrests. Among
the laws and regulations used to control access in the region are the press and publi-
cation laws, penal codes, emergency laws, antiterrorism laws, Internet-specific laws,
ISPs’ terms and conditions, and telecommunications decrees.
Press and Publication Laws, Penal Codes, Emergency Laws, and Antiterrorism Bills
Many countries in the region use restrictive press laws to regulate online publishing and
traditional journalism. For example, censorship of online media and print journalism
in Bahrain is exerted using the 2002 Press Law.17 Kuwait’s 2006 press law allows the
imprisonment of journalists for making references to Islam that are deemed insulting18
or for articles seen as ‘‘against national interests.’’19 Oman’s 1984 Press and Publication
Law authorizes the government to censor publications deemed politically, culturally,
or sexually offensive.20 Syria’s 2001 Press Law sets out sweeping controls over publica-
tions printed in Syria.21 Journalists in Tunisia have been prosecuted by Tunisia’s press
code, which bans offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the
government perceives as false news.22 Yemen’s 1990 Press and Publications Law sub-
jects publications and broadcast media to broad prohibitions and harsh penalties.23
The press law in Morocco has been used to suppress outspoken online writers.24
In addition to press codes, some countries often use penal codes to suppress journal-
ists and online writers. Yemen’s Ministry of Information declared in April 2008 that
the penal code will be used to prosecute writers who publish content on the Internet
that ‘‘incites hatred’’ or ‘‘harms national interests.’’25 Syria’s penal code criminalizes
spreading news abroad.26 Though the Bahraini government in May 2008 introduced
amendments to the 2002 press law that eliminate prison sentences for journalists and
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prior censorship on publications, journalists can still be charged and jailed using the
penal code and antiterrorism law.27
In addition to the use of penal and press codes, two countries—Egypt and Syria—
both of which have been under emergency law for some time, have taken advantage
of this status to punish individuals deemed threatening. Egypt’s emergency law, in
force since the declaration of the state of emergency in 1981, grants the government
powers to search, arrest, and detain individuals without the supervision of judicial
bodies. Rights groups say that the uninterrupted application of the emergency law
since 1981 has led to the emergence of a parallel legal system unchecked by ordinary
judicial bodies.28 Similarly, Syria uses the ongoing state of emergency (which began in
1963) to arrest media workers.29
Morocco uses its antiterrorism bill, passed following suicide bombings in Casablanca
in 2003, to punish journalists. The bill grants the government sweeping legal power to
arrest journalists for publishing content deemed to ‘‘disrupt public order by intimida-
tion, force, violence, fear or terror.’’30
Internet-Specific Laws
Few countries in the region have introduced Internet-specific laws to regulate Internet
activities; among them are the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE’s 2007 federal cyber law
criminalizes hacking, abusing holy shrines or religious rituals, opposing the Islamic
religion, transcending family principles and values, setting up a Web site for groups
promoting programs in breach of public decency and order, and setting up a Web site
or publishing information for a terrorist group under fake names with intent to facili-
tate contacts with their leadership, or to promote their ideologies and finance their
activities, or to publish information on how to make explosives or any other sub-
stances to be used in terrorist attacks.31
In January 2008, Saudi Arabia implemented 16 articles of a new law on the use of
technology. The law includes penalties of ten years in prison and a fine for Web site
operators who advocate or support terrorism; three years and a fine for financial fraud
or invasion of privacy; and five years and a fine for those guilty of distributing pornog-
raphy or other materials that violate public law, religious values, and social standards
of the kingdom. Accomplices of the guilty parties and even those who are proven to
have only intended to engage in unlawful IT acts can receive up to half of the maxi-
mum punishments.32
Terms and Conditions of ISPs
Terms and conditions imposed on users by ISPs are also used to control access in some
countries. In Oman, for example, Internet use is regulated by the ISP Omantel’s terms
and conditions, which mandate that users ‘‘not carry out any unlawful activities which
contradict the social, cultural, political, religious or economical values of the Sultanate
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of Oman or could cause harm to any third party,’’ as any abuse and misuse of the Inter-
net services will ‘‘result in the termination of the subscription and/or in the proceed-
ings of Criminal or Civil lawsuits against the Customer.’’33
Another example is Yemen, where the terms and conditions set by the ISP TeleYemen
(or Y.Net) prohibits ‘‘sending any message which is offensive on moral, religious, com-
munal, or political grounds.’’ TeleYemen reserves the right to control access ‘‘and data
stored in the Y.Net system in any manner deemed appropriate by TeleYemen.’’ Section
6.3.3 cautions subscribers that TeleYemen will report ‘‘any use or attempted use of the
Y.Net service which contravenes any applicable Law of the Republic of Yemen.’’34
Telecommunications Laws
Telecommunications laws are used to control what ISPs can and cannot host. In Alge-
ria, for example, article 14 of a 1998 telecommunications decree makes ISPs responsible
for the Web sites they host and requires them to take ‘‘all necessary steps to ensure
constant surveillance’’ of content to prevent access to ‘‘material contrary to public
order and morality.’’35 Bahrain’s Telecommunications Law of 2002 contains penalties
for illicit use of the Internet, including the transmission of messages that are offensive
to public policy or morals.36 In Tunisia, the 1998 post and telecommunications law
enables the authorities to intercept and check the content of e-mail messages.37 Elec-
tronic surveillance such as filtering of e-mail messages of government opponents has
been reported in Tunisia.38
Surveillance and Monitoring
Measures to monitor Internet activities, particularly in Internet cafés, have been intro-
duced in many Arab countries. In Algeria, security forces started raiding Internet cafés
and checking the browsing history of Internet users after terrorist attacks hit the coun-
try in April 2007. In April 2008, the security forces increased their monitoring and
surveillance efforts of Internet cafés, and cafés were required to collect names and iden-
tification numbers of their customers and report this information, together with any
suspicious activities, to the police.39
Similarly, in March 2008 Jordan began to increase restrictions on the country’s Inter-
net cafés. Cameras were installed in Internet cafés to monitor users, and owners were
required to register the IP number of the café, their users’ personal data, the time of
use, and the data of Web sites explored.40
Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior in April 2009 ordered Internet cafés
to install hidden cameras and provide a record of names and identities of their cus-
tomers.41 In Kuwait, Internet café owners also were required to maintain a record
of customers’ names and identifications, which they must submit to the Ministry of
Communications upon request.42
528 MENA Overview
Some Internet café operators in Lebanon admit that they use computer surveillance
software that enables them to monitor the desktops and browsing habits of their
clients under the pretext of protecting the security of their computer networks or to
stop their clients from accessing pornography.43 However, there is no evidence that
the government orders these measures.
In March 2008, the Syrian authorities ordered Internet café users to provide their
names, identification cards, and the times they use the Internet café to café owners,
who will consequently present them to the authorities.44
In October 2007, police in Yemen ordered some Internet cafés to close at midnight
and demanded that users show their identification cards to the café operator.45 Some
owners use surveillance software to monitor the online activities of their customers
and refuse access to clients who access pornography.46
In August 2008, Egyptian authorities imposed new monitoring measures by demand-
ing that Internet café clients must provide their names, e-mail addresses, and tele-
phone numbers before they can use the Internet. Once the data are provided, clients
will receive a text message on their cell phones and a PIN number that they can use
to access the Internet.47
In addition to the preceding measures, some countries impose physical restrictions
on Internet cafés as part of their monitoring efforts. For example, Yemen48 and
Oman49 require that computer screens in Internet cafés must be visible to the floor
supervisor. No closed rooms or curtains that might obstruct the view of the monitors
are allowed.
Technical Filtering
The OpenNet Initiative conducted tests for technical Internet filtering in all the coun-
tries in the Middle East and North Africa between 2008 and 2009. Test results prove
that the governments and ISPs censor content deemed politically sensitive; critical of
governments, leaders, or ruling families; morally offensive; or in violation of public
ethics and order.
Testing also revealed that political filtering continues to be the common de-
nominator across the region. Many states in the Middle East and North Africa pre-
vent their citizens from accessing political content or have blocked such content
in the past. For example, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia have censored Web sites containing con-
tent critical of governments and leaders, Web sites that claim human rights viola-
tions, and/or Web sites of opposition groups. Mauritania briefly blocked the news
Web site Taqadoumy, and Egypt at one point blocked the Web site of the Islamic
opposition group Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the Web site of the Labor Party’s
newspaper.
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To one degree or another, the Gulf countries, Sudan, Tunisia, Gaza, Yemen, and Iran
censor pornography, nudity, gay and lesbian content, escort and dating services, and
Web sites displaying provocative attire. Also censored by most of these countries are
Web sites that present critical reviews of Islam and/or attempt to convert Muslims to
other religions. Some of these countries also filter Web sites related to alcohol, gam-
bling, and drugs.
Generally, the countries that implement political or social filtering also target to
various degrees proxies and circumvention tools to prevent users from bypassing fil-
ters. Some of these countries also block online translation services and privacy tools,
apparently because they can also be used to access blocked content.
Testing by ONI revealed no evidence of technical filtering in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon,
and the West Bank between 2008 and 2009.
Regional Trends in Access Control
Internet censorship in the Middle East and North Africa is on the rise, and the scope
and depth of filtering are increasing. Previous ONI tests revealed that political filtering
was limited in some countries, but 2008–2009 results indicate that political censorship
is targeting more content and is becoming more consistent. For example, previous tests
found that Yemen temporarily blocked political Web sites in the run-up to the 2006
presidential elections, and Bahrain did the same ahead of parliamentary elections.
However, 2008–2009 testing revealed that filtering in these two countries has been
consistently extended to include several Web sites run by opposition groups or news
Web sites and forums that espouse oppositional political views.
In the meantime, countries that have been filtering political content continue to add
more Web sites to their political blacklists. For example, filtering in Syria was expanded
to include popular Web sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Amazon, as well as more
Web sites affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Kurdish opposition groups. An-
other example is Tunisia, which added more political and oppositional content as well
as other apolitical Web sites such as the OpenNet Initiative and Global Voices Online.
Social filtering is also increasing and is catching up with the continuously growing
social Web. Testing revealed that most of the Arab countries have begun blocking
Arabic-language explicit content that was previously accessible. Interestingly, filtering
of Arabic-language explicit Web content in the Middle East and North Africa is usually
not as fast as that of other languages. The ONI investigation revealed that the U.S.-
based commercial filtering software used by most of the ISPs in the region (e.g., Smart-
Filter, Websense, and Bluecoat) do not pick up Arabic content as comprehensively as
content in other languages.
Increases in filtering are the norm in the Middle East and North Africa, and lifting
blocks is the exception. Among the few examples of the unblocking of Web sites are
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Syria’s restoration of access to Wikipedia Arabic, Morocco’s lifting of a ban on a few
pro-Western-Sahara-independence Web sites, and Libya’s allowing access to some pre-
viously banned political Web sites. Sudan’s filtering of gay and lesbian, dating, provoc-
ative attire, and health-related Web sites was also more limited compared to previous
test results.
Another regional trend toward second-generation controls is that more Arab coun-
tries are introducing regulations to make Web publishing subject to press and publica-
tion laws, and are requiring local Web sites to register with the authorities before they
can go live. In Jordan in September 2007, for example, the country’s Legislation Bureau
in the Prime Minister’s Office issued a decision that Web sites and electronic press must
comply with the provisions of the publications and publishing law and fall under the
oversight of the Publications and Publishing Department, which announced that it
would exercise immediate supervision and censorship.
Another example is Saudi Arabia, which announced in May 2009 plans to enact leg-
islation for newspapers and Web sites that will require Saudi-based Web sites to get of-
ficial licenses from a special agency under the purview of the Ministry of Information.
Bahrain already has a similar system that requires local Web sites to register with the
Ministry of Information.
Among the new trends in controlling access through second-generation methods is
the increase in incidents of hacking of opposition and dissident Web sites and blogs.
Such incidents have been reported in Tunisia and Yemen. On the other hand, sectarian
cyber attacks among different religious groups in the region, namely Shiite and Sunni
groups, have occurred in the past few years. The cyber attacks managed to deface the
Web sites of significant Shiite and Sunni organizations and individuals, and in some
cases the attackers managed to remove content from some of these Web sites. Addi-
tionally, Israeli, Palestinian, and Lebanese Web sites run by Hezbollah have been tar-
gets of attacks, especially during conflicts.
Conclusion
Governments in the Middle East and North Africa continue to invest in media and IT
projects, and at the same time are continuing to invest in censorship technologies to
prevent their citizens from accessing a wide range of objectionable content. Also, while
Western companies build ICT infrastructure necessary for development in the region,
other Western companies provide the censors with technologies and data used to filter
the Internet.
First- and second-generation access controls are evident throughout the Middle
East and North Africa. Censors in the region attempt to control political content using
technical filtering, laws and regulations, surveillance and monitoring, physical restric-
tions, and extralegal harassment and arrests. Filtering of content deemed offensive
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for religious, moral, and cultural reasons is pervasive in many countries, and is
growing.
Though many governments acknowledge social filtering, most continue to disguise
their political filtering practices by attempting to confuse users with various error
messages.
The absence of technical filtering in some countries in the region by no means indi-
cates free online environments in those countries; surveillance and monitoring prac-
tices and extralegal harassment from security agencies create a climate of fear used to
silence online dissidents and conform to second-generation controls found elsewhere
in the world.
Many ISPs block popular politically neutral online services such as online transla-
tion services and privacy tools, fearing that they can be used to bypass the filtering
regimes. The censors also overblock Web sites and services such as social networking
sites and photo and video sharing sites because of the potential for content considered
objectionable.
More users in the Middle East and North Africa are using the Internet for political
campaigning and social activism; however, states continue to introduce more restric-
tive legal, technical, and monitoring measures, amid growing local and regional calls
to ease restrictions and remove barriers to the free flow of information.
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There is no evidence of Internet filter-
ing in Egypt, although a small group
of politically sensitive Web sites have
been blocked in the past. The author-
ities have increased their crackdown
on online writers and bloggers and
have harassed and detained them for
their online activities. Surveillance
efforts have also increased. Similar to
second-generation controls found else-
where in the world, Egypt has used broad national security laws to justify restric-
tions on new media services, such as satellite television and cellular phones.
Background
Egypt has amended its constitution to allow opposition parties to contest presidential
polls, but potential candidates face restrictive criteria for participation. Political reform
activists have become more outspoken and have organized street protests in defiance
of an emergency law in force since 1981.1
The emergency laws grant the government the power to search, arrest, and detain
individuals without the supervision of judicial bodies. Rights groups state that the
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uninterrupted application of emergency laws has led to the emergence of a parallel le-
gal system, one that is unchecked by ordinary judicial bodies.2 Despite this, journalists
now openly criticize the regime’s policies, and both private and opposition media have
started to break taboos despite judicial, bureaucratic, and economic pressure against
them.3
Egypt was listed by the Committee to Protect Journalists as one of the top ten worst
countries to be a blogger, because the authorities monitor Internet activity on a regular
basis and have detained a large number of active bloggers (more than 100 in 2008
alone) for open-ended periods.4 Nevertheless, Egyptian bloggers and online activists
have managed to utilize the power of the Internet to organize street protests and to
expose human rights violations in Egypt. For example, two government officials were
arrested and imprisoned in November 2007 for torturing prisoners after video clips of
their actions were posted on the Internet by online activists.5
Internet in Egypt
Egypt has become a leading Internet market in Africa in terms of users, international
bandwidth, and services offered. Also, unlike in many Arab countries, the international
bandwidth market and VoIP telephony have been liberalized, and more than 200
Internet and data service providers operate in Egypt, making ADSL services among the
least expensive in Africa.6 The ICT sector continues to grow—Egypt’s spending on
information and communication technology (ICT) reached USD 9.8 billion in 2008
and is expected to rise to USD 13.5 billion by 2011.7
As part of the Egyptian government’s ambitious program to expand access to ICT, an
agreement to spread personal computers to every home was signed in August 2008
among the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT), the
National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA), the Egyptian National
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 5,052
Life expectancy at birth (years) 71
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 66
Human development index (out of 179) 116
Rule of law (out of 211) 101
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 184
Democracy index (out of 167) 119 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 91
Internet users (percent of population) 15.4
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
538 Egypt
Post Organization (ENPO), and the Computer and Software Department at the Federa-
tion of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce. The agreement is the second phase of a 2002
initiative and is part of the MCIT’s strategy of spreading the practice and utilization
of IT tools and the Internet to all social segments in Egypt, focusing on remote areas
and limited-income families. The initiative will include offering integrated packages of
personal computers and 512 Kbps ADSL subscriptions for three years for monthly
installments.8
Furthermore, telecommunications companies continue to enable users to access
Internet content. For example, Egypt’s telecommunications giant Vodafone, which
has 15 million subscribers, announced in August 2008 its intention to buy a majority
stake in content provider Sarmady Communications (Sarcom) in an attempt to boost
its Internet service by providing content to its customers, which is also part of a strat-
egy to dominate the Internet market.9
Egypt’s monopoly fixed-line telephone company, Telecom Egypt, owns a 45 percent
stake in Vodafone Egypt and had 11.3 million fixed-line subscribers at the end of June
2008. Other Egyptian mobile operators pay Telecom Egypt for use of its network for
mobile to fixed-line calls and for international calls. Egypt’s plans to sell a second
fixed-line license in September 2008 would end Telecom Egypt’s monopoly.10
Almost a million Egyptian households have access to broadband, thanks to sharing
of ADSL lines. In fact, 63.4 percent of Egyptian households share connections with
their neighbors. In 81.9 percent of households that share lines, the connection is
shared with more than three other households. Egypt had 427,085 ADSL lines by the
end of 2007. It is estimated that 75 percent of those are residential ADSL lines. Among
Egyptian Internet users, 81.2 percent state a preference for browsing Arabic-language
Web sites. Internet cafés remain an important source of connectivity for Egyptians,
with 27.8 percent of Internet users reporting they use Internet café services.11
The number of blogs in Egypt has risen from just 40 in 2004 to an estimated 160,000
in July 2008, according to a report released by the Egyptian Cabinet’s Information and
Decision Support Center (IDSC). Of these Egyptian bloggers, 76.8 percent write in
Arabic, 20.8 percent in mixed Arabic and English, and 9.6 percent solely in English.
Egyptian blogs account for more than 30 percent of all Arabic blogs. Most of the blog-
gers are young men in their 20s, 27 percent are female, and over half of all bloggers are
between the ages of 20 and 30.12
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The government continues to stifle freedom of the press and restricts the flow of in-
formation. For example, it proposed a draft bill on audiovisual media that critics say
is aimed at cracking down on dissent and opposition voices on television and the
Internet across the region.13 The bill requires journalists and broadcasters to avoid
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damaging ‘‘social peace,’’ ‘‘national unity,’’ ‘‘public order,’’ and ‘‘public values.’’ Viola-
tors of the rules face imprisonment, cancellation of broadcasting licenses, confiscation
of equipment, and fines.14 The bill will create a National Agency for Regulation of
Audio and Visual Broadcast to enforce the implementation of the proposed rules. The
agency will be composed of representatives from national security and military intelli-
gence entities. This draft bill coincides with an increase in the closure of television
channels by the government.15
The Egyptian government enforced media licensing laws to punish an Egyptian
satellite company for broadcasting protest footage of antigovernment demonstrations
in April 2008.16 The company was later shut down. This incident came a few weeks
after three other satellite channels were dropped by Egypt’s state-controlled Nilesat
satellite.17
As the Egyptian blogosphere continues to grow, so too does the government’s crack-
down on bloggers and Internet users. For example, blogger Abdel Kareem Nabil Sulei-
man Amer (‘‘Kareem Amer’’) was sentenced to four years in prison in February 2007 for
‘‘incitement to hatred of Islam’’ on his blog and for insulting Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak. He became a symbol of online repression for the country’s bloggers.18 Other
Egyptian bloggers have been arrested for their online activities and some were sen-
tenced to prison. One of the most recent examples is blogger Mohamed Refaat, editor
of the blog Matabbat (matabbat.blogspot.com), who was arrested in August 2008
under the state emergency law.19 He was accused of ‘‘offending the state institutions,
destabilizing public security, and inciting others to demonstrate and strike via the
Internet.’’20
The Egyptian authorities have also taken measures to restrict the potential use of
cell phones for activism. Under the pretext of protecting public security, the Egyptian
government asked cell phone companies to block service to anonymous subscribers in
May 2008.21 Reuters reported that ‘‘the move comes as Egypt tries to combat a wave
of public discontent over rising prices and low wages that have sparked a series of
labor and anti-government strikes, organized largely by mobile phone and over the
Internet.’’22
In a landmark legal case, an administrative court in December 2007 rejected a law-
suit brought by a judge calling for the banning of 51 Web sites in Egypt. The court
emphasized its support for freedom of expression as long as such Web sites did not
harm fundamental beliefs or public order.23 However, in May 2009, a Cairo court ruled
that the Egyptian government must ban access to pornographic Web sites because they
are deemed offensive to religion and society’s values.24 The suit was filed by a lawyer
who claimed that a recent case of an Egyptian couple who were sentenced to prison
for starting a swingers club over the Internet highlighted what he called ‘‘the dangers
posed by such offensive Web sites.’’25 It remains to be seen whether the authorities will
enforce this court order.
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Surveillance
Despite the government’s initiatives to encourage Internet use, the Egyptian author-
ities continue to place restrictions on how Egyptians use the Internet. In February
2005, for example, Egypt’s Ministry of Interior ordered Internet café managers and
owners to record their customers’ names and identification numbers and threatened
to close the cafés if they refused to implement the order. This kind of action was con-
demned by a Cairo-based human rights group, which described it as ‘‘a gross violation
to the right to privacy.’’26
In August 2008, the Egyptian authorities imposed new measures that increased the
extent of censorship on Internet users by demanding that Internet café customers be
required to provide their names, e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers before they
could use the Internet. Once the data were provided, customers would then receive a
text message on their cell phones with a personal identification number (PIN) that
they could use to access the Internet. A Cairo-based human rights group, the Arabic
Network for Human Rights Information, considered these requirements to be censor-
ship procedures.27
Egypt has witnessed an increase in the use of Facebook for social activism, which
alerted the government to the potential force of the social networking site.28 As a
result, there were rumors that it might be blocked, especially after a group of activists
managed to recruit supporters using Facebook for a general strike that took place on
April 6, 2008, protesting against rising food prices and President Mubarak’s govern-
ment.29 Another opinion suggested that the authorities would rather leave Facebook
accessible so that they could trace back suspect online activities to the individuals
responsible and punish them.30 Because of the increasing use of Facebook for political
activism in Egypt, activists have reported that the government has started to monitor
the social networking site for the organization of any possible activities similar to that
of April 6, 2008. The vice chairman of Egypt’s El Ghad opposition party, Wael Nawara,
said, ‘‘The word is that there is even a special division called the State Security Investi-
gation Police for Facebook.’’31
In addition to monitoring online activism, a constitutional reform approved by par-
liament in March 2007 gave authorities the power to spy on the correspondence of
suspected terrorists and to tap their telephones without a court order.32 In fact, Voda-
fone’s global head of content standards, Annie Mullins, revealed in February 2009 that
Vodafone handed over communications data to the Egyptian authorities in response to
government demands. This data may have been used to help identify rioters who were
protesting over the bread crisis, which erupted in the Egyptian town of Mahallah el-
Hubra in April 2008. During the demonstrations, many protesters carried cell phones,
using them to call friends and send text messages. On December 22, individuals were
convicted in connection with the food riots.33
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Interestingly, Egypt’s minister of telecommunications and information technology
publicly admitted that he allowed the security offices to monitor, record, and tap fixed
lines and cell phones. A member of parliament considered this access unconstitutional
and a violation of human rights.34
Egyptian telecommunications law mandates that telecom operators and providers
shall provide, at their own expense, equipment and software that enable the armed
forces and national security entities to exercise their powers within the law.35
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative in-country tests in 2008–2009 were conducted using the ISPs Link
Egypt and TEData. As in previous testing, ONI found no evidence of Internet filtering
in Egypt.
In 2005, most ISPs blocked the official Web site of the Muslim Brotherhood
(www.ikhwanonline.com), Egypt’s largest opposition movement. At one time, the
popular ISP LINKdotNET blocked www.alshaab.com, the Web site of the Labor Party’s
biweekly newsletter; it no longer does so.36
A number of ISPs offer optional filters to block pornography. The ISP TEData, for
example, offers Internet services with ‘‘content control,’’ which eliminates ‘‘all of the
Internet’s indecent content that might affect your children.’’37
Conclusion
Egypt has become a leading Internet market in Africa, and Internet users enjoy un-
filtered access to the Internet. However, the May 2009 court order to block access to
pornography online might result in a shift in filtering policy. The government moni-
tors online activities and has increased its surveillance efforts. Egyptian bloggers con-
tinue to use the Internet for online activism, which continues to result in government
harassment, arrests, and intimidation. Current legislation allows jail terms for journal-
ists, editors, and online writers, including bloggers.
Notes
1. BBC News, ‘‘Country Profile: Egypt,’’ March 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle
_east/country_profiles/737642.stm.
2. Sarah Carr, ‘‘Journalists Challenge Egypt’s Exceptional Laws at Seminar,’’ Daily News Egypt,
August 1, 2008, http://dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=15464.
3. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Egypt: Annual Report 2008,’’ 2008, http://arabia.reporters-sans
-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=25429.
542 Egypt
4. Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘10 Worst Countries to Be a Blogger,’’ April 30, 2009, http://
www.cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.php.
5. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Egypt: Annual Report 2008,’’ 2008, http://arabia.reporters-sans
-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=25429.
6. Paul Budde Communication Pty., Ltd., ‘‘Egypt—Convergence Broadband and Internet Mar-
kets,’’ March 2009, http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/64a7a1/egypt_convergenc.
7. Daily News Egypt, ‘‘Egypt ICT Spending to Reach $13.5 Billion, Says Report,’’ September 8,
2008, http://dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=16314.
8. Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, ‘‘Dr. Kamel Witnesses Agreement
Signing to Spread PC for Every Home Initiative Nationwide,’’ August 25, 2008, http://www.mcit
.gov.eg/PressreleaseDetailes.aspx?id=hSXOldo18K4=.
9. Theodore May, ‘‘Vodafone Egypt Clinches Sarcom Content to Boost Internet Service,’’ Daily
News Egypt, August 21, 2008, http://dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=15900.
10. Will Rasmussen, ‘‘Update: 2-Telecom Egypt Says Q2 Profit Jumps on Mobile Revenue,’’
Reuters, August 14, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMediaTelecomNews/
idUSLE69056820080814?sp=true.
11. ITP, ‘‘Nearly One Million Egyptian Households Have Broadband,’’ April 28, 2008, http://www
.itp.net/news/517740-nearly-one-million-egyptian-households-have-broadband.
12. Meghan Michael, ‘‘Blogging on the Rise in Egypt Despite Security Risks, Threats, Says Report,’’
Daily News Egypt, July 31, 2008, http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=15427.




16. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Government-Shuttered Company, Its Owner Face Continuing Ha-
rassment over Broadcasts of Anti-government Protests,’’ May 28, 2008, http://www.ifex.org/en/
content/view/full/94083.
17. Ibid.
18. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Two Years for a Blog: That’s Enough! Reporters Without Borders
Calls for Release of Blogger Kareem Amer,’’ November 5, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id
_article=29192.
19. Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ‘‘Blogger Arrested, Faces Charges under State
of Emergency Law,’’ August 26, 2008, http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/96460/.
20. Ibid.
Egypt 543
21. Cynthia Johnston, ‘‘Egypt Asks Mobile Firms to Bar Anonymous Users,’’ Reuters, May 5, 2008,
http://ca.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idCAL056268520080505?sp=true.
22. Ibid.
23. Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ‘‘Weekly Update for the Arabic Network
for Human Rights Information #192,’’ December 28, 2007, http://www.anhri.net/en/newsletter/
2008/newsletter1003.shtml.
24. Agence France Presse, ‘‘Cairo Court Rules to Block Porn Sites,’’ May 12, 2009, http://newsx
.com/story/52677.
25. Ibid.
26. Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ‘‘Egypt: Increasing Curb over Internet Usage
Harassments against Net Cafés Should Immediately End,’’ February 23, 2005, http://www.anhri
.net/en/reports/2005/pr0223.shtml.
27. Agence France Presse, ‘‘Egypt Demanding Data from Cyber Cafés Users: NGO,’’ August 9,
2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hN_tktRSmeojLOOn65lVULB4lj8A.
28. Arab Press Network, ‘‘Rumors of a Facebook Block Persist in Egypt,’’ Menassat, August 29,
2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/4508-rumors-facebook-block-persist-egypt.
29. Noam Cohen, ‘‘In Egypt, a Thirst for Technology and Progress,’’ New York Times, July 21,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/business/media/21link.html.
30. Arab Press Network, ‘‘Rumors of a Facebook Block Persist in Egypt,’’ Menassat, August 29,
2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/4508-rumors-facebook-block-persist-egypt.
31. Ibid.
32. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Egypt: Annual Report 2008,’’ 2008, http://arabia.reporters-sans
-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=25429.
33. OpenNet Initiative Blog, ‘‘Can They Hear Me Now? (On ICT Regulations, Governments, and
Transparency),’’ February 24, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/02/can-they-hear-me-now-on-
ict-regulations-governments-and-transparency.
34. Mohammed al-Mutasem, ‘‘Naeb parlamani yutalib bimuhasabat wazir alittisalat’’ [A parliament
member calls for holding Minister of Telecommunication responsible], al-Arabiya.net, December
29, 2008, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/12/29/63061.html.
35. National Telecom Regulatory Authority, Egypt Telecommunication Regulation Law, Law
No. 10 of 2003, Article 64, http://www.tra.gov.eg/uploads/law/law_en.pdf.
36. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North
Africa: Egypt,’’ November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/4.htm.




The Islamic Republic of Iran continues
to expand and consolidate its techni-
cal filtering system, which is among
the most extensive in the world. A cen-
tralized system for Internet filtering
has been implemented that augments
the filtering conducted at the Internet
service provider (ISP) level. Iran now
employs domestically produced tech-
nology for identifying and blocking
objectionable Web sites, reducing its reliance on Western filtering technologies.
The regulatory agencies in Iran charged with policing the Internet continue to
expand. The Revolutionary Guard has begun to play an active role in enforcing
Internet content standards. In conjunction with expansive surveillance, this in-
crease in regulatory attention exacerbates an online atmosphere that promotes
self-censorship and discourages dissenting views. The blocking of political Web
sites during the 2009 presidential elections energized opposition to Internet cen-
sorship within Iran and has brought fresh attention to the issue of press controls.
Background
Speech in the Islamic Republic of Iran is heavily regulated. The limits on freedom of
expression in Iran are grounded in the constitution, and speech restrictions extend
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over a broad range of topics, including religion, immorality, social harmony, and poli-
tics. In comparison to the well-developed state controls over print media, radio, and
television, the Internet initially offered a relatively unfettered medium for communica-
tion in Iran, allowing independent media and opposition voices to flourish.1 The Inter-
net also has provided Iranian expatriates a platform for publishing opinions in
opposition to the government, such as pro-secular and reformist political viewpoints,
outside the reach of standard offline strategies for enforcing speech restrictions. The
growing popularity of the Internet has led to increasing government scrutiny. Dissent-
ing voices online, including human rights activists, bloggers, and online media outlets,
have became the target of government regulatory action and are subject to arrest,
imprisonment, and torture.2 Internet control mechanisms have continued to grow in
scope and scale to address this digital challenge to information control in Iran. Regula-
tors have invested in more sophisticated technical control mechanisms, and new regu-
latory agencies have been created to identify and block expression deemed offensive.
The presidential elections in 2009 led to an increase in online political organizing,
which provided a further impetus for increasingly contentious controls on the Web
sites used by legitimate opposition contenders.
Efforts to control online speech by the Iranian government have relied primarily on
large-scale Internet filtering and the threat of targeted legal action. The declaration of a
spokesman from the Revolutionary Guard to launch 10,000 blogs written by members
of the Basij, a volunteer Iranian paramilitary force under the authority of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, hints at the adoption of a different strategy for shaping online
information: a government-backed war of words on the Internet.3 This is similar con-
ceptually to the government information dissemination strategies seen in just a small
number of countries—for example, the Fifty Cent Party in China, where workers are re-
portedly paid for producing progovernment content, and in Russia, where pro-Kremlin
bloggers are suspected of receiving government support.4
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 10,346
Life expectancy at birth (years) 71
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 82
Human development index (out of 179) 84
Rule of law (out of 211) 165
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 191
Democracy index (out of 167) 145 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 105
Internet users (percent of population) 31.3
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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Internet in Iran
Internet usage in Iran continues to increase at a sharp rate. Over the past eight years,
the number of Internet users in Iran has growth at an average annual rate of approxi-
mately 48 percent, increasing from under 1 million Internet users in 20005 to around
23 million in 2008.6 This rate of growth is higher than any other country in the Middle
East. Internet users now account for approximately 31.3 percent of the population of
Iran. This Internet penetration rate is considerably higher than the Middle East average
of 23 percent.7
The Persian blogosphere has been heralded as one of the largest and most active in
the world. The number of active Persian blogs is estimated to be approximately
60,000—a formidable number of independent voices for a country accustomed to
tightly controlling the press.8
Iranian Internet policies reflect a strong tension between the regulatory urge to reign
in free speech and the promotion of innovation and economic growth supported by
expanding access to information and communication technologies (ICT). Bolstered by
the strong growth in Internet penetration in Iran, Iran’s Fourth Five-Year Development
Plan called for enhanced broadband penetration, with 1.5 million high-speed Internet
connections nationwide.9 However, in October 2006, the Ministry of Information and
Communications Technology (MICT) issued an order that appears to have been
designed to thwart household access to broadband Internet, forbidding ISPs from pro-
viding Internet connectivity to households and public Internet access points at speeds
greater than 128 Kbps. This policy, which restricts the ability of Internet users to down-
load multimedia content, is likely intended to inhibit online alternative media sources
that might compete with the tightly controlled radio and television media in Iran and
to hinder access to alternative media sources.10
At the time of this order, approximately 250,000 users had access to high-speed
Internet service, with demand continuing to grow.11 Over the prior two years, 11 com-
panies had been licensed to provide such high-speed services and had invested signifi-
cant capital in importing the required machinery and setting up the required
infrastructure. These regulations on Internet access speed were met with intense oppo-
sition, including a campaign to overturn the policy by members of parliament.12
Reports at the time suggested that the restrictions would be lifted once more effective
content control mechanisms were put into place. However, the ban on high-speed ser-
vice for households and public access points remains in place, although universities
and private businesses are able to obtain high-speed broadband service. Before this
policy was enacted, fiber-optic networks had been expanding rapidly in Iran, more
than doubling from 2005 to 2007.13 The growth of fiber-optic networks in Iran has
since dropped off precipitously.14 Mohammad Soleimani, Minister of Information and
Communications, publicly defended the ceiling on access speeds and indicated that
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slower speeds are adequate and that there is no demand for higher speeds.15 Iran is the
only country in the world to have instituted an explicit cap on Internet access speed
for households.
Efforts to gain control over the Internet were already under way in 2001, when the
government of Iran asserted control over all Internet access points coming into the
country.16 Commercial ISPs in Iran that offer Internet connectivity to the public are
required to connect through the state-controlled Telecommunication Company of
Iran (TCI).17 OpenNet Initiative research corroborates that ISPs offering Internet ser-
vice to the public all connect through TCI. The other international connections to the
Internet are associated with research and academic organizations. Designing the Inter-
net infrastructure around a government-managed gateway—rare for a country with
this many Internet users—offers a central point of control that facilitates the imple-
mentation of Internet filtering and monitoring of Internet use.
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Speech regulation in Iran is rooted in its constitution, which declares that ‘‘the media
should be used as a forum for healthy encounter of different ideas, but they must
strictly refrain from diffusion and propagation of destructive and anti-Islamic prac-
tices.’’18 Applying these principles to the Internet has proven to be difficult. A number
of government regulatory initiatives have been launched over the past decade to assert
control over online communications, although the legal status of Web sites and blogs
continues to be contested.
The legal and institutional basis for the technical filtering system in Iran grew out of
a series of decrees passed down by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution
(SCRC) in December 2001 that required ISPs to employ filtering systems.19 An inter-
agency committee, the Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Sites
(CCDUS), was set up a year later to set criteria for identifying unauthorized Web
sites to be blocked.20 This committee also decides on the blocking of specific domains.
The SCRC issues guidelines to this committee and oversees committee members, who
include representatives of MICT, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance
(MCIG), the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security, and the Tehran Prosecutor
General.21
The implementation of the filtering decisions is charged to a filtering division within
the Information Technology Company of Iran (ITC), an agency under MICT.22 An-
other agency, the Communication Infrastructure Company, has been given the task
of unifying filtering across Iran.23
Iran has promoted the development of domestic tools and technical capacity to carry
out Internet filtering in order to reduce its reliance on Western technologies. Prior ONI
research reported the use of SmartFilter, a product of the U.S.–based firm Secure Com-
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puting, for filtering Internet content.24 Secure Computing denied any knowledge of
the use of their products in Iran.25 The use of Western technology was problematic
for both the companies involved and the Iranian government. For the companies,
involvement in Internet censorship in Iran was a public relations liability, as they
were viewed as contributing to the suppression of legitimate speech, if not breaking
U.S. law by violating trade sanctions against Iran. For the Iranian government, the reli-
ance on Western technologies was seen as a source of weakness and a potential vulner-
ability for the integrity of the Iranian Internet. Some within Iran were concerned that
Western software might include a ‘‘backdoor’’ that would give outsiders access to key
infrastructure.26
Several Iranian technology companies are now producing hardware and software
products for use in the Iranian filtering system.27 Domestically produced technology
is currently used for filtering. Iranian technology is also used for searching the Internet
for objectionable content and tracking keywords and links to banned Web sites, which
are used by filtering authorities to make blocking decisions.28 With the emergence of
this domestic technical capacity, Iran joins China as the only countries that aggres-
sively filter the Internet using their own technology.
The legal structures for enforcing speech restrictions in Iran are ambitious in their
reach and offer authorities several alternatives for targeting objectionable speech and
implementing the wide mandate to curtail a broad range of impermissible speech
in Iran. Significant ambiguity in the statutes and directives used to regulate speech in
Iran leaves the agencies charged with executing these laws with broad discretionary
powers.
The Press Law of 1986 is the principal instrument for regulating media in Iran and
frames the boundaries of permissible speech by media. This legislation is unusual in
that it not only describes restricted speech but also lays out normative objectives for
the press, who are required to ‘‘propagate and promote genuine Islamic culture and
sound ethical principles.’’29 The Press Law outlines broad restrictions on speech,
including prohibitions on ‘‘promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of
the Islamic Republic . . . offending the Leader of the Revolution . . . or quoting articles
from the deviant press, parties or groups that oppose Islam (inside and outside the
country) in such a manner as to propagate such ideas . . . or encouraging and insti-
gating individuals and groups to act against the security, dignity and interests of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.’’30 Other provisions prohibit insulting Islam or senior reli-
gious authorities.31
The application of this law to Web sites and blogs in Iran has been contested. An
amendment to the Press Law in 2000 appears to have brought electronic publications
under the aegis of the law.32 In April 2009, another amendment to the Press Law was
passed by the Iranian parliament that could facilitate the application of Press Law to
online sources of content. The 2009 amendment stipulates that ‘‘the rules stated in
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this Press Law apply to domestic news sites and domestic websites and set out their
rights, responsibilities, legal protection, crimes, punishments, judicial authority and
procedure for hearings.’’33 This article, which was rejected a year earlier when proposed
to the previous parliament, was reportedly passed this time with strong pressure from
the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.34 Given the ambiguous word-
ing of the April 2009 amendment to the Press Law, critics say that personal Web sites
and blogs may also fall within the new definition, allowing greater scope for inhibiting
freedom of expression on the Internet. The government claims that the law now
applies to all ‘‘Internet publications.’’35
As applied to Web sites and blogs, the Press Law would not only subject online con-
tent to the comprehensive set of speech restrictions in the law, but also require Web
sites to obtain a license prior to publication. Bloggers and online media sources would
also be subject to the regulatory authority of the Press Supervisory Board under the
Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance (MICG), which has the power to revoke
licenses, ban publications, and refer complaints to a special Press Court.36
Internet ‘‘publications’’ that do not obtain a license under the Press Law, however,
are subject to the stricter general laws of the Penal Code and come under the jurisdic-
tion of the general courts. The Penal Code incorporates content-based crimes such as
propaganda against the state and allows for the death penalty or imprisonment of up
to five years for speech deemed to be an ‘‘insult to religion.’’37 Additional punishable
offenses include creating ‘‘anxiety and unease in the public’s mind,’’ spreading ‘‘false
rumors,’’ or writing about ‘‘acts which are not true.’’ Another provision criminalizes
criticism of state officials. Cases heard in the general courts do not have the benefit of
a jury trial, which is used only in the Press Courts, increasing the risk for those that opt
not to register their Web site or blog.
Both supporters and critics of the 2009 amendment to the Press Law agree that
implementing these new provisions is beyond the capacity of current regulatory
agencies. Critics suspect that the proximity of the law’s approval to the 2009 elections
was linked to the incumbent president’s desire to limit the influence of reformist can-
didates in cyberspace.38
Authorities in Iran have struggled for many years with the challenges of regulating
speech on the Internet, complicated by the relative ease of anonymous speech online
and access to content hosted outside the country. Internet service providers and sub-
scribers are subject to prohibitions on 20 types of activities, where insulting Islam and
religious leaders and institutions, as well as fomenting national discord and promoting
drug use or obscenity and immoral behaviors, are prominent.39 In 2006, a directive of
the SCRC declared Web sites and blogs that did not obtain a license from the MICG to
be illegal.40 The MICG issued a notice in January 2007 requiring registration by March
1, 2007. A Telecommunications Ministry official, however, indicated that enforcement
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was not feasible.41 The number of blogs that have registered with the state is thought
to be very low.42
Another key piece of legislation for regulating online content in Iran is the Bill of
Cyber Crimes’ Sanctions (Cyber Crimes Bill) ratified into law in November 2008. This
bill was still under review by the Guardian Council at the time of writing.43 The bill
requires ISPs to ensure that ‘‘forbidden’’ content is not displayed on their servers, that
they immediately inform law enforcement agencies of violations, that they retain the
content as evidence, and that they restrict access to the prohibited content.44 Under
the Cyber Crimes Bill, ISPs that do not abide by government regulations (including
filtering regulations) will be fined, and with subsequent offenses temporarily or perma-
nently suspended.45 The bill also includes provisions for the protection and disclosure
of confidential data and information as well as the publishing of obscene content.46 A
prior draft of the legislation included provisions that made ISPs criminally liable for
content transmitted over their networks. These provisions have been removed from
the latest draft of the Cyber Crimes Bill.
The role of different government agencies in deciding on blocking, and the legality
of doing so, has been a point of contention. The Internet Bureau of the Judiciary has
issued mandates to ISPs to block Web sites through court orders, which are considered
a form of lawful punishment imposed on legal entities.47 Tehran Prosecutor General
Saeed Mortazavi, who has led harsh crackdowns on media and has also been impli-
cated in cases of torture of detainees, including 21 bloggers arrested in 2004, has also
ordered that certain sites be censored.48
The legality of Iran’s filtering regime was brought into question following the block-
ing of the conservative online journal Baztab (formerly baztab.com) in February 2007.
Baztab was made accessible inside Iran again after the Supreme Court of Iran ruled
against the filtering of the Web site.49 This incident sparked a debate within Iranian
legal and media circles over the authority of the CCDUS and whether as an executive
body of government it was improperly involved in making legislative or judicial deci-
sions.50 This debate did not forestall the eventual closing of the offices of Baztab.51
Surveillance
Iran is reportedly investing in improving its technical capacity to extensively monitor
the behavior of its citizens on the Internet. The routing of Internet traffic through
proxy servers offers the potential for monitoring and logging essentially all unen-
crypted Web traffic, including e-mail, instant messaging, and browsing. The architec-
ture of the Iranian Internet is particularly conducive to widespread surveillance, as all
traffic from the dozens of ISPs serving households is routed through the state-
controlled telecommunications infrastructure of TCI. The MICT, when announcing
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the creation of a centralized filtering system, indicated that they would keep a record of
Web sites visited by users. A later statement denied that this infrastructure would be
used for tracking browsing habits and identifying users.52
In 2008, two European companies reportedly sold a sophisticated electronic surveil-
lance system capable of monitoring Internet use that could be utilized for tracking and
monitoring the online activities of human rights organizations and political dissidents.
The Telecommunication Company of Iran is said to have received the equipment from
Nokia Siemens Networks, a joint venture between the Finnish cell phone maker and
the German company Siemens.53 Women’s rights activists reported that they were
shown transcripts of instant messaging sessions by authorities after their arrest, which,
if true, would support the existence of an advanced surveillance program.54
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative conducted testing in 2008 and 2009 on five ISPs in Iran: ITC,
Gostar, Parsonline, Datak, and Sepanta. The testing results confirm that Iran has con-
tinued to consolidate its position as one of the most extensive filterers of the Internet.
Iran consistently filters a broad range of Web sites that are offensive to the moral stan-
dards of Iran’s religious leadership. Internet censors in Iran have moved decisively
against a number of political targets over the past two years, including women’s rights
groups, human rights organizations, and political opposition parties.
Filtering in Iran is implemented by routing all public Internet traffic through proxy
servers. This allows the employment of filtering software to target specific Web pages as
well as the blocking of keywords. The blocking of Web sites is carried out in a transpar-
ent manner in Iran; a block page is displayed to users who attempt to access a blocked
site with a warning that they are not permitted to access a particular Web site. The
block pages, which vary by ISP, generally include a contact e-mail address for users
who might wish to contact the filtering administrators to question or contest the
blocking of a Web site.
A noteworthy recent development in Iran’s filtering regime is the implementation of
a centralized filtering regime. Historically, there has been substantial variation in
blocking across different ISPs, with several ISPs filtering fewer Web sites than TCI and
thereby offering a more permissive view of the Internet.55 This variation in access to
Web sites was the result of differences in the implementation of government filtering
instructions by ISPs. This differential filtering practice has now been effectively
replaced by a uniform filtering pattern with the implementation of the supplementary
centralized filtering system. The vestiges of the ISP-based system, however, are still ap-
parent: the source of filtering is made evident by the block page that appears, which in
some cases comes from the respective ISPs and in other cases from a standard block
page issued by TCI. It is unclear what the long-term structure of the filtering system
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will be. Options include continuing with the current dual-location filtering system or
switching to either a system in which all filtering is carried out at a central point or
to a distributed but centrally coordinated filtering system. Regardless of the method
chosen for implementation, it appears that Iran is firmly on the path toward a cen-
tralized filtering system under the control of the government, as carried out in Saudi
Arabia, for example.
The Iranian filtering system continues to strengthen and deepen. In addition to
targeting ‘‘immoral’’ content on the Internet, independent and dissenting voices are
filtered across a range of issues, including political reform, criticism of the government,
reporting on human rights issues, and minority and women’s rights. A notable change
in the scope of filtering in Iran over the past several years has been an expansion of
political filtering and blocking of human rights organizations, particularly targeting
the women’s rights movement in Iran. Blocking orders issued by CCDUS in May 2008
added many new Web sites to the blocking lists. These included numerous Web sites
and blogs of women’s rights and human rights activists in addition to several well-
known journalists, including www.roozmaregiha2.blogfa.com and pargas1.blogfa.com.
Women’s rights Web sites in Farsi, such as www.we-change.org and feministschool
.com, are consistently blocked in Iran.
A prominent example of targeted political filtering is the blocking in February
2009 of www.yaarinews.ir, a Web site created for the planned election campaign of
former president Mohammad Khatami. A Web site of the reformist coalition, www
.baharestaniran.com, was blocked in March 2008. The blocking of Facebook in May
2009 has proven to be particularly controversial in Iran. Many believe that supporters
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were behind the blocking orders, as a reformist
candidate for president, MirHossein Mousavi, had been using Facebook for political
organizing.56 Ahmadinejad has since denied any involvement in the decision to block
Facebook.57 The blocking of the popular social network Web site was reversed several
days later after strong popular opposition to the blocking in Iran.58 Facebook had
been blocked in the past: ONI testing showed that it was blocked in Fall 2008, with
access to the Web site allowed again in February 2009.59
The role of speech restrictions in the political realm are also evident in the guidelines
passed down from SCRC to CCDUS in April 2009 that defined allowable speech during
the 2009 presidential elections for Web sites and ISPs. These guidelines outlined 20
categories of prohibited speech, including ‘‘disrupting national unity’’ and ‘‘creating
negative feelings toward the Islamic government.’’60
Independent media Web sites offered only in English are inconsistently blocked,
though a number of prominent Western news Web sites have been blocked in Iran.
The Huffington Post and the Web site for Al-Arabiya (alarabiya.net) are blocked in
Iran. The New York Times, available in May 2009, has been blocked on several occasions
in the past. Global Voices, an international blog aggregator, was blocked in May 2009.
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The Web sites of numerous international free-speech organizations are blocked, includ-
ing rsf.org, epic.org, citizenlab.org, and eff.org. The Web sites of Amnesty International
and the OpenNet Initiative were not blocked in May 2009.
A higher proportion of independent media Web sites in Farsi are blocked than are
sites with English-language content. The BBC’s Persian service (www.bbc.co.uk/
persian) was blocked soon after its launch in January 2009. The introduction of this
new broadcast station was condemned by the Iranian government and declared to
be illegal.61 In addition, Iranian.com, roozonline.com, and radiozamaneh.com are
among the independent sources of news and opinion that are blocked in Iran.
A popular Farsi social networking and independent news Web site, Balatarin.com,
was blocked in 2007, reportedly for a user-contributed post with a link to a Web site
that included a rumor of the death of Supreme Leader Ali Hoseyni Khamenei. Strident
objections by users to the blocking of Balatarin were not successful in reversing the
blocking decision, and Balatarin continues to be blocked.
The Web sites of several ethnic and religious minorities are blocked in Iran, includ-
ing those associated with the Baha’i faith and Kurdish movements. Web sites that are
critical of Islam are widely blocked. A higher proportion of Web sites in Farsi related to
religious and minority rights are blocked than those in English.
The blocking of blogs in Iran is focused primarily on individual blogs. However, sev-
eral blog-hosting services are blocked in their entirely, including www.livejournal.com
and www.xanga.com. Also, technorati.com and boingboing.com are blocked.
In fall 2008, the ONI tested a sample of approximately 8,800 blogs, drawing the
sample from the blogs in the Farsi blogosphere that had the highest number of links
to one another.62 Of these, approximately 9 percent were found to be blocked by TCI.
A majority of the blogs that were blocked are associated with secular politics and
reformist viewpoints. However, blogs from the conservative and religious segments of
the blogosphere were blocked as well, several of which apparently included content
deemed to be too extreme. Further ONI analysis carried out over a sample of filtered
and unfiltered blogs displays a systematic targeting of blogs with oppositional views
but with substantial inconsistency; many blogs with solidly dissident views remain
unblocked, while other blogs without controversial content are blocked.
Several popular social networking Web sites are blocked in Iran, including MySpace
.com and Orkut.com. Prior to being blocked, Orkut was highly popular in Iran.
Among the more prominent social media Web sites, Flickr.com, www.bebo.com,
www.metacafe.com, www.photobucket.com, and delicious.com are all blocked. After
several episodes of blocking in the past, YouTube, one of the most popular destinations
for Iranian Internet users, was available in May 2009.
Consistent with one of the stated objectives of Iran’s filtering policy, pornographic
content is heavily filtered. Iran is highly successful in blocking pornography, blocking
a vast majority of the Web sites tested by ONI. Sites that include photographs depict-
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ing provocative attire are also consistently blocked. Esmail Radkani, of Iran’s quasi-
official Information Technology Company, claimed in an interview in September
2006 that 10 million Web sites were filtered at that time, 90 percent of which con-
tained ‘‘immoral’’ content.63 Another official was quoted in November 2008 saying
that 5 million Web sites were blocked in Iran.64 Given the large number of Web sites
with sexual content blocked in Iran, neither of these estimates is implausible.
The filtering of material related to sexuality extends as well to Web sites offering con-
tent related to sexual education. Approximately half of the dating Web sites tested by
ONI were found to be blocked in Iran. OpenNet Initiative testing also found significant
blocking of content related to homosexuality, particularly if it had any connection to
Iran. A number of Web sites related to drugs, alcohol, and gambling are blocked in
Iran, although many remain unblocked.
Web sites that offer tools and techniques for circumventing filters are also heavily fil-
tered. Just as new Web sites with options for circumventing Internet filters are regularly
offered by Internet users around the world, blocking lists in Iran are frequently updated
to include these new Web sites. A great majority of Web sites offering information
about and access to circumvention tools tested by ONI were blocked.
The proxy server filtering strategy also permits filtering by keyword. Web searches
that include the keyword ‘‘women’’ are still blocked in Iran. The word ‘‘sex’’ and a
broad range of words related to sexual activity both in English and Farsi are blocked.
The Farsi word for ‘‘photograph’’ is also blocked.
Conclusion
Iran continues to strengthen the legal, administrative, and technical aspects of its
Internet filtering systems. The Internet censorship system in Iran is one of the most
comprehensive and sophisticated in the world. Advances in domestic technical capac-
ity have contributed to the implementation of a centralized filtering strategy and a
reduced reliance on Western technologies. Despite the deeply held commitment to
regulating Internet content, authorities continue to be challenged in their attempts to
control online speech. Political filtering related to the 2009 presidential campaign,
including the blocking of Facebook and several opposition party Web sites, brought
renewed attention to the role of filtering in Iran and shows a clear inclination toward
second-generation controls.
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Saudi Arabia filters Web sites related
to opposition political groups, human
rights issues, and religious content
deemed offensive to Muslims. Pornog-
raphy and Web sites containing LGBT
content are pervasively filtered, as
are circumvention and online privacy
tools. Bloggers have been arrested and
blogs and Web sites run by online
activists have been blocked.
Background
Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad and the cradle of Islam. It
embraces a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam and has a strong religious self-identity.
Political parties are banned, and activists who publicly call for reform risk being jailed.1
Journalism is strictly controlled, and journalists must exercise self-censorship in order
to avoid government scrutiny and dismissal.2
Despite substantial Saudi investment in pan-Arab satellite television such as the
Dubai-based MBC channels and the Bahrain-based Orbit Satellite Network, the media
environment within Saudi Arabia is one of the most tightly controlled in the region.
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The kingdom’s four television networks—including news channel Al-Ikhbaria—and its
radio stations are operated by the state-owned Broadcasting Service of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (BSKSA), which is chaired by the Saudi minister of culture and informa-
tion.3 Private television and radio stations are prohibited on Saudi soil.4 However, the
minister of culture and information said in May 2009 that an official committee had
been formed to study the draft privatization project of Saudi television and the Saudi
News Agency, and that the Ministry of Culture and Information was considering grant-
ing a number of radio licenses.5
Blogging has grown as a medium for expression in Saudi Arabia, with an estimated
2,000 bloggers in 2006, half of whom are women.6 In 2005, the government tried to
ban Blogger, the platform most often used by Saudi bloggers.7 However, after a few
days the ban was lifted, with the censors choosing to block specific content hosted on
the platform instead.8
In November 2008, Saudi activists launched for the first time a daring move to sup-
port a human rights campaign online and called for a two-day public hunger strike to
protest the detention without charges of human rights activists. The campaign was
highly publicized and received coverage from international media.9
In early 2009, Saudi Arabia was ranked by the Committee to Protect Journalists as
one of the ten worst countries in which to be a blogger, citing the widespread self-
censorship and local calls by influential clerics for harsh punishment for online writers
who post content deemed heretical.10
Internet in Saudi Arabia
Since its creation in 1998, the state-run Saudi Telecom Company (STC) had been the
sole provider of telecom services. However, in an effort to join the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), the government opened the telecommunication sector to competition
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 21,659
Life expectancy at birth (years) 73
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 85
Human development index (out of 179) 55
Rule of law (out of 211) 87
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 193
Democracy index (out of 167) 161 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 75
Internet users (percent of population) 30.5
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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in 2002.11 To enhance the information and communication technology (ICT) infra-
structure in the kingdom, STC started installation of IP-VPN service at various speeds
of up to 2.5 Gbps.12
The telecom sector continues to grow with relative consistency. Service revenues
have been climbing steadily at an annual average rate of nearly 15 percent since 2001.
Despite high mobile revenues, the kingdom’s broadband penetration rate of about 1
percent remains well below the world average of 5 percent and the 20 percent bench-
mark of developed countries.13 This situation, however, is likely to change as advanced
ICT projects are introduced. These projects include STC’s launch of a home fiber-optic
service providing Internet speed reaching 100 Mbps for its clients in the kingdom.14
The government’s Internet Services Unit (ISU), a department of the King Abdulaziz
City for Science and Technology (KACST), has been responsible for overseeing Internet
services in Saudi Arabia and for implementing government censorship.15 As its Web
site explains, 25 licensed ISPs connect users to the national network.16 In accordance
with a Council of Ministers decision, the Saudi Communications Commission was
renamed the Communications and Information Technology Commission and took
charge of licensing and filtering processes previously managed by KACST.17
Because of numerous restrictions on the public interaction of unrelated men and
women and the limited roles of women in open society, the Internet has emerged not
only as a popular means of socialization but also as one that is dominated by women.
Reports estimate that two-thirds of Saudi Internet users are women.18 Some Saudis be-
lieve that cyberspace has encouraged people to lead ‘‘double lives,’’ conducting them-
selves in a more conservative manner in the public eye while engaging in far more
liberal behavior online.19
Legal and Regulatory Framework
Saudi newspapers are established by decree. Although pan-Arab newspapers are avail-
able, they are subject to censorship and tend to conform to the state’s standards when
contemplating the publication of sensitive content.20 Public criticism of the Saudi lead-
ership and the questioning of Islamic beliefs are not generally tolerated, but in the
post-9/11 era and amid instances of internal militancy, a bolder and more candid
approach has brought about at least some press and television coverage of more con-
troversial topics.21 This approach remains limited, however. For example, in January
2008 the Ministry of Culture and Information imposed a nationwide ban on all live
broadcasts from Saudi public television channels two days after disgruntled viewers
phoned in to the Al-Ikhbariya news channel and made critical remarks targeting senior
Saudi officials. The ban compelled Reporters Without Borders to call for a reversal of
the government’s action and the reinstatement of the network’s director, who had
been fired after the incident.22
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The Saudi government openly admits to filtering and explains its policy in a section
of the ISU Web site.23 According to this Web site, KACST is directly responsible for fil-
tering pornographic content, while other Web sites are blocked upon request from
‘‘government security bodies.’’ The Web site also has forms that enable Internet users
to request that certain Web sites be blocked or unblocked. According to a KACST offi-
cial, ‘‘The majority of blocked Web sites contain pornographic content, and over 90
percent of Internet users have tried to access a blocked Web site.’’24 The censors rely
on citizens, who send in roughly 1,200 requests a day to have Web sites blocked.25
In January 2008, Saudi Arabia implemented 16 articles of a new law on the use of
technology. Its provisions include penalties of ten years in prison and a fine for Web
site operators that advocate or support terrorism; three years and a fine for financial
fraud or invasion of privacy; and five years and a fine for those guilty of distributing
pornography or other materials that violate public law, religious values, and social
standards of the kingdom. Accomplices of the guilty parties and even those who are
proven to have only intended to engage in unlawful IT acts can receive up to half of
maximum punishments.26
Providers and distributors of Internet equipment can also be held liable under the
new law, including Internet café managers whose facilities are used to post content
that infringes upon the ‘‘values’’ of the kingdom.27
The new law was implemented amid global scrutiny of the landmark imprisonment
of Saudi blogger Ahmad Fouad Al-Farhan, who was arrested by the Saudi government
for violating ‘‘nonsecurity regulations.’’ Al-Farhan is reported to have stated that he
was arrested because he ‘‘wrote about political prisoners in Saudi Arabia.’’28 Al-Farhan
was freed after more than four months in prison.29
The new law has also been applied in nonpolitical cases. For example, a court fined
a young man 50,000 Saudi riyals (approximately USD 13,000) and sentenced him to
22 months in jail and 200 lashes after he was found guilty of breaking into a woman’s
e-mail account and stealing photos of her. The man threatened to post the photos of
the woman on the Internet if she did not agree to have an affair with him.30
In July 2008, the Saudi authorities reportedly refused to renew the residence permit
of an Egyptian national who had lived in Saudi Arabia for 44 years for writing articles
in newspapers and on the Internet that were critical of the Egyptian regime.31 The
Arabic Network for Human Rights Information claimed that the writer’s activities
‘‘only amount to writings about his concerns and opinions about Egypt and do not
include any Saudi related matters.’’32
In an unprecedented move, Saudi Arabia’s National Human Rights Society
announced attempts to have Web sites of Arab and international human rights or-
ganizations unblocked by the Saudi authorities.33 The chairman of the society said
that they are aware of the blocking of Web sites of Human Rights Watch, Reporters
Without Borders, and the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information inside Saudi
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Arabia. He added that ‘‘blocking these sites is tantamount to depriving Saudi Arabia of
its rights as a member of the UN Human Rights Council’’ and that ‘‘blocking those
websites violates clause 19 of the International Human Rights Declaration, which deals
with freedom of expression and clause 23 of the Arab Human Rights Charter.’’34
In May 2009, 13 female Saudi journalists filed complaints with the Ministry of
Interior accusing the local online newspaper Kul Al-Watan (All of the Homeland) of
‘‘defaming and distorting the image of the Saudi media.’’ The journalists said the on-
line newspaper published an offensive report entitled ‘‘Saudi Women in Red Nights,’’
in which it alleged that prostitution, alcohol, and drugs have become widespread in
Saudi society and that female journalists rely on illicit relationships with newspaper
bosses to get support and fame. One of the female journalists accused the writer of
taking advantage of an absence of censorship in online publishing in Saudi Arabia.35
Shortly thereafter, the minister of culture and information announced that Saudi
Arabia intends to enact laws, regulation, and legislation for newspapers and Internet
Web sites. This regulation will require Saudi-based Web sites to get official licenses
from a special agency under the purview of the Ministry. The minister said the pro-
posed regulation aims to deter ‘‘dangerous’’ writing in newspapers and on Web sites.36
Surveillance
Like many countries in the Middle East, the Saudi authorities monitor Internet activ-
ities. In March 2009, Internet cafés were ordered by the Ministry of Interior to install
hidden cameras and provide a record of names and identities of their customers.37
The Saudi religious police have also expressed an interest in practicing online surveil-
lance. Members of the religious police (the Commission for Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice) asked the chairman of the Saudi Shura (Consultative) Council to
enable them to have access to blocked Web sites, ‘‘to monitor immoral practices by
visitors of these sites.’’38 The religious police have argued that some young people
‘‘get involved in negative practices away from the eyes of the Saudi authorities’’ on
these blocked Web sites, and are therefore striving to put a stop to the ‘‘immoral
practices’’ online.39 The chairman of the Shura Council, however, questioned the legit-
imacy of the request and stated, ‘‘These justifications must be supported by clear evi-
dence, otherwise there is no need for it.’’40
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative conducted in-country testing on three ISPs: STC, National
Engineering Services and Marketing (Nesma), and Arabian Internet and Communica-
tions Services (Awalnet). The three providers blocked the same Web sites, as expected
given the centrally administered filtering system.
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Using Secure Computing’s SmartFilter software for technical implementation and to
identify Web sites for blocking, the Saudi censors have increased the number of targeted
Saudi political reformists and opposition groups. In addition to the previously blocked
Web sites such as the Web sites of the Islah movement (www.islah.tv and islah.info)
and the Tajdeed movement (tajdeed.net), the authorities have added more opposition
Web sites to the block list. Examples include www.alumah.com and www.alhijazonline
.com. Testing in 2008–2009 also revealed that the censors now target user-generated
oppositional content such as the forum New Arabia (www.newarabia.org).
The ONI monitored in-country access to the blog of Saudi blogger Ahmad Fouad
Al-Farhan, who was jailed for more than four months. His blog was found to be
blocked during his arrest and continued to be blocked even after he was released from
prison. Also, the ONI verified that the Web site of the Voice of Saudi Women
(www.saudiwomen.net), now defunct, was indeed blocked in October 2008. The Web
site, according to Reporters Without Borders, published a number of analytical reports
about the status of women in Saudi society and has denounced impediments to
women becoming effective actors in Saudi society.41
The ONI also found that the blog Saudi Christian (christforsaudi.blogspot.com)
was blocked in Saudi Arabia in January 2009, after reports that Saudi blogger Hamoud
Bin Saleh declared on his blog that he converted from Islam to Christianity. The ONI
monitored the blog and found that it was removed in March 2009 for unknown
reasons.
In keeping with the Saudi government’s emphasis on protecting the ‘‘sanctity of
Islam’’ and the legitimacy of the regime, a number of Web sites opposing each are
also blocked. These include Web sites relating to minority Shia groups (www.yahosein
.com), a Bahai site (www.bahai.com), and sites that espouse alternative views of Islam,
such as the Web site of the Institution for the Secularization of Islamic Society
(www.secularislam.org). Web sites that present critical reviews of the religion of Islam
and try to convert Muslims to other religions were also censored (answering-islam.org,
www.islamreview.com).
The Web pages of a few global free speech advocates, such as Article19 (www
.article19.org) and the Free Speech Coalition (www.freespeechcoalition.com), are
blocked. However, filtering of human rights content primarily targets Saudi or regional
organizations. All Web pages of the Saudi Human Rights Center (www.saudihr.org) are
blocked.
The human rights Web site www.humum.net was found blocked in 2008–2009
testing, whereas only the page related to Saudi Arabia was found to be blocked in the
previous phase of testing. The Web site receives complaints on human rights violations
from Arab citizens and is run by the Cairo-based Arab Human Rights Information
Network.
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Most global media Web sites tested, including Israel-based news outlets such as the
daily Haaretz (www.haaretz.com), were accessible. However, Web sites of certain prom-
inent Arabic newspapers and news portals were blocked, including the Arab-language
newspaper Al-Quds Al Arabi (www.alquds.co.uk) and the news portal Elaph (www
.elaph.com). Access to Elaph was restored several months after testing.
‘‘Immoral’’ social content continues to be a priority target for Saudi censors. The vast
majority of pornographic Web sites that were tested were blocked, as were most of
those featuring provocative attire or gambling. The 2008–2009 testing also showed
that censorship has expanded to block Arabic-language Web sites containing explicit
content.
Also blocked were numerous Web sites containing content relating to alcohol and
drugs, gay and lesbian issues, and sex education and family planning. A substantial
number of Internet tools, including anonymizers and translators, were filtered.
Conclusion
Saudi Arabia publicly acknowledges censoring morally inappropriate and religiously
sensitive material, but the authorities also filter political opposition Web sites and
resources on human rights issues. In addition, the state has introduced new surveil-
lance measures at Internet cafés and announced plans to start a system that will require
local Web sites to register with the authorities.
Saudi citizens have started to use the Internet for online activism, but the authorities
have arrested several online writers and blocked their content. A local human rights
group expressed interest in legally challenging the government’s censorship of human
rights Web sites.
Generally, Internet filtering in Saudi Arabia mirrors broader attempts by the state to
repress opposition and promote a single religious creed.
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Syria
The Syrian government has expanded
the range ofWeb content it filters, con-
tinues to detain citizens for expressing
their opinions online, and monitors
Internet use closely. Broadly worded
laws, characteristic of second-genera-
tion controls, invite government ha-
rassment and have prompted Internet
users to engage in self-censorship and
self-monitoring in order to avoid the
state’s ambiguous grounds for arrest.
Background
In Syria, the media are primarily owned and controlled by the government and the rul-
ing Baath party. Criticism of the president and his family is not allowed, journalists
practice self-censorship, and foreign reporters rarely receive accreditation.1 Though
there have been improvements in Syrian press freedom since Bashar al-Assad became
president in 2000,2 the state continues to use the ongoing state of emergency to arrest
media workers.3 Journalists and political activists constantly risk arrest for virtually any
reason and are ‘‘up against a whimsical and vengeful state apparatus which continually
adds to the list of things banned or forbidden to be mentioned.’’4 Syrian journalists
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have been arrested for interviewing exiled regime opponents, participating in confer-
ences abroad, and criticizing government policies.5 In 2006, Reporters Without Borders
ranked Syria among the 13 ‘‘enemies of the Internet,’’6 and in 2007 described Syria as
the biggest prison for cyber dissidents in the Middle East because of the number of
arrests and the frequency of mistreatment of online activists.7 In 2009, the Committee
to Protect Journalists ranked Syria third in a list of the ten worst countries in which to
be a blogger, given the arrests, harassment, and restrictions that online writers in Syria
have faced.8
The government admits to censoring ‘‘pro-Israel and hyper-Islamist’’ Web sites, such
as those run by the illegal Muslim Brotherhood and those calling for autonomy for
Syrian Kurds.9 In defense of these practices, former Minister of Technology and Com-
munications Amr Salem has said that ‘‘Syria is currently under attack . . . and if some-
body writes, or publishes or whatever, something that supports the attack, they will
be tried.’’10
Internet in Syria
The telecommunications market in Syria is the most regulated in the Middle East and is
among the least developed. State-owned Syrian Telecom (STE) owns all telecommuni-
cations infrastructure and has made some substantial investment to bring services to
rural areas, but limited competition exists with private ISPs competing with STE in the
Internet provision market.11
A government body that is part of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Tech-
nology, STE is also the regulator of telecommunications in Syria; in addition to being
an ISP, it enjoys a monopoly over wired and wireless services provided anywhere in
Syria.12 Telecom providers in Syria include Syriatel,13 MTN,14 Aya,15 and SCS-Net,
which is the ISP arm of the Syrian Computer Society.16 Additionally, MTN and Syriatel
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 4,260
Life expectancy at birth (years) 74
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15+) 83
Human development index (out of 179) 105
Rule of law (out of 211) 133
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 198
Democracy index (out of 167) 156 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 104
Internet users (percent of population) 16.7
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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now offer 3G mobile broadband in four major cities, as well as EDGE and GPRS con-
nectivity (WAP) across the country.17 However, 3G is prohibitively expensive for most
Syrians at nearly USD 50 per month.
The Internet was introduced to the general public in Syria in 2000 as part of the
modernization reforms of President al-Assad. In the subsequent seven years, Internet
use soared by 4,900 percent, far exceeding the global growth rate of 249 percent. The
vast majority of Syrian users get online service at Syria’s ubiquitous Internet cafés and
from houses using dial-up connections over landlines.18 Syrian users continue to access
blocked Web sites using proxies and circumvention tools, and prefer to use Internet
cafés to browse banned content because they believe the government can monitor
Web surfing through home Internet connections.19
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
The constitution of Syria provides for freedom of speech and of the press, but the
Syrian government restricts press freedom with repressive laws such as the Emergency
Law, which was put in place in December 1962 and broadly mandates the censorship
of various forms of communication; the 2001 Press Law which sets out sweeping con-
trols over publications printed in Syria; articles 286 and 287 of the penal code, which
criminalize spreading news abroad; and Decree No. 6 of 1965, which criminalizes
‘‘publishing news aimed at shaking the people’s confidence in the revolution.’’20
The Syrian authorities extended their censorship of Internet activities and monitor-
ing of Internet users in March 2008 by ordering Internet café users to provide users’
names, identification cards, and times they use their services.21 The head of the Syrian
Media Center told Reuters, ‘‘These steps are designed to terrorize Internet users and
spread fear and self-censorship in violation of the right to privacy and free expres-
sion.’’22 Government officials said these measures were necessary to guard against
what they described as attempts to spread sectarian divisions and ‘‘penetration by
Israel.’’23
In addition, an increasing number of Syrians have faced trial or been jailed for their
online writings, and the Syrian authorities continue judicial persecution of cyber dissi-
dents. For example, Habib Saleh was tried in December 2008 for publishing articles
calling for democracy in Syria on the Web site Elaph.com, which is censored in Syria,
and was given a three-year prison sentence in March 2009. Saleh was convicted under
article 285 of the criminal code for ‘‘weakening national sentiment’’ (a charge that is
applicable only in wartime, said his lawyer).24 Similarly, blogger Tariq Biasi received
a three-year sentence for ‘‘weakening national sentiment’’ as well as ‘‘publishing false
information’’ on a blog.25
In addition, owners of opposition Web sites face harassment by the authorities. For
example, lawyer and Web site editor Abdallah Souleiman Ali was detained for 12 days
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for ‘‘persisting in publishing legal and political articles criticizing the role of the gov-
ernment’’ on his Web site Al Nazaha (alnazaha.org) in July 2008.26
Access to the social networking site Facebook was blocked in November 2007 as
part of a crackdown on political activism on the Internet. According to a women’s
rights advocate, this action was taken because Facebook helped Syrian civil society
form civic groups outside government control.27 However, the government claimed
that Facebook was blocked because it could become a conduit for Israeli penetra-
tion of Syrian youth.28 The advocacy group Syrian Media Center claims that at least
153 Web sites have been blocked, among which are Blogger (owned by Google), the
Arabic blogging host service Maktoob, YouTube, and Web sites of opposition parties,
Lebanese newspapers, and Lebanese groups opposed to ‘‘Syrian interference in Leba-
non.’’29 In September 2008, the Public Institution for Telecommunication ordered the
blocking of the entire Web site of the Cairo-based Arabic Network for Human Rights
Information (ANHRI) as well as their blogs (www.katib.org). Prior to that, only one
page on ANHRI’s site containing information about human rights violations in Syria
was blocked. The organization believes that this blocking was ordered by the security
forces, ‘‘which have a louder voice than the law and the Constitution in Syria.’’30
Internet cafés in Syria are subject to tough measures that make opening one very
difficult. To start an Internet café, one needs to get a license from the Syrian Telecom-
munications Institution, as well as a security license from the Interior Ministry, which
sets security instructions that require each café visitor to provide his or her name, iden-
tification, and the names of his or her mother and father.31 The café owner must also
show visitors which religious and political Web sites they are banned from using.32
Failure to follow the rules can result in closure of the café, large fines, and, in extreme
cases, jail time.33
Surveillance
On its Web site, STE states that the telecommunications it provides remain private and
shall not be shared except by law and regulations at an official request.34
However, café operators have reported that the authorities ask them to spy on their
customers and that they believe everything is monitored.35 A young cyber dissident
who was arrested at an Internet café in Damascus in late 2006 for his critical online
writings said security services often request café owners to spy on clients, and they pro-
vide them with software programs for the task.36 In addition, as mentioned earlier,
Internet café operators must keep a record of their clients’ names and identification to
present to the authorities on request.
Furthermore, Syria-based Web sites were ordered by the government in 2007 to
reveal the identity and name of those behind any article or comment they published.37
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The use of cell phones is also subject to surveillance. The Interior Ministry and the
Syrian Telecommunications Institution have banned the sale of cell phones that have
GPS and have WAP services that are not being properly monitored by the service
providers.38
Technical censorship in Syria is implemented using software from a Canadian com-
pany called Platinum, Inc.39 The company uses the ThunderCache solution for URL
filtering, which is a system capable of monitoring and controlling a user’s dynamic
Web-based activities as well as conducting deep packet inspection.40
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative testing was conducted on two ISPs in Syria: formally SCS-Net (also
known as Aloola) and Aya.
The testing results for 2008–2009 indicate that Syria’s Internet filtering regime has
increased the scope and depth of targeted content. Censorship has been extended to
include high-profile Web sites such as the video-sharing site YouTube, the social net-
working site Facebook, and the online shop Amazon.
Political filtering continues to be pervasive. For example, Web sites of the Syrian
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood such as ikhwansyria.com and jimsyr.com (now de-
funct) were blocked. Unlike results from 2006 to 2007, more Web sites affiliated with
the Muslim Brotherhood, including that of the Egyptian branch, were blocked. Exam-
ples include www.ikhwanonline.com, www.ikhwanweb.com, and www.ikhwan.net.
Results from 2006 to 2007 testing indicated that only two Kurdish Web sites
were blocked, but results from 2008 to 2009 testing show that several Kurdish Web
sites have been added to the block list. These include www.kurdnas.com, amude.net,
www.kurdistanabinxete.com, www.pajk-online.com, www.kurdmedya.com, and www
.kurdax.net.
Also blocked were the Web site of the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon
(freelebanon.org), which campaigns for an end to Syrian influence in Lebanese politics;
the Web site of the Lebanese Forces (www.lebanese-forces.org); and some Lebanese
newspapers such as www.annahar.com.
Several political Web sites were also filtered. Among them are the Web site of the
Reform Party of Syria (www.reformsyria.org), a Web site of a communist party in Syria
(www.syriaalaan.com), the Web site of the Hizb al-Tahrir or Liberation Party (www
.hizb-ut-tahrir.org)—an Islamist group that seeks to restore the Caliphate—and various
news and oppositional Web sites such as www.thisissyria.net, www.free-syria.com, and
www.syriatruth.org.
The tests conducted by ONI revealed that a number of Syrian blogs hosted on
Google’s popular blogging engine Blogger (blogspot.com) continue to be blocked, a
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finding which strongly suggests that ISPs have blocked access to all blogs hosted on
this service, including many apolitical blogs. Interestingly, Blogger.com (the site from
which users of the service write posts) is not blocked, meaning Syrian users can blog
but cannot read blogs (including their own). Also blocked was freesyria.wordpress.com,
a blog created to campaign for the release of Michel Kilo, a prominent Syrian journalist
imprisoned for his writings.
Results for 2008–2009 confirmed that Syria has unblocked access to the popular
e-mail service Hotmail as well as the small Web-based e-mail sites address.com and
netaddress.com. All three were found to be blocked in previous rounds of testing.
None of the Arabic-language e-mail sites ONI tested were blocked, though the Arabic-
language hosting site www.khayma.com was. Among the few Web sites found
unblocked since 2006–2007 testing were the localized Arabic version of Wikipedia
and the Web site of the Lebanese Free Patriotic Movement (www.tayyar.org).
Though most foreign news Web sites were accessible, those of some prominent
Arabic newspapers and news portals were found to be blocked. Examples include the
pan-Arab, London-based, Arabic-language newspapers Al-Quds al-Arabi (www.alquds
.co.uk/) and Al-Sharq al-Awsat (www.asharqalawsat.com), the news portal elaph.com,
the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Seyassah (www.alseyassah.com), the U.S.-based Web site of
the Arab Times (www.arabtimes.com), and the Islam-oriented news and information
portal Islam Online (islamonline.net). These publications frequently run articles criti-
cal of the Syrian government.
Web sites of human rights organizations were generally available. Those associated
with the London-based Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) and the Web site of
the Syrian Observatory Human Rights (www.syriahr.com) were notable exceptions. As
indicated previously, some blogs that criticize the human rights record of Syria were
also blocked.
Several Israeli Web sites were tested to confirm whether or not Syria blocks the entire
‘‘.il’’ domain. All tested Web sites within the domain were blocked, suggesting that the
entire domain is indeed blocked. In addition, URLs containing the keyword ‘‘Israel’’
were found to be blocked.
Nearly one-third of the anonymizer Web sites tested were blocked, indicating some
measure of effort to preempt circumvention. None of the Web sites containing porno-
graphic content were found to be blocked, including the select few found blocked in
2006–2007 testing. Additionally, as in the 2006–2007 rounds of testing, Web sites
that focus on LGBT issues were generally available.
Syrian ISPs offer an optional filtering system to block content deemed immoral and
violent, as well as chat Web sites. The ONI did not test the scope and depth of these
optional systems.
Filtering continues to lack transparency; there is no explicit block page, and the ISPs
and telecom regulators do not publish clear information about what they filter.
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Conclusion
In addition to high-profile Web sites such as YouTube, Amazon, and Facebook, the
Web sites blocked in Syria span a range of categories, with the most substantial filtering
being of Web sites that criticize government policies and actions or espouse opposi-
tional political views. Repressive legislation and the imprisonment of journalists and
bloggers for their activities online have led many Syrians to engage in self-censorship,
which conforms to second-generation controls found in other parts of the world.
Meanwhile, the government continues to promote the growth of the Internet through-
out the country.
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Although Tunisia has actively sought
to develop its information and com-
munication technology (ICT) infra-
structure, the government continues
to pervasively block a range of Web
content and has used nontechnical
means, characteristic of second-
generation Internet controls, to im-
pede journalists and human rights
activists from doing their work. The
filtering of political content and restrictions on online activity have prompted
frequent criticism from foreign governments and human rights organizations, as
well as online protest campaigns from Tunisian Internet users.
Background
The Tunisian constitution guarantees freedom of the press under ‘‘conditions laid
down by law,’’ but the government closely controls the media. Additionally, the Press
Law criminalizes defamation, and those who violate it can be imprisoned and fined.1
Tunisia is considered by media watchdog Reporters Without Borders to be ‘‘the region’s
most authoritarian regime’’ in regard to civil liberties. Journalists and human rights
activists have been banned from leaving the country and are subject to arrest and
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imprisonment. The majority of the country’s newspapers conform to the official line of
the government, and opposition newspapers have been seized.2 The Internet is also
heavily regulated and perceived as a potential threat to the stability and security of
the country.3 There are also instances of banning foreign publications for publishing
content that is deemed prejudicial to Islam.4
Internet in Tunisia
Tunisia has one of the most developed telecommunications infrastructures in North
Africa, with a high mobile penetration rate and one of the lowest broadband prices in
Africa.5 As of October 2008, the number of GSM subscribers had reached 9 million,
while the number of Internet users was 1.7 million, 114,000 of whom have broadband
subscriptions.6 Out of a population of 10.2 million, nine out of ten Tunisians own a
cell phone.7 Of the Internet users, 84 percent access the Internet at home, 75.8 percent
use it at work, and 24 percent use Internet cafés.8
The Tunisian Ministry of Communications established the Tunisian Internet Agency
(ATI) to regulate the country’s Internet and DNS services, which had formerly fallen
under the purview of the Regional Institute for Computer Sciences and Telecommuni-
cations (IRSIT).9 The ATI is also the gateway from which all of Tunisia’s 11 ISPs lease
their bandwidth.10 Six of these ISPs are public (ATI, INBMI, CCK, CIMSP, IRESA, and
Defense’s ISP); the other five—Planet Tunisie, 3S Global Net, HEXABYTE, TopNet, and
TUNET—are private.11
The government has made concentrated efforts to spread Internet access. The ATI
reports connectivity of 100 percent for the education sector (universities, research lab-
oratories, secondary schools, and primary schools).12 Government-brokered ‘‘free
Internet’’ programs that provide Web access for the price of a local telephone call and
increased competition among ISPs have significantly reduced the economic barriers to
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 7,102
Life expectancy at birth (years) 74
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 78
Human development index (out of 179) 95
Rule of law (out of 211) 84
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 181
Democracy index (out of 167) 141 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 87
Internet users (percent of population) 27.5
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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Internet access. Tunisians for whom personal computers remain prohibitively ex-
pensive may access the Internet from more than 300 Internet cafés set up by the
authorities.13
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
In addition to filtering Web content, the government of Tunisia utilizes laws, regula-
tions, and surveillance to achieve strict control over the Internet.
For example, journalists have been prosecuted by Tunisia’s press code, which bans
offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the government per-
ceives as false news.14 The government also restricts the media by controlling the reg-
istration of print media and licensing of broadcasters, refusing permission to critical
outlets, and controlling the distribution of public sector advertisement.15 Journalists
are also charged in court with vague violations of the penal code.16
Online dissidents face severe punishment. For example, human rights lawyer
Mohamed Abbou was sentenced to three and a half years in prison in 2005 for publish-
ing on a banned Web site a report in which he accused the government of torturing
Tunisian prisoners.17
In a landmark legal case that challenged the Web-filtering regime in the country,
journalist and blogger Ziad El Heni filed a legal suit against the ATI for censoring the
social networking site Facebook.18 The Tunisian Union of Free Radio Stations and
the Unionist Freedoms and Rights Observatory joined El Heni in the lawsuit and called
for Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to testify.19 Facebook was blocked on
August 18, 2008, and then unblocked on September 2 at the Tunisian president’s
request.20 The Third District Court of Tunisia, however, dismissed the case in Novem-
ber 2008 without providing any explanation.21
In addition to being blocked in Tunisia, many opposition and dissident Web sites
and blogs have been targets of hacking attempts and, in some cases, successful content
removal and shutting down of servers.22 Although it is not clear who is behind these
cyber attacks, many Tunisian opposition leaders believe the government is responsi-
ble.23 For example, the independent news site Kalima (www.kalimatunisie.com) was
hacked into and shut down in October 2008. The eight-year Arabic and French
archives were completely destroyed. The Web site has been blocked since it was
launched in 2000. Its administrator accused the government of being responsible for
the attack because, as she told the Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘The only ones
who benefit from this attack are the authorities.’’24 She also stated, ‘‘I would not rule
out the possibility that this act was committed by the secret services, with the aid of
hackers or pirates based in Tunisia or abroad.’’ The Web-based newsletter Tunis News
(www.tunisnews.net) and a blog run by a judge (tunisiawatch.rsfblog.org) have been
subject to similar attacks.25
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Tunisia does not have specific laws that regulate online broadcasting. As a result, a
group of journalists exploited the lack of legal obstacles to broadcast on the Internet
and on December 10, 2007, launched Tunisia’s first Internet radio station, Radio 6, to
mark the 59th anniversary of the World Declaration of Human Rights.26
Web filtering in Tunisia is achieved through the use of a commercial software pro-
gram, SmartFilter, sold by the U.S.-based company Secure Computing. Since all fixed-
line Internet traffic passes through facilities controlled by ATI, the government is able
to load the software onto its servers and filter content consistently across Tunisia’s 11
ISPs. Tunisia purposefully hides its filtering from Internet users. SmartFilter is designed
to display a 403 error message when a user attempts to access a blocked Web site; the
Tunisian government has replaced this message with a standard 404 error message,
which gives no hint that the requested Web site is actively blocked.27
Surveillance
The Tunisian authorities practice various forms of Internet surveillance and request
that service providers such as Internet cafés become partners in controlling Internet
use. For example, the authorities monitor Internet cafés, instruct Internet users to
show identification before they can use the Internet in some regions, and hold Internet
café operators responsible by law for their clients’ online activities.
There is also technical surveillance, whereby downloading or adding attachments
to an e-mail must go through a central server. Under the pretext of protecting public
order and national security, a 1998 post and telecommunications law enables the
authorities to intercept and check the content of e-mail messages;28 in fact, electronic
surveillance such as the filtering of e-mail messages of government opponents has
been reported.29 Global Voices Advocacy director and Tunisian activist Sami Ben
Gharbia conducted a test from the Netherlands with two Tunisia-based activists, and
confirmed by logging on to their e-mail accounts from the Netherlands that what he
saw was not what the bloggers saw when they logged on from Tunisia, and that the
bloggers could not access some of the messages they received.30
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative carried out tests in Tunisia using the ISPs Planet Tunisie
and TopNet. Similar to 2006–2007 test results, 2008–2009 testing revealed pervasive
filtering of Web sites of political opposition groups such as the Democratic Forum for
Labor and Liberty (www.fdtl.org), Al-Nadha Movement (www.nahdha.info), Tunisian
Workers’ Communist Party (www.albadil.org), and Democratic Progressive Party
(pdpinfo.org).
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Also blocked were Web sites run by opposition figures such as activist Moncef Mar-
zouki (www.moncefmarzouki.net) and Web sites that contain oppositional news and
politics such as www.nawaat.org, www.perspectivestunisiennes.net, www.tunisnews
.com, and www.tunezine.com.
Web sites that publish oppositional articles by Tunisian journalists were also
blocked. For example, ONI verified the blocking of the French daily Libération in Febru-
ary 2007 because articles by Tunisian journalist Taoufik Ben Brik critical of President
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali appeared on its Web site.31
Also blocked are Web sites that criticize Tunisia’s human rights record. These include
the Web sites of Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org), Freedom House (www
.freedomhouse.org), Reporters Without Borders (www.rsf.org and www.rsf.fr), the
International Freedom of Expression eXchange (www.ifex.org), the Islamic Human
Rights Commission (www.ihrc.org), and the Arabic Network for Human Rights Infor-
mation (www.hrinfo.org). Although the home page of Human Rights Watch (HRW)
was accessible, the Arabic- and French-language versions of an HRW report on Internet
repression in Tunisia were blocked.
The prominent video sharing sites YouTube (www.youtube.com) and Dailymotion
(www.dailymotion.com) were found blocked, apparently because Tunisian activists
used them to disseminate content critical of the regime’s human rights practices. Inter-
estingly, the Web site of ONI (opennet.net) was blocked. Also blocked was the Web
site of Global Voices (www.globalvoicesonline.org), a nonprofit global citizens’ media
project. Most of the tested Web sites in the anonymizers and circumvention tools
category were blocked. These include Psiphon (psiphon.civisec.org), TOR (tor.eff.org),
Anonymizer (www.anonymizer.com), e-mail privacy service provider Stealth Message
(www.stealthmessage.com), Guardster (www.guardster.com), and JAP (anon.inf.tu
-dresden.de).
The filtering regime pervasively filters pornographic content, several gay and lesbian
information or dating pages, provocative attire, and several online translation services.
Also blocked were a few Web sites that criticize the Quran (www.thequran.com) and
Islam (www.islameyat.com). Although the small number of such sites indicates that
there is limited filtering of religious content in Tunisia.
Conclusion
Tunisia’s government continues to suppress critical speech and oppositional activity,
both in real space and in cyberspace. Unlike other states that employ filtering soft-
ware, Tunisia endeavors to conceal instances of filtering by supplying a fake error
page when a blocked Web site is requested. This technique makes filtering more
opaque and clouds users’ understanding of the boundaries of permissible content.
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Tunisia maintains a focused, effective system of Internet control that blends content
filtering with harsh laws to censor objectionable and politically threatening informa-
tion characteristic of second-generation controls.
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The government of the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) censors political and
religious content and pervasively fil-
ters Web sites that contain pornog-
raphy or relate to alcohol and drug
use, LGBT issues, or online dating or
gambling. Online privacy and circum-
vention tools, as well as some Web
sites belonging to Nazis or historical
revisionists, are also blocked. Addi-
tionally, legal controls limit free expression and behavior, restricting political
discourse and dissent online.
Background
The UAE is a federation of seven emirates formed in 1971 after independence from
Britain. Each emirate maintains a large degree of independence, and the UAE is gov-
erned by the Supreme Council of Rulers of the seven emirs of the emirates. Though
the UAE is one of the most liberal countries in the Gulf, it was until December 2006
the only state in the region not to have elected bodies.1
The UAE’s economy continues to grow, but civil society remains stagnant, and
human rights progress has been slow. Authorities have exerted censorship on a wide
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range of activists, impeding the kind of vigorous monitoring and reporting that can
draw attention to and help curb human rights abuses.2 Although the prime minister
decreed in 2007 that journalists should not face prison for ‘‘for reasons related to
their work,’’ current media laws allow for the imprisonment of journalists and sus-
pension of publication for publishing ‘‘materials that cause confusion among the
public.’’ The government monitors press content, and journalists routinely exercise
self-censorship.3
Though the emirate of Dubai has established itself as a regional and international
hub for media in which there is a media zone authority that allows 100 percent foreign
ownership and offers tax breaks, the Internet is filtered in this hub, as ONI test results
show, and there are reports of other forms of censorship.4 For example, Dubai author-
ities interrupted the broadcast of two Pakistani television stations, Geo News and Ary
One World, in November 2007. Geo News said the decision resulted from constant
pressure by Pervez Musharraf, then president of Pakistan, who had at the time im-
plemented a state of emergency in Pakistan.5 Dubai later allowed the two stations to
resume broadcasting following negotiations with the Pakistani government and Dubai
Media City.6
Internet in the UAE
According to a World Economic Forum report, the UAE continues to lead the Arab
world in the adoption of information and communication technology (ICT)7 and is
expected to spend about USD 3.3 billion on ICT hardware for schools, hospitals, and
other civil projects for the period 2008–2011.8
According to the Internet Telecommunication Union, Internet penetration in the
UAE has increased from 36 percent in 2006 to an estimated 65.2 percent in 2008.9
The Arab Advisors Group states account penetration to be at approximately 25 percent.
KEY INDICATORS
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 51,586
Life expectancy at birth (years) 79
Literacy rate (percent of people age 15þ) 90
Human development index (out of 179) 31
Rule of law (out of 211) 64
Voice and accountability (out of 209) 160
Democracy index (out of 167) 147 (Authoritarian regime)
Digital opportunity index (out of 181) 37
Internet users (percent of population) 65.2
Source by indicator: World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009a, UNDP 2008, World
Bank 2009b, World Bank 2009b, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, ITU 2007, ITU 2008.
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By the end of 2008, 11 percent of the total population had ADSL/broadband accounts.
By the end of October 2008, the ISP Etisalat’s ADSL accounts constituted around 36
percent of the operator’s total fixed lines.10
Etisalat remains the dominant telecom provider, but in the interests of competition
the UAE’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) facilitated the launch of
the Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company, named Du. Established in
2007, Du is an integrated telecommunications provider that offers voice, data, and
entertainment on mobile networks and converged broadband, television, and landline
services.11
Competition in the broadband Internet market is limited because the two ISPs still
do not share each other’s networks, and Du is unable to offer broadband Internet or
landline telephone services outside of a handful of property developments in Dubai
where it owns the physical telephone network.12 Because Etisalat has been the sole
telecom company for 30 years, it owns the national telephone network, based on
both copper-wire and new fiber-optic cables.13
Legal and Regulatory Framework
A new draft media law is expected to be issued in 2009. The highest regulatory media
organization in the UAE, the National Media Council (NMC), claims the draft law
provides unprecedented provisions that protect and promote freedom of expression in
the country. It also states that the draft law, ‘‘provides journalists freedom from coer-
cion to reveal sources, reflecting the government’s commitment to the journalistic
right to protect sources; in this particular regard, the pending law’s protection exceeds
that of many advanced democracies, including the United States.’’14
The pending law, passed by the Federal National Council in January 2009, was
rejected by the UAE Journalists Association because, according to the association’s
chairman, ‘‘It has nothing to do with the concept of media; it contains 45 articles
which don’t provide a proper description of the media’s duties and rights. Similarly,
there are 10 articles which talk about penalties and punishments.’’15
International advocacy groups have also expressed concerns over the draft law.
Human Rights Watch argues that the pending draft law unlawfully restricts free expres-
sion and will unduly interfere with the media’s ability to report on sensitive subjects,
and that it includes provisions that would grant the government virtually complete
control in deciding who is allowed to work as a journalist, as well as which media
organizations are allowed to operate in the country. Human Rights Watch further
states that while the new law contains some improvements over the draconian media
law currently in effect, it will continue to punish journalists for such infractions as
‘‘disparaging’’ government officials or publishing ‘‘misleading’’ news that ‘‘harms the
country’s economy.’’16
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The Committee to Protect Journalists has also expressed concern over the draft law
in a letter they sent to the president of the UAE urging him to reject the law in its
current form because, if passed, ‘‘it will negatively impact the state of press freedom in
the UAE.’’17
The telecommunication services in the UAE are regulated by the TRA, which was
established in 2003 by a federal law and is tasked with ensuring adequacy of tele-
communications services throughout the UAE and establishing and implementing a
regulatory and policy framework.18 The TRA is responsible for producing the Internet
Access Management (IAM) policy, which outlines prohibited online content categories
for ISPs. These categories include Internet tools for accessing blocked content, content
providing information on criminal skills and illegal drugs, content containing pornog-
raphy and nudity, gambling sites, Web sites for hacking and malicious codes, content
offensive to religions, phishing Internet sites, Internet content that downloads spy-
ware, Web sites providing unlicensed VoIP service, terrorism content, and prohibited
top-level domain,19 apparently a reference to the top-level domain of Israel (‘‘.il’’),
which is blocked in the UAE.
The UAE government has issued a federal law on combating cyber crimes. Cyber-
Crime Law No. 2 of 2006 considers any intentional act that abolishes, destroys, or
reveals secrets or that results in the republishing of personal or official information to
be a crime. Individuals may be imprisoned for using the Internet to defame Islamic
places of worship and traditions, insult any recognized religion, or promote ‘‘sinful
acts.’’ Anyone convicted of ‘‘transcending family principles and values’’ or setting up
a Web site for groups ‘‘calling for, facilitating, and promoting ideas in breach of the
general order and public decency’’ may be jailed.20
In August 2007, a court in the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah sentenced the creator of
Web site majan.net to one year in prison and a fine for defaming a local official. The
court also ordered the site to be shut down. In September, the same individual received
a five-month prison sentence and a fine in a second defamation case involving another
local official, but was released on bail at the end of September 2007. Two months later,
his two prison sentences were overturned by an appeals court after defamation com-
plaints were withdrawn by the officials. In the end, he received a one-year suspended
prison sentence after being convicted in a third defamation case.21
In April 2009, the chief of Dubai’s police force denied allegations that Dubai Police
had asked UAE’s Telecommunication Regulatory Authority to censor Web sites. In ear-
lier reports, the head of the Doha Media Freedom Center claimed that the Dubai Police
had developed a list of 500 keywords, by which access to certain Web sites would be
blocked.22 The police chief stated that the government did not attempt to censor Web
sites critical of the UAE, that the 500 search terms were designed to shield UAE Internet
users against pornographic content, and that they were proposed by the telecommuni-
cation regulators themselves, not the Dubai Police.23 This denial came shortly after
Dubai’s police chief called for the blocking of the video-sharing site YouTube because,
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he said, it contained religiously inappropriate content.24 YouTube and Google have
denied that they are engaged in plans to censor online content in the UAE.25
Although Etisalat and Du conform to the TRA policies by automatically blocking
Web sites that offer free VoIP services, individuals—including Internet café owners—
have found ways of getting around the ban by using the Internet to make cheap inter-
national calls. Violators have been prosecuted. For example, a police officer in the emi-
rate of Ras Al Khaimah warned several Internet café owners against the use of ‘‘illegal
calling cards’’ for making inexpensive international telephone calls. Several violating
cafés were referred to the police for investigation.26
Surveillance
The authorities have established committees and electronic surveillance departments
to monitor objectionable Internet activities. For example, a government committee
was established in March 2009 to monitor Internet cafés in order to ensure that Inter-
net connections in these cafés do not bypass filtering regimes set up by the two
national ISPs, as per the regulations of the TRA. This move was in response to specula-
tion that some Internet cafés provided unfiltered Internet connections using virtual
private networks (VPNs).27
In addition, an online surveillance team was set up by Dubai Police to carry out
around-the-clock checks on the Internet. The team, known as e-police, investigated a
total of 222 cases in 2008. The cases include 87 involving fraud and other financial
crimes, 38 cases of illegal hacking, and 92 cases of defamation and extortion. The elec-
tronic patrol team has set up special forums and used assumed names in an attempt to
collect information about potential criminal activity.28 This online surveillance depart-
ment announced in April 2009 that it managed to track down and later arrest women
who promoted their sexual services online and publicized their Dubai phone numbers
on Web sites. In addition, the surveillance team announced that it managed to track
down individuals who offered inexpensive illegal VoIP services from their apart-
ments.29
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative testing in 2008–2009 revealed that the UAE’s censors have
increased the scope and depth of Internet filtering.
One of the significant policy shifts that occurred during 2008–2009 testing is the im-
plementation of TRA-mandated filtering by the ISP Du, which used to offer unfettered
access to the Internet in the Dubai free zones, including Dubai Media City, Dubai
Internet City, and the residential areas affiliated with the free zones. Du began filtering
on April 14, 2008; 2008–2009 test results show that its filtering is almost as extensive
as that of the other national ISP, Etisalat, which has the lion’s share of the market.
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The two ISPs were found to block Web sites that express alternative political or
religious views. For example, in addition to blocking UAE prison (uaeprison.com), a
Web site hosting testimonials of former prisoners and critiques of the government’s
human rights practices, and the Web site of the U.S.-based Arab Times (arabtimes
.com), the ONI found that the censors blocked the Web site ‘‘Save Zack Shahin’’
(www.savezackshahin.com), an online campaign calling for the release of U.S. citizen
Zack Shahin from a UAE prison. The Web site encourages Americans to help him by
sending letters to members of Congress. Shahin is a former chief executive of a Dubai
property developer who in April 2009, together with a former UAE minister, was
charged with seizing public money and harming state interests.30
Another example is the blocking of the Web site UAE Torture (uaetorture.com),
which posted video clips that allegedly show a member of the UAE royal family tortur-
ing an Afghan businessman. The story drew the attention of international media such
as ABC31 and human rights advocates such as Human Rights Watch.32 Blocking of this
Web site has been inconsistent, however: it has been found to be accessible and inac-
cessible at different times.
The UAE’s censors are also apparently sensitive to content that is critical of the state
of the local economy or society. For example, censors blocked access to the Arabic UAE
blog Mujarad Ensan (mujarad-ensan.maktoobblog.com) in October 2008, a few days
after the anonymous blogger published a post sarcastically entitled, ‘‘Laugh with Me
and Say: Our Economy Is in a Good Condition.’’ In the text of the blog post, he accused
the UAE government of lacking transparency when dealing with the U.S. financial
crisis and the local papers of lying about the real status of the local economy. The
writer also accused government-owned real estate companies of publishing exagger-
ated information about business deals to create the impression that the local economy
had not been negatively affected by the U.S. financial crisis. The ONI monitored access
to the blog and found that it became accessible a few days later for unknown reasons.
Another example is the blocking of the blog Secret Dubai Diary (secretdubai
.blogspot.com), which was also found blocked in 2006–2007 testing. Apparently, this
blog was blocked because it offers a critical review of social life in the UAE.
Similar to 2006–2007 testing results, several Web sites presenting unorthodox
perspectives on Islam (thequran.com, islamreview.com, secularislam.org) were blocked,
along with a handful of Web sites promoting minority faiths (albrhan.org, ansarweb
.net). Among the few Web sites considered ‘‘extremist’’ that are filtered in the UAE
are hinduunity.org, which advocates Hindu solidarity and resistance to Islam, and
kahanetzadak.com, a Web site devoted to the founder of the militant Jewish Defense
League.
Testing conducted in 2008–2009 showed that censors have expanded filtering in
these categories to include previously accessible Web sites such as the presumably
UAE-based atheist blogs Ben Kerishan (benkerishan.blogspot.com), The Land of
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Sands (thelandofsands.com), and Ben Short (benshort.blogspot.com). Also blocked are
Wikipedia pages that contain information about religiously sensitive content such as
Fitna, a film produced by Dutch politician Geert Wilders and considered by many to
be offensive to Islam, and the Wikipedia page about the Islamic prophet Muhammad,
possibly because the page displays drawings of the Prophet.
In March 2009, censors blocked access to the Web site Ahmed and Salim
(ahmedandsalim.com), an Israeli Web site that posted video episodes considered offen-
sive to Arabs and Muslims.33 The UAE also blocked access to the YouTube links where
the video clips appeared. The UAE’s TRA ordered the blocking of the Web site and the
YouTube links only a few days after the content appeared online, apparently because,
in addition to the content perceived as offensive to Islam, one of the characters was
dressed in traditional Gulf attire and the UAE flag appeared in several scenes.34
Interestingly, several Web sites on Nazism, Holocaust denial, and historical revision-
ism were blocked. These include the Web site hitler.org and that of the Institute for
Historical Review’s publishing arm (www.noontidepress.com). Also blocked was the
Web site vdare.com, which is often described as carrying anti-Semitic content. Mean-
while, the state continues to deny access to all Web sites on the Israeli country code
top-level domain ‘‘.il.’’
Testing done in 2008–2009 also revealed that UAE filters still target social net-
working sites, video- and photo-sharing sites, bookmarking services, and blogging ser-
vices. However, filtering of these Web sites has not been consistent. For example,
Livejournal.com, a free service for blogging, was blocked in the UAE in June 2008,
apparently because it was categorized as a dating site in the database of Secure Com-
puting, a commercial filtering product. The UAE uses SmartFilter, a product of Secure
Computing, to block access to various content categories including dating, pornogra-
phy, sex, and gambling.35 Access was restored a few weeks later.
Similar to 2006–2007 testing results, 2008–2009 testing revealed pervasive filtering
of pornographic and LGBT content. The 2008–2009 results also revealed blocking of
previously accessible Arabic forums, which are commonly used to facilitate the ex-
change of Arabic sexually explicit content.
Compared to 2006–2007 testing, fewer Web sites relating to sexual health education
were found to be blocked. For example, previously filtered Web sites such as circumci-
sion.org and sexualhealth.com were found accessible, though others in the same cate-
gories are still blocked. Some Web sites containing provocative attire (lingerie.com)
were still filtered. Web sites promoting alcohol and drug use or facilitating online
gambling or dating were also blocked in large numbers, and many Arabic-language
dating sites or Web sites that target Arabic users (e.g., www.arablounge.com,
www.gaymiddleeast.com/country/uaemirates.htm) have been added to the blacklist.
Nudity, even if in an artistic context and nonerotic, is censored (an example is the
Arabic magazine www.jasadmag.com).
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Internet tools, including those which facilitate hacking (e.g., thesecretlist.com),
anonymizers (e.g., anonymizer.com), and translation tools (Google Web site translator,
not the text translator), remain substantially filtered. Similarly, numerous VoIP sites
(Skype.com, www.pc2call.com) were still blocked in accordance with the national ban
on such applications.
In October 2006, the UAE unblocked access to social networking and multimedia
sharing sites, including YouTube.com, Flickr.com, Metacafe.com, and MySpace.com.
However, sections of these Web sites containing objectionable material remain
unavailable. The photo-sharing site Flickr (Flickr.com) was later blocked entirely.
Conclusion
The UAE continues to prevent its citizens from accessing a significant amount of Inter-
net content spanning a variety of topics. Though the vast majority of Web sites filtered
are those deemed obscene in some way, a select few political Web sites are blocked, as
are some pertaining to Nazis, Holocaust denial, and historical revisionism. The entire
‘‘.il’’ top-level domain continues to be blocked as well, which is more indicative of the
UAE’s opposition to the state of Israel than to the content.
Additionally, the state has extended its filtering scheme to the Dubai free zones,
which previously enjoyed unfettered Internet access, and has increased the depth of
technical filtering, blocking more Web sites across broader categories.
The UAE employs SmartFilter software to block content related to nudity, sex, dat-
ing, gambling, the occult, religious conversion, and drugs. Web sites pertaining to
anonymizer tools, hacking, translation tools (as these have been used as proxies), and
VoIP applications are also filtered in this manner.
Lastly, there are government efforts to monitor Internet activities in public Internet
cafés to ensure that connections provided there do not bypass national filtering. Elec-
tronic surveillance to monitor objectionable online activities is publically acknowl-
edged by the authorities.
Notes
1. BBC News, ‘‘Country Profile: United Arab Emirates,’’ August 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/middle_east/country_profiles/737620.stm.
2. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘United Arab Emirates: Events of 2007,’’ http://hrw.org/englishwr2k8/
docs/2008/01/31/uae17622.htm.
3. Ibid.
4. BBC News, ‘‘Country Profile: United Arab Emirates,’’ August 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/middle_east/country_profiles/737620.stm.
596 United Arab Emirates
5. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Dubai Urged to Reverse Decision, Taken under Pressure from
Musharraf, to Suspend Broadcasting by Two Pakistani TV Stations,’’ November 17, 2007, http://
www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24415.
6. Lynne Roberts, ‘‘Pakistan TV to Resume Dubai Broadcasts,’’ Arabian Business, November 19,
2007, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/504302-pakistan-tv-to-resume-dubai-broadcasts.
7. Tom Gara, ‘‘UAE Leads Region in IT, Says Report,’’ The National, April 16, 2009, http://www
.thenational.ae/article/20090416/BUSINESS/448045865/-1/ART.
8. Khaleej Times, ‘‘UAE Will Spend $3.3b in IT and Communications,’’ March 19, 2009, http://
www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?col=&section=business&xfile=data/business/2009/
March/business_March818.xml.
9. International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ‘‘Internet Indicators: Subscribers, Users, and
Broadband Subscribers,’’ 2008, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx
?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechnologyPublic&RP_intYear=2008&RP_intLanguageID=1.
10. Arab Advisors Group, ‘‘Cementing Its Stance as the Arab World’s Internet Leader, the UAE’s
ADSL Penetration Reached around 11% by End of 2008,’’ March 16, 2009, http://www.arabadvisors
.com/Pressers/presser-160309.htm-1.
11. UAE Interact, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Yearbook 2007: Infrastructure,’’ http://www.uaeinteract
.com/uaeint_misc/pdf_2008/English_2008/eyb6.pdf.
12. Tom Gara, ‘‘Du Relies on Network Sharing to Compete,’’ The National, April 24, 2009, http://
www.thenational.ae/article/20090425/BUSINESS/704249787/1005.
13. Ibid.
14. Gulf News, ‘‘UAE National Media Council Welcomes All Debates on Draft Media Law,’’ April
13, 2009, http://www.gulfnews.com/nation/Media/10303708.html.
15. Alia Al Theeb, ‘‘Draft Media Law: Journalists ‘Will Insist on Changes,’ ’’ Gulf News, April 28,
2009, http://www.gulfnews.com/nation/Media/10308566.html.
16. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘UAE: Media Law Undermines Free Expression,’’ April 13, 2009, http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/13/uae-media-law-undermines-free-expression.
17. Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘CPJ Concerned about UAE Draft Media Law,’’ March 9,
2009, http://cpj.org/2009/03/cpj-concerned-about-uae-draft-media-law.php.
18. Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA), http://www.tra.org.ae.
19. Internet Access Management (IAM) policy, http://www.etisalat.ae/assets/document/
blockcontent.pdf.
20. Gulf News, ‘‘UAE Cyber Crimes Law,’’ November 2, 2007, http://archive.gulfnews.com/uae/
uaessentials/more_stories/10018507.html; Cyber-Crime Law No. 2 of 2006, Articles 15, 16, and 20.
21. Amnesty International, ‘‘UAE—Amnesty International Report 2008,’’ http://www.amnesty
.org/en/region/uae/report-2008.
United Arab Emirates 597
22. Gulf News, ‘‘Dahi Dismisses Web Policing Allegations,’’ April 23, 2009, http://archive.gulf-
news.com/articles/09/04/24/10307260.html.
23. Ahmed Shaaban, ‘‘Police ‘Play No Role’ in Censorship: Tamim,’’ Khaleej Times, April 25, 2009,
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=/data/theuae/2009/April/theuae_April599
.xml&section=theuae.
24. Khaleej Times, ‘‘Call to Blank Out YouTube in Emirates Too,’’ March 10, 2009, http://www
.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?col=&section=theuae&xfile=data/theuae/2009/March/
theuae_March239.xml.
25. Ahmed Shaaban, ‘‘Police ‘Play No Role’ in Censorship: Tamim,’’ Khaleej Times, April 25, 2009,
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=/data/theuae/2009/April/theuae_April599
.xml&section=theuae.
26. Asma Ali Zain and Sebugwaawo Ismail, ‘‘Cyber Cafes Work around the Ban to Provide VoIP
Services,’’ Khaleej Times, April 2, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile
=data/theuae/2008/April/theuae_April39.xml&section=theuae&col=.
27. The National, ‘‘Shisha and Internet Cafes Scrutinised,’’ March 8, 2009, http://www.thenational
.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090308/NATIONAL/113439722/-1/NEWS.
28. Andy Sambidge, ‘‘Dubai’s e-Police Probe 222 Internet Crime Cases,’’ Arabian Business, October
30, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/536556-dubais-e-police-probe-222-internet-crime-cases.
29. Emaratalyoum, ‘‘Esabah takhtalis almukalamat aldawliyah wa fatayat yorawijna lilda’ara’’ [Inter-
net gangs steal international calls, girls market their sex services online], April 15, 2009, http://
www.emaratalyoum.com/articles/2009/4/pages/14042009/04152009_4a6c7e4ba0894c5bb31-
fe02a74c60295.aspx.
30. WAM, ‘‘Dubai Attorney General Refers Suspects in Deyaar Case to Courts,’’ April 8, 2009,
http://www.wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1238851046552&p
=1135099400124&pagename=WAM%2FWamLocEnews%2FW-T-LEN-FullNews.
31. Vic Walter, Rehab El-Buri, Angela Hill, and Brian Ross, ‘‘ABC News Exclusive: Torture Tape
Implicates UAE Royal Sheikh,’’ ABC News, April 22, 2009, http://www.abcnews.go.com/Blotter/
story?id=7402099&page=1.
32. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘UAE: Prosecute Torture by Royal Family Member,’’ April 28, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/28/uae-prosecute-torture-royal-family-member.
33. OpenNet Initiative Blog, ‘‘Middle East Countries Continue to Censor Content Deemed
Offensive to Muslims,’’ March 1, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/03/middle-east-countries-
continue-censor-content-deemed-offensive-muslims.
34. Ibid.
35. OpenNet Initiative Blog ‘‘A Blind-Date with the Censors in UAE,’’ June 20, 2008, http://
opennet.net/blog/2008/06/a-blind-date-with-censors-uae.
598 United Arab Emirates
Glossary of Technical Terms
2G is the second generation of telecommunication technology for mobile networking.
3G is the third generation of telecommunication technology for mobile networking.
403 (403 Forbidden) is the standard HTTP error code that occurs when a server will not allow a
Web browser to access the file being requested.
404 (404 Not Found ) is the standard HTTP error code that occurs when a server cannot find the
file being requested.
ADSL (asymmetric digital subscriber line) is a technology that allows data to be sent over existing
copper telephone lines.
Bandwidth is the amount of data that can flow in a given time.
Block page is the page delivered to the user when a request for a Web site is filtered, or blocked.
Block pages take many forms and may be disguised as benign error pages or may bear the ISP’s
logo and further explanation of the block.
CCTV (closed circuit television) is the use of video cameras to transmit video from a specific place
to a limited set of monitors. Signals for CCTV are not openly transmitted.
Circumvention refers to the general concept of using proxies and other tools to bypass Internet
filtering.
Deep packet inspection is a form of computer network packet filtering that examines the data
part (and possibly also the header) of a packet as it passes an inspection point, searching for pro-
tocol noncompliance, viruses, spam, intrusions, or predefined criteria to decide if the packet can
pass or if it needs to be routed to a different destination, or for the purpose of collecting statistical
information.
DNS (domain name system) is a hierarchical naming system for computers, services, or any re-
source participating in the Internet.
DNS tampering (domain name system tampering) is a method of blocking communication by pre-
venting the conversion of domain names into IP addresses, effectively blocking access to the
requested site.
Domain name is a label identifying a specific computer, service, or resource on the Internet.
DoS attack (denial of service attack) is an attempt to prevent users from accessing a specific com-
puter resource, such as a Web site. DoS attacks (sometimes called DDoS, or distributed denial of
service, attacks) usually involve overwhelming the targeted computer with requests so that it is
no longer able to communicate with its intended users.
DSL (digital subscriber line) is a family of technologies that provides digital data transmission over
existing telephone wires.
EDGE (Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution) also known as EGPRS or Enhanced GPRS is a GSM
extension that improves data transmission rates by up to three times their original speed.
GB (gigabyte) is a unit of digital information storage equal to 109 (1,000,000,000) bytes. However,
this term is also often used to mean 1,0243 (1,073,741,824 bytes).
GPRS (general packet radio service) is service for mobile devices that divides data into packets for
transmission purposes. It can be used with 2G and 3G wireless telephone technology operating
on the GSM standard.
GPS (Global Positioning System) is a free global navigation satellite system that is used for both
military and civilian purposes.
GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) is a digital mobile phone standard used by as
much as 80 percent of the global market. Its widespread use enables international roaming among
different mobile phone operators.
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) is a set of standards for exchanging text, images, sound, and
video by means of the Internet.
HTTP proxy filtering blocks communication on the basis of the specific HTTP address or URL
being requested.
ICP (Internet Cache Protocol) is a set of rules used to coordinate Web caches (places where dupli-
cations of online data are temporarily stored, enabling faster access and reducing bandwidth).
ICP (Internet content provider) is an online service provider that creates or provides informational,
educational, or entertainment content.
ICT (information and communication technology) is an umbrella term that includes all technologies
intended for the manipulation and communication of information.
IP address (Internet protocol address) is a numerical identification assigned to devices participating
in a computer network utilizing the Internet Protocol.
ISP (Internet service provider) is a company that provides users with access to the Internet.
IT (Information technology) describes the use of computers, computer software, and other commu-
nications technologies to create and manage information.
IXP (Internet exchange point) is a shared facility that allows ISPs to exchange traffic with one
another through free, mutual peering agreements.
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KB (kilobyte) is a unit of digital information storage equal to either 1,000 bytes (103) or 1,024
bytes (210), depending on context.
Kbps (kilobits per second ) is a measure of bandwidth on a data transmission medium.
LGBT is an acronym that refers to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community. Some-
times used to refer to anyone who is nonheterosexual.
MB (megabyte) is a unit of digital information storage equal to 106 (1,000,000) bytes.
MP3 (MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3) is a digital audio encoding format that compresses audio data by a
factor of 12 without losing noticeable sound quality.
P2P (peer-to-peer) is a computer network that uses diverse connectivity between participants in
a network and the cumulative bandwidth of network participants rather than conventional cen-
tralized resources where a relatively low number of servers provide the core value to a service or
application.
Portal
1 if Web portal: is an online interface that allows Internet users to collect and view information
(e-mail, weather, stock prices, etc.) from various sources in a visually unified way.
1 if Intranet portal: is a single network-specific hub that provides unified access to information
and applications, often for a private company or organization.
Proxy (also Proxy server) is a server that acts as a go-between for clients (such as Web browsers
or other applications) and other servers. Proxy servers enable anonymous online activity and in-
crease access speed through caching.
Reverse filtering (also known as Geolocational Filtering) is a practice that occurs on the Web
server hosting the content, as opposed to at a point along the way of the traffic flow, and is based
on restricting requests based on geographical location of the originating Internet Protocol address.
Copyright holders who want to restrict access to their content in certain markets often use reverse
filtering. Examples include hulu.com, BBC.com, and other sites that syndicate commercial video
and audio content that is subject to licensing.
SMS (short message service), also known as text message, is a communication service standardized
in the GSM mobile communication system, allowing the exchange of short text messages between
mobile devices.
Social networking sites are Web services that focus on communities of users with shared inter-
ests. Popular examples include Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and Orkut.
TB (terabyte) is a unit of digital information storage equal to 1 trillion (1012) bytes, or 1,000
gigabytes.
TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) is the set of standards governing data
transmission over the Internet.
TCP/IP content filtering blocks communication on the basis of where packets of data are going
to or coming from, and not on what they contain.
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TCP/IP header filtering blocks communication on the basis of the IP address and/or the port
number (which gives clues as to the type of Web service being accessed) contained in the header
of the data packet being sent.
Top-level domain the group of letters (usually two or three, but can include more) that follow
the final dot in a domain name. Example: in opennet.net, the top-level domain is .net.
URL (Uniform Resource Locator) is a string of characters that specify where a particular resource is
located online and how to retrieve it. Also known as a Web address.
User ID (User Identification) is a unique string of characters that identifies users of password-
protected online services, such as e-mail or social networking sites.
VCD (Video Compact Disc) is a digital compression standard that enables the storage of video on a
Compact Disc.
VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) is a technology that allows for voice communication over the
Internet.
WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) is a global standard for the transfer of information without
using electrical conduits (wires). It allows for access to the Internet using mobile devices.
Warez (derived from the plural of ‘‘ware,’’ as in software) refers to copyrighted material that is
distributed in violation of copyright law.
White Hat a person who attempts to infiltrate information technology systems or networks in
order to expose weaknesses so they can be corrected by the systems’ owners. Also known as an
ethical hacker.
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